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1.  Introduction 
1.1.  Context 
The first decade of this century saw the international community declare the Millenni-
um Development Goals (MDGs), which have symbolized international aid efforts ever 
since. Along with this declaration of intent came pledges to not only increase the 
volumes of aid, but even more importantly to improve its effectiveness through better 
management and delivery. The OECD-hosted Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
(WP-EFF) organized a series of High Level Forums in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), 
Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) and put aid effectiveness and ways of fostering it at 
the top of the international aid agenda (Tujan 2011: 340). The declarations made at 
these meetings influence our understanding of how good development co-operation 
should look today, they shape ideas and practices “that constitute the field of devel-
opment cooperation” (Ruckert 2008: 96).  
As the international community approaches the 2015 end-date of the MDGs, debates 
at the UN level on a prospective new, post-2015, development agenda have intensi-
fied. Inextricably linked to the discussions on a revised goal-set are financial consider-
ations over the types of resources that public and private actors should provide in 
support of the international development policies, possibly including more general 
global concerns such as climate change, migration and others. These questions are 
linked to the OECD-wide discussions on the future conceptualization and measure-
ment of Official Development Assistance (ODA) – a central concept that due to inter 
alia the ‘embellishment’ of reported flows by certain donors has lost some of its ap-
peal over the years.  
In light of the changes to be expected in both international development policy and 
finance, this study inquires into the field of soft loan financing – a means of interven-
tion that has so far remained largely outside the realm of academic research. By spe-
cifically investigating the historical genesis of soft loan instruments as well as current 
potential transformational forces, both de jure tied and formally untied forms of financ-
ing are examined from the perspective of development policy.  
For decades soft loans have formed part of foreign trade and development finance 
policies in most DAC donor countries. These have been widely used to finance ex-
ports and investment projects in richer developing countries and were mainly tied to 
procurement of goods and services in the donor country. Throughout the 1980ies 
concerns grew that these concessional credits were used as a backdoor subsidiza-
tion of national industries. Tied soft loans have thus been successively brought under 
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regulation through the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits as part of 
the OECD’s export promotion framework, the latter aiming at the elimination of trade 
distorting practices.  
In spite of these institutional roots in the export promotion field, tied soft loans claim a 
place amongst not only the instruments of development finance, but of official devel-
opment assistance. Donors justify the legitimacy of their respective programs, while 
being in contradiction with the OECD’s liberal trade philosophy, through postulated 
development goals and highlight the leverage effect of mixing public and commercial 
funds. As a result of the Arrangement’s disciplines, tied soft loans are mainly used to 
finance commercially non-viable projects in public sectors, such as health, water and 
sanitation, education or infrastructure. The resulting focus on the provision of public 
goods which are considered to be key to development gives tied soft loans their as-
sumed development relevance. Given the officially stated motivation of contributing to 
economic development and welfare in developing countries and complying with the 
25 % grant element threshold set by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
the concessional part of a tied soft loan becomes ODA-eligible and contributes to a 
donor’s overall ODA performance. 
The described status between export promotion and development policy makes tied 
soft loans subject to tensions stemming from the polyvalent interests of the actors 
involved. Whether the ambitious aim of achieving dual goals with a single instrument 
leads to efficiency losses with regard to the achievement of both goals remains largely 
unaddressed in official statements of the programs. However, following Jan Tinbergen, 
who demonstrated that each policy goal needed its own policy to be efficiently 
achieved (Tinbergen 1986: 14), this assumption behind tied aid programs requires 
profound examination.  
Recent debates on aid and development effectiveness – as they are reflected in the 
Declarations of DAC High Level Meetings in Paris, Accra and Busan – are closely 
intertwined with a formal consensus on the untying of aid as well as the call for Policy 
Coherence for Development (PCD). Hence, part of the ideas of what encompasses 
sound development policies is a widely recognized consensus among the DAC mem-
bers that “… removing the legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for aid 
funded procurement … generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transac-
tion costs and improving the ability of recipient countries to set their own course. 
It also allows donors to take greater care in aligning their aid programmes with the 
objectives and financial management systems of recipient countries” 1.  
In light of these developments, the defining features of tied soft loans need to be 
critically examined. The latter have increasingly come under pressure to justify their 
very existence, which has pushed several OECD countries to either end their tied soft 
                                                            
1  OECD/DAC: http://www.oecd.org/dac/untied-aid/untyingaidtherighttochoose.htm; emphasis added 
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loan schemes (mainly mixed credits), untie these or at least evaluate their programs 
(Clay et al. 2009). The first part of this study provides a conceptual analysis of the 
international design of tied soft loans in the context of recent debates on an overhaul 
of the concept of ODA and on development finance more generally. The emphasis lies 
on the question of the extent to which the Arrangement of Officially Supported Export 
Credits, which gives tied soft loans their basic design, is in line with today’s political 
framework for the OECD’s development policy. Based on an analysis of the genealo-
gy of the rules governing tied aid credits2, this hybrid instrument and its potential 
relevance for development policy will be assessed along the DAC’s standards and 
guidelines.  
In the second main part of this study, after having considered the international frame-
work for traditional tied soft loans, attention is shifted to the differences in implementa-
tion at the national scale. This appears necessary for at least two reasons: 1) Actually, 
the international regulatory framework leaves considerable room for maneuver to the 
national implementing agencies, in particular with regard to the development orienta-
tion of the institutional setting as well as of potential projects. 2) Over time new forms 
of soft loan financing have been practiced, which are not covered by the existing 
framework, mainly because they are de jure not conditional upon the procurement of 
goods and services from the donor country. While tied soft loan programs had been in 
place in the majority of OECD countries up to the late 1980ies/early 1990ies, the 
programs and their successors have evolved into different directions over the past 
two decades, particularly since the adoption of the tied aid disciplines under the Hel-
sinki Package of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. As a result 
profound analysis of national implementation strategies of Arrangement terms and 
analogous programs is required in order to substantiate and potentially differentiate 
the findings derived from the international institutional and regulatory framework. For 
this purpose, the second part of this study is dedicated to analyzing and comparing 
soft loan programs (and one grant facility respectively) of four selected OECD donor 
countries with regard to their development orientation.  
1.2.  Research Questions and Aim 
The overall research aim is to assess the relevance of soft loans as an instrument of 
development policy and finance, respectively, by means of a comparative analysis of 
soft loan programs of four OECD donor countries. Due to the hybrid nature of tied 
soft loans, corresponding policies draw on two fields of reference – export promotion 
and development policy – and claim to bridge these. In PART II of this study, the 
emphasis will be put on examining the coherence of tied soft loans in their basic de-
sign (i.e. the tied aid disciplines of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
                                                            
2  “Tied aid credit“ is the terminus technicus used in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export  
Credits.  
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Credits) with the reference field of development policy or more precisely, the DAC’s 
guidelines and principles for development policy. PART III aims at an analysis of the 
extent to which development “safeguards” are built into the design and practice of 
national soft loan policies in four European donor countries. On the basis of the case 
study analyses, the programs will be compared with regard to their development 
orientation. Ultimately, possible future scenarios for the development of the field of 
soft loan financing shall be inquired in the context of the dynamically changing interna-
tional politico-economic landscape.  
The main research question and sub-questions of the study are: 
(1) To which extent are development policy aspects integrated into the design of 
soft loan policies at the international level, particularly in the Arrangement on 
Officially Supported Export Credits? Are tied soft loans consistent with the 
OECD’s standards and principles for development policy? 
1.1. Which role did development policy aspects and interests play in the his-
torical genesis of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits 
in general and its tied aid disciplines in particular?  
1.2. To what extent are the resulting tied aid disciplines, which give tied soft 
loans their basic design, coherent with the OECD’s standards and guide-
lines for development policy? 
(2) To which extent and in which ways are development policy aspects integrated 
into national soft loan programs in selected OECD countries? 
2.1. How are development policy aspects articulated in the institutional set-up, 
decision-making processes, project evaluation procedures as well as 
transparency and accountability principles of the national soft loan pro-
grams? 
2.2. Which commonalities and differences exist between national soft loan 
programs in particular with regard to program characteristics and objec-
tives, institutional arrangements and development orientation?  
The relevance of this study inter alia lies in the importance of bringing transparency 
into the field of tied soft loans, which have been widely neglected by academic re-
search so far. It is to be understood as a door-opener, laying the scientific foundations 
for further in-depth research. Also, against the background of the untying targets 
agreed upon by the “international development community” – or rather the member 
states of the DAC – this study makes a valuable contribution in that it examines one 
important element of the tying toolkit, namely tied soft loans. While other forms of tied 
aid, especially tied food aid – as such exempted from the DAC Untying Recommenda-
tion –, have received considerable academic attention, tied soft loans remain largely 
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below the academic radar. So far, many questions on the development orientation of 
tied soft loans as well as of untied successor programs in some countries have re-
mained unanswered by the existing literature. 
1.3.  Methodology  
The study adopted an applied approach aiming at gathering policy relevant findings 
with regard to the development orientation of soft loan financing. Overall, a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative methods was chosen to collect and interpret data stem-
ming from a variety of sources, both primary and secondary. Apart from the analysis of 
the existing academic literature, the study relies on primary sources, such as official 
and policy documents, homepage content, OECD archive footage as well as tran-
scripts of expert interviews. Likewise, statistical data analyzed were extracted from 
different sources, including the Participants’ notification system (archive footage), the 
DAC’s aid statistics databases as well as national statistical databases in the case 
study countries.  
1.3.1.  Desk Research and Literature Review 
In a first step, information on soft loan financing at both the international and the na-
tional level was gained – to the extent available – by means of extensive desk re-
search. In particular, the conceptual framework analyzed in Chapter 3 of this study 
draws on literature analysis of OECD publications, NGO reports and the existing 
academic literature.  
Yet, when doing some first research in (digital) libraries and relevant journals in order 
to get an overview of the state of research on (tied) soft loans, we were puzzled to 
find only very little academic literature: some OECD publications on the occasion of 
the Arrangement's anniversaries (OECD 1998, 2008, 2011b), a few academic papers 
dealing with export credits thereby briefly touching upon tied aid credits (Evans 2003; 
Hall 2011; Levit 2004; Moravcsik 1989; Morrissey 1998; Rosefsky 1993) and some 
books, the majority of which were written by (former) OECD representatives and none 
of which were available in Austrian Libraries. Therefore, a review of the academic 
literature on tied soft loans in general and even more so from a development perspec-
tive provided unsatisfying results. 
By far the most comprehensive publication on the genesis of tied soft loans is John 
Ray’s book “Managing Official Export Credits: The Quest for a Global Regime”, pub-
lished in 1995. This contribution is insightful in the full sense of the word – John Ray 
headed the Division of Financing and Other Export Questions in the Trade Directorate 
(today Trade and Agriculture Directorate) of the OECD and provides the reader with 
observations made from inside the organization. 
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In line with the wide neglect of tied soft loans by academia, there are only few relevant 
publications on tied soft loans in Austria. The most notable contribution concerning 
the topic in question is a study commissioned by the Oesterreichische Kontrollbank 
(OeKB) and conducted by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) in 
1992 (Bayer/Stankovsky/Url). A follow-up study was done by Url (2003), which has 
not been publicly released. Both studies take the perspective of national donor indus-
tries and their situation regarding competitiveness. Furthermore, there are some indi-
vidual diploma theses available, which approach the issue from a donor economic 
angle (Handrich 1992) and provide a case study of an Austrian company using soft 
loan finance (Egger 1997). A more recent diploma thesis focuses on the treatment of 
environmental aspects in project assessment by the Austrian Export Credit Agency 
(OeKB) (Breuss 2005).  
In contrast, the academic literature dealing with the incentives for and consequences 
of tying aid is rather extensive, but one-sided3. Most authors dealing with tied aid in 
general (and not tied soft loans in particular) are neoclassical economists who make 
use of macro-economic modelling to show the overall welfare-loss in the tied com-
pared to the untied scenario (Jepma 1991; also Chilchiniski 1983; Bhagwati et al. 
1983; Kemp/Kojima 1985; Schweinberger 1990; Jepma 1991; Hatzipanayotou/ 
Michael 1995; Lahiri/Raimondos 1995; Brakman/van Marrewijk 1995; all quoted in 
Clay et al. 2008). Explanations for ODA allocation from a microeconomic perspective 
are given by Michaelowa (1998), for instance. 
With the exception of some publications in the wake of the 2001 Untying Recom-
mendation (e.g., Arrowsmith/La Chimia 20094; La Chimia 2004; Petermann 2013), 
there seems to have been peaceful silence surrounding the issue of tied soft loans 
since around 2000. While large projects supported by traditional export credits have 
repeatedly been caught in the crossfire of NGO criticism for their negative environ-
mental and societal impacts, tied soft loans have largely been neglected by civil socie-
ty. In contrast to, or maybe as a result of, the limited academic and civil society inter-
est in tying practices, the OECD itself has published several reports on the issue.  
As the conceptual first part of this study was in the process of being finalized, Jan-
Henrik Petermann's dissertation “Between Export Promotion and Poverty Reduction” 
(2013) was published by Springer publishing. Although not specifically focusing on 
tied soft loans, he investigates the “foreign economic policy of untying Official Devel-
opment Assistance” in general. The almost 500-page publication shows the relevance 
of the research topic and illustrates the timeliness of studying tying practices.  
                                                            
3 
 Jan-Henrik Petermann’s review of key literature comes to similar conclusions (Petermann 2013: 38-41). 
The author states that political science has so far largely neglected the (un)tying issue (ibid.: 39).  
4  Arrowsmith/La Chimia (2009), for instance, explore the possibility of integrating untying or rather anti-tying 
provisions into the legal EU and WTO frameworks governing public procurmenet (see also Petermann 
2013: 38).  
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Astonishingly, the academic literature on the OECD itself has also proved to be lim-
ited and was not very helpful in identifying, for instance, power (im)balances between 
different Directorates (in this case the Trade and Agriculture Directorate and the De-
velopment Co-operation Directorate respectively) and groups subordinate to them. 
Literature on the very functioning of the Organization reaching beyond a mere descrip-
tion such as given in official OECD publications would have been useful in under-
standing the dynamics between the two divisions being researched. This lack of aca-
demic literature on the OECD is even the more puzzling considering the Organiza-
tion’s political influence as well as in light of one of its fundamental pillars: transparen-
cy. Similarly, Jakobi and Martens (2010c: 269) say: “In fact, the organization is prob-
ably most prominently known for the data it produces despite the fact that we know 
little about how it is produced”.  
Although the OECD produces vast amounts of data that are widely cited and used, 
surprisingly, only little is known about how this data is produced in the first place. The 
DAC and its ODA statistics figure as prominent examples for this discrepancy be-
tween being a “knowledge producer” on the one hand and being the subject of re-
search on the other hand. Practically the entire donor community relies on publica-
tions and statistical records produced by the DAC, but hardly any academic literature 
has so far dealt with the inner workings of the DAC, asking about dynamics behind 
drafting DAC policies, or how in-and outside influences and “ideological motivations” 
are shaping them. Some of the few publications on the OECD in general, touching 
also upon the DAC, are the books/volumes by Mahon/McBride (2008), Martens/ 
Jakobi (2010a), and Woodward (2009). 
The lack of relevant literature was challenging at various stages of the research pro-
ject and unfortunately did not always allow for cross-checking of statements gained 
from interviews and comparing them with findings in the established literature. Closing 
these considerable gaps lies beyond the scope of this study. However, this study sets 
itself the modest goal of at least identifying relevant future research topics on the 
OECD that could considerably enhance our understanding of the processes shaping 
policy outcomes, e.g. in the form of OECD recommendations and their (potential) 
transfer into national policies.  
In addition to the unsatisfying situation concerning the literature, initial research was 
made difficult by incoherent wording, insufficient differentiation between “traditional” 
export credits and tied soft loans and loopholes in statistical recording due to the 
legal frameworks (or political calculus) in certain countries. Accordingly, the findings 
presented in this study have to be interpreted in light of these constraints.  
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1.3.2.  Field Research 
Data on the international framework was mainly gathered in June/July 2012. During a 
research stay in Paris, the OECD archives were consulted and expert interviews were 
conducted. Information for the case study analyses, including field-visits to Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands, were collected between September and December 
2013. Changes which have occurred in the meantime are considered only to a limited 
extent in this study.  
While the conceptual framework analyzed in Chapter 3 of this study mainly draws on 
literature analysis of OECD publications, NGO reports and academic literature, the 
subsequent chapters of Part II follow a historical approach borrowing from both doc-
ument and qualitative content analyses (see Mayring 2004: 266-270). From a histori-
cal vantage point it becomes possible to see the interlinkages between the two fields 
of reference, which have shaped the design of tied soft loans over the past decades. 
Essentially, this constitutes an attempt to understand the concerns that have driven 
the actions of the two main groups regulating tied aid credits – the Participants Group 
and the DAC. By combining the findings of this document analysis with the expert 
interviews with OECD officials, who dealt in one way or another with tied aid financ-
ing, development policy aspects in the Arrangement will be assessed and DAC posi-
tions on the issue over time will be examined.  
Expert Interviews 
In view of the limited academic literature on soft loans in general and tied aid credits in 
particular, expert interviews appeared to be an appropriate method of collecting in-
formation on the instrument and a way of entering the complex interface of export 
promotion and development policy. With the help of (semi-structured) expert inter-
views information was gained on both the genesis and status quo of tied soft loan 
policies and the national implementation practices in the case study countries. Fur-
thermore, interviews provided an insight into the interviewees’ perception of the use-
fulness of soft loans as an instrument of development policy. In order to get a com-
prehensive picture of soft loan financing, experts with varying institutional back-
grounds were selected. With regard to the export promotion and development policy 
perspective a balanced choice of the interview partners was made. Interviews with 
employees of governmental institutions, financial organizations, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and academia in the case study countries were at the core of 
the methodological mix applied in Part III of this study.  
All interview extracts have been made anonymous. In order to distinguish statements 
taken from different interviews, numerical codes have been attributed, i.e. Interview I, 
II, A1, A2, etc. Where critical for the interpretation of the quote, the institutional back-
ground of the respective interview partner is mentioned to place the statement in its 
   19  13 
respective context (Flick 2009: 140). A list of all interview partners is provided in the 
Annex. 
Collection and Analysis of OECD Archive Footage  
As briefly mentioned above, Part II of the study relies heavily on OECD archive foot-
age in order to properly and comprehensively address the first set of research ques-
tions. 
“… Archive sources are an important, and all too often neglected, source of useful 
information about development processes and practice, the evolution of and shifts 
in policy formulation, debates amongst development practitioners and analysts, and 
so on. Archives can provide what a reliance on contemporary-focused documents 
and other participatory research methods can sometimes leave out: the long-term 
context of a particular programme or policy“ (Jennings 2006: 241; emphasis add-
ed). 
By considering the main research goals of Part II of finding out about the role of de-
velopment aspects and motivations in the genealogy and the contemporary design of 
tied soft loans, analyzing documents from the OECD archives appeared to be the 
most valuable method, despite the heavy workload associated with the processing of 
the collected documents. Furthermore, as tied soft loans are subject to “rule sets” of 
two separate groups linked to different degrees to the OECD’s Trade and Agriculture 
Directorate and Development Co-operation Directorate, respectively, analyzing archive 
material was expected to “… break down the image of the organization as monolith-
ic entity and reveal the divisions and contested notions that lie at the heart of institu-
tions“ (Jennings 2006: 249). This leads Jennings to conclude that “the archive 
reaches into the inner most sanctums where dissent, debate and discussion 
exist. The archive allows the private voice to emerge from behind the public face“ 
(Jennings 2006: 244; emphasis added).  
Following this role attributed to archive documents, the analysis of the retrieved files 
was expected to give an insight into the interests and political dynamics that have 
shaped today’s regulatory framework for tied soft loans. It needs to be considered as 
an attempt to de- and subsequently reconstruct the existing set of rules, which is 
understood as the result of long-lasting and difficult negotiations between different 
interest groups.  
Documents from the years 1978 to 2005 were retrieved, in hope that this would allow 
us to trace tied soft loans back to their roots and to assess the role of development 
aspects in their evolution. Furthermore, special attention was paid to the period im-
mediately before and after the adoption of the so-called Helsinki Package in 1992 up 
to the release of the first Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid in 1996. Prior research had 
demonstrated that these were the major innovations in the regulatory framework with 
regard to potential development content of the rule set. Content wise, the research 
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was restricted to the work of three major bodies: the Export Credit Group (ECG), the 
DAC Working Party for Financial Aspects of Development Assistance (DAC/FA) and 
the Participants Group (PG). This selection was made on the basis of prior knowledge 
of the institutional setting gained through both, OECD publications and first inter-
views. Documents prior to 1990/1991 were stored on microfiche and retrieved from 
the archives staff on our request. These were skim read in the archives and directly 
scanned. Due to time constraints, a first sorting out of documents available on micro-
fiche was done already in the archives by reviewing the agenda of the respective 
meetings. Consequently, no claims to completeness5 are made. From 1991 onwards 
OECD documents have been digitalized, which made the research process easier 
and allowed to proceed via word search functions in OLIS and retrieve the relevant 
documents electronically. Put in place in 1990 (see DAC/FA/M(90)1(Prov.): 4), 
OLISnet6 provides the possibility of searching with the help of key words and key 
word chains such as “tied aid credits – development”. Following this first step, which 
allowed us to gain an overview of the main topics discussed within both the Partici-
pants Group and the DAC/FA, documents were selected on grounds of their ex-
pected explanatory power. To a certain extent, a “gather as much as possible” philos-
ophy was followed because returning to the archives at a later stage of the research 
was not an option. The flip-side of this strategy was that the great amount of material 
retrieved considerably complicated the subsequent analysis and interpretation.  
Initially, more than 1500 documents of three groups – the DAC Working Party on 
Financial Aspects of Development Assistance (DAC/FA), the Export Credit Group 
(ECG) and the Participants Group (PG) – were retrieved. A first screening of the 
documents as well as hints by interviewees, however, resulted in putting the research 
focus on the Participants Group and the DAC/FA, largely leaving aside parallel dis-
cussions in the ECG.  
All of the documents retrieved follow, to varying degrees, the purpose of documenting 
discussion processes and outputs within the respective groups and are not per se 
produced for an “external” audience. The fact that they are rather “inward-bound” is 
reflected in the highly technical language used. Wolff argues that “a major part of 
official documents … are intended only for a defined circle of legitimate or involved 
recipients” (Wolff 2004: 284). This idea is reflected in classification levels attributed 
also to OECD documents. This means that they are categorized according to their 
                                                            
5  Furthermore discussions within other Working Parties or groups, for instance, the Development 
Committee Task Force on Non-Concessional Flows, touching upon the borderline of export and tied aid 
credits were not considered in our analysis.  
6  OLIS is “a restricted online portal providing remote access to committee information and discussion 
groups where they can mingle with the secretariat and their counterparts abroad” (Woodward 2009:53). 
According to the OECD homepage, “national delegates use OLIS to interact with the Secretariat in 
preparation for Committee meetings. Other policymakers use the service to research the OECD infor-
mation banks – including publications, statistics, document archive and committee work-in-progress”. 
For further information on OLIS please see http://www.oecd.org/general/olis.htm  
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degree of “confidentiality”. Classification levels of documents range from “secret” 
ones, which are strictly confidential and accessible only for members of the respective 
group, to “unclassified official” documents, which can be accessed by the wider pub-
lic either by searching the archives in case of microfiche documents or on the OECD 
database7 in the case of digitalized documents. In between, there lies a range of “con-
fidential” and “restricted” documents. With the exception of documents classified 
“secret”, the classification level attributed to documents changes over time. After a 
period of seven years, OECD documents can be accessed for research purposes. As 
a result of these regulations, most documents used here date back to the year 2005 
and prior. After 2005 only official documents were accessible. Notably, these classifi-
cation policies seriously restricted the availability of statistical information on project 
notifications made by the Participants. In addition, a considerable number of docu-
ments from Participants’ meetings that we requested have been held confidential to 
the present day and, therefore, could not be retrieved – a peculiarity of the Partici-
pants Group. It needs to be kept in mind that the documents used hereafter constitute 
only pieces of the puzzle. The lack of information on contextual circumstances, a char-
acteristic of most of the documents, combined with the very specific use of wording, 
which had been developed by groups of experts in a very specialized field and which 
were not streamlined across groups, represented a major challenge to interpreting 
them.  
The extensive amount of archive material consisting mainly of Aide-Memoires, Chair-
man Proposals and Notes by the Secretariat were coded and analyzed with the help 
of Atlas.ti, a QDA software that supports qualitative data analysis and is especially 
suited to process large amounts of data. 
Choice of Case Study Countries 
As part of a comparative case study analysis the soft loan policies and programs of 
Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands are assessed with regard to their 
development orientation. The selection of the case studies is based on the following 
three main criteria: 
Criterion 1:  European financiers with large funding volumes (Austria, France, 
Germany, Spain, the Netherlands) 
Criterion 2:  Open economies that pursue export-oriented policies (Austria, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Germany) 
Criterion 3:  States that are generally considered pioneers in the field of develop-
ment assistance (the Netherlands and Denmark) 
                                                            
7  The OECD database of official documents can be accessed at http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/  
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By assessing the three criteria we opted for a sample of the following four countries: 
Austria (1,2), Denmark (2,3), the Netherlands (1,2,3), Germany (1,2). 
As part of its export promotion policies, Austria – a small and open economy – offers 
tied soft loan financing in accordance with the Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits. Prevailing low interest rates as well as the current split of competenc-
es have triggered discussions on the future of this hybrid instrument. The latter are 
taken as a point of departure for an inquiry into the functioning of the soft loan system 
in place. Denmark is amongst the countries with a proven commitment to develop-
ment cooperation. In addition, it is a country that shares some characteristics with 
Austria (small, export-oriented economy), which makes it particularly interesting from 
an Austrian perspective to learn about the Danish policies in the field of soft loan 
financing. The Netherlands – a small and open economy as well – constitute a peculi-
ar case in the chosen sample. The comparability of macroeconomic indicators and the 
country’s export orientation notwithstanding, the Dutch programs differ in two essen-
tial characteristics: they are provided in grant form and they are in their majority offi-
cially untied. Furthermore, the Dutch development finance system currently is under 
reconstruction, possibly indicating one conceivable avenue for developments in the 
field of soft loan financing more generally. Due to the country’s economic and political 
weight in Europe, Germany figures as an important point of reference in economic 
and development policy discourse (especially so for small open economies such as 
Austria). Thus, its chosen path of providing de jure untied soft loan financing is well 
worth studying. Furthermore, recent criticisms voiced by DAC peers with regard to 
Germany’s reporting of loans as ODA and the associated debate about 
“concessionality in character” gave further relevance to an assessment of German 
Financial Cooperation.  
Notably, as a result of their partially de jure untied character not all of the programs 
analyzed fall within the scope of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits. In this respect, the choice of case studies encompasses a variety of institu-
tional arrangements and reflects the heterogeneity prevalent in the field of soft loan 
and concessional financing.  
1.4.  Structure of the Publication 
This study consists roughly of four parts, combing explorative with analytical chapters.  
In PART I, which comprises Chapter 1 and 2, key terminology is defined and the 
foundations for the subsequent analysis are laid.  
PART II – Chapter 3 to 8 – turns to the historical evolution and institutional structure 
of tied aid in general and of tied soft loans in particular. The latter will be traced back 
to their roots in the export credit race of the early 1980ies. This will allow to grasp the 
deep linkages of the instrument with traditional export credits and the initial aim of 
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gaining competitive advantage for domestic companies via tied aid practices. It is only 
in the light of these early motivations and the resulting concern about trade distortion 
that the contemporary set of rules governing (tied) soft loan financing can be under-
stood. Looking back at the history of tied soft loans will demonstrate that at the inter-
national level they have been designed from a liberal economics’ perspective striving 
first and foremost to eliminate trade distortions. In parallel, this part aims at exploring 
the role and influence of the DAC in the making of today’s rules governing tied soft 
loans and the resulting indications of development aspects in the Arrangement on 
Officially Supported Export Credits. After the statistical analysis of the evolution and 
geographical as well as sectoral distribution of tied soft loan flows (notifications), the 
compatibility of the existing rule set with principles of development cooperation as 
stipulated by the DAC will be assessed.  
Following this inquiry into the international framework which gives tied soft loans their 
basic design, in PART III, comprising Chapter 9 to 13, the implementation of and 
deviations from these international guidelines at the national level will be examined. 
For that purpose, soft loan policies of four European donor countries (Austria, Den-
mark, Germany and the Netherlands) will be analyzed and the development orientation 
of the respective programs will be assessed. In the analysis of the respective case 
studies, attention will be given above all to the extent to which development policy 
actors are involved and development aspects are considered at both institutional and 
policy levels as well as in the implementation of programs, i.e. to the level of project 
selection and approval.  
PART IV – Chapter 14 and 15 – will provide a comparative analysis of the case stud-
ies with regard to their development orientation and will present the main conclusions 
of the study. Ultimately, taking recent developments in the wider context of interna-
tional development finance into account, potential future scenarios for the field of soft 
loan financing will be explored. 
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2. Preparing the Grounds:  
Definition of Key Terminology 
“Words mean what I say they mean” 
(The Red Queen, Alice in Wonderland; quoted in Raffer 1998: 1) 
Today’s development finance reaches far beyond the Cold War image of aid, which 
could be described as one of wealthy northern states transferring aid flows either 
directly or via multilateral channels to southern developing countries, and has come to 
encompass a myriad of private and public actors not necessarily divided along the 
north-south line. While Official Development Assistance (ODA), both bilateral and 
multilateral, still holds a prominent position in the field of development finance, in-
creasingly claims have been made that other and more innovative forms of financing 
for development are needed if profound changes are to occur in the international 
system (Atkinson 2004; Ketkar/Ratha 2009; OECD 2005: 30). Despite the acknowl-
edgement of the fact that ODA constitutes only one component of the broader field of 
development finance, as a result of its research questions this study will focus on 
official bilateral aid flows. Soft loans claim their place not only among the instruments 
of development finance but of official development assistance. As a result the criteria 
established by the DAC for determining official development assistance as well as the 
development policy standards set at the OECD level constitute the most appropriate 
tangible benchmark against which tied soft loans can be assessed.  
The fact that tied soft loans, or the concessional element thereof, are eligible as Offi-
cial Development Assistance, is the most visible sign and direct link between the two 
sets of goals united in this policy instrument and illustrates the instrument’s position 
in-between two policy areas – export promotion and development policy. In a first 
step, this chapter thus defines the concept of Official Development Assistance. In a 
subsequent step, a working definition of “tied aid credit” and “tied soft loan” will be 
given and its relation to other key terms, namely “soft loan” and “associated financing” 
will be explained. 
2.1. The Concept of Official Development Assistance  
Understanding the concept of Official Development Assistance and the way the ODA 
numbers, which give the concept its political meaning, are produced is critical for any 
analysis of the relevance of tied aid credits as an instrument of development policy. 
Clearly, accounting modalities do frame behavior and the resulting numbers are used 
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not only by academics and evaluation bodies to discuss aid effectiveness (Severino 
2010: 128, 129), but they also build the basis for international targets, such as the 
0.7 % of gross national income (GNI) target, which considerably shape today’s devel-
opment discourse. According to Renard and Cassimon (2001: 1) this “political im-
portance of statistics makes them … liable to efforts at ‘embellishment’ “.  
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was created in 1961 as a separate 
institutional branch within the OECD and was given the mandate to “[…] perform the 
core functions of research and coordination among member states in the field of 
international development” (Petermann 2013: 211). The DAC is responsible for the 
formulation of quality standards and the sharpening of definitions of various types of 
Official Development Assistance. Its Secretariat manages statistical reporting on aid 
commitments and disbursements and provides scientific analyses of development 
issues, recommendations for national policy making, monitoring and evaluation. An 
essential instrument of mutual monitoring used by the Committee is the so-called peer 
review process. Furthermore, as early as in 1962 the so-called “OECD Development 
Center” was created to supplement the exchange of views and foster debate between 
various stakeholders (Petermann 2013: 211).  
The DAC is not only one of the main driving powers of international development 
discourse, but also dominates international development co-operation in quantitative 
term. Its 22 member states plus the European Commission make for approximately 90 
to 95 % of all ODA allocated worldwide (Petermann 2013: 211; Ruckert 2008: 100). 
The core measurement used to describe a country’s commitment to international 
development is the share of national income devoted to ODA, ODA as percentage of 
GNI. 
Since its inception in 1961, it has been one of the main tasks of the committee to 
measure resource flows to developing countries, both concessional and non- or low-
concessional ones, stemming from public and private sources. In view of the general 
mandate of the DAC, special attention, however, has been given to the official and 
concessional part of these flows, labeled Official Development Assistance, in short 
ODA8. ODA was first defined in 1969, when the older concept of “Official Flows” was 
separated into two new categories: Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
Other Official Flows (OOF). These common roots of what is known today as OOF 
and ODA will be important in the context of tied aid credits. In 1972, the definition of 
ODA was slightly revised, when the minimum grant element was increased from 20 to 
25 %. Ever since, both the basic criteria as well as the method of computation have 
remained unchanged (Ray 1995: 59 et seqq.).  
                                                            
8 
 In the DAC’s usage of the term, ODA is largely synonymous to “aid”, whereas in the Participants’ wording 
“aid” refers to official state support, regardless of whether it comes from the aid budget and is ODA re-
portable or not. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
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In short, Official Development Assistance comprises grants or loans to developing 
countries and territories defined by the DAC List of ODA Recipients. These grants or 
loans are carried out by the official sector (official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or their executive agencies). The main objectives of ODA transactions 
are the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries. 
They are provided at concessional financial terms, which means that they have to 
convey a “minimum grant element of 25 percent and be concessional in character” 
(DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1: 11; emphasis added).  
The concept of ODA has become the “[…] key measure used in practically all aid 
targets and assessments of aid performance”9. The DAC’s “double monopoly on data 
production and performance evaluation”, to speak in Raffer’s terminology, has hardly 
ever been seriously challenged10 (Raffer 1998: 2). The political importance attached to 
the concept is probably most prominently illustrated by the self-obliged target of the 
international donor community of investing 0.7 % of GNI in development assistance to 
be met by 2015. Understanding the nature of the ODA concept, which has become 
far more than a statistical term, is thus crucial if one wants to follow basically any 
debate on development co-operation, be it at the national, regional or international 
level.  
The DAC defines ODA the following way: 
“[T]hose flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to 
multilateral institutions which are: 
(i) provided by official agencies including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies; and 
(ii) each transaction of which: 
a. is administered with the promotion of the economic development and wel-
fare of developing countries as its main objective; and 
b. is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 
per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” 11 
The conditions subsumed in criterion (i) of the above definition are rather straightfor-
ward and compliance therewith is relatively easy to assess. Likewise the Statistical 
Reporting Directives provide a list of ODA eligible multilateral organization and inter-
                                                            
9  OECD/DAC: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
10  Alternative approaches to measuring aid flows have been proposed, for instance, by Chang et al. (1999) 
(World Bank) in form of the so-called Effective Development Assistance. This idea is also investigated by 
Cassimon/Renard 2001. Furthermore, the Center for Global Development (cgdev) produces on a yearly 
basis the so-called Commitment to Development Index (CDI) as an alternative measurement. “The index 
rates governments on aid, trade, investment, migration, environment, security, and technology, and aver-
ages the seven for an overall score”. For further information please see the homepage of the Center, 
http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index 
11  OECD/DAC, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
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national Non-Governmental Organizations in the annex. Furthermore, the OECD lists 
developing countries and territories which are eligible as recipients of ODA. The DAC 
categorizes countries in four groups according to their gross national income (GNI) 
per capita in USD. The current list, last updated in 201112, defines countries or territo-
ries with per capita incomes below USD 12.275 (in 2010) as potential ODA recipi-
ents (OECD/DAC 2012a). 
In contrast to these rather clear-cut criteria on the eligibility of recipient countries or 
institutions, the criteria defining the eligibility of the transaction/flow itself (above sub-
sumed under (ii)) are ambiguous and require further examination. While this section 
has demonstrated where flows must go to in order to qualify as ODA, it will now be 
shown which flows are reportable. 
2.1.1. Economic Welfare and Development as the Main Objective 
This criterion which rests on underlying motivations and intentions is often the deci-
sive one in determining the ODA-eligibility of a transaction and is informally also re-
ferred to as “motivational test” (Consultation Meeting X). In order to ensure that the 
decision is not merely subjective and “arbitrary” certain additional criteria were adopt-
ed, for instance, military aid is excluded, assistance to refugees, in contrast, is report-
able (OECD/DAC 200813). Despite these clear-cut limits on ODA, the criterion comes 
down to a matter of intention and thus leaves broad discretionary powers to decide 
whether a transaction is administered with contributing to the development of the 
recipient as main objective. In particular, the official definition does not give any guid-
ance on how to proceed in the case of multiple officially stated goals as in the case of 
tied aid credits. For the time being, it appears that the institutional framework is used 
as a proxy of the motivation for making a transaction. Thus, it is likely to depend on the 
mandate of the agency administering the flow, whether the latter is considered to be 
trade/commercially or aid/developmentally motivated (Consultation Meeting X).  
2.1.2. Concessional in Character and a Minimum Grant Element of 25 % 
Criterion ii) b) of the DAC’s ODA definition states that a transaction must be “conces-
sional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at 
a rate of discount of 10 per cent)“ (OECD/DAC 2008). 
The rationale underpinning the concept of ODA is that it should reflect a donor’s 
budgetary effort “in favour of a developing country” (OECD/DAC 2008). The DAC 
approach is based on a calculation of the “opportunity costs to donors of using funds 
for aid loans as opposed to other uses, e.g. domestic investment” (DCD/DAC/FA 
                                                            
12  Currently, some DAC members have increasingly expressed their interest in discussing the possibility of a 
revision of the DAC’s list of ODA eligible countries and territories. See for instance OECD/DAC 2014.  
13  For the whole list excluded/reportable activities, please see the factsheet, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf 
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(2002)2: 3). Thus, the grant element “[…] is not intended to reflect any measure of 
the benefit to recipients, for instance, compared to other financial sources” 
(DCD/DAC/FA(2002)2: 4, original emphasis). This budgetary effort is to be assessed 
with the help of the grant element calculation.  
The grant element measures the “softness” of a loan and reflects three factors: the 
interest rate, grace period (the interval from the commitment date of the loan to the 
date of the first payment of amortization), and maturity (interval from the commitment 
date to the date of the last payment)14. It is defined by the DAC as the “difference 
between face value of the loan and the present value of the stream of repayments on 
that loan ..., expressed as a percentage of the face value” (Kuhn et al. 1995: 36). 
The present value of the borrower’s payments is calculated on the basis of a uniform 
10 % discount rate, applied to all currencies (DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1: 9 et seqq.). 
Both the 25 % grant element threshold as well as the 10 % discount rate were rec-
ommended by the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assis-
tance and adopted at the DAC High Level Meeting in 1972 as part of a Recommen-
dation on Terms and Conditions of Aid (DCD/DAC/FA(2002)2: 2). In the DAC Glos-
sary it is explained that the 10 % discount rate15 “… was selected as a proxy for the 
marginal efficiency of the domestic investment, i.e. as an indication of the oppor-
tunity cost to the donor16 of making the funds available. Thus, the grant element is 
nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 percent; it is 100 per cent for a grant; and 
it lies between these two limits for a soft loan”17. 
Today, with long-term interest rates in most OECD member countries well below 
10 %, attaining the 25 % grant element has become much easier (OECD/DAC 
2008). Therefore, it is increasingly being questioned whether the required grant ele-
ment presently calculated automatically ensures that flows are also “concessional in 
character” – as such being the third ODA-eligibility criterion mentioned in the above 
definition, but not benchmarked and hence difficult to assess. Not only have external 
observers increasingly drawn attention to the potential erosion of the ODA concept 
(for instance Chang et al. 1999; Raffer 1998; Renard/Cassimon 2001; Vanheukelom 
et al. 2012), but also critical voices have been raised from within the DAC. In April 
2013 an open letter by Richard Manning, former DAC Chairman, was published in the 
Financial Times, in which he sharply criticized the DAC’s practice of recording loans 
by saying: "The OECD is now quietly allowing large volumes of loans to be counted 
as ODA even though they do not meet any reasonable definition of being 
                                                            
14  DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm 
15  Analysis of the archive documents has shown that the choice of the appropriate discount rate has repeat-
edly been accompanied by discussions among the members of the DAC (see, for instance 
DAC/FA/M(82)(Prov.); DAC/FA(86)12); DCD/DAC/2002)4; DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1). 
16  This very assumption of the discount rate being an appropriate proxy for the opportunity cost to the donor 
also requires critical examination.  
17  DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm; emphasis added 
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'concessional in character', which is the basis of the OECD's definition of aid" 
(Manning 201318). Implicitly he criticizes those donors which argue that not only sub-
sidized loans can be reported as concessional, but any loan given on more favorable 
terms than what the developing country could get on the market. Hereby, it is irrele-
vant whether this entails a budgetary effort of the donor (see also the reaction of Jon 
Lomoy, Director of the DCD-DAC to the letter by Richard Manning19). 
Furthermore, Richard Manning urges to rethink the underlying discount rate and calls 
for a revision of the “definition of concessionality that reflects the real cost of capital 
and requires real fiscal effort” (Manning 2013). In a similar vein the DAC Working 
Party on Statistical Aspects (WP-STAT) is currently investigating the issue20. One way 
of bringing the budgetary effort reflected in the grant element closer to the character-
istic of “concessional in character” would be to adopt the Participants’ method of 
computing their concessionality level on the basis of a market-based discount rate, 
the so-called DDR. This rate represents “a proxy for the funding cost to the donor for 
making the funds available” (DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1: 2).  
The concept of ODA as it is defined today – based motivations and built on 
concessionality – as well as its shortcomings will be crucial for the subsequent analy-
sis of the developmental relevance and potential effectiveness of tied aid credits as an 
instrument of development policy.  
2.2. Measures to Express Concessionality of a Loan:  
Grant Element vs. Concessionality Level 
The grant element used by the DAC and the concessionality level applied by the 
Participants Group are two different measures to demonstrate the “softness” of a 
credit. Both measures reflect the same financial terms, i.e. the interest rate, maturity, 
and grace period of a commitment. The method to calculate the grant element and the 
concessionality level is the same. The difference lies in the discount rate applied. The 
DAC applies a fixed discount rate of 10 % for the calculation of the grant element, 
which was selected as “[…] a proxy for the marginal efficiency of domestic invest-
ment i.e., as an indication of the opportunity cost to the donor of making the funds 
available” (DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1: 2). The Participants use a market-based 
                                                            
18  Manning goes as far as to suggest that the UN should take the lead in measuring international conces-
sional flows, should the OECD not undertake the necessary steps to improve its statistics and regain 
credibility. The letter can be accessed under http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3d73884-a056-11e2-
88b6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2U1AjIUfN. Following Manning’s letter the Guardian published an article 
with the title “The Value of Aid Overstated” see http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013 
/apr/30/ aid-overstated-donors-interest-payments?INTCMP=SRCH 
19  For Lomoy’s article “Yes, it is time to revisit the concept of development assistance”, see 
http://insightsblog.oecdcode.org/?p=5554 
20  See for instance the draft paper “Benchmarking Concessionality in Character: Draft Report, 
DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)20/DRAFT 
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discount rate, the so-called Differential Discount Rate (DDR) to calculate the 
concessionality level. The rate represents “[…] a proxy for the funding cost to the 
donor for making the funds available” (DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1: 2). 
The method to calculate the grant element as well as the concessionality level is as 
follows: 
 
grant element = the concessionality level =  
(nominal value of the loan – repayments at present value)
 
nominal value of the loan 
The grant element and the concessionality level are expressed as the percentage of 
the nominal value of the loan, calculated by subtracting the present value of all ex-
pected future repayments, using a discount rate of 10 % (grant element) or the DDR 
(concessionality level), from the nominal value of the credit.  
The present value of repayments is calculated as follows:  
present value  = 
future value 
(1+d)
t
 
The higher the discount rate, the lower the present value of future repayments. There-
fore, if the DDR is lower than 10 %, the grant element is higher than the 
concessionality level. Based on an example published by the DAC in 2012 
(DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1) the difference between the two measures using a 
fictitious loan will be demonstrated.  
Example: Grant element vs. concessionality level  
Table 1 and Table 2 are based on a fictitious loan with the same financial terms. The 
loan of 1000 units is committed and disbursed on the same day and has a credit 
period of 7 years. Its interest rate is 2.5 % p.a. and the grace period is 4 years. Re-
payments are made in equal installments every year as from year 4.  
This example demonstrates that the discount rate applied assumes a decisive role in 
determining the concessional element or softness of a loan. In the given example the 
DAC’s grant element is calculated at 31 % and the Participants’ concessionality level 
at 7 % for the same financial terms. In extreme cases when the DDR which is based 
on current interest rates is very low, a grant element with a value of 25 % translates 
into a negative concessionality level.  
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Table 1:  Calculation of the Grant Element Using a 10 % Discount Rate 
Period 
(year) 
Principal 
outstanding
Principal
payment Interest
Total future 
payments
(1+d)
t
d = 10 %
Present value 
of future 
 payments 
1 1000.00 - 25.00 25.00 1.10 22.73 
2 1000.00 - 25.00 25.00 1.21 20.66 
3 1000.00 - 25.00 25.00 1.77 14.11 
4 1000.00 250.00 25.00 275.00 1.46 187.83 
5 750.00 250.00 18.75 268.75 1.61 166.87 
6 500.00 250.00 12.50 262.50 1.77 148.17 
7 250.00 250.00 6.25 256.25 1.95 131.50 
         
      Sum 691.87 
Source: The example is based on DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1 
Grant element = (1000 – 691.87) / 1000 = 31 % 
Table 2:  Calculation of the Concessionality Level Using a 4 % Discount Rate  
Period 
(year) 
Principal 
outstanding
Principal
payment Interest
Total future 
payments
(1+d)
t
d = 4 %
Present value 
of future 
payments 
1 1000.00 - 25.00 25.00 1.04 24.04 
2 1000.00 - 25.00 25.00 1.08 23.11 
3 1000.00 - 25.00 25.00 1.12 22.22 
4 1000.00 250.00 25.00 275.00 1.17 235.07 
5 750.00 250.00 18.75 268.75 1.22 220.89 
6 500.00 250.00 12.50 26250 1.27 207.46 
7 250.00 250.00 6.25 256.25 1.32 194.73 
         
      Sum 927.53 
Source: The example is based on DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1 
Concessionality level = (1000 – 927.53) / 1000 = 7 % 
Before turning to the analysis of the international framework regulating tied aid credits, 
some further clarifications on terminology have to be made. The next sub-chapter will 
break the ODA definition down to the concrete level of instruments and flows and 
explain the basic mechanisms of tied aid financing. 
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2.3. Soft Loans, Tied Aid Credits, Associated Financing:  
Almost the Same but not Quite?  
"As Confucius told the Prince of Wei some 25 centuries ago,  
confused and diffuse definitions produce incoherent policies" 
(Ray 1995: 5) 
Weak definitions and inconsistent terminology used by the Participants Group and the 
DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance (DAC/FA), 
posed serious challenges at various stages of this research project. In order to avoid 
misunderstandings resulting from incoherent wording, this section provides a working 
definition of “tied aid credit” and explores its relation to other key terms such as soft 
loan, associated financing and mixed credit. In addition, the DAC’s definitions of the 
core categories “tied” “partially (un)tied” and “untied” will be explained.  
“Soft loan” can be considered a superordinate term for both tied aid credit and asso-
ciated financing. The term “soft loan” per se has a very broad scope and designates 
any credit, the financial terms of which are more favorable than what the market would 
offer. They are considered to be soft because the credit is granted at concessional 
terms, that is, for instance, at lower interest rates (compared to market interest rates), 
with extended repayment periods or granting grace periods. In this broad definition 
any concessional credit can be subsumed under “soft loan”, hence the term alone 
does not give any indication of the donor or recipient institution involved or the geo-
graphical situation (i.e. at home or abroad) – the sole defining criteria are the financial 
terms (Handrich 1992: 30, 31). Also the term per se does not allow to draw conclu-
sions on the tying status of the loan.  
Confusingly, the same term is also used in a much narrower sense. In the Austrian 
case, for instance, the term “soft loan” refers to the so-called “Rahmen-II-Kredite”, 
which essentially correspond with the definition of the Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits of tied aid credits (see Box 1). In this particular case, the 
term “soft loan” is used largely interchangeably with “tied aid credit”, with a clear 
preference in official material21 for the former over the later.  
The main definition of tied aid credits, as used hereafter, is provided by the minimum 
conditions laid down in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. 
Throughout this study the terms tied aid credits and tied soft loans are used synony-
mously, the former being the terminus technicus which is predominant in official doc-
uments at the OECD level. Following the Arrangement’s eligibility criteria for tied aid, 
the so-called Helsinki tied aid disciplines, tied aid credits can broadly be defined as 
follows:  
                                                            
21  See, for instance, the section on soft loans on the homepage of the OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/export-
services/financing/soft-loans/pages/default.aspx 
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In short, they are tied to procurement in the donor countries, contain an element of 
aid, i.e. official support and are provided as credits, requiring – as opposed to grants 
– repayment of debt. In a more sophisticated definition, tied aid credits might be de-
fined as official, state supported credits that are tied to the procurement of goods and 
services in the donor country, contain a concessionality level22 of at least 35 % or 
50 %, which in principle is ODA eligible, and can be used to finance commercially 
non-viable projects in a limited pool of recipient countries. In order to assess the eligi-
bility of a project for tied aid the Arrangement introduces the following two key tests: 
 “whether the project is financially non-viable, i.e. does the project lack capacity 
with appropriate pricing determined on market principles, to generate cash flow 
sufficient to cover the project's operating costs and to service the capital em-
ployed, i.e. the first key test; or 
 whether it is reasonable to conclude, based on communication with other Partic-
ipants, that it is unlikely that the project can be financed on market or Arrange-
ment terms, i.e. the second key test” (TAD/PG(2013)1: 21). 
Box 1: Basic Characteristics of a Tied Aid Credit 
 concessional long-term credit 
 conveys a minimum concessionality level of 35 or 50 % if the recipient is an LDC 
 is tied to procurement of goods and services in the donor country 
 project is commercially non-viable 
 limited pool of recipients (countries with a GNI p.a. below the upper limit for lower  
middle income countries according to World Bank data) 
(TAD/PG(2013)1) 
As a result of the minimum criteria and common characteristics (mainly the commer-
cial non-viability) tied aid credits are especially used to finance large infrastructure 
projects that would not be undertaken on market terms, mainly in economically 
stronger developing countries that are expected to have sufficient debt repayment 
capacity and are commercially attractive for exporters. The definition of commercial 
non-viability such as stated in the Helsinki Package can be understood as a reaction 
to situations of market failures23 and entails that primarily public sector projects which 
are thought to contribute to the improvement of economic welfare and thus to the 
                                                            
22  Just as the grant element, the concessionality level assesses the “softness” of a credit and reflects its 
financial terms i.e. the interest rate, maturity, and grace period of a commitment. While the basic method 
of computation is the same as in the case of the grant element, the uses discount rate is different. Unlike 
for the grant element, a market-based discount rate, a so-called differentiated discount rate (DDR) is used 
to calculate the concessionality level (DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1: 2).  
23  An extensive discussion of the public goods, market failure, subsidy nexus is provided by Schweiger 
(2013). 
   19  29 
overall objective of development are financed. Although no sectoral restrictions are 
made by the international regulatory framework, statistical evidence shows that pro-
jects eligible for soft loans are most frequently to be found in sectors such as water 
and sanitation, health, education, infrastructure and disaster prevention (Lammersen 
1998: 63). As a consequence of this sectoral concentration in traditional public sec-
tors with widespread influence on economic welfare, the budget funds attributed to 
the financing of soft loan projects are ODA eligible. Despite the fact that most “soft 
loan” programs officially declare the development of the recipient country in general 
as a major goal, the definition thereof seems – for the time being – to be reduced to 
the interpretation of the commercial non-viability of a project. 
Tied aid credits such as defined in the Arrangement might be provided as single-
source financing, i.e. taken from the donor’s resources and extended to the recipient 
as a single flow (TD/CONSENSUS/86.53; DAC/FA(86)12: 12), but mixed financing 
is also possible, meaning that the government funds are combined with a commercial 
credit that is extended either by an Export Credit Agency or provided by the capital 
market. In older DAC/FA documents, which this study will repeatedly draw on, mixed 
financing can further be divided into pre-mixed financing and associated financing 
(TD/CONSENSUS/86.53; DAC/FA(86)12: 13).  
Box 2: Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) 
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) are the national institutions that undertake official export promo-
tion activities (Kuhn 1995:6), i.e. by securing export transactions and export finance. Institutional 
arrangements and the structure of programs and terms of cover provided by an ECA vary con-
siderably from country to country. ECAs can be part of a ministry, an independent governmental 
agency or a private company acting on behalf of the government. The latter is, for instance, the 
case in Austria, where Oesterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB AG) – a specialized private bank – 
acts as agent of the Republic of Austria (Ministry of Finance) on the legal basis of the Export 
Promotion Act. Independently from the institutional setting, ECAs enjoy (varying but) generally 
high degrees of independence from their respective governments because they operate under 
charters that give them clearly defined powers and responsibilities. Nevertheless, they remain 
accountable to their governments (which finance them) and have so-called “guardian authorities” 
who are responsible for the overall policy formulation regarding official support. It is these 
“guardian authorities” that represent ECAs in most international fora such as the OECD (Kuhn et 
al. 1995: 6).  
For a detailed description of the products and services offered by most ECAs see for instance 
Gatti 2008; Grath 2012. 
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The DAC speaks of Associated Financing whenever both ODA grants and loans are 
combined with any other funding to create financing packages. These packages have 
to meet the “same criteria of concessionality, developmental relevance and recipient 
country eligibility as tied aid” 24.  
The definition of associated financing and its relation to tied aid are laid down in the 
DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially Untied 
Official Development Assistance published in 1987 and has been used up to today. 
Following this definition “associated financing with developing countries associates in 
law or in fact two or more of the following: 
i) Official Development Assistance 
ii) Other Official Flows with a grant element of at least 25 % 
iii) Officially supported export credits, other official flows or other funds with a grant 
element of less than 25 %” (OECD/DAC 1987: para. 3) 
Such associated financing transactions may occur in the form of mixed credits, mixed 
financing, joint financing, parallel financing or single integrated transactions 
(OECD/DAC 1987: 2, para. 4). The OECD’s Glossary of Statistical Terms defines, for 
instance, a mixed credit as “a credit that contains an aid element, so as to provide 
concessional credit terms – such as a lower rate of interest or a longer credit peri-
od”25. The main common characteristic of all these forms is that “[…] either the non-
concessional or the concessional component or the whole financing package, is in 
effect tied or partially untied and that the availability of concessional funds is condi-
tional upon accepting the linked non-concessional component” (OECD/DAC 1987: 
2). 
It goes without saying that the precise terms of the tied transaction or financing pack-
age have repercussions on how the concessional element might be or not be reflect-
ed in the DAC’s ODA statistics. Part II of this study is explicitly interested in those 
credits that are tied to the procurement of goods and services in the donor country. 
While this certainly is the case for tied aid credits, mixed credits might be tied, partially 
untied or fully untied. The DAC/FA’s usage of the term suggests that mixed credits are 
thought to be most likely tied, and are as such included in the analysis provided 
throughout this part of the study. For the definition of tied in contrast to untied aid, the 
Arrangement relies on the DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and 
Tied and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance (OECD/DAC 1987).  
  
                                                            
24  DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts: http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm 
25  OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5974 
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Table 3:  DAC Definitions of Tying Status of ODA, Other Official Flows and Officially  
 Supported Credits  
TYING STATUS CATEGORY DEFINITION AND COVERAGE 
UNTIED AID Loans and grants whose proceeds are fully and freely 
available to finance procurement from all OECD countries 
and substantially all developing countries. 
PARTIALLY UNTIED AID Loans which are contractually or in effect tied to procure-
ment of goods and services from a restricted number of 
countries which must include substantially all developing 
countries and can include the donor country. 
TIED AID All other loans and grants are classified as tied, whether 
they are tied formally or through informal arrangements.  
 
Source: Clay et al. 2009: 5; definitions based on OECD/DAC 1987 
While these definitions might seem quite straightforward, in reality, the borderline 
between them is blurry and difficult to assess (Jepma 1991: 20). Flows declared as 
“untied” might be de facto tied, i.e. through hidden contract clauses, by publishing 
calls for international bidding on national bulletin boards and in the donor’s official 
language only (Consultation Meeting X). The tying of aid has been a long lasting mat-
ter of concern within the DAC and one of the main debates shaping the Committee’s 
work since its very inception. In the past decade a minimum consensus was formal-
ized among DAC donors saying that all other things equal untied aid is the most ap-
propriate way of providing assistance. This seemingly broad donor consensus, cou-
pled with other key concepts on good development policy, will be used in the subse-
quent chapter to set up a conceptual framework against which tied aid credit and soft 
loan policies will be assessed. 
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3. The DAC’s Development Agenda 
This section will present and analyze the major debates on development co-operation 
that were framed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)26 in the 
past two decades. The aim thereof is to identify key concepts of how development co-
operation and policy should be designed so as to be of maximum effectiveness in 
recipient/partner countries. The conceptual framework derived from these debates will 
be used as benchmark against which tied aid credits will be assessed. Eventually, 
when compared with tied aid credit policies as framed by the Arrangement on Official-
ly Supported Export Credits, this will also allow drawing conclusions on the OECD’s 
internal coherence in the field of development policy.  
As described in greater detail in the previous chapter tied aid credits have essentially 
three features: they are tied, they are credits (as opposed to grants)27 and they contain 
a minimum grant element which – paired with an assumed development motivation 
and a concessional character – makes them ODA-eligible. 
This chapter contextualizes these features and links them to OECD debates and ideas 
on what constitutes good development co-operation and finance practices. To some 
extent this literature review of dominant development discourses primarily, though not 
exclusively, within the OECD allows formulating preliminary hypotheses on the useful-
ness of tied aid credits as an instrument of development policy. In addition, it lays the 
foundations for the subsequent analysis of the Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits.  
It is under the umbrella of “the aid effectiveness debate” that the Paris Principles as 
well as untying initiatives will be examined. Although the Paris Declaration is the key 
                                                            
26  Despite the fact that international development discourse and ideas on what makes for good or bad 
development practice are shaped by a myriad of actors ranging from the civil society to multilateral organi-
zations, the emphasis in the following will be put on the OECD’s DAC. First of all this is justified with the 
central role of the DAC in producing ideas on development (policy) and in setting widely accepted stand-
ards and norms as well with the quantitative importance of its Members’ contributions to worldwide ODA 
volumes. Secondly, this priority setting results from the fact that tied aid credit rules have been set up by a 
group – the so-called Participants Group – which is linked to the OECD and the members of which are 
majorly OECD member states. Hence, the analysis of DAC framed debates on development policy will 
eventually allow assessing the degree of coherence between and within OECD policies.  
27  The fact that the instrument in question is a credit-based financing form (as opposed to outright grant 
financing) is extensively discussed in the thesis of Eva Schweiger (2013) and will not explicitly be exam-
ined here. Furthermore, the “grants vs. loan debate” was steered by multilateral organizations such as IMF 
and World Bank in the wake of the devastating debt crisis of the 1980ies and 90ies and entered the DAC 
only to a lower extent. Later, in 2000, the Meltzer report clearly advocated for the use of highly conces-
sional financing forms, i.e. declaring a clear preference for grants over loans (see Lerrick/Meltzer 2002). In 
any case it appears that the answer to the question whether loans or grants are more appropriate financ-
ing forms for development can only be: it depends (for a discussion thereof see, for instance, Cohen et al. 
2006; Klein/Hardford 2005; for an earlier analysis of the issue see Schmidt 1964).  
36 
document referring to aid effectiveness, this term will hereafter be applied in a broader 
sense, subsuming all measures (not necessarily only those reflected in the Paris Dec-
laration) that are thought to improve the quality of official development assistance. 
Last but not least this means that the effectiveness of aid is dependent on the design 
and implementation of other policies directly or indirectly impacting on development 
processes. In this respect, Policy Coherence for Development is to be seen as both, 
a process leading to greater effectiveness and a result in itself28.  
All these debates are interwoven and in the name of coherence are thought to mutual-
ly reinforce each other so as to jointly achieve the main objective of a greater impact 
of invested aid resources. With regard to this, they are also to be interpreted as com-
bined efforts to achieve the overall goals declared at the Millennium Summit in 2000.  
Considering the importance subsequently attributed to the evolution of tied aid credits 
since the late 1970ies, this chapter also adopts a “historical” approach. Not only the 
status quo on aid quality and effectiveness will be addressed, but also some major 
steps towards the making of this broad, though not uncontested, “consensus” will be 
taken into account. 
3.1. The Aid and Development Effectiveness Debate 
“Ever since the DAC was founded in 1961, disputes about the nature  
and extend of appropriate measures to enhance the efficiency  
of bilateral ODA have been a recurrent fact”  
(Petermann 2013: 211) 
Despite the fact that controversies surrounding development concepts and develop-
ment practices have been apparent ever since and have been discussed vividly by 
academia, political and civil society actors29, it was above all in the 1990ies30 that 
criticism on the aid system in place gained momentum. This was widely due to wide-
spread frustration on both recipient and donor side with the poor results31 develop-
                                                            
28  Of course the DAC has also been pushing for other, less techno-managerial, issues during the last 
decade, e.g. governance and development, tax and development, conflict and fragility etc. For example, 
the Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, established in 1993 when vari-
ous aspects of aid-related governance entered the DAC’s agenda, should become one of the main fora 
for “information-sharing and policy dialogue for aid donors’ (Robinson 1999: 426; quoted in Petermann 
2013: 218). This paper only marginally touches upon these since they are not directly relevant to the as-
sessment of the appropriateness of tied aid credits as an instrument of development policy. See the 
DAC’s homepage for more information on the respective topics, http://www.oecd.org/dac/ 
29  See for instance the “Pearson Report” 1969 (Commission on International Development 1970). 
30  Also the end of cold war is thought to have erupted the international aid system and provoked a shift in its 
underlying rationale. In this respect, Petermann’s regression analysis suggests, for instance, that “… do-
nors’ motivations for a gradual untying of aid have undergone a marked change from the primacy of ‘donor 
interest’ to a growing significance of ‘recipient need’” (Petermann 2013: 406). The author argues that the 
external shock of 1989/1990 has decisively contributed to the reorientation of aid politics towards effi-
ciency and ownership (Petermann 2013: 208).  
31  How to assess the impact of aid has, however, itself been a matter of contention (for an analysis of the 
difficulties encountered when assessing the impact of aid; see, for instance, Fielding/McGillivray/Torres 
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ment cooperation had shown. The resulting discontent manifested itself in concerns 
voiced regarding costly tying practices of aid procurement, the overloading of recipi-
ents with a miscellaneous set of donor requirements, the failure of technical assis-
tance to strengthen indigenous capacity and the like. In this context, Wood et al. 
argue that the unfulfilled promise of development paired with tensions arising from 
structural adjustment policies and other aid conditionalities “[…] had taken their toll 
on confidence in aid regimes and resulted in a genuine crisis in the field of aid”. This 
malaise or elsewhere called “fatigue” of the aid system was reflected in a decline in 
international development spending (Wood et al. 2008: 5). 
Broadly speaking, this unsatisfying diagnosis lead on the one hand, to the formation of 
“radical” positions united by a general rejection of the belief in aid as an adequate tool 
for poverty eradication and on the other hand, to a call for reform of the existing aid 
system. Although “radical” critique of aid is not at the centre of this study, not even of 
this chapter, some clarifications on different diagnoses of the status-quo of the aid 
system are crucial if one wants to understand “the” aid effectiveness debate (or rather 
the various debates that evolved around the impact of aid). 
Subsumed under the container term “radicals” are positions as diverse as liberal 
market advocates for whom aid as such is distorting the allocation mechanism of 
markets (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009) to the so-called post-developmentalists who fear 
the reproduction of power imbalances and western dominance through development 
practices (Escobar 1995; Esteva 1992)32. These criticisms rooted in diverging ideo-
logical standpoints led its respective advocates to denounce either lacking results or 
even perverse effects of development aid.  
Albeit development and development aid remain contested concepts and practices, 
the mainstream in both intellectual and policy-driven debates have followed the re-
formist track. Accordingly, the emphasis will be put on more reformist stances – a 
priority setting that results from the fact that this study is primarily interested in dis-
courses driven by development “practitioners” or “designers”, i.e. by those working in 
the aid business who – one might assume – quite naturally have an interest in reviving 
the concept of aid rather than in declaring its death33.  
                                                                                                                                       
2007). Not only have indicators such as GDP/capita been questioned and gradually complemented by 
more holistic concepts such as the Human Development Index (HDI), but also the difficulty of isolating the 
effects of aid form the effects of other factors such as political and economic situations has been pointed 
out. Likewise attributing all poor development outcomes solely to aid is yet another inappropriate oversim-
plification. For a more differentiated analysis of what development has and could have achieved see 
Barder (2009). 
32  For a thorough overview of post-developmental positions see Ziai/Aram 2006, 2007 
33  This refers to Dambisa Moyo’s (2009) book “Dead Aid“ in which she strongly advocates for a replace-
ment of aid by marked-based policies. By doing so, she argues, the roots of poverty linked to a lack of ac-
cess to capital as well as inadequate trading policies can be disclosed (Guljarani 2011: 201). In contrast, 
Jean-Michel Severino (2011) speaks of the “resurrection of aid”. In a similar vein Riddell refers to the “re-
invention of aid” (quoted in Barnes/Brown 2011: 170). 
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It is in the context of the reformist pledges that aid effectiveness debates discussed 
hereafter are embedded. Or differently put – the aid effectiveness debate can partly 
be considered a reaction to the disillusionment of the “international aid community” 
considering the limited effects their past aid efforts have had (Clay et al. 2009). The 
reasons for this “failure” have of course been attributed to different factors with accu-
sations ranging from corrupt recipient countries to contradictory donor policies.  
3.1.1. Evolution and Principles: From Rome to Busan via Paris and Accra 
The aid community’s and especially the DAC’s continuing concern with the quality of 
aid led to the formulation of international principles that (should) guide today’s devel-
opment practice, in particular the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as well 
as its companion, the Accra Agenda for Action, adopted in 2008. The documents 
referred to and discussed in greater detail below are road-maps for efficient and effec-
tive aid. They shall help countries to take responsibility for their own development 
(incarnated in so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – PRSPs), simplify proce-
dures and thus reduce transfer costs and enable both donors and developing coun-
tries to efficiently and effectively achieve results (Clark 2011: 52).  
While often the first association with the aid effectiveness debate, the 2005 Paris 
Declaration was not the starting point of international efforts dedicated to increasing 
aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration is mainly rooted in a 1996 DAC document 
titled “Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of development co-operation”. In this 
document the DAC's “strategy” for the new century is built around 3 pillars: “the vi-
sion (the MDGs in embryo), Partnerships and making aid work better (the aid effec-
tiveness process in embryo) and Bringing our policies together (policy coherence, not 
in embryo – a long standing key issue)” (De Milly 2012: 1; OECD/DAC 1996). 
Based on this publication, the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects (DAC/FA34), a 
group that had only just successfully completed major work on untying, in conjunction 
with the World Bank, took the lead in pushing forward the harmonization of donor 
procurement practices (De Milly 2012: 1 et seqq.). 
To trigger the aid reform agenda an additional DAC Task Force on Donor Practices 
(TFDP) was set up and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), which 
had meanwhile been established by the World Bank, gave further valuable impulses to 
the aid effectiveness agenda (De Milly 2012: 2). The CDF upgraded poverty reduction 
to a core goal for public policies and suggested the drafting of national strategies by 
recipient countries (PRSPs) (FRIDE 2008: 16). Also, the UN conference in Monterrey 
2002 had built a consensus among the “aid community” that not only additional and 
                                                            
34  This group will play a crucial role for the analysis of the influence of development policy on the Arrange-
ment because it figured as main DAC body monitoring the Participants’ negotiations on tied aid credits. 
As will be shown, it worked in parallel on disciplines for associated financing and tied and partially untied 
aid.  
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more innovative aid resources were needed, but above all that these resources had to 
be channeled in a more effective way (United Nations 2003: 1-17). This gave further 
momentum to the aid effectiveness agenda  
The parallel initiatives in both World Bank and United Nations show that although the 
DAC was and is the main driving power behind the aid effectiveness agenda, the 
Committee has never been operating in a vacuum, but is subject to outside influences 
– an argument we will come back to when analyzing the evolution of today’s regulato-
ry framework covering tied aid credits.  
All these efforts culminated in the first High Level Forum in Rome in 2003, where the 
first declaration on effectiveness on a ministerial level was proclaimed, the so-called 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization35) (OECD/DAC 2003). This declaration provided 
the first set of “Paris Principles” building the basic framework for co-operation be-
tween donors and recipients (De Milly 2012: 2). 
After the Rome Declaration, the afore mentioned TFDP merged with the DAC/FA to 
become the Working Party on Effectiveness and Donor Practices (WP-EFF) – not at 
last a symbolic appreciation of the growing weight attributed to the aid effectiveness 
agenda in the DAC’s work. According to De Milly, a senior researcher at the OECD – 
this group became “an actual partnership of donors and recipients, with the participa-
tion of the main multilateral organizations and, from 2004 onwards, 14 developing 
countries” (De Milly 2012: 3). Rome was followed by a series of High Level Forums 
the outcomes of which were documented most prominently in the 2005 Paris Decla-
ration on Aid Effectiveness (Kindornay/Morton 2011: 1). Midway through the Paris 
cycle (2005-2010), in Accra ministers of developing and donor countries declared to 
deepen and accelerate their implementation of the Paris Declaration. De Milly summa-
rizes the priority setting at the respective HLF as follows: “If Rome can be seen as 
symbolised by 'harmonisation', and Paris by 'alignment', Accra brought more flesh to 
'ownership'” (De Milly 2012: 3).  
One might add the outcomes of the latest High Level Forum (HFL) in Busan 2011, 
which has been portrayed as an important step in the conceptual shift from aid to 
development effectiveness36 (Keijzer 2012: 4; see also Homepage of the “Open Fo-
rum for CSO Development Effectiveness37). The extent to which this transition from 
                                                            
35  Therein Ministers, Heads of Aid Agencies and other senior officials declared the following: “Our delibera-
tions are an important international effort to harmonise the operational policies, procedures, and practic-
es of our institutions with those of partner country systems to improve the effectiveness of development 
assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the Millennium Development Goals“ (OECD/DAC 2003).  
36  More information on whether this truly is a new paradigm entailing behavioral changes or a mere rhetoric 
shift can be found in a paper by the North-South Institute (Kindornay 2011). ActionAid, for instance, was 
skeptical about the outcomes of Busan and reacted with an article titled “Africa let down by Busan Aid 
Agreement” (see http://www.actionaid.org/2011/12/africa-let-down-busan-aid-agreement).  
37  The Open Forum is a platform that “brings together civil society organisations from around the world to 
discuss the issues and challenges to their effectiveness as development actors“, see http://www.cso-
effectiveness.org/4th-high-level-forum-on-aid,080?lang=en 
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aid to development effectiveness – pushed for especially by Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs)38 – truly occurred is yet to be seen. Furthermore, an agreement 
reached at the Busan Summit led to the emergence of the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation39, which considers itself an “an inclusive, political 
forum“ that gathers 160 countries and 46 organizations “around a set of principles 
that form the foundation of effective development co-operation”. In the summit Decla-
ration called Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation older com-
mitments such as Policy Coherence for Development and the untying of aid are reiter-
ated and special emphasis is put on the variety of actors and stakeholders in the 
development co-operation architecture (OECD/DAC 2011a, Busan Declaration). In 
line with the idea that development is to be understood as a multi-stakeholder pro-
cess, the Declaration calls for a global partnership, thereby enlarging the “traditional” 
conceptualization of partnership between North and South essentially by two addi-
tional dimensions: South-South cooperation and the inclusion of these “new” actors 
into the aid architecture as well as public-private partnerships. 
3.1.1.1. Excursus: The Idea of Partnership in Development Co-operation 
Today, “partnership” has become part of the mainstream discourse on development 
co-operation and “has come to dominate the development lexicon” (Barnes/Brown 
2011: 165 et seqq.). This is reflected in the fact that the term “partnership” is to be 
found in virtually all policy texts of aid donors and recipients alike (ibid.: 172). 
Although the idea that aid should “[…] reflect a partnership of equals between donor 
and recipient governments” has long tradition in development discourse and can be 
traced back to the 1969 report of the Pearson Commission, it is in the immediate post 
Cold War era that the concept gains momentum (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 76). Several 
authors (e.g. Barnes/Brown 2011; Fraser/Whitfield 2009) explain the rise of the part-
nership idea in the 1990ies with the radical changes in the international system 
brought about by the end of the Cold War. A shift in the climate for development aid 
from rather “stable” to “one of apparent ‘crisis’ … seems to have created ideal 
conditions for the rise of the idea of partnership” (Barnes/Brown 2011: 167). With 
the end of the Cold War, also development aid – hitherto a strategic means to secure 
spheres of influence – faced a sever crisis of legitimacy40 paired with a “growing anxie-
ty about the ‘effectiveness’ of development aid” (Barnes/Brown 2011: 168). As has 
already been addressed in the introduction to this chapter, there was widespread 
                                                            
38  See for instance BetterAid, an umbrella advocacy platform of Civil Society Organizations engaged in 
development cooperation (very active in the run up to Busan, dissolved, however, in December 2012); 
see www.betteraid.org 
39  For more information on the “Global Partnerships” as well as for its mandate and targets, please see 
http://effectivecooperation.org/about.html and http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/globalpartnership.htm 
40  Fraser and Whitfield (2009: 76) detect the same removal of reasons for aid giving and argue that espe-
cially “fiscal conservatives urged that the end of the Cold War should allow for a ‘piece dividend’ and 
pressed for cuts in the defense and diplomatic budgets”. And indeed aid statistics show a decline of aid 
flows in the period of 1992 to 1997.  
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consensus by the mid-1990ies that the neoliberal approach to aid followed most 
prominently with the so-called structural adjustment programs “[…] had not only been 
‘ineffective’ in driving economic growth, but had also entailed considerable social 
costs” (Barnes/Brown 2011: 168). Concomitantly, criticism on aid conditionality in 
general gained momentum and various NGOs and academics criticized aid and de-
velopment policies for being “’symptomatic’ of the paternalistic, neo-colonial and 
therefore unequal way in which aid was governed” (Barnes/Brown 2011: 169). In an 
attempt to bring about the reorientation of the heavily criticized international aid sys-
tem and to give aid practice a new raison d’être a new story of aid was invented. It is 
in this context that the DAC produced the document “Development Partnerships and 
the New Global Context”, in which inter alia the necessity of partnership was high-
lighted (Fraser/Whitfield 2009: 77). Subsequently, a “Groupe de Réflexion” was given 
the task to develop a “more coherent narrative that would ‘sell’ development aid to a 
broad constituency of support“ (Barnes/Brown 2011: 170). The Group’s members’ 
attempt of constructing a ”[…] convincing and persuasive story about aid, which 
would enroll the support of a range of different actors who might have competing 
perspectives about the future need for, and role of, development aid in the post-cold 
war era“ led to the drafting of what should henceforth be a key reference document 
for the DAC: Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-
operation. Therein, the idea of partnership appears as one of the central pillars of any 
future aid efforts – Barnes and Brown (2011) go as far as to conclude that “partner-
ship comes across as the ‘master’ concept” and leitmotiv of the “reinvention of aid” 
(Barnes/Brown 2011: 170). The following quote, taken from the document “Shaping 
the 21st Century” sheds light on the DAC’s early understanding of partnership: 
“In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to do things for developing 
countries and their people, but with them. It must be seen as a collaborative effort to 
help them increase their capacities to do things for themselves. Paternalistic ap-
proaches have no place in this framework. In a true partnership, local actors 
should progressively take the lead while external partners back their efforts to 
assume greater responsibility for their own development” (OECD/DAC 1996: 13; 
emphasis added).  
Gradually the idea, of who the partners in development co-operation were, was 
broadened and became to encompass a miscellaneous set of actors ranging from 
recipient governments to civil society and private companies (OECD/DAC 2011a, 
Busan Declaration). How this theoretical and normative shift should be translated into 
development practices, however, remains somewhat obscure. According to Barnes 
and Brown (2011: 166) the idea of partnership remains – despite its popularity and 
omnipresence – “… an impoverished theoretical appeal, which is under-defined, 
poorly scrutinised and rather unconvincingly utilised as a guiding concept in applied 
practices”.  
42 
3.1.2. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a Benchmark 
The Paris Declaration, today broadly considered a “landmark international agreement“, 
was endorsed in 2005 by over a hundred ministers, heads of development agencies 
and other senior officials from a variety of countries and international organizations 
(Wood et al. 2008: 1). This Declaration went beyond previous joint statements on aid 
harmonization and alignment in that it set out measurable targets to be met by 2010 
(De Milly 2012). More specifically, the Declaration presents an action-oriented road-
map and contains 56 commitments which are organized around the principles of 
ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability 
(OECD 2005-2008). Progress41 in implementing the presented principles (and their 
more detailed sub-commitments) is to be measured nationally and monitored interna-
tionally with the help of 12 indicators (OECD 2005-2008: 10 et seqq.). 
The figure below, taken from an OECD report on the implementation progress of the 
Paris Declaration (OECD 2011a: 18), illustrates the “Paris Principles” – in the Decla-
ration labeled “Partnership Commitments”42 – as the five pillars of a new and more 
effective aid delivery system (OECD 2005-2008: 3).  
Figure 3.1:  Paris Principles  
 
Source: OECD 2011a: 18 
  
                                                            
41  For a detailed account of progress made so far and difficulties encountered see Clay et al. (2009); also 
see http://www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/48742718.pdf 
42  The fact that they are given the label “Partnership Commitments” illustrates that the idea of partnership 
figures as underwriting principle of the Declaration (Barnes/Brown 2011).  
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Given the centrality of these principles in current aid discourses and development 
practices, they shall briefly be described here.  
1.  Ownership: “Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their develop-
ment policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD 
2005-2008: 3).  
The concept of country ownership lies at the core of the Paris Declaration, in the 
sense that a legitimate and accountable government capable of articulating its 
own development strategies is thought to be the prerequisite of any effective part-
nership between donor and partner country43. These priorities and strategies are 
ideally to be formulated in a so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – a 
mechanism already introduced and discussed in the context of the Comprehen-
sive Development Framework of the World Bank – which donor interventions 
should then be aligned with (Harmer/Ray 2009: 7). With regard to country owner-
ship the Paris Declaration sets the target of 75 % of partner countries having op-
erational development strategies by 2010. These strategies are expected to “have 
clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and re-
flected in annual budgets” (OECD 2005-2008: 9). The problem that arises if it is 
assumed that ownership itself results from development processes is not ad-
dressed in the Declaration. Furthermore, criticism has been raised that ownership 
per se does not tell anything about the political dynamics constituting the ability of 
a recipient state to formulate development strategies. Hence, ownership cannot 
be equaled with democratic ownership, which according to critics should be the 
aspired goal (The Reality of Aid Management Committee 2012: 10). 
2.  Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national de-
velopment strategies, institutions and procedures” (OECD 2005-2008: 3). 
Under the heading of alignment donors are expected to put their intervention in 
line with the poverty reduction strategies of the recipient country well as the the-
matic and sectoral priorities. With the principle of alignment donors committed to 
use partners’ Public Finance Management (PFM) and procurement systems, make 
their aid allocations more predictable, long-term and free from donor 
conditionalities (Harmer/Ray 2009: 8). Furthermore, it is agreed that untied aid is 
generally the better aid (OECD 2005-2008: 5). Aiming at a greater amount of aid 
channeled through local systems has led to the creation of several assessment 
tools such as CPIAs (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment).  
                                                            
43  Throughout the Paris Declaration developing countries are referred to as ”partners” or “partner countries”. 
These terms are here used interchangeably with the word recipient (country). It is argued here that under-
lying relationships remained essentially the same. In this respect we follow Fraser and Whitfield (2009: 
89), who conclude their analysis of the Paris Declaration by saying that “… although the donor commu-
nity has produced a shared consensus around how aid should be delivered, has devised new tools to im-
plement it, and has produced a dizzying array of new policy instruments and acronyms, the impact on the 
overall balance of power between donors and recipients may be very small” (emphasis added). 
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According to a research paper published by FRIDE (a European think-tank for 
global action), alignment links ownership and harmonization and is the most tech-
nical part of the Declaration reflected in the dedication of 7 out of 12 indicators 
assessing progress in implementation (FRIDE 2008: 4). Figure 3.2, taken from the 
Paris Declaration, shows some of the alignment indicators on national procure-
ment systems and exemplifies the complexity and technical nature of the targets 
set by the international community.  
Figure 3.2: Extract from the Paris Declaration – Indicators 5a and 5b 
 
Source: OECD 2005-2008: 9 
*  Note on Indicator 5: Scores for Indicator 5 are determined by the methodology used to measure quality of procurement 
and public financial management systems under Indicator 2. 
3.  Harmonization: “Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and collec-
tively effective” (OECD 2005-2008: 6). 
The harmonization component of the Paris Declaration is aiming at increased co-
ordination of donor implementation practices and commits donors to establish 
more effective system of labor division based on their respective strengths. More-
over, it spells out the goal of simplifying and aligning funding and disbursement 
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mechanisms and monitoring and evaluation requirements (Harmer/Ray 2009: 9). 
Furthermore, it contains a section on “delivering effective aid in fragile states” as 
well as on the “promotion of a harmonized approach to environmental assess-
ments” (OECD 2005-2008: 6, 7). The targets set for 2010 spell out that “66 % of 
aid flows are provided in the context of programme-based approaches”, that 
“40 % of donor missions to the field are joint” and that “66 % of country analytic 
work is joint” (OECD 2005-2008: 10). 
4.  Managing for Results: “Managing resources and improving decision-making for 
result” (OECD 2005-2008: 7).  
The principle “Managing for Results” commits both donors and partner countries 
to monitor and evaluate progress in meeting development goals. To do so, the 
Declaration obliges donors, amongst other things, to improve the statistical capac-
ities of partner countries (Harmer/Ray 2009: 10) and to “reduce the proportion of 
countries without transparent and monitorable performance assessment frame-
work by one-third” until 2010 (OECD 2005-2008: 10). 
5.  Mutual accountability: “Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results” (OECD 2005-2008: 7). 
With the adoption of the principle of “mutual accountability” donors and recipients 
declare to be mutually accountable to each other as well as to their respective 
constituents (Harmer/Ray 2009: 10). The target set for 2010 (Indicator 12) ex-
pects all partner countries to have mutual assessment reviews in place (OECD 
2005-2008: 10).  
Together these five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for 
results and mutual accountability build the basis of the DAC’s development architec-
ture. Along with these principles the call for the evaluation44 of programs and projects 
entered the international development discourse.  
  
                                                            
44  The emphasis put on evaluations of all kinds evokes Michael Power’s (1997: 2, 3) notion of an “audit 
society”. Borrowing from accounting, the author argues that society today is characterized by a constant 
checking and verifying of “accounts” in various spheres of life, in education or health, for example. Also 
Martens (2002: 155) critically examines the role of evaluation in foreign aid programs with help of game 
theory. He argues that evaluations often serve the purpose of maintaining a political equilibrium, regard-
less of whether this equilibrium is “efficient in terms of satisfying taxpayers’ objectives of genuine wealth 
transfers”. 
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3.1.3. Untying Aid: A Long-lasting Matter of Concern  
“Member countries should jointly and individually endeavour …  
to reduce progressively the scope of aid tying with a view ultimately to removing 
procurement restrictions to the maximum extent” 
(DAC 1965: 120; quoted in Ray 1995: 28) 
“When the political rationale of a government for the application of tying is rooted 
in a desire to satisfy the ‘national interest’ articulated by domestic firms and voters,  
export subsidization with the help of tied aid appears to be hardly justifiable 
in an era of economic globalisation” 
(Petermann 2013: 114) 
This chapter briefly examines how the politics of untying has been formed over dec-
ades and eventually led to the declaration of a set of measures, spelled out in a DAC 
Recommendation on Untying. The practice of tying aid to the procurement of goods 
and services in the donor country is a long and established practice and a frequent 
phenomenon in donor-recipient relations (La Chimia 2004: 1). Historically, bilateral aid 
from individual DAC members was commonly linked to the granting of preferences for 
donor companies, consultants, and products; that is procurement was not channeled 
through an open and competitive market. According to Holland half of ODA typically 
used to be “tied”, with distortion, cost escalations and decreased value for ODA 
money as negative effects of such practices (Holland 2008: 357).  
The example of untying illustrates that what we see in the Paris Declaration and the 
Accra Agenda for Action is only the tip of a solid iceberg of long-lasting discussions 
among DAC donors, or as Richard Manning, former DAC Chairman, puts it – they are 
the fruits after “decades of pain” (Manning 2011: 29). Clearly, this long-lasting re-
sistance against untying can, as will be shown later, only be understood in light of 
domestic interests driving donor policies. 
The introductory quote above dates from 1965 and shows that untying has been an 
issue of controversy basically from the 1960ies onwards, that is, since the Commit-
tee’s very inception45. Yet it is still timely. In 2002, for instance, the European Com-
mission identified tied aid as one of the most hotly debated cases of policy incoher-
ence and one of the main obstacles on the way to greater aid effectiveness (EC 
2002: 68). 
Some years after the establishment of the Committee, at the High Level Meeting 
(HLM) in 1973, DAC members agreed to untie their contributions to multilateral insti-
                                                            
45  Founded in 1961, the Development Assistance Committee is entitled to carry out the following mandate: 
“… promote development co-operation and other policies so as to contribute to sustainable develop-
ment, including pro-poor economic growth, poverty reduction, improvement of living standards in develop-
ing countries, and to a future in which no country will depend on aid“ (DCD/DAC(2010)34/FINAL: 3). 
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tutions and in a Memorandum of Understanding46 the same year they declared their 
preference for procurement in recipient countries rather than in the donor country 
(DAC/FA(86)11). However, in 1977 further moves towards an agreement on the 
mutual untying of aid – according to the DAC/FA Working Party the ideal solution to 
aid and trade distortions – had to be abandoned due to resistance of member states 
(DAC/FA(81)1: 19).  
And indeed it would take the DAC members 30 more years47 to agree on a more 
comprehensive recommendation to untie their aid to the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and to Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to “the greatest extent” 
(DCD/DAC(2001)12/FINAL: 4). The underlying philosophy is straightforward: through 
untying competition would increase, the local private sector would develop and do-
nors would symbolically show their commitment to development even if it was not in 
their immediate self-interest (Holland 2008: 357). This 2001 Recommendation on 
Untying Official Development Assistance to Least Developed Countries and Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries for sure is to be considered a success48, but it also leaves 
remarkable loopholes and suffers numerous limitations that considerably restrict the 
scope of the agreement49 (La Chimia 2004: 11). Most prominently, the Recommenda-
tion does not cover food aid, technical co-operation50 and donor administrative costs 
(Clay et al. 2009: 1), and to some degree obscures the transparency of aid financing 
practices51. The latter concern stems from the fact that untied aid credits are not sub-
                                                            
46  In this “Memorandum of Understanding on Untying of their Bilateral Development Loans in Favour of 
Procurement in Development Countries“ the therein participating countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Sates and later Australia and Switzerland) submit-
ted their own list of procurement-eligible developing countries (TD/CONSENSUS/86.52; DAC/FA(86)12: 
33). Furthermore, the document contained “target quotas” and time frames for the partial untying of aid, 
laid down “several concepts of competitively organized procurement of aid-financed goods and services 
and suggested new measures to strengthen tendering systems in recipient countries” (Petermann 2013: 
214). 
47  According to J. H. Petermann (2013: 215, 216) the DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing 
and Tied and Partially Untied ODA, concluded in April 1987, mark the official starting point “of the untying 
aid initiative as it has been known in the post-Cold War period”. This, however, is not to be equaled with 
donor countries’ willingness to actually undertake the necessary steps to fully untie their aid programs . 
48  Clay et al. speak of 2001 Recommendation as an “aid success story“ (Clay et al. 2009: 55). 
49  According to La Chimia’s (2004: 29) calculation the Recommendation only covers 12 % of total ODA 
flows.  
50  According to the DAC Glossary technical co-operation is “provided specifically to facilitate the implemen-
tation of a capital project and is included indistinguishably among bilateral project and programme ex-
penditures, and not separately identified as technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows” (DAC 
Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts). The loophole of technical co-operation is frequently targeted by 
criticism. La Chimia (2004: 15), however, mentions that the Recommendation makes a distinction be-
tween Investment Related Technical Co-operation (IRTC) and Free-Standing Technical Co-operation 
(FSTC), the former of which is covered by the Recommendation. 
51  This newly arising problems stem – as will be shown later on – partly from imprecise definitions of tied 
and untied which allow for de-facto tying of aid. Jepma, for instance, argues that “while these definitions 
given in the 1987 Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially Untied Official De-
velopment Assistance may seem quite straightforward, in practice they are weak when it comes to pre-
cisely assessing the nature of tied aid relationships [....] [because] tying is not only determined by formal 
arrangements, but also informal understanding, or even as a secondary consequence of an arrangement 
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ject to the Arrangement’s transparency provisions. As reflected in the title of the Rec-
ommendation, this declaration of intent only deals with ODA flows to LDCs and 
HIPCs. In a short article on “The future of international concessional flows”, the former 
DAC Chairman Richard Manning argues that direct national donor interests behind 
giving ODA “are most likely to predominate when the gap between the national in-
come levels of the provider and recipient countries is relatively smaller” and vice 
versa. This also explains why DAC donors were willing to agree on untying their finan-
cial aid to LDCs and HIPCs but no to middle-income or indeed to all low-income 
countries (Manning 2011: 112).  
The second agreement that had its birth pangs in the 1990ies and aimed at discour-
aging tying practices, is the Helsinki Package52. This Package – which will be dis-
cussed in great detail in the next chapter – is part of the Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits negotiated under OECD auspices, and considerably con-
strains the use of tied concessional financing for projects53 (Lancaster 2007: 54). 
These two respective agreements (legally speaking they do not have any power to 
enforce compliance though) are rooted in two different, albeit overlapping, sets of 
concerns. While the DAC was primarily concerned with the development implications 
of tying, the Participants Group, which negotiated the Helsinki Package, was worried 
for export competition reasons and feared the potential trade distorting implications of 
concessional lending tied to the exports of goods and services from the donor (Clay 
et al. 2009: 5). Besides, both bodies are, albeit to different degrees, linked to the 
OECD, and pursue the goal of contributing to a liberalized, non-discriminatory interna-
tional aid and trade system (OECD Convention 1961; quoted in Jepma 1991: 2). 
Interestingly, the tying of aid, thus, unites critics from various fields and with potentially 
diverging ideological backgrounds. On the one hand proponents of the free market 
philosophy argue that tying practices have trade-distorting effects that need to be 
eliminated. On the other hand, development “experts” criticize tied aid for being an 
inadequate, donor-driven, instrument for promoting development which decreases 
aid’s value for money and undermines recipient ownership. Therefore, they want to 
see it being abolished. 
Concerns over adverse effects of tying practices on the effectiveness of aid have 
been raised for decades. In this respect, the untying debate can be considered both, 
a predecessor and a core concern of the aid effectiveness agenda. Resulting from the 
                                                                                                                                       
already in effect” (Jepma 1991: 20). To curb these practices the Participants and the DAC jointly work on 
transparency initiatives for untied aid.  
52  According to Petermann agreement on the Helsinki Package, which further realigned regulations on 
export credits, is considered by the OECD itself as “the beginning of multilateral consultations on a jointly 
coordinated phasing-out of tying requirements” (Petermann 2013: 211).  
53  Leaving exemptions of the Helsinki Package aside, the use of tied aid financing is essentially restrained to 
commercially non-viable projects and has to contain a minimum concessionality level of 35 and 50 % re-
spectively depending on the classification of the recipient country.  
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underlying assumption that untying contributes to increased effectiveness of aid re-
sources, the issue was taken up by the Millennium Development Goals (target 35) as 
well as by the Paris Declaration (Clay et al. 2009: 60). 
In the context of alignment efforts the Paris Declaration states the following: 
“Untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for 
partner countries and improving country ownership and alignment. DAC Donors will 
continue to make progress on untying as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recom-
mendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed 
Countries (Indicator 8)” (OECD 2005-2008). Indicator 8, referred to in this quote, 
sets the vaguely formulated target of “continued progress over time”54 to be met by 
2010 (OECD 2005-2008: 10).  
Although the Paris Declaration attributed the case of untying to the principle of align-
ment, the tying status of aid and calls for untying, respectively, are without doubt 
closely intertwined with ownership claims. In Accra donors reaffirmed their commit-
ment to untie their aid and declared, among other things, their will to “promote the 
use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that their procurement proce-
dures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to compete” (OECD 2005-
2008: 18; emphasis added). This add-on to the Paris Declaration reflects concern 
over an increase in informal, de-facto tying practices due to the lack of transparency in 
procurement practices.  
In 1988 Catrinus Jepma conducted a study55, commissioned by the DAC Working 
Party on Financial Aspects and largely financed by USAID, in which he examined the 
potential effects of tying on both donor and recipient country (Jepma 1991). Some of 
his key arguments, which guided the DAC/FA’s discussions on untying, are summa-
rized below.The various arguments presented in favor of or against official export 
support schemes, including the tying of aid, can basically be grouped in three major 
categories.  
The first set of arguments explains from a national welfare point of view of the country 
engaged in the export support polices that such schemes are in the long run often 
counterproductive and highly cost intensive. The second category consists of a num-
ber of arguments evaluating the impact of export support schemes from an interna-
tional perspective. “Their main thrust is that the various governments involved are 
basically competing with each other in a defensive process which commonly creates 
only an overall welfare loss”. The last set of arguments takes the recipient countries’ 
perspective and argues that their interests are “almost always hurt by tying, either 
                                                            
54  Progress in implementing the untying target varies among donors. For a detailed account of “… why 
some donors liberalised their ODA, while others have hitherto seemed “to be politically unwilling – or insti-
tutionally unable – to do so”, see Petermann (2013).  
55   OECD’s Development Centre published Jepma’s study with the title “Tying of Aid” (Jepma 1991). 
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directly, i.e. by adversely affecting the delivery terms, or indirectly because the com-
modities and services supplied do not sufficiently meet the recipients’ priorities. 
However, it may well be that tying bears some relationship to the overall domestic 
support for aid in the donor country” (Note by the Secretariat – 
DCD/DAC/FA(92)8/REV1: para. 4; emphasis added).  
In sum, the main argument brought forward against aid tying, mainly by economic 
analysts (Chilchiniski 1983; Bhagwati et al. 1983; Kemp/Kojima 1985; Schwein-
berger 1990; Jepma 1991; Hatzipanayotou/Michael 1995; Lahiri/Raimondos 1995; 
Brakman/van Marrewijk 1995; all quoted in Clay et al. 2008) was and still is that 
goods and services procured under tied aid regimes are on average 15-25 % more 
costly than those provided in an untied and hence competitive system (Gibson et al. 
2005) – with estimations ranging up to 50 % for food aid (Interview V). While in earli-
er times a political argument brought forward for tying was the benefit concomitantly 
transferred to the donors’ constituents (and thus their increased support56 for devel-
opment aid), more recent studies show that the macroeconomic impact of tying on the 
donor country (e.g. in the form of increased employment) is rather limited (Clay et al. 
2008: 28)57. 
Thus, in a way tying is seen as unfavorable for both, donor and recipient (cost for 
subsidy respectively higher costs of the purchased good). Furthermore, several au-
thors show that these purchases are largely supplier driven58 and might result in the 
delivery of inappropriate technologies59 (Morrissey 1998: 249 et seqq.). According to 
Morrissey (1998: 25) these negative effects are likely to be more pronounced in the 
case of associated financing because the aid is not only tied to procurement but also 
to the acceptance of the non-concessional part of the financing package. Morrissey 
(1998: 249, 250) argues that as a result, “… projects are initiated by companies 
rather than aid agencies, and there may, in practice, albeit not in principle, be 
less stringent appraisal of development impact than for normal aid“. Tied aid in 
                                                            
56  In this regard Jepma (1991: 38) speaks of a juste retour and La Chimia (2004: 5) compares this argument 
to the idea of “buying political support”.  
57  Petermann explains that “whenever commercial gains derived from return follow-up orders, maintenance 
works or project-related investments occurred, they were usually centered on a small number of highly 
specialized companies” (Petermann 2013: 113). According to Clay et al. (2008: 28) the ‘limited’ com-
mercial benefits may, however, be considerable to particular domestic interest groups. 
58  The choice of inappropriate technologies is a prime example used by several of our key informants to 
illustrate how tying practices can undermine ownership. With regard to the purchase of non-tailored 
goods and equipment, Petermann (2013: 110-111) gives the example of capital-intensive machinery that 
“may be of little developmental use and strategic priority to the beneficiaries of aid”. Maybe even more im-
portantly, Petermann goes on, “it charges recipients with regular maintenance costs, absurdly favouring 
premature discontinuation of projects and aggravating dependence on Northern technologies … and fol-
low up imports”. 
59  In his book “Lords of Poverty” Graham Hancock (1989) gives several examples of technologies and high-
tech schemes unable to meet the needs of the receiving countries. One of the examples, a delivery of Brit-
ish Westland W-30 helicopters to India will be addressed again at a later stage. Another example, taken 
up also by Petermann (2013: 111), concerns an irrigation project in Niger, which eventually had to be 
abandoned because the government that had received the project as aid could not meet the costs.  
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general and associated finance in particular are thus judged to be incompatible with 
ownership principles and inconsistent with the call for demand-driven purchasing as 
particularly stressed in the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 2005-2008: 16, para. 
14a; Gibson et al. 2005: 117). 
Although Clay et al. (2009: 30) confirm in principle the above findings, they conclude 
their extensive literature review on the effects of tied and untied aid by saying that 
“there has been little formal investigation of the effectiveness of tied versus untied 
aid or on the impact of untying. … The discussion about untying has also failed to 
take into account the evidence about aid modalities for which untying is a necessary 
condition”. These findings are also confirmed by Jepma, who argues that establishing 
direct causalities is a dangerous undertaking and states that in the end aid effective-
ness of a given project or program will depend on a variety of factors. Jepma (1991: 
16) concludes that “… since there is no clear link between the developmental 
impact of aid and its tying, one cannot, a priori, conclude that tied aid, whether or not 
procured on competitive terms, is necessarily worse for the recipient than untied aid”. 
With regard to diagnoses of the effects of untied aid, it has to be mentioned that the 
scientific community (with the exception of some economists) has paid fairly little 
attention to this issue. Consequently, the equation of untied aid with better aid is 
based on rather old studies, which rely on data collected when the effects of untied 
aid could only be roughly estimated because most aid was still tied. Furthermore, 
except for tied food aid the varying effects of different types of tied aid have hardly 
been studied. With regard to tied aid credits it would be interesting to see whether 
foreseen practices of “advance bidding”60 have effects on procurement prices. 
Given the presumably negative repercussions of tying practices, the long-lasting re-
sistance of DAC members to agree on untying can only be interpreted as an expres-
sion of the multilayered interests behind development cooperation (the non-
development aspects of aid). Considering that the main intention of aid tying is to give 
an advantage to suppliers in the donor economy compared to the rest of the world 
(Clay et al. 2009: 27), discussing the tying of aid must go along with an examination 
of motivations and interests driving foreign aid in general. 
The existence of different actors with polyvalent interests behind the tying of aid is 
reflected in the following statement made within the DAC/FA Working Party: “We 
know each member country faces many domestic difficulties such as the internal 
opposition from the business community to the adoption of fully general untying” 
(DAC/FA(86)11; emphasis added). This statement evokes the influence of business 
interest over development interests. It has been widely recognized (Lancaster 2007; 
                                                            
60  “Advance bidding” would, for instance, mean that mixed credits are provided only if a domestic supplier 
has already won an export order in an International Competitive Bidding procedure (DAC/FA(82)2; 
TC/ECG/82.4: 22). Financing terms should only be considered in a subsequent step.  
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Christiansen/Rogerson 2006; Morrissey 1998; Rao 2003; Riddell 2007) that motiva-
tions behind aid are manifold ranging from political and strategic interests and security 
concerns of all sorts to economic considerations61. Regarding the myriad objectives 
pursued also with tied aid credits – the instrument in question throughout this study – 
we are here primarily interested in what Lancaster calls “commercial motivations” 
behind aid. In the “commercial use of aid” Lancaster sees one explanation for the 
ineffectiveness of the assistance in promoting development and argues that often 
these interests not only “collided with development concerns, they could also under-
cut development by funding overpriced, inefficient, and low-priority projects that left 
behind little development but lots of debt” (Lancaster 2007: 54).  
Concerns about the commercial motivations and the difficulty of disclosing them have 
been voiced on a regular basis by the DAC/FA. In a Note by the Secretariat distribut-
ed to both Participants and DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development 
Assistance in 1982, for instance, it says: “The extent to which a given transaction is 
intended to serve aid objectives or trade objectives, or both is not objectively verifia-
ble, since intentions cannot be monitored. The following paragraphs, however, will 
suggest that the developmental and the commercial motivations for associated 
financing, as they are revealed in practice, while sometimes coinciding, are fre-
quently divergent and even incompatible” (DAC/FA(82)2; TC/ECG/82.4: 9 et 
seqq.; emphasis added). Throughout their work the Participants Group and the 
DAC/FA were – as will be shown later – confronted with this difficulty of verifying or 
falsifying an officially stated motivation. 
The arguments presented above against the tying of development aid to the procure-
ment of goods and services in the donor country suggest that tied aid financing is not 
compatible with some of the core principles of the DAC’s approach to development 
policy. Hence, the untying discourse can undoubtedly be interpreted as a partial an-
swer to the question whether tied aid credits are an effective instrument for develop-
ment policy. Not least of all, the case against tying also argues that donors’ economic 
policies should not contradict their aid efforts. This argument will be key to the con-
cept of Policy Coherence for Development introduced in the next subchapter.  
3.1.4. Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) 
“Yet this interdependence is a reality and therefore the unit to be considered  
is the totality of all measures in execution at a given moment or proposed to be taken  
simultaneously; this we shall call a system of economic policy or an economic policy“ 
(Tinbergen 1952: 68) 
Tying practices as exemplified in the previous chapter have shown that potentially 
contradictory policy goals (e.g. donor export promotion vs. development of local 
                                                            
61  For a detailed account of motivations of tying see Petermann 2013, especially Chapter 2 and 3.  
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economies) might reduce the effectiveness of official development assistance and 
might hurt the credibility of both a donor’s aid and trade policies62. Departing thereof 
and guided by Jan Tinbergen’s63 quote, in which he urges that a policy be considered 
in its relation to other policies, this chapter elaborates on the concept of Policy Co-
herence for Development (PCD).  
The discussion on the effectiveness of aid is to be seen in the context of achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is inextricably linked with the major “sys-
temic questions” of international development. These “systemic questions” concern 
matters of coherence on a European and a global level, but also of different intra-
national policies. A broader definition of effectiveness clearly goes beyond the domain 
set by the Paris indicators and encompasses all policy areas that have repercussions 
on the goals of development policy. Eventually, the behavior of global players within 
the WTO or the trading policies of the European Union, for instance, is the central 
policy arena in which the effectiveness of development efforts is fought (Six 2006: 
27). In this respect, Policy Coherence for Development is rooted in the frustration of 
the aid community that saw its efforts being spoiled by contradictory policies in other 
policy fields. Most prominently this criticism was directed at the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) or to the trade policy of the EU64.  
Although the idea of coherence was already spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty65 of 
the European Community (1992), it was the Millennium Summit in the year 2000 that 
gave fresh wind to the coherence debate. Donor administrations realized that aid 
alone was not enough and that other policies having an effect on development coun-
tries had to be addressed as well. Consequently, the goals formulated at the Summit 
went beyond the realms of development cooperation. This broader scope is probably 
best reflected in Goal 8, which aims at the establishment of a “Global Partnership” 
between industrial and developing countries (Obrovsky 2006: 72). By targeting, for 
instance, the development of a “trading system that is open, rule-based, predictable 
                                                            
62  Petermann (2013: 115) emphasizes that “a donor’s external trade policy looses credibility if the govern-
ment pursues contradictory strategies like PSD and the tying of aid in the same recipient country”.  
63  The Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen came to be known in particular for his contribution to macroeconomic 
modeling and economic policy decision-making. Interestingly, Tinbergen was also Chairman of the United 
Nations Committee on Development Planning and estimated, based on his macroeconomic models, “… 
the capital inflows developing economies needed to achieve desirable growth rates.” Based on his find-
ings he proposed a target for concessional and non-concessional official flows together of 0.75 % of 
GDP. Based on his idea the Pearson Commission later adopted the target of 0.7 % of GDP to be invest-
ed in development assistance, which is up to today the target against which donor efforts are assessed 
(OECD/DAC 2002: 1, 2). 
64  For a detailed discussion of policy fields that are particularly likely to interfere with each other, see for 
instance the OECD publication (2005a): “Policy Coherence for Development. Promoting Institutional 
Good Practice“, in particular Box 7.1. on page 164.  
65  In the treaty it states: “... the Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130U 
[which refers to development cooperation] in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect de-
veloping countries” (see Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992). The 2005 “Eu-
ropean Consensus on Development“ further upgraded PCD and attributed it a central role in European 
Development Cooperation (for a more detailed discussion see Keijzer 2012: 2 et seqq.).  
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and non-discriminatory“66, MDG 8 appeals to the necessity of coherent policies for 
development. This idea of a “Global Partnership” also made its way into the 2002 
Monterrey Consensus on financing for development, in which development is referred 
to as a shared responsibility (United Nations 2003: 38). “Developing countries com-
mitted themselves to good governance, good policies and conflict resolution”, while 
developed countries declared their commitment to increased and more effective aid 
and policy coherence (OECD 2005: 22; FRIDE 2008: 3).  
Given the DAC’s mandate, discussions about PCD on both the European and the 
international level are very much steered by the OECD. This political mandate was 
agreed upon in 2002 and outlined in the so-called “OECD Action for a Shared Devel-
opment Agenda” (DCD/DAC, Final Communiqué 16/05/2002). In 2008 this mandate 
was enlarged with the adoption of a ministerial declaration on PCD, which put special 
emphasis on the need to invest in measuring impacts of OECD members’ policies and 
evaluate results achieved through joined efforts to promote PCD. Since 2000 PCD 
has also been given a more prominent role in the Peer Review Process67 by paying 
attention to efforts made with regard to overall policy changes (Keijzer 2012: 3; 
OECD 2005: 39, 135 et seqq.). Most recently the ‘OECD Strategy on Development’, 
presented in 2012, has stressed the importance of promoting PCD and has men-
tioned “strengthening OECD Members’ capacities to design policies consistent 
with development” on top of the listed options for action (OECD 2012: 9).  
Despite this accumulation of recent events centering on coherence, it goes without 
saying that the term policy coherence and even the claim of harmonizing political 
decision making with development agendas are much older than the concept of PCD 
(Obrovsky/Schlögl 2011: 11). Borrowed from physics and philosophy68, the term 
‘coherence’ has not entered social and economic sciences until very recently 
(Picciotto 2004: 4). In combination with the term development, the newly created 
buzzword Policy Coherence for Development found its way into development dis-
course and was coined by the DAC in the early 1990ies (OECD 2005: 39 et seqq.). 
Despite the vast amount of reports on PCD, an official definition of the concept does 
not exist (OECD 2005: 27). It can broadly be defined in the following way: “Policy 
coherence […] involves the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policies 
across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving 
the defined objective” (DAC Guidelines for Poverty Reduction 2001; quoted in 
OECD 2005: 28). This also implies that donors work “[…] to ensure that the objec-
                                                            
66  For more detailed information on the eight MDG Goals, see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 
67  Roughly every four years each DAC member is peer reviewed by examiners of two fellow DAC member 
states. The aim of these reviews is on the one hand to show the reviewed country areas of improvement of 
its policies and on the other hand to share good practices (see OECD/DCD Homepage).  
68  While in physics the term is used to refer to “the force by which molecules are held together, the ‘con-
stant phase relationship’ of waves or the viscosity of a substance“, philosophical “coherence theory holds 
that ‘the truth of a proposition consists in the coherence of that proposition with all other true proposi-
tions’“ (Picciotto 2005: 323). 
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tives and results of a government’s (or institution’s) development policies are not 
undermined by other policies of that government (or institution), which impact on 
developing countries, and that these other policies support development objectives, 
where feasible” (OECD 2005: 28). 
More advanced definitions of Policy Coherence for Development differentiate be-
tween internal coherence, intra-country coherence, inter-donor coherence and donor-
partner coherence (van der Hoeven 2010: 30 et seqq.). 
 
Box 3: Dimensions of Policy Coherence for Development According to Picciotto  
 
Picciotto (2004: 8) defines the different dimensions of coherence as follows: 
(i)  internal coherence: the consistency between goals and objectives, modalities and proto-
cols of a policy or program carried out by an OECD government in support of develop-
ment (e.g. aid) 
(ii)  intra-country coherence: the consistency among aid and non-aid policies of an OECD 
government in terms of their contribution to development 
(iii)  inter-donor coherence: the consistency of aid and non-aid policies across OECD coun-
tries in terms their contribution to development 
(iv) donor-recipient coherence: the consistency of policies adopted by rich and poor countries 
to achieve shared development objectives”  
 
While traditionally development evaluation put its focus on type (i) coherence, that is 
the alignment of means with goals in development assistance, increasing emphasis is 
now put on managing for results, which has led to greater preoccupation with type   
(ii) coherence – also called “whole of government” approach. In parallel, the diversifi-
cation of actors within the aid system was accompanied by a greater need to reduce 
aid transaction costs entailed by uncoordinated actions and resulted in calls for type 
(iii) coherence through harmonization. Furthermore, as the limits of aid conditionality 
became more apparent and ownership became a main pillar of development effective-
ness, donor-recipient coherence came to the fore (Picciotto 2004: 8). This descrip-
tion of the different dimensions of coherence reminds us of the wording used in the 
Paris Declaration (in particular ownership, alignment, harmonization) and illustrates 
once more that the debates and concepts discussed in this chapter are intertwined 
with each other.  
With regard to implementation, the Commitment to Development Index (CDI), pub-
lished on a yearly basis by the Center for Global Development, (OECD 2005: 134 et 
seqq.), reveals that as with other non-binding recommendations and declarations, the 
implementation of the concept of PCD proves difficult69. Existing hierarchies of policy 
                                                            
69  In its publication “Policy Coherence for Development: Promoting Institutional Good Practice”, the OECD, 
for instance, addressed implementation difficulties with regard to the MDGs and international commit-
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fields might be disadvantageous to development policy and hence hinder the full 
deployment of PCD. In this respect Christiansen and Rogerson stress that coherence 
presents not only opportunities, but also threats for development goals. They state:  
“This is not necessarily a win-win game, and development may well lose to more 
powerful domestic political constituencies. Like it or not, the aid industry is part of 
this broader context, both defined by and constitutive of it. The current debate 
around ‘harmonisation’ of donor policies and systems, for example, is part of the aid 
subcomponent of the coherence agenda and needs to be seen as such. Progress in 
some of its key dimensions, such as aid untying, presupposes the demand for paral-
lel policy changes elsewhere” (Christiansen/Rogerson 2006: 14; emphasis added). 
That these parallel changes are not always easily provoked can, to a certain extent, be 
exemplified by policies for tied aid credits and associated financing. The hierarchy of 
policy areas and their respective ministries and the predominance of national interests 
and resulting deadlocks in negotiations are reflected at several occasions in Partici-
pants’ negotiations. The Austrian example – tied aid credits are dealt with by the Ex-
port Credit Agency OeKB (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank) – illustrates the importance 
of studying both, the institutional split of competences in a given country and the 
potential incoherence resulting from the international policy framework for tied aid 
credits. Quotes like the following extract form Austrian parliamentary documentation 
demonstrate the problematique:  
“Das Exportfinanzierungskomitee (EFK) agiert nach den internationalen Richtlinien 
für staatlich unterstützte Exportkredite. Daraus ergibt sich, daß eine Kohärenz mit 
dem 3-Jahresprogramm der österreichischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nicht 
immer gegeben sein kann. Das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten 
(Sektion Entwicklungshilfe) ist im EFK mit Sitz und Stimme vertreten” 
(Parlamentarische Materialien 1997, 3369/AB XX.GP: 2; emphasis added).  
The international guidelines for officially supported export credits referred to in the 
above quote are spelled out in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Cred-
its. Whether this reference document truly provides the breeding ground for incoher-
ence with development policy goals and how it tries to ensure coherence respectively, 
will be examined in the subsequent Chapters.  
Another related example of implementation difficulties is the afore-mentioned slow 
progress in untying and the exception of food aid from the 2001 Recommendation on 
Untying of Bilateral Development Assistance to Least Developed Countries. Despite 
vivid declarations on paper for increased policy coherence, agriculture – and along 
with it food aid – is neither covered by the 2001 Untying Recommendation nor by the 
                                                                                                                                       
ments in general (OECD 2005: 31). Therein it states that “heads of state sign up to the MDGs and fur-
ther international commitments, but they often face political constraints on ratification and implementation” 
(quoted in Obrovsky/Schlögl 2011: 34). 
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Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. This loophole prepares the 
breeding ground for incoherent policies (one might just think of the potentially per-
verse effects of agricultural subsidies in the EU on local production in developing 
countries). In this respect, mixed credits and agricultural credits are explicitly referred 
to in the DAC’s Illustrative Checklist on Policy Coherence for Poverty Reduction 
which identifies policy areas requiring due diligence with regard to coherence (OECD 
2001: 103).  
While traditional official export credits are addressed in most articles dealing with 
PCD and have repeatedly been the target of criticism by NGOs70 (e.g. in the form of 
letters to the Export Credit Division of the OECD), tied aid credits raise concern about 
coherence on yet another level. Given their proclaimed development motivation and 
the resulting ODA-eligibility, the question is not only whether tied aid policies are 
coherent with other policy areas, but whether they in themselves are consistent with 
the principles and procedures of development policy. In this respect, it is above all the 
internal coherence of aid policies that will be of interest here. 
To conclude let us come back to Tinbergen, who shaped the idea of “each goal, its 
policy”. According to Tinbergen each of these somewhat separated goals requires 
policies especially designed to achieve the respective goal (Tinbergen 1986: 14). 
Considering that in the case of tied aid credits (at least) two policy goals are to be 
achieved with a single instrument, we will later have to ask ourselves to which extent 
the Arrangement equally provides the tools for achieving both – or to speak with the 
language of the Participants whether the guidelines are sufficiently “balanced”. 
3.2. Critical Remarks 
This chapter has departed from the three core features of tied aid credits (tied to 
procurement in the donor country, concessional and provided in form of a loan rather 
than a grant) and put them in the context of OECD framed discourses on good devel-
opment aid. Broadly speaking, three different, but highly interlinked debates have 
been identified: the aid effectiveness debate as incarnated in the Paris Declaration, 
long-lasting discussions on and hesitant steps towards the untying of aid as well as 
the call for Policy Coherence for Development.  
In a first step the evolution of the aid effectiveness debate and its culmination in the 
2005 Paris Declaration was examined. The principles on aid effectiveness – harmoni-
zation, alignment, ownership, mutual accountability and managing for results – will be 
                                                            
70  Especially ECA-Watch tries to attract public attention to perverse effects of export credit practices on 
human rights and social and environmental developments and advocates for reform of ECA practices (see 
http://www.eca-watch.org/). Calls of ECA-Watch for bringing ECA policies in line with social, economic 
and environmental goals are best summarized in the so-called Jakarta-Declaration, endorsed by over 300 
NGOs (http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/jakartadec.html).  
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taken up in the assessment of the regulatory framework for tied aid credits from the 
angle of development policy. 
After an examination of the wide debates on aid effectiveness, one specific feature of 
tied aid credits, namely their tying status was discussed in greater detail. This analysis 
demonstrated that on the level of official statements, a general consensus exists with-
in the “donor community” that untied aid is the better type of aid. Following this “tech-
nical discussion” of Paris Principles and the tying status of aid, the ambitious concept 
of Policy Coherence for Development was analyzed. The latter calls for a more “holis-
tic” approach to development policy, taking into account interferences with other 
policy areas potentially thwarting development co-operation efforts.  
All three of the presented “debates” give us partial answers with regard to the poten-
tial of tied aid credits as an instrument of development policy. Without wanting to 
anticipate, this literature analysis suggests that the nature of tied aid credits is at least 
partially at odds with today’s DAC consensus on what constitutes good development 
cooperation. This stems primarily from the fact that these concessional loans are tied 
to procurement in the donor country and thus undermine efforts to improve the own-
ership of recipient countries and might hamper the development of local/regional 
economies, which in turn is thought to decrease the positive impact of the invested 
money. 
The subsequent assessment of the aid quality of tied aid credits against these largely 
OECD homemade criteria shall not be interpreted as naïve belief in the pertinence of 
these principles and recommendations. Also, a smooth implementation of them is not 
taken for granted. However, a detailed discussion of the phases of implementation of 
the different guidelines is not considered to be fruitful for the purposes of this study, 
which at this point is more interested in the making of the underlying discourses. 
Progress made in implementation will be more relevant on a case study level.  
The call for greater effectiveness as embodied in the Paris Declaration implicitly pre-
sumes a mutual and uncontested understanding among all actors of what aid shall 
achieve. Yet, as demonstrated in particular in the subchapter on untying, motivations 
behind and purposes of aid are manifold. This raises questions with regard to what is 
considered greater “effectiveness” of aid (and subsequently on how to measure it 
appropriately). UNIDO’s Evaluation Office, for instance, defines effectiveness as “the 
extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are 
expected to be achieved“ (UNIDO 2008: vi)71. Taking such an interpretation of effec-
tiveness as starting point shows that defining principles of how to increase the effec-
tiveness of development aid, presumes a mutual understanding of all actors on the 
very goals and purpose of their aid efforts. This assumption, however, masks diverging 
                                                            
71  A detailed account of the DAC’s criteria for international development evaluations is given by Thomaz 
Chianca (2008). 
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interests behind aid and the multiplicity of goals aspired. As precisely this assumption 
is not fulfilled, Christiansen and Rogerson argue that if aid “in practice serves a wide 
range of interests and objectives, then assessing its fitness in terms of any single 
purpose is of limited utility“ (Christiansen/Rogerson 2006: 13). Summing up, Christi-
ansen and Rogerson’s argue that improving the way in which aid is delivered presup-
poses an examination of why this aid is delivered72. Whenever we talk about motiva-
tions of actors behind certain practices and behavior, we, however, get into hardly 
tangible waters.  
Bringing motivations behind aid to the spotlight means addressing the political roots 
of the aid business. According to Nilima Gulrajani – a scholar at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science – current OECD/DAC debates on aid, however, fail 
to do so. In this respect, she sees the aid effectiveness debate and its manifestation in 
the Paris Declaration as an illustration of aid reformers’ attempts to push for reforms 
that are meant to stay beyond political dynamics (Gulrajani 2011: 209). Other schol-
ars also voice similar concern about the de-politicization entailed by the Paris Princi-
ples. With regard to one of the pillars of the Paris Declaration, Rosalind Eyben, for 
example, states that “… harmonisation becomes a vice when it strengthens long-
standing donor habits of pretending that poverty is not political” (Eyben 2010: 219). 
Concern over the de-politization of the intrinsically political action of aid-giving is also 
raised by Clemens Six. He recognizes that the Paris Declaration addresses decades 
of deficits of international development cooperation, but also warns of the degradation 
of essentially political questions to techno-administrative levels by the Paris principles 
and indicators (Six 2012: 27). This criticism is linked to the meaning given to aid 
effectiveness by the Paris Declaration through which the “... prescriptions for better 
delivery and management of foreign aid are divorced from political dynamics and 
relations that impinge, for better or worse, on aid” (Gulrajani 2011: 209). Accordingly, 
the Declaration fails to provide “... either a tool for assessing change in aid relation-
ships towards the new principles or a tool with which recipient countries can pres-
sure donors to do so”. As result, the commitments made in Paris in 2005 remain on a 
technocratic level without any means to bring about more fundamental changes (Fra-
ser/Whitfield 2009: 89). 
In a similar vein, Gulrajani argues that by defining aid effectiveness in terms of 5 prin-
ciples reflected in 12 indicators, the Paris Declaration reduces aid effectiveness to a 
techno-administrative matter and hence largely ignores power structures and politics, 
which are inherent to all aid relations. Considering that, for instance, reporting prac-
tices of the indicators have been subject to political dynamics on both donor and 
recipient side, Gulrajani concludes that the Paris Declaration represents an “[…] un-
                                                            
72  Inspired by such criticism especially civil society actors in the aid community try to shift the focus from aid 
to development effectiveness (Kindornay/Morton 2009) – a broadening of the concept especially ad-
dressed in Busan 2011.  
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helpful ideal of how aid could be better managed as it appears to exaggerate the 
ease with which aid can be reformed to deliver development outcomes”. In this re-
spect, the Declaration on Aid Effectiveness figures as prime example of the aid com-
munity’s conviction that business managerialism, as she calls it, is the main vehicle for 
improving the effectiveness of foreign aid (Gulrajani 2011: 209). A more profound 
transformation73 of the aid system is not envisaged. Similarly, Owen Barder describes 
the changes implemented with Paris and Accra as a “planning mindset” and argues 
that long coordination meetings between donors and recipient countries will not 
change the institutional and political constraints under which aid agencies operate 
(Barder 2009: 1)74. Political answers to overarching questions such as coherence or 
ecological sustainability are essential (pre)conditions under which “operative details” 
such as harmonization and alignment only become truly meaningful (Six 2006: 27). 
The concept of Policy Coherence for Development is to be interpreted as a more 
holistic approach to the aid effectiveness debate and can – at least in its conceptual 
ideal – be considered an attempt of shedding light on the “political embedding” of 
development (aid). In this respect, Policy Coherence for Development in its multiple 
dimensions can be considered a strategic approach by means of which the MDGs 
shall be better and faster achieved. While the Paris Declaration aims foremost at 
increasing efficiency through harmonization of aid activities and through alignment of 
donor strategies with recipient policies, PCD can enlarge the political room for ma-
neuver and thus widen the potential for efficiency increase. Without growing efforts to 
implement the concept of PCD, the principles of harmonization and alignment will 
remain processes limited to the optimization of development cooperation, which as 
such will then be limited by the lack of a political framework (Obrovsky 2006: 79). In 
that sense PCD reminds us that development is not a mere business undertaking, but 
an intrinsically political act.  
  
                                                            
73  Fraser and Whitfield (2009: 89) similarly criticize that the Paris Declaration only scratches the surface. 
They interpret this as the logic result of the functioning of the “donor community”. They state: “Perhaps we 
should not be surprised that the Paris process has not promoted radical reform of the international aid 
system. The key institution driving it forward is the DAC, a forum run and dominated by the interests of 
donor countries”. A more inclusive forum to discuss development assistance, providing developing and 
emerging countries with a means to express their views, would, for instance, be the Development 
Cooperation Forum within the UN Economic and Social Council. 
74  According to Barder (2009: 2) moving from a planning rationale to a system of collaborative market would 
be a step towards overcoming the challenges of the aid system. He uses the term collaborative market as 
a “shorthand for a market governed by collective regulatory agreements and complemented by symmetric 
and accessible information. Specific measures to move towards a collaborative market could include 
unbundling funding from design and implementation of aid programs, to create explicit markets for aid 
delivery; improving international competition in the supply of development services; new standards for aid 
transparency; mechanisms to allow aid beneficiaries to provide feedback about the services they receive; 
penalties for negative spill-overs (such as entry fees to discourage proliferation) and subsidies for positive 
spill-overs (such as independent and rigorous evaluation); and the establishment of a more effective 
regulatory mechanism, backed if necessary by treaty”. 
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Being fully aware of these shortcomings of and criticisms on recent OECD framed 
discourses on development aid, they still remain the most appropriate – or better put, 
the most tangible – benchmark against which the intended assessment of the devel-
opmental fitness of tied aid credits can be made. Taking DAC concepts as starting 
point is appropriate not only because of the Committee’s function as clearing house 
for definitions on what aid is and should be (FRIDE 2008: 3), but also because it 
allows to make statements about the OECD’s internal coherence, i.e. whether the 
Organization lives an example of its own concept of Policy Coherence for Develop-
ment. Furthermore, keeping the addressed criticism in mind helps placing potential 
criticism on the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (and the way it 
has been negotiated) in the broader development context. This might contribute to 
disclosing some of this criticism as “systemic” rather than as individual cases. 
Having these OECD framed discourses in mind, the next chapter will turn to the regu-
latory framework covering tied aid credits to find more answers regarding the weight 
of development goals and policy in the design of the instrument. This inquiry into the 
roots of tied aid credits will lead way back into the jungle of the export credit world of 
the late 1970ies.  
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
4. An Introduction to the International 
Regulatory Framework 
Keeping the recent OECD discourses in mind and with first hypotheses on the devel-
opmental orientation of tied aid credits in our baggage, we will now travel back to the 
roots of this instrument. To understand the history of tied aid credits some introducto-
ry words on the current state of affairs will be provided in the following paragraphs. 
The aim thereof is to give an introduction to the complex sets of rules for tied aid 
credits, which have evolved over almost four decades. 
In a first step the status quo of the regulatory framework that determines tied aid 
credits will be presented briefly. This shall help understand why in the following so 
much attention is paid to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. 
Departing from that brief description the subsequent chapter will ask how this “Con-
sensus” on official support for export credits including tied aid credits came into be-
ing. Before going into Arrangement details and their historical genesis the reader shall 
be given a little tour through the institutional scenery of export credit and tied aid 
financing. This chapter gives a first grasp of the overlapping sets of rules existing in 
the field of official support for export credits. For that purpose this chapter will locate 
the Arrangement within the international trading system. It will touch upon its comple-
mentary function in relation to WTO legislation and EU law, its link to DAC principles, 
as well as its legal character. Finally, the main mechanisms and provisions of the Ar-
rangement will be presented. 
Most prominently export credits and tied aid credits are regulated by the so-called 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, hereafter simply referred to as 
the Arrangement. The Arrangement, however, has interfaces with several other sets of 
rules and guidelines. Touching upon these embeddings of the Arrangement into other 
policy frameworks is not only interesting for its own sake, but crucial if one wants to 
assess the afore-mentioned attempt to create Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD). 
With Figure 4.1, Evans illustrates the complexity of institutional arrangements govern-
ing trade finance75 and along with that tied aid credits. The structure of this chapter 
follows, in essence, Evan’s table on the “Dimensions of Official Trade Finance”, but 
shifts the emphasis from trade finance to development finance. The three most im-
                                                            
75  It shall, however, not be forgotten that all these provisions only apply to forms of export credits in which 
the state is involved, the growing private market for export credits is not covered. In the following exclu-
sively those export credits that contain elements of official support will be treated.  
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portant forums where officially supported export credits are being discussed are the 
OECD (the Export Credit Group and the loosely linked Participants Group), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) as well as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
While in some areas the activities of the respective institutions overlap, loopholes exist 
in other instances (as the case of untied aid will show) (Evans 2003: 6 et seqq.).  
The figure below shows that in the case of mixed credits and tied Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) the Helsinki rules – core part of the Arrangement – overlap 
with DAC guidelines. This in itself is a manifestation of the fact that tied aid credits 
have been a matter of concern for different groups out of different reasons ranging 
somewhere on the spectrum between containment of aid respectively trade distortion. 
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Official Trade Finance 
 
Source: Evans 2003: 5 
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4.1. The Participants Group and “their” Arrangement 
Following figure 4.1 this section will give a short introduction to the trade finance rules 
laid down in the Arrangement in general and its Helsinki disciplines in particular. Un-
derstanding the institutional framework, in which this rule set is embedded, will later 
be of importance when its compatibility with the DAC’s development policy standards 
will be assessed. 
4.1.1. Purpose and General Provisions of the Arrangement 
The Arrangement is the regulatory framework for officially supported export credits 
and tied aid credits. Its scope covers any form of official support for the export of 
goods or services, or both, including financial leases. This means that the provisions 
explained hereafter only apply to official support provided by governments or by insti-
tutions acting on behalf of a government whereas private forms of export promotion 
are excluded from the provisions. Forms of official support, which are defined by the 
Arrangement (article 5) are export credit guarantee or insurance, direct credit/ 
financing and refinancing, interest rate support, or any combination of the listed. The 
Arrangement applies to officially supported export credits of a repayment term of a 
minimum of 2 years (OECD 1998: 17). 
The main purpose of the Arrangement is to limit market distortions created by officially 
supported export subsidies. This shall be achieved by fostering competition among 
exporters, meaning that competitors should compete in quality and price, rather than 
on the best financial terms and conditions (OECD 1998: 17). Limitations on the terms 
and conditions of officially supported export credits are set through defining minimum 
interest rates, risk fees and maximum repayment terms. In addition, the Arrangement 
regulates the provision of tied aid credits. The part of the Arrangement which particu-
larly addresses tied aid credits is called the Helsinki Package. It comprises rules, 
which aim at limiting the use of concessional financing for projects that otherwise 
could be financed on commercial terms (financial viability). These are usually projects 
which are commercially viable76. Whether a project is eligible for an officially support-
ed export credit can be assessed with the help of two key tests on commercial viabil-
ity set out in the Helsinki Package. Furthermore, in 1996 an Ex Ante Guidance for 
Tied Aid was published to give additional practical guidance to potential exporters 
and financial institutions in assessing whether a project can be expected to be eligible 
for tied aid financing or whether it should be financed on commercial or Arrangement 
terms. 
The Arrangement is not a legal act of the OECD. Derogations of the rules and excep-
tions are technically possible, since there is no official body which enforces the rules. 
Peer pressure appears to be the force disciplining the Participants’ compliance with 
                                                            
76  OECD, export credits: http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/about.htm 
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the rules. Within the scope of the Arrangement procedures for prior notification, con-
sultation, and information exchange are in place. Exceptions and derogations of the 
rules, as well as tied aid offers are continuously being reviewed by the Participants77. 
The core Arrangement text is supplemented by various sector understandings, which 
provide specific provisions for projects in the following sectors: nuclear power plants, 
civil aircraft, ships, and renewable energy, climate change mitigation and water pro-
jects. Military equipment is not covered by the disciplines of the Arrangement. Despite 
extensive negotiations for including agricultural commodities, the Participants have 
also failed to incorporate these in the Arrangement up to today (TAD/PG(2013)1).  
4.1.2. The Masters of the Arrangement 
As explained above officially supported export credits are dealt with in two separate 
groups, linked in different ways to the OECD, more precisely to the Export Credit 
Division: the Participants to the Arrangement (Participants Group) and the Export 
Credit Group. According to Nicola Bonucci, former Director of the OECD’s Legal 
Directorate, the unusual relationship between these two groups is a specificity difficult 
to understand as an outsider (Bonucci 2011: 52). This diffuse relationship and blurry 
split of competences between the Export Credit Group and the Participants requires 
some explanations. They should contribute to a better understanding of how national 
actors grouped themselves to seek political answers to and put in place international 
regulations for what were thought to be harmful protectionist subsidy policies.  
Although the first version of the Arrangement, adopted in 1978, had initially been 
drafted by members of the Export Credit Group, in the very year – following a Com-
muniqué from the Ministerial Council Meeting – a new body, the Participants Group 
(PG), was established and given the task of monitoring and developing further the 
Arrangement text. This informal group, “[…] while not an OECD body, would meet in 
the OECD and be serviced by the OECD secretariat” (West 1998: 22). Due to this 
loose link to the OECD, the Participants are not legally bound by the OECD rules of 
procedures. This allows them to invite non-OECD members to join the Arrangement – 
as it was the case when Brazil signed the sector understanding for civil aircraft. The 
Arrangement text explicitly states that other “OECD Members and non-members may 
be invited to become Participants by the current Participants”78 (TAD/PG(2012)9: 5). 
This also reflects concerns of the Participants over how to adapt to changing realities 
and newly emerging competitors – a concern voiced by the majority of our interview 
partners (without specific questions directed at this topic from our side).  
                                                            
77  OECD, export credits: http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/about.htm 
78  Brazil was the first non-OECD member-state to become a Participant to parts of the Arrangement when it 
signed the new Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft in 2007. Negotiations leading up 
to this signature had been surrounded by the so-called “Embraer case” – a WTO dispute case between 
Brazil and Canada. For further information see Sanchez 2008. 
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As of January 2013 there are nine Participants to the Arrangement. These are:  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Swit-
zerland and the United States (TAD/PG(2012)9: 5).  
In Participants’ meetings the European Commission represents EU member states79 – 
another peculiarity that results from the informal status of the Participants Group 
(Bonucci 2010: 52). In addition to the above mentioned participants, Israel and Turkey 
are observers to Participants’ meetings. Also other organizations, the International 
Union of Credit and Investment Insurers (the Berne Union80), the Secretariat of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) are invited to participate “when issues of mutual interest 
are discussed“81. 
The parallel existence of a so-called Export Credit Group (ECG)82 might be somewhat 
misleading. The ECG does influence and is related to the Participants’ work, but the 
ECG – contrary to what its name might suggest – does not hold the competence over 
the Arrangement. Instead, the ECG deals with complementary issues such as anti-
bribery, environmental standards or sustainable lending83.  
While, strictly speaking, the Participants are not part of the OECD, the Export Credit 
Group, founded as early as in 1963, is an ordinary OECD Working Party (albeit with 
somewhat unusual reporting practices) under the Trade and Agriculture Directorate84. 
Due to its direct link to the TAD and the formal character of the group, EU member-
states participate with their “own vote and voice” (Bonucci 2010: 52). 
The work done by the two groups is usually complementary – a feature that results 
from the fact that generally the same people/country delegates represent a state or 
Export Credit Agency in both ECG and Participants’ meetings (with the exception of 
EU countries which are represented by the Commission in Participants’ meetings). A 
brief glance at the lists of participants in both the Participants’ and ECG meetings 
                                                            
79  This results from the fact that the Commission holds the competence for trading issues of its member 
states – a split of competences that came into effect after a long dispute, especially between France and 
the Commission had been settled on the question of competences (Geberth 1998: 31). 
80  The Berne Union, formally known as The International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, was 
founded in 1934 as a forum for the exchange of information on the export credit industry and on specific 
countries. Its main purpose is to design sound principles of export credit insurance and maintenance of 
discipline in the terms of credit in international trade (Kuhn et al. 1995: 35). Unlike at OECD meetings, the 
Berne Union brings together export credit agencies alone, that is guardian authorities are not represented 
as would be the case at OECD meetings (Kuhn et al. 1995: 6). Consequently, discussions on some poli-
cy issues are limited (Kuhn et al. 1995: 13). Furthermore the Berne Union also includes export credit 
agencies from non-OECD countries (Kuhn et al. 1995: 6). 
81  Additional information can be found at http://www.oecd.org/tad/exportcredits/participants.htm 
82  The full name of the ECG is “Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees”.  
83  Sustainable lending is a topic originating from the World Bank and the IMF; in 2008 OECD members 
adopted sustainable lending principles for official export credits; for the Press Release see 
http://www.oecd.org/general/oecdcountriesagreesustainablelendingprinciplesforofficialexportcredits.htm 
84 Formally called Trade Directorate, hence the abbreviation TD used in most archive documents.  
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(attached to each Aide-Memoire) shows that usually representatives of either the 
Ministry of Finance and/or of the respective Export Credit Agency participate in meet-
ings and negotiations (often held in the same week).  
While no clear-cut rules exist determining which topics are to be discussed in either 
the ECG or the Participants Group (Interview VII), some norms and practices have 
evolved over the years. One of our interview partners of the Export Credit Division 
describes the distribution of competences as follows: “The Participants deal with 
financial disciplines in a wider sense and the ECG deals with underwriting prac-
tices and non-financial disciplines, so the ECG sets the rules, for instance, for envi-
ronmental assessment, it will discuss rules on combating bribery, and such things” 
(Interview VII). This appraisal corresponds with the description found on the official 
homepage of the ECG, which says that the group “is responsible for discussing and 
progressing work on good governance issues, such as anti-bribery measures, envi-
ronmental and social due diligence, and sustainable lending”85.  
4.1.3. Legal Status of the Arrangement 
The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits is often referred to as the 
“OECD Arrangement” (see for instance the Figure 4.1 by Evans 2003: 5). Strictly 
speaking, it is, however, not an “act of the Organization” [OECD], but rather an “ar-
rangement between certain countries which are all Members of the OECD” (Ray 
1998: 33). It has already been mentioned above, however, that OECD membership is 
not imperative. Although the Arrangement text is to be found on the OECD homepage 
and the Council provides the Participants’ budget, the Arrangement “is owned” by the 
Participants and the “OECD serves as a mere administrative home” (Levit 2004: 77). 
Several observers such as Ray (1998: 3) and Bonucci (2011: 49) argue that the legal 
status of the Arrangement – also considered a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” – is deliber-
ately ambiguous and not too tight86. Since the disciplines are non-binding, the Ar-
rangement is considered “soft law” and its Participants feel politically bound rather 
than legally obliged (Bonucci 2011: 50, 51). 
Despite the loose link of the Participants to the OECD and the soft law character of 
the Arrangement, Richard Woodward considers export credits an area where “legal 
governance”87 of the OECD takes precedence. While in general, the role of the 
                                                            
85  For the section on export credits see: http://www.oecd.org/tad/exportcredits/ecg.htm 
86  Although the OECD Council and the Council of Ministers have legal instruments at their disposal, soft 
instruments such as recommendations, declaration, arrangements or understanding are used way more 
frequently by the Organization (Martens/Jakobi 2010b: 6 et seqq.).   
87  The appropriateness of speaking of truly “legal governance” might be questioned considering the 
“toothlessness“ of the Arrangement (as one of our interview partners from the ECG put it; similar expres-
sions used in literature to describe the relative lack of “hard instruments for enforcement” are “talking 
shop” or “debating society” (Martens/Jakobi 2010b: 6). This, however, does not devaluate the core argu-
ment of Woodward’s observation, being that the rules are set by the OECD and not e.g. the WTO 
(Woodward 2009: 85). The author does not explain his interpretation of this term legal governance. Here 
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OECD in the field of trade policy is one of supporting the WTO and the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in norm building processes, 
it sets the “rules” itself in the case of export credits (Woodward 2009: 85). Existing 
literature does not answer the question as to why this precedence occurred in the first 
place and why export credits were not from the very onset the domain of GATT or why 
the authority over official export credits was not transferred to the WTO later.  
One of our interview partners affiliated with the Export Credit Division shared with us 
his hypothesis on this matter and presented two reasons why the Arrangement was 
negotiated by the Participants and not the WTO. Firstly, the authority of the Arrange-
ment over export credits results from the simple fact that at the time it was negotiated 
the WTO had not yet been set up and its predecessor, the GATT, was concerned 
more with competitiveness issues and not with broader trade policy (Interview VI).  
Secondly, it was, in the view of our interview partner, negotiated by the Participants 
and not in a more inclusive framework out of political calculation. The following quote 
illustrates the political reasoning stressed by our interview partner:  
“So the donors, there is a strong view on this in the US and I have a strong view 
that the donors should control the discipline. Because you know it’s coming out of 
donor tax payers’ money, you know, he who provides the money should have the 
say in how it is used. And the recipients may have mixed feelings but in the end 
there is a financial incentive to try to get as much as they can and so not to be so 
anti-subsidy“ (Interview VI)88.  
The assumption of a circumvention of the GATT/WTO out of political tactics is also 
reflected in Richard Woodward’s analysis of the functioning of the OECD, albeit 
formulated in a more diplomatic manner. According to him, states negotiate legal 
agreements (in our case rather an informal agreement with elements of hard law) at an 
OECD level (in our case a group loosely linked to the OECD), because it enables 
them to deal with issues affecting disproportionately OECD countries. He argues – 
and this could be applied to the export credit case – that “… especially in areas 
where divergences between OECD and non-OECD members would obstruct a 
formal treaty in an international institution with a wider membership” (Woodward 
2009: 72 et seqq.), the OECD figures as negotiation framework. In a similar vein, 
Steven Hall argues that the OECD was chosen as a forum because it “… allowed 
the US to target key tied aid players while excluding potentially obstructive third 
                                                                                                                                       
it is assumed that the emphasis lies more on the governance part, the regulatory role of the OECD in the 
field of export credits. 
88  Early documentation of the discussions on the impact of mixed credits in the DAC Working Party on 
Financial Aspects of Development Assistance in a way feeds arguments like those brought forward by our 
interview partner. In a note by the DAC Secretariat it says that “developing countries draw substantial 
benefit from the subsidisation of export credits” (DAC/FA(81)1: 17). In another note they are even con-
sidered the sole beneficiaries from such policies. However, in later DAC/FA documentation it becomes 
clear that these benefits might be rather short-term effects that only occur in case of true “additionality” of 
the resources provided in the form of mixed credits. 
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parties. …. More importantly, confining negotiations to the OECD precluded the 
presence of aid recipient countries. Such states benefiting from aid diversion into 
export promotion and donor competition over terms would have a strong incentive to 
block agreement” (Hall 2011: 660 et seqq.; emphasis added).  
Despite its legal softness the Arrangement seems to have been working effectively 
over a considerable period of time. To some degree compliance with the Arrangement 
might be due to the legal mechanisms induced to the Arrangement as a consequence 
of its integration into other legal frameworks, above all into EU law and GATT respec-
tively WTO law.  
Since most EU legislation on export credits is based on texts elaborated within the 
Export Credit Division of the OECD, in particular the Arrangement, the latter became 
legally binding for a vast majority of the Participants Group. The main EU-internal 
legislation dealing with export credits is laid down in the “Council Directive 98/29/EC 
on harmonization of the main provisions concerning export credit insurance for 
transactions with medium and long-term cover”. This directive is based on Articles 
132 and 133 of the “Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union” and spells out common principles for insurance and guarantee ar-
rangements, premia and cover policies89. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 132 states the following: “1. Without prejudice to obligations 
undertaken by them within the framework of other international organizations, Mem-
ber States shall progressively harmonize the systems whereby they grant aid for 
exports to third countries, to the extent necessary to ensure that competition between 
undertakings of the Community is not distorted“ (EU 2006 – essentially no changes 
made with Lisbon Treaty). This paragraph explicitly deals with aid for exports to third 
countries only and hence does not include intra-Union trade. The latter is covered 
primarily by EU law on state aid90 (Martenczuk 2008: 182).  
4.2. WTO Legislation 
“Up to now development aid policies have been immune  
from any scrutiny of compatibility with free trade rules” 
(La Chimia 2004: 7) 
As illustrated by Evan’s table presented earlier in this chapter, in some areas the activ-
ities of the Participants (and the OECD) overlap with rules and practices of the World 
                                                            
89  Documentation of discussions on officially supported export credits in the European Parliament; see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010-0364&language=EN 
90  After the then EU Competition Commissioner in 1991 had “indicated that ‘tied development aid’ should 
be treated as a type of ‘state aid’“ (ActionAid 1999: 13), ActionAid together with 40 other European 
NGOs submitted a legal complaint to the EC on the grounds that aid tying was violating EU competition 
and internal market rules (see http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/71_1_competition_policy.pdf). This ac-
tion was thought to be “crucial to galvanizing the international donor community to untie aid 
(ActionAid/Milligan 2001: 26).  
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Trade Organization91. This can be shown most prominently by the example of the 
Arrangement and the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM) (Evans 2003: 6 et seqq.). 
In 1980 the Subsidies Agreement of the GATT came into effect, prohibiting the use of 
subsidized export credits to gain competitive advantages. Up to the present the 
Agreement, now having the status of a WTO Agreement, has provided a “safe harbor” 
for those export credit practices that are in conformity with the Arrangement. This 
means that violating the Arrangement also entails a violation of the Subsidies Agree-
ment, which provides legal remedies (Mendelowitz 1989: 5). This “safe harbor” is 
most evidently expressed in item (k)92 of the ASCM, which prohibits the use of export 
subsidies with the exception of export credits in conformity with the Arrangement. The 
Agreement text states the following: 
“Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on 
official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are 
parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted 
by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rates 
provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformi-
ty with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this 
Agreement“ (GATT/WTO 1994: 263)93. 
Although not referred to explicitly, with the term “international undertaking” the Ar-
rangement on Officially Supported Export Credits is meant. Bonucci concludes that 
the Arrangement has hence “multilateralised”94 its scope, meaning that any WTO 
member – Participant to the Arrangement or not – “[…] would be deemed to comply 
with WTO obligations” (Bonucci 2010: 51). In this respect, the incorporation into 
WTO law gave international effect to what used to be (and in itself still is) a non-
binding agreement, which has been negotiated by an elitist circle of countries over 
decades. The rather closed and secretive character of this group might thus be con-
fronted with concerns considering the democratic nature of the resulting discipline 
and especially raises questions with regard to the OECD’s self-obliged premise of 
partnership in its relationship with developing countries. The latter were not part of the 
negotiating group during the 1970ies, 1980ies and 1990ies. The question whether 
they were given the chance to propose changes to the Arrangement at a later stage, 
will be addressed in the assessment of the regulatory framework against the backdrop 
of DAC principles and ideas on development (aid).  
                                                            
91  The issue of tied aid and the relation of tying practices with the current WTO legal framework have so far 
been very little studied from a legal perspective. With their article “Addressing Tied Aid: Towards a More 
Development-Oriented WTO?” La Chimia and Arrowsmith (2009) attempt to fill this gap. 
92  Furthermore item (j) contains some provisions on officially supported export credits. 
93  The Agreement can be found under: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 
94  A “way of proceeding“ that – up to the Doha Round – can also be observed in other fields of WTO/GATT 
rule making. 
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4.3. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
Tied aid credits and associated financing have traditionally also been a matter of con-
cern within the DAC and fall due to their proclaimed development goals into its field of 
competence. 
For the purpose of increasing the development policy content of the financing transac-
tions and/or packages in question a Working Party on Financial Aspects of Develop-
ment Assistance (DAC/FA)95 was created within the DAC as early as 1975 
(DCD/DAC/FA(99)6: 5). From the early 1980ies onwards, it was the main task of this 
Working Party to follow and monitor the Participants’ work and to ensure that devel-
opment aspects were considered appropriately in their negotiations (DAC/FA(85)2: 
21). The DAC/FA also took a more active role in regulating tied aid credits. First 
guidelines were adopted already in the 1980ies and continuously developed in paral-
lel to the Participants’ work. The most important ones were the DAC Guiding Princi-
ples for the Use of Aid in Association with Export Credits and Other market Funds 
(1983) and their successor the DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing 
and Tied and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance (1987). The 
DAC/FA’s efforts culminated in the adoption of New Measures in the Field of Tied 
Aid in 1992.  
The overlap of competences, as described above, results from the fact that official 
export credits and tied aid credits, as such both official flows to developing countries, 
are inextricably linked at their origin. Consequently, tied aid credits can only be under-
stood in their relation to export credits. In somewhat broader terms this argument is 
also brought forward in a Note by the DAC Secretariat circulated to the Members of 
the DAC/FA in 1992: “Considered that way from an analytical point of view, tying of 
aid can be viewed as way to in fact establish an official export subsidy to promote 
the own trade or at least to defend the existing national market shares on faraway 
markets. The debate on tying should therefore be placed in the perspective of the 
OECD countries’ export credit support schemes in general” (DCD/DAC/FA(92)8/ 
REV1: para.3; emphasis added).  
                                                            
95  The DAC/FA Group replaced the Working Party on Terms of Aid. According to former DAC-Chairman 
Helmut Führer this took place in 1964 (Führer 1996: 16; OCDE/GD(94)67), documents available, such 
as the above quoted “DAC Review of Working Parties: Draft Report on the Working Party on Financial 
Aspects of Development Assistance, however, suggest otherwise and speak of 1975 as the Group’s in-
ception year.  
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
5. Historical Genesis of the Arrangement on 
Officially Supported Export Credits: Evolution and 
Status Quo of the Tied Aid Disciplines 
With these general provisions in our toolkit, we will now look deeper into a specific 
part of the Arrangement, namely the disciplines on tied aid credits. This chapter 
adopts a historical and somewhat more “descriptive approach”. It aims at tracing tied 
aid credits back to their historical roots. In doing so, the underlying question is wheth-
er tied aid credits originate from a development corner or were designed from an 
export credit finance perspective. Understanding the original motivation is crucial for 
two reasons. Firstly, it explains why the Arrangement’s disciplines on tied aid credits 
are the way they are since they try to disincentive certain practices. Secondly, it par-
tially gives an answer as to whether it is legitimate to consider tied aid credits an 
instrument of development policy. This inquiry of the original motivation behind tied aid 
credits also paves the way for our later analysis with regard to the ODA-eligibility of 
these flows – a concept fundamentally based on the motivation and intention of the 
donor to make a certain transaction.  
Our literature review showed that academic literature on tied aid credits in general 
and their historical genesis in particular was limited. By far the most insightful publica-
tion on the genesis of tied aid credits is John Ray’s book “Managing Official Export 
Credits: The Quest for a Global Regime”, on which this chapter heavily draws. Result-
ing from the unsatisfying number of scientific literature available, the chapter is also 
based on archive footage, primarily on Aide-Memoires of Participants’ meetings as 
well as on Notes by the OECD Secretariat (Trade (and Agriculture) Directorate). This 
is done so as to fill important information gaps. Claims of giving a full historical ac-
count of the events are, however, not made. For the part on motivations driving tied 
aid practices – as such difficult to find in official documentation due to their implicit 
character – analyses of the expert interviews conducted at the OECD will be provid-
ed. 
The account that will be given is also partial in the sense that the focus is put on a 
narrow part of the Arrangement, namely the provisions on tied aid credits. That is also 
why in particular two “packages” – the Wallén and the Helsinki Package – as well as 
the resulting Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid are at the center of interest. While also 
other more “general” provisions of the Arrangement might be relevant for development 
policy, the Wallén and even more so the Helsinki Package are the two rule sets explic-
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itly designed for tied aid credits. In total, four so-called packages96 have been adopt-
ed, which are basically amendments to or revisions of the Arrangement. Other chang-
es made to the Arrangement, like the adoption of sector understandings as well as the 
redrafting of the whole Arrangement text, completed in 1997, are not grouped in 
specific “Packages”. Although highly interesting from a development perspective, the 
attempt and eventual failure to adopt a sector understanding on agriculture will be 
addressed only briefly because an in-depth inquiry would easily fill the pages of an-
other study. This is because the aim is to capture as best as possible development 
policy issues and not necessarily effects of the general Arrangement provisions on 
recipient development. This would have simply gone beyond the scope of this study 
because such an undertaking requires a lot more information from the recipient side.  
Since the Participants have, so to speak, the primacy over the regulation of tied aid 
credits (Evans 2003: 6 et seqq.), the focus of this chapter lies on the work of this 
group. It aims at examining how the Arrangement has evolved and what role develop-
ment aspects played in its formulation and later evolution. Despite this focus on the 
Arrangement, parallel and at time complementary work done within the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) and especially the DAC Working Party on Financial 
Aspects of Development Assistance (DAC/FA) is addressed whenever appropriate. 
After all, these different bodies and their respective work relate to each other and 
cannot be understood in isolation.  
The complexity of the issue demands a high degree of flexibility from the ones study-
ing it. In this respect, this chapter follows John Ray’s book, although some criticism 
has been voiced concerning his approach. One reviewer, for instance, states the 
following: ”However, it may be unavoidable that readers may feel lost. It would make 
the arguments stronger and help carve them into readers' minds if the book had a 
clearer theme“ (Wang 1997: 827). In defense of Ray’s insightful account it is argued 
that this feeling of “being lost” rather results from the hybridity of the instrument and 
the complex regulatory answers to it and is not necessarily result of an author having 
lost track. It will be shown in the course of this chapter that at their roots tied aid 
credits and export credits are inextricably linked. Although first trade consideration 
and then aid consideration will be examined, jumping from export credits to tied aid 
credits as well as from development aid to export promotion is unavoidable at times – 
after all these practices are not worlds apart. Every now and then the reader will find 
information boxes that shall help them orientate in the “jungle of the export credit 
world”, as one interviewee put it (Interview VII).  
The Arrangement says: “Tied aid policies should provide needed external resources 
to countries, sectors or projects with little or no access to market financing. Tied aid 
                                                            
96  These, with the exemption of Helsinki named after the Participants’ Chairman at the time, are the follow-
ing: Wallén Package (1987), Helsinki Package (1992), Schaerer Package (1994), Knaepen Package 
(1997) (see OECD 1998).  
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policies should ensure best value for money, minimize trade distortion, and con-
tribute to developmentally effective use of these resources” (TAD/PG(2012)9, 
Chapter III: 19; emphasis added).  
An attentive reader might have noticed that the aim of contributing “to the develop-
mentally effective use of tied aid credits” in the above quote is only listed last. The 
following chapters enquire whether this order is mere coincidence or reflects the 
priority setting of the Participants. If development concerns indeed play a subordinate 
role, the question arises what this means for the quality of development assistance, 
which is delivered in the form of tied aid credits. 
5.1. Contextualization: an Export Credit Race on the Rise 
To understand negotiations on tied aid credits one needs to go almost half a century 
back into the 1970ies, a time when “survival of the fittest”97 in a somewhat perverse 
sense was common practice in the jungle of officially supported export credits.  
It was in the wake of the oil crisis in the early 1970ies that international negotiations 
over export credits were taken up (Rosefsky 1994: 446). The four-fold increase in oil 
prices in 1973 provoked drastic trade deficits in many OECD countries – most of 
which traditionally were oil-importing states (Levit 2004: 75). In view of steeply in-
creasing oil prices industrialized countries needed more and more hard currency to be 
able to satisfy their oil consumption (Geberth 1998: 27). In order to curb their exports 
in a situation of worldwide economic depression, most industrialized countries heavily 
subsidized their exporters via their Export Credit Agency (ECA). Since at that time no 
detailed rules were in place regulating the terms that ECAs could offer98, an export 
credit “war” became a threatening and conceivable scenario (Cutts/West 1998: 12). 
The macro-economic changes which were reflected in large trade deficits were ac-
companied by sharp increases in interest rates and made official interest rate subsi-
dies ever more expensive for already heavily burdened governments. Given these 
economic conditions “[…] – high interest rates, large trade deficits, and limited gov-
ernment resources – all OECD ECAs braced for an inevitably costly export credit 
race, but also recognized that their own internal budget situation might not permit 
unfettered participation in that race” (Levit 2004: 75). In response, those politically 
responsible – mostly finance ministers – undertook first steps towards leveling the 
playing field. 
                                                            
97  Perverse in the sense that the fittest therein was not the most competitive player on a free market, but the 
strongest, that it best state-supported, Export Credit Agency. 
98  The only exception was the subsidies code of the GATT. An analysis of the treatment of tied aid in general 
under the GATT and its successor is provided by Arrowsmith and La Chimia (2009) in their article “Ad-
dressing Tied Aid: Towards a More Development-Oriented WTO?” 
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Box 4: “Trade Considerations” 
The trade considerations step-by-step leading to the below analyzed rules have to be under-
stood in the context of the OECD’s overall “liberalization agenda”.  
In Article 1 of the OECD Convention, signed in December 1960, contributing “to the expansion 
of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international 
obligations” is declared as one of the Organization’s main goals (quoted in Jepma 1991: 2)99. 
Accordingly, the international trading system which is built around the basic principle that 
competition for export sales should be determined by price, quality and services and be free 
from government interventions likely to distort competition. Departing from this commercial 
viewpoint, subsidizing financial terms be it through associated financing or any other form of 
export subsidy that lowers the cost to the buyer, goes against this “philosophy” (DAC/FA (82)2; 
TC/ECG/82.4: 14). 
In this vein, a Note by the Secretariat states that from a trade policy view point, associated 
financing raises a broader spectrum of concerns than those directly relevant for aid policy. “It is 
immaterial to the commercial impact of a financing package whether its subsidy element 
derives from the aid program, or from some other source of concessional public funds. What 
is of concern, in the end, is the potential trade distortion resulting from a subsidized conces-
sional financing package, rather than the specific nature of the package’s component” 
(DAC/FA (82)2; TC/ECG/82.4: 15). The association of aid funds and export credits leads to 
aid and/or trade distortion, if the transfer of the ODA element is made conditional upon the 
acceptance by the recipient of the export credit (and hence the exports) of the donor country 
that the recipient in the absence of an effective association would not necessarily have taken (or 
would not have taken from the same donor which extends the aid transfer). “The problem 
therefore rests on tying the less concessional part of the financing package to procurement in 
the donor country and making the transfer of the more concessional part of the financing 
package conditional on such procurement”   (DAC/FA(82)2; TC/ECG/82.4: 13). 
 
Although not discussed in the literature on official export credits at hand, these early 
developments in the use and regulation of export credits were linked to major changes 
in the world economic system brought about by the abandoning of the Bretton 
Woods system of a gold standard in favor of a “managed float regime” in 1971. By 
that time the value of the dollar was being undermined by an increasing American 
trade deficit and inflation in the USA, while Germany and Japan both had positive 
balances of payment and undervalued currencies. The transition to a freely floating 
dollar led to a devaluation of the dollar, which provoked radical changes in the interna-
tional competitive environment (Conte/Karr 2001)100. The resulting drawback in the 
relative competiveness of German and Japanese exports, had, one might assume, 
                                                            
99  Petermann (2013: 212) argues that “these recommendations may have been rather abstract and gen-
eral, but they became the foundation on which the DAC’s free-trade philosophy was to be built. The insti-
tution’s efforts to liberalize trade and aid flows, in turn, were to become a central normative pillar of the un-
tying aid initiative”. 
100  The information are drawn from the “Outline of the U.S. economy“, which was prepared for the U.S. 
Department of State.  
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repercussions on the export credit policies of these countries. More precisely, Euro-
pean states and Japan began subsidizing export credits on a large scale in order to 
match the terms the U.S. Ex-Im Bank could offer without subsidization due to low 
interest rates (Fernald 1984: 438). 
5.2. The Early “Consensus”: Establishing a Level Playing 
Field 
When industrialized countries realized that their race for export credits would be to 
their own detriment, slowly but nonetheless steadily forms of cooperation between the 
rivals emerged. In a study conducted for the Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
(WIFO) Bayer et al. explain this emergence of cooperation101 with the help of game 
theory. To overcome the “prisoner’s dilemma”, in which industrialized countries found 
themselves, the different actors sought to eliminate information asymmetries and allow 
for cooperation102 which eventually would improve the position of all ‘players’ 
(Bayer/Stankovsky/Url 1992: 11; Moravcsik 1989: 199; Petermann 2013: 205; Ray 
1995: 156).  
With the growing realization of the adverse effects of excessive use of export promo-
tion, several informal agreements within the IMF, the OECD and at G5 summit meet-
ings were concluded, all of which were attempting to regulate export subsidies and to 
bring an end to the export credit race that started taking its toll on government budg-
ets (West 2011: 21). At the G8 summit at Rambouillet in 1975, “[th]e Heads of State 
and Government of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Unit-
ed Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States” declared 
that they “[…] will also intensify […] efforts to achieve a prompt conclusion of the 
negotiations concerning export credits” (Rambouillet Declaration 1975).  
It was this declaration that provided the basis for an informal consensus – the “Con-
sensus on Converging Export Credit Policies” – agreed on in 1976 by a limited num-
ber of OECD countries on how to subsequently deal with export credits (West 2011: 
21). This early consensus would, however, only be the beginning of difficult and long-
                                                            
101  Andrew Moravcsik (1989: 174) gives a somewhat more thorough account of why states agreed on the 
Arrangement and proposes “theoretical explanation for the formation, maintenance, and success of this 
regime”. Game theory is thereby only one of the theoretical concepts he draws on. He, moreover, exam-
ines in great detail different country positions in the course of negotiations (in the beginning above all di-
verging positions of the USA and France). 
102  Such a move to cooperation in order to avoid “spiraling escalation of spending” proves particularly diffi-
cult, “when preferences over levels of expenditures vary” considerably between the competitors. In such a 
situation cooperation will only evolve when also “governments with sufficient budgetary resources prefer 
subsidy reduction, but can mobilize domestic constituencies to make subsidy retaliation credible” – as will 
be shown later this was exactly the USA’s position and role in negotiations (Hall 2011: 346).  
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lasting negotiations103. The minimum consensus of 1976 set targets for maximum 
duration and minimum down payments (Ray 1995: 52) and fixed a common minimum 
rate of interest for credits with a maturity of more than two years below which credits 
should no longer be extended. This rate varied in accordance with categories estab-
lished for borrower countries, essentially being higher for richer than for poorer coun-
tries (Byatt 1984: 163 et seqq.). Furthermore, the “Consensus” provided early rules 
for credits linking commercial and aid credits, so-called mixed credits (Ray 1995: 52). 
The “Consensus”104 was formalized in 1978 in the so-called Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits (West 1998: 9). At this early stage the Arrangement only 
set modest limits for interest-rate subsidies and banned maturity terms above ten 
years (Moravcsik 1989: 199). With the help of these measures, the Participants tem-
porarily ‘’contained what was a rapidly developing credit race“ (Stafford 1998: 45). 
Detailed provisions on tied aid credits were not yet included in the Arrangement – it 
only gave some guidance with regard to notification procedures in accordance with 
the percentage of the grant element (Fleisig/Hill 1984: 341). While tied aid credit 
practices were not restricted, it was expected that through the notification proce-
dures, which were strengthened in 1981, their transparency would be enhanced 
(DAC/FA(82)2; TC/ECG/82.4: 6). 
5.3. Packages Adopted and Alternatives Discussed up to 
Helsinki  
This tightening of rules for “traditional” export subsidies – especially so the sharp 
increase in so-called matrix interest rates as well as the no-derogation agreement105 – 
put limits to the Participants’ capacity of giving direct subsidies to export credits. As a 
result national export credit programs decreased steadily. Additionally confronted with 
a severe debt crisis in most of the developing world, industrialized countries were in 
search of alternative ways of keeping their export levels up (Ray 1995: 66).  
In this dismal situation they more and more frequently took recourse to tied aid credits, 
which allowed them for some time to continue their subsidy policies under the dis-
guise of giving (development) aid. This trend also manifested itself in a growing num-
ber of OECD countries putting tied aid schemes in place. While in the 1960ies only 
few Participants (including France and Switzerland) had such systems in operation, in 
                                                            
103  This Consensus was not yet spelled out in a multilateral declaration, but only declared in unilateral state-
ments by individual governments (see for instance Fernald 1984: 443). For a very detailed discussion of 
how this first Consensus emerged see Geberth 1998.  
104  Somewhat misleadingly the term “Consensus“ is still widely used to refer to the Arrangement (Bayer/ 
Stankovsky/Url 1992: 12).  
105  Matrix interest rates – the system in place before the introduction of CIRRs – were fixed uniform interest 
rates for financing exports (TD/CONSENSUS/86.53; DAC/FA(86)12: 38). Prior to the no-derogation 
agreement, Participants could derogate (e.g. from maximal duration) as long as prior notification was giv-
en. The only derogation henceforth still in place was the matching mechanism (Ray 1995: 55). 
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the early 1980ies the majority of the then 22 OECD member countries participating in 
the Arrangement had the opportunity “to blend export credits with concessional aid 
loans” (DAC/FA(81)1: 15). This renaissance of tied ODA in the late 1970ies and 
early 1980ies was also due to the fact that “[…] the untying problematique lost much 
of its salience in the day-to-day development politics”, which were overshadowed by 
more pressing issues resulting from the oil crisis (Petermann 2013: 214).  
John Ray, for instance, makes this point and argues that in reaction to the falling de-
mand for export credits, most OECD countries maintained, if not increased, their 
offers of tied aid credits with higher grant elements. Most of these aid credits were 
extended for long-term projects in countries hit the hardest by the debt crisis – which 
tended to be the richer developing countries. Increasingly, tied aid credits became a 
distorting factor of competition among the OECD countries and replaced interest rate 
subsidies as prime source of trade distortion (Ray 1995: 67). Also within the DAC 
Working Party on Financial Aspects concern was raised that “the spreading use of 
mixed credits … threatens the basic discipline of the Arrangement” and will lead to 
the relaunch of “the export credit terms race under another guise” (DAC/FA(82)2; 
TC/ECG/82.4: 15). In a similar vein, several interview partners also made the observa-
tion that, as the early Arrangement tightened rules for traditional export credits but 
neglected tied aid credits, the latter were soon seen as way of circumventing the 
Arrangement (Interview V, VI, VII). One interviewee, however, specified that “circum-
vent” was not the best word because there was not yet much to circumvent. This is 
why this interview partner repeatedly described the practices as follows: “They were 
used to play competitive games” (Interview VII). Similarly, other observers see early 
tied aid credits as “subsidy by the back door” (Stafford 1998: 46). 
Ray uses the example of the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) to 
explain that in the immediate post-war period officially supported credits were thought 
to be a proper and logical way of promoting development in the poorer countries of 
the world (Ray 1995: 58 et seqq.). Documentation of DAC/FA meetings in the early 
1980ies gives credential to the observation that some member countries “[…] con-
sider the use of ODA in association with export credits to be a normal and useful 
way of increasing the flow of development financing and improving its terms” 
(DAC/FA/M(81)1(Prov.): 4; see also DAC/FA(85)2: 5). 
Gradually, however, both export credit agencies as well as aid agencies came to the 
realization that the two programs should be separated for as to avoid both trade and 
aid distortions. The greatest distortions, they thought, were being emanated from tied 
aid credit practices (Ray 1995: 59). At the DAC High Level Meeting in 1981, for 
instance, the Secretary-General stressed that putting undue emphasis on short-term 
export or employment benefits of mixed credit practices “… could raise unrealistic 
expectations in public opinion and was bound to produce distortions in both trade 
and aid effectiveness” (quoted in DAC/FA(82)2; TC/ECG/82: 5; DAC/FA(81)1: 16). 
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The Byatt Report published in 1982 (named after the chairman of the responsible 
research team I.C.R. Byatt) also voiced concern about the harmful effects of subsidies 
given to the export of capital goods. Above all, in the long-run they were considered 
“… an extremely expensive way to reduce unemployment” (Byatt 1984: 177). The 
report provoked a considerable controversy in the UK, but – as Ray puts it – “the 
world economic climate in the first half of the 1980ies was not propitious to cutting 
back on the use of tied aid” (Ray 1995: 68).  
In a first attempt to curb these practices, Participants agreed to increase the minimum 
permissible grant element to 20 %, thereby rendering tied aid credits more expensive. 
Furthermore, notification requirements for tied aid credits were strengthened, which 
“reduced the competitive advantage that could be gained” by employing tied aid 
credits (Moravcsik 1989: 186).  
The key challenge repeatedly evoked in meetings (see for instance DAC/FA(82)2) 
consisted in the separation of aid and trade flows. According to John Ray, reaching an 
agreement on the proper relationship of officially supported export credits to official 
development aid was one of the most difficult tasks. To a certain extent the belief that 
these flows should be separated was also reflected in an earlier DAC decision (1969) 
to divide its concept of official flows into two distinct types of flows: Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) (Führer 1996: 21). In the 
same year the idea of weighing members’ contributions according to their respective 
grant elements106 was introduced (Ray 1995: 59 et seqq.), a concept which would 
later also play an important role in the work of the Participants. 
Before the Participants could take up negotiations on the difficult issue of tied aid 
credits, they had to agree on a common understanding of the term “tied aid”. Differen-
tiating between and agreeing on definitions of tied and partially untied aid turned out 
to be a cumbersome undertaking. The DAC was working on these definitions in paral-
lel and when it agreed on the revision107 of its old definitions in 1985, the Participants 
also declared that their disciplines would henceforth refer to both tied and partially 
untied aid (Ray 1995: 69 et seqq.).  
Following a Ministerial Council Meeting in 1984 in which major concerns about the 
ongoing subsidy race via tied aid credits were raised, both the Participants and the 
DAC worked to fulfill the Ministers’ Mandate of bringing these harmful practices to an 
end. In the corresponding Ministerial Communiqué it says:  
“Ministers affirmed their commitment to avoid any de jure or de facto financing prac-
tices which give rise to trade distortions and to diversion of aid flows from develop-
                                                            
106  Three years later, in 1972, the DAC introduced the requirement, valid up to today, that flows financial have 
to contain a grant element of at least 25 % calculated on the basis of a 10 % discount rate for as to be 
counted as Official Development Assistance (Petermann 2013: 213 et seqq.).  
107  The revisions concerned primarily the required grant element. Henceforth tied aid was supposed to have a 
25 % instead of a 20 % grant element in order to count as ODA (Führer 1996).  
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ment objectives and to apply fully the guiding principles they have agreed upon. They 
enjoined the competent bodies of the Organization to take prompt action to improve 
existing arrangements so as to strengthen transparency and discipline in this area by 
all appropriate means” (OECD Ministerial Communiqué 1984, 18 May: para. 22; 
quoted in DAC/FA(85)2: 4). 
The afore-mentioned decision by both Participants and the DAC to include partially 
untied aid in the Arrangement guidelines was an important step towards the fulfillment 
of the Ministers’ Mandate (Ray 1995: 73 et seqq.). While in the 1984 Communiqué it 
was not yet clear whether an increase in the minimum permissible grant element 
(MPGE108) was the right step forward, the 1985 Communiqué announced the agree-
ment on an increase of the grant element to 25 %. Despite this progress ministers 
declared that “[m]easures aiming at strengthened transparency and discipline in the 
field of tied-aid credits and associated financing of exports will continue to be pur-
sued expeditiously” (OECD Ministerial Communiqué 1985, 11 April: para. 14(a); see 
Annex Ray 1995: 295).  
It would take the Participants, however, another decade to agree on drastically cutting 
back on the use of tied aid credits (Ray 1995: 68). Especially the USA, whose aid 
program109 was less focused on capital goods than it was the case with their Europe-
an counterparts (Mendelowitz 1989: 3) and whose exporters thus felt disadvantaged, 
got frustrated with the standstill in negotiations and decided to leverage its negotiat-
ing position with a more persuasive argument: a “war chest”110 (Mendelowitz 1989: 4). 
The money provided through this chest – established in 1985 – should be and was 
used to extend mixed credits specifically targeted to outbid offers by France, which 
according to the USA was blocking negotiations (Ray 1995: 75). Ronald Reagan 
himself is reported to have said in this context that the war chest shall be used to 
combat foreign credit subsidies that “… deprive US companies from fair access to 
world markets” (New York Times, 26 September 1985; quoted in Ray 1995: 75). The 
fact that tied aid credits were even addressed on a presidential level gives further 
                                                            
108 Austria, for instance, was long hesitant to agree on an increase of the MPGE arguing that it “… feared 
that such an increase might be counterproductive, both to exporters and to LDC's sic!“ 
(TD/CONSENSUS/85.88: 3). This opposition to an increase of the MPGE was reiterated at several meet-
ings in 1986 (for instance TD/CONSENSUS/86.11 or TD/CONSENSUS/86.66). The Swiss Delegate al-
so stressed that trade distortion was not a function of the grant element, and that hence with higher grant 
element thresholds trade distorting practices would continue, albeit at a higher cost level. Consequently, 
the Delegate emphasized the need for additional measures (TD/CONSENSUS/86.66: 3) 
109 This focus of the U.S.’ foreign aid program on basic needs rather than on capital goods was also empha-
sized by two of our interview partners. This diverging aid policy was presented as one of the main reasons 
for the USA’s strong commitment to design more comprehensive rules (Interview VI, VII). More information 
on the U.S. position can be found in the note by the U.S. delegate (DAC(88)11).  
110  Already a couple of years earlier, in 1980 the U.S. had threatened to offer credits with longer repayment 
terms than those allowed under the Arrangement should negotiations on strengthened disciplines not be 
intensified (Ray 1995: 54). Also after agreement on the Helsinki Package had been found the now called 
“Tied-Aid Capital Fund” was continued to be used as a competitive tool (see GAO 2002; Ray 1995: 106 
et seqq.). An insightful account of the usage of the “war chest” is also provided by Steven Hall (2011).  
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credit to the assumption that this instrument was touching upon core national inter-
ests of the participating countries.  
The same year also the United Kingdom (UK) announced that it intended to use tied 
aid credits more aggressively (Ray 1995: 75). A perfect example of soft loan practices 
in the mid-1980ies are what Ray titles “Helicopter Follies”111 – the procurement im-
posed by the UK on the Indian government of 21 Westland W-30 helicopters com-
pletely unsuitable for their intended duties in the natural gas and oil sector (Ray 1995: 
76, 77). Understanding that these practices had little to nothing to do with sound 
development projects or the more general intention of promoting development in the 
recipient country does not require detailed examination. It clearly illustrates that in the 
1980ies the “… possibility of a full-fledged export credit war became a probability” 
(Ray 1995: 74). 
Most authors who have examined the formation of the Arrangement seem to attribute, 
albeit to different degrees, an important role to the war chest in the run up to the 
Wallén Package. Like in Ray’s (1995) and Mendelowitz’s (1989) account, also in 
Katherine Rosefsky’s portrayal the U.S. is seen as the major actor pushing for further 
regulation of tied aid credit practices via its war chest. Moravcsik (1989: 199, 200) 
even goes as far as to say that “agreements were possible in 1978, 1983, and 
1985 because the United States threatened to use a unique power resource, 
grounded in the greater depth of North American capital markets, which permitted it 
to extend very long term loans. ... Breakthroughs in the negotiations in 1983 and 
1987 followed explicit American threats of retaliation” (emphasis added).  
In a similar vein, two of our interview partners described the search for regulation of 
tied aid credits as a U.S. led project (Interview VI, VII). In this respect, their narrative of 
agreement on the Arrangement fits into the conceptualization of a “Pax Americana” or 
can, according to Moravcsik, at least be interpreted as an “… expression of hege-
monic stability represented by the neoliberal international aid and trade system 
which has been backed by the U.S. since the 1970s to prevent ‘American decline’” 
(Petermann 2013: 230). Similarly, Hall argues that the U.S. was not only crucial in the 
making of an early consensus but also in pushing for agreement on the Helsinki Disci-
plines. He concludes his analysis by saying that “despite an apparent decline in 
international influence, the U.S. was able to compel accession to the Helsinki 
agreement by threatening substantial increases in its spending” (Hall 2011: 346). 
  
                                                            
111  In his book “Lords of Poverty” Graham Hancock gives a detailed account of this alleged “aid transfer” 
(Hancock 1989: 163 et seqq.). 
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5.3.1. The Wallén Package (1987) 
“Final results cannot be better than the lowest common denominator. One has to take  
the opportunity to find a better solution when it rises but also be realistic enough to see  
when the best is the enemy of the good. Progress is the art of the possible” 
(Chairman Report Wallén; quoted in Ray 1995: 81, 82)112 
The above situation led to though negotiations which eventually – after the change in 
position of France – culminated in an agreement on the Wallén Package in 1987. This 
Package, named after the then Chairman of the Participants, Axel Wallén, of the Swe-
dish Ministry of Finance, introduced a new method of calculating the grant element, 
from then on referred to as “concessionality level”113. Henceforth, the Participants no 
longer followed the DAC’s way, but used a Differential Discount Rate (DDR), which 
should ensure that market interest rates for each currency were better reflected114. The 
decision to adjust the basis for the calculation of the grant element had been preced-
ed by difficult negotiations between Low Interest Rate Countries (LIRCs), such as 
Austria, and High Interest Rate Countries (HIRCs). The main matter of contention 
thereby was that for LIRCs it was easier to provide the 25 % grant element because 
their Commercial Interest Reference Rates (CIRRs)115 were below the uniform 10 % 
used to calculate it116 (Ray 1995: 79).  
Concomitantly with these changes in calculation, the minimum concessionality level 
was increased once more, from 25 to 35 % (OECD 1998: 19). Again, the Partici-
pants expected that by increasing the costs linked to the extension of tied aid credits, 
aid agencies “… would be less willing to allow their scarce aid funds to be used to 
improve the competitivity of their exporters in bidding for commercial projects of 
limited development interest ” (Timonen 1998: 53). 
Simultaneously, the Participants as well as the DAC worked on fulfilling the Ministers’ 
Mandate. To that end the 1986 Good Procurement Practices as well as the 1987 
revised Guidelines for Associated Financing and tied and partially untied ODA were 
adopted.  
                                                            
112  This quote also hints to another important point that will briefly be touched upon later: the political reality 
of negotiations between independent nation states within a system built on consensus. It is important to 
keep this in mind because it is critical for understanding negotiation outcomes.  
113  The “name change“ can be seen as an attempt to signify underlying methodological differences 
(DAC/FA/M(87)1(Prov.)). 
114  Another, yet older, difference with regard to the calculation of the grant element persisted: While the DAC 
used the commitment date of an ODA loan for measuring its maturity, Participants count maturity from the 
Berne Union starting point – the latter yields, according to the DAC Secretariat – a somewhat lower grant 
element (DAC/FA(85)2: 13; DAC/FA(87)6: 3).  
115  According to the Arrangement, the minimum interest rate applied for official financing support for loans 
with a fixed interest rate is the Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR). CIRRs should represent, inter 
alia, “final commercial lending interest rates in the domestic market of the currency concerned” and 
should “correspond to a rate available to first class foreign borrowers” (TAD/PG(2013)1: 11).  
116 A similar discussion on whether the 10 % discount represented market realities should later also pop up 
in the DAC – albeit accompanied by astonishingly little public debate and NGO engagement.  
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Box 5: The Wallén Package in a Nutshell 
 
(i) The minimum permissible concessionality level for tied and partially untied aid was in-
creased to 50 per cent for credits to LLDCs and to 35 per cent for other countries; 
(ii)  The discount rate for calculating the concessionality level was changed from a standard 
10 per cent to differentiated discount rates and 
(iii) Matrix rates were abolished for Category I countries and increased by 30 basis points for 
other categories (TD/CONSENSUS/88.25). 
 
5.3.1.1. An Inquiry into the Logic of Concessionality  
As mentioned before the Participants borrowed their concept of a concessionality 
threshold from the DAC’s grant element. While at first they entirely followed the 
DAC’s example of setting a 25 % grant element as threshold for flows to be counted 
as ODA (Ray 1995: 61), the Participants as of 1987 used a derived concept – the 
so-called concessionality level. The reasoning behind it, however, essentially remains 
the same. While the DAC’s approach is based on a calculation of the opportunity 
costs to donors, the Participants’ approach measures the financial costs of the loan to 
donors. Both approaches, however, do not reflect any measures of the benefit to 
recipients (for instance in comparison to other financial sources) (DCD/DAC/FA 
(2002)2: 4).  
By the mechanism of the concessionality level the Participants aim at reducing trade 
distortions through tied aid credits while still allowing for sound development projects 
to be financed this way. Following this line of reasoning a higher concessionality level 
is equaled with greater development content of a project. With higher levels of 
concessionality, the budgetary sacrifice of a given amount of national exports grows 
and the use of aid subsidies for commercial purposes becomes more expensive. 
Consequently, so goes the argument, they are not mindlessly (ab)used to promote 
exports (Tvardek 2011: 210) and trade distortion is reduced. While any tied aid (in-
cluding tied grants) is liable to involve some trade distortion, Participants in the Ar-
rangement accept this at a high level of concessionality because of the presumed 
development orientation of a high grant element transaction117. Up to the adoption of 
the Wallén Package it was expected that by increasing the minimum concessionality 
and the cost to donors, aid would be used more carefully for high priority projects 
(TD/CONSENSUS/86.53: 29, 30). 
Steve Tvardek labels the concept of concessionality a “typical economist’s solution” 
and compares it to a tax that is designed to discourage a certain activity or behavior 
                                                            
117  Economists disagree on whether every aid is by its very definition distorting market mechanisms; for an 
examination of whether it is the tying status or also the grant/loan feature that determines the degree of 
distortion, see the ODI (2009) report “The Trade Implications of Aid Instruments and Tying Practices”. 
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(Tvardek 2011: 210). As a by-product of this “tax” resource transfers to aid recipients 
are thought to increase and a more valuable contribution to the aid product is ex-
pected. At first glance it might seem irrational to try to resolve a problem resulting 
from aid subsidies by asking for a higher degree of the very subsidy that one actually 
wants to prevent. However, a closer examination of the political realities of tied aid 
credits quickly shows that black and white rules, that is rules banning the extension of 
such credits altogether, simply were not a feasible option (Interview VI) – a somewhat 
pragmatic stance which is also reflected in Axel Wallén’s statement above according 
to which “progress is the art of the possible” (Chairman Report Wallén; quoted in Ray 
1995: 81, 82).  
5.3.2. Failure of the Wallén and Negotiation of the Helsinki Package 
Soon after the implementation of the Wallén Package (done in two phases118) the 
Participants were confronted with limited and partially even adverse effects of the 
measures they had taken.  
Already in 1988 the then Chairman of the Participants, John Coleman, drew attention 
to the fact that the effects of the newly adopted disciplines in the field of mixed credits 
were questionable in important export markets. He gave the example of Indonesia, 
where mainly trade-motivated mixed credits were offered at an average of 40 % 
concessionality level. “[…] Indonesia has succeeded in imposing very high costs on 
export credit activity in its market – indeed effectively forcing many export credit 
agencies to become large aid donors – and our governments do not seem to be 
deterred by these increased costs“ (TD/CONSENSUS/88.14: 4)119. In this respect 
one of our interview partners argued: “Whatever color the Indonesian list of projects 
is, they became routinely requiring aid for any capital goods project. That shows you 
how bad the situation got” (Interview VI). David Stafford, former Chairman of the 
Participants’ Nuclear Sector and Aircraft Sector Groups, examines the situation in 
greater detail and explains that by Presidential Decree Indonesia made aid credits a 
precondition for all public-sector infrastructure projects (Stafford 1998: 47). “Gone 
were the days of unsophisticated buyers when a low interest rate without regard to 
currency often determined the award of contracts. Procurement agencies are adept 
at evaluating finance offers as one element of an overall package and playing willing 
suppliers off against one another“ (Stafford 1998: 47)120. 
                                                            
118  The implementation of the new method took place in two steps, on 15 July 1987 and on 15 July 1988 
(Ray 1995: 80). 
119  In this same report he proposes to limit trade-related tied aid credits to an agreed maximum threshold 
which could be set as a proportion of a donor’s overall ODA disbursement (TD/CONSENSUS/88.14). 
This proposition was, however, not taken up by the Participants.  
120  Keeping the historical context of the Cold War in mind, the “strategic use” of tied aid credits, indicated by 
Stafford, appears as common practice. Petermann (2013: 116, 117) examined recipients’ strategies of 
gaining the greatest advantage from the competition between the superpowers – a fight over influence, 
which was also fought in the development aid arena.  
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In a Note by the Secretariat in 1988 “[e]xperience with the new rules of the Arrange-
ment on tied aid and partially untied aid financing” was evaluated (a series of three of 
such notes were distributed to the Participants). The Note confirmed Coleman’s ap-
praisal and concluded that the package had not delivered the expected results. Statis-
tical analysis provided in this note suggested that the new disciplines had triggered a 
move from poorer to richer developing countries as main “beneficiaries” of tied aid 
credits and gave reason to presume that the terms of aid credits for the LLDCs had 
hardened (TD/CONSENSUS/88.25). Figure 5.1 shows a sharp increase in the vol-
ume (in billion SDR) of tied aid credits with a concessionality level between 30-35 % 
and a reduction in those with softer terms (45-100 %).  
Figure 5.1: Change of Concessionality Levels after Agreement on the Wallén Package  
 
Source: TD/CONSENSUS/88.25: 4 
A year later, still no changes to the better had occurred. In its note the Secretariat 
stated that the package contributed to a sharp decrease of credits at very hard 
terms121, but “caused a bunching up just above the new minimum concessionality 
level” (TD/CONSENSUS/89.24). In the same report concern was again voiced with 
regard to the regional distribution of softer tied aid credits: 
“Richer developing countries seem to have profited more from the package than the 
poorer ones. On the one hand, richer countries' share in total aid notifications in-
creased steadily and, on the other hand, the weighted average concessionality level 
for richer countries increased noticeably, while that for poorer countries did not show 
the same development“ (TD/CONSENSUS/89.24; TD/CONSENSUS/89.17). 
                                                            
121  In this paper “hard aid is defined as credits with a concessionality level of 50 per cent or less” 
(TD/CONSENSUS(89)24: 8).  
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With regard to these trends, one of our interview partners spoke of a “second anti-
development twist”, meaning that resources were taken away from poorer countries to 
faster developing countries for the purpose of boosting donors’ capital goods sector. 
As a result, he argued, not only trade but also aid was being distorted (Interview VI). 
In addition, there was evidence that the number of prior notification of low-
concessionality aid credits had increased since 1987. In its analysis of size effects, 
the Secretariat explained that the observed increase could have resulted from better 
reporting or could be due to the substitution of grants by loans and better reporting of 
the latter compared to the former or to tying of previously untied aid 
(TD/CONSENSUS/88.25: 7). While, according to Ray, the reasons for this trend 
were not fully understood, “… it seemed plausible that development projects that 
would otherwise have been financed by grants or by high-concessionality loans were 
now being financed by loans with a lower level of concessionality”. This meant that 
the Wallén Package had failed to achieve one of its main goals, namely a decrease in 
the use of tied aid credits as an instrument of export promotion (Ray 1995: 85 et 
seqq.).  
In a statement before the U.S. General Accounting Office’s Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Allan Mendelowitz122 also enquired the reasons 
for the limited effectiveness of the disciplines. The answer he gives, however, is not 
much more precise than Ray's tautology above. He explains the observed increase in 
offers of tied aid credits with the following factors: Firstly, the numbers might simply 
reflect greater adherence to the Arrangement and its transparency provisions. Sec-
ondly, they might be a manifestation of donors’ willingness to continue their subsidiza-
tion policies at higher costs. Finally, Mendelowitz argues, that the “[…] increased 
volume of offers may reflect reduced market opportunities in which tied aid offers 
compete” (Mendelowitz 1989: 12).  
In light of the failure of the Wallén Package to meet the aspired goals, the Participants 
decided already in 1989 – barely two years after the adoption of the package – to 
seek agreement on a new, “balanced package” of disciplines covering (a) export 
credits, (b) aid credits and (c) selected problem sectors123 (e.g. agriculture, iron and 
steel as well as telecommunications) and spoiled markets (Timonen 1990; see Ray 
1995: 304). This package, proposed by the then Chairman Eero Timonen, should 
later in its fifth version become to be known as the Helsinki Package – also Helsinki V 
(Ray 1995: 86).  
                                                            
122  Allan Mendelowitz was the Director of the Trade, Energy, and Finance Issues National Security and 
International Affairs Division of the United States Accounting Office.  
123  The terms “problem sectors” was mainly used to refer to those sectors, in which the “use of aid financing 
for exports was widespread and expected” (Ray 1995: 90).  
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The following year export and tied aid credits were also on the agenda of the Ministe-
rial Council Meeting – although somewhat overshadowed by debates on the GATT 
Uruguay Round (C-M(90)11-Prov.). The representative of the Netherlands (Mr. 
Bukman), for instance, addressed the issue of tied aid credits in his statement and 
pointed out that further rules improving the Wallén package of 1987 were needed. 
“We need such improved rules not only to reduce the trade distorting effects of a 
growing number of export credits for agricultural products, but also to prevent ex-
cesses in official support for exports under the guise of official development 
assistance” (C-M(90)11-Prov: 84; emphasis added). Such an undertaking, he urged, 
required close cooperation between the DAC and the Trade Committee (C-M(90)11-
Prov: 84). 
The fact that this argument is also reflected in the Ministerial Communiqué124 proves 
that the above statement represents not a minority or even single opinion but captures 
the general sentiment among the Participants. In this Communiqué the Ministers de-
clared that they “[...] welcome that these bodies [the competent bodies] have started 
negotiations on a balanced package of measures to reduce substantially, through 
improved discipline and transparency, those distortions resulting from the use of 
officially supported commercial and tied-aid credits. They urge that negotiations 
should be expedited and that a final report should be submitted to Ministers in 
1991” (Ministerial Communiqué 1990, 31 May: para.31; see Ray 1995: Annex). 
Despite the accumulation of evidence proving the “failure” of the Wallén Package, the 
quest for a truly balanced package, satisfying both sides – those concerned with 
trade-distortion as well as those worried about effects on foreign aid flows –, would 
become a huge challenge for the Participants – by then already tired of negotiations – 
and their Chairman Eero Timonen. Since repeatedly increasing the concessionality 
level had not shown the expected results, the Participants had to come up with alter-
native mechanisms to further sharpen the distinction between aid and trade motivated 
flows – terms used in the Arrangement, without ever being properly defined. 
Already in their first negotiating meeting on the new proposal made by Eero Timonen 
in 1989, the Participants agreed that a renewed increase in the minimum 
concessionality level could not bring the needed improvements (Ray 1995: 88). In 
search of the most effective additional mechanisms the Participants discussed a 
miscellaneous set of ideas125 ranging from a ban of tied aid credits for spoiled markets 
and problem sectors, to a “simple” checklist for aid quality (Ray 1995: 89 et seqq.). 
From a development perspective, the idea of basing a new set of rules on the quality 
of the aid project financed with the tied aid credits is of particular interest. This pro-
                                                            
124  Interestingly, while E. Timonen had used a rather warning tone in his report to the ministers, the Commu-
niqué is characterized by soft formulations and reticent wording (Ray 1995: 87).  
125  Already at that several participants considered “general untying” the most adequate way to meet the 
ministers’ mandate (Ray 1995: 90).  
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posal126 was rooted in the realization that “a poorly conceived showcase project that 
does not conform to the needs of the recipient country is a bad project and a waste 
of funds no matter how soft the credits from which it benefits” (Ray 1995: 98). The 
idea was to use a checklist bringing together the most important DAC development 
principles in order to assess the quality of a project. The Participants then would have 
to indicate the degree to which their offer met these criteria prior to extending the 
credit. Also a consultation procedure with regard to the compatibility of the project 
and the set of DAC guidelines was envisaged. However, the negotiators were con-
fronted with insurmountable practical difficulties. For example, it proved impossible to 
develop a simple and easily usable list of indicators of aid quality. Judging a project’s 
quality proved more complex and could not be made on the basis of a simplifying list 
of yes-or-no questions. Finally the Participants concluded that the concept of aid 
quality was too subjective to meet their needs (Ray 1995: 89).  
Without wanting to anticipate, this quest for the appropriate alternative to a renewed 
increase of the concessionality level, eventually ended – as will be explained later – 
with the Helsinki Package. Therein the Participants finally agreed on the concept of 
commercial viability as the best (feasible) way of distinguishing commercially-
motivated export credits from aid-motivated tied aid credits (Ray 1995: 91). 
Despite their full commitment and hard work neither the Chairman of the Participants 
nor the Chairman of the DAC/FA was able to meet the Ministers’ Mandate before the 
next Ministerial Council Meeting took place in June 1991 (Timonen 1998: 53; Ray 
1995: 94). In order to increase pressure on delegates to find a quick agreement, both 
chairmen presented well coordinated reports on the cornerstones of future agree-
ments to the ministers (DAC/FA/M(90)1(Prov.): 3; see also Letter by the DAC/FA 
Chairman B.R. Ireton, DCD/DAC/FA(91)2: 2). Following a renewed mandate by the 
Ministers in which “… they expressed their commitment to overcome remaining 
obstacles in order to come to an agreement […] not later than the end of this year” 
(Ministerial Communiqué 1991, 5 June (para. 26); quoted in Ray 1995: 295), intense 
negotiations started.  
  
                                                            
126  Surprisingly, none of our interview partners mentioned this “proposal” discussed by the Participants. Even 
when explicitly asked for alternatives discussed with regard to ways of ensuring the development content 
of projects financed with tied aid credits, a specific aid quality test was not mentioned. The reasons 
thereof remain unclear. It might be that the interviewees did not know about it because this aid quality test 
had been discussed in an informal setting by the main negotiators only.  
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5.4. Agreement on the Helsinki Tied Aid Disciplines  
“The new rules will limit the use of tied aid for projects  
that should be financed commercially. They provide a level playing field  
where tied aid credits are used to fund projects that are developmentally sound  
but not commercially viable. […] I  
urge commercial lenders and export credit insurance agencies to accept this challenge  
by expanding credits and coverage for commercially attractive projects  
in developing countries so that total flows of resources  
to these countries will expand127” 
(erstwhile Secretary-General of the OECD, Mr. Jean-Claude Pay 1992; 
quoted in TAD/PG(2005)20: 4) 
In December 1991 agreement on the fifth version of the Chairman’s proposal, hence-
forth called the Helsinki Package, was reached. The by far most important modifica-
tions and amendments made to the Arrangement in this “landmark” agreement con-
cerned the regulation of tied aid credits. These provisions introduced in 1992 have 
remain basically unchanged until today and are listed in today’s Arrangement under 
“Chapter III: Provisions for tied aid” as well as in “Chapter IV: Procedures” (Section I, 
2, 3, 4, 5) (see TAD/PG(2012)9128). 
5.4.1. The Helsinki Package (1991/1992) 
The aim of the Helsinki Package was to prevent tied aid concessionary credits from 
being used to finance what would otherwise be financially viable projects in develop-
ing countries (and that could have trade distorting effects) (Hanssen-Bauer/Owen/ 
Grimsrud 2000: 18). By doing so, tied aid credits were expected to be redirected 
away from better-off developing countries towards developing countries which were 
worse-off (OECD 1995: 3). To achieve this goal, the Package explicitly defined mini-
mum criteria that tied aid credits had to meet to be qualified as such. Up to today 
criteria have been included for both country and project eligibility. Having realized that 
a mere increase in costs for governments to offer tied aid credits (the concessionality 
mechanism) did not bring the expected results, the Participants refined their strategy 
and basically broke it all down to one characteristic: the commercial viability of a pro-
ject. 
                                                            
127  To some degree this statement also reflects the fear that the new rules might lead to a decrease in 
transactions to developing countries – an argument brought forward as justification of reticence to adopt 
new measures (see for instance Ray 1995: 155). 
128  As this study is being written, updated Arrangement versions are published. However, none of the minor 
modifications made to the Arrangement touch upon tied-aid credits (see TAD/PG(2013)1).  
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5.4.1.1. Country Eligibility 
An integral part of the Helsinki disciplines was (and still is) the limitation of the pool of 
recipients. The Participants agreed that with the exception of grants and very soft 
credits, which they defined as having a concessionality level of 80 % or more, tied aid 
credits should not be allowed for countries whose per capita GNI makes them ineligi-
ble for 17-year loans from the World Bank129. This group of countries is thought to be 
generally creditworthy and thus able to attract commercial financing. Consequently, 
aid credits would probably not provide any additional resources (TAD/PG(2012)9: 20 
et seqq.; Ray 1995: 97). The intention of this discipline was to redirect aid away from 
richer to poorer development countries. 
5.4.1.2. Project Eligibility 
Since historically the vast majority of tied aid credits went to middle-income countries, 
the Helsinki package provides the most detailed rules for this country group. Basically 
the Arrangement subsumes these provisions under the heading of “project eligibility” 
(TAD/PG(2012)9: para. 37).  
The main concept introduced to assess the eligibility of a project for tied aid credits is 
the commercial viability of the latter. Henceforth, projects that are deemed to be 
commercially viable should be financed on market or Arrangement terms, but should 
no longer receive tied aid credits. Participants agreed on two key tests to evaluate 
whether projects are commercially non-viable and therefore eligible for aid financing. 
These are: 
 “whether the project is financially non-viable, i.e. does the project lack capacity 
with appropriate pricing determined on market principles, to generate cash flow 
sufficient to cover the project's operating costs and to service the capital em-
ployed, i.e. the first key test; or 
 whether it is reasonable to conclude, based on communication with other Partic-
ipants, that it is unlikely that the project can be financed on market or Ar-
rangement terms, i.e. the second key test. In respect of projects larger than SDR 
50 million130 special weight shall be given to the expected availability of financing 
at market or Arrangement terms when considering the appropriateness of such 
aid” (TAD/PG(2012)9: 21; emphasis added)  
                                                            
129 Information on the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups can be found at 
 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups  
130  Proposals of how to define “large” project ranged from setting the threshold at SDR 40 up to 80 million. 
In the run-up to the Helsinki Package, the Participants also looked into the possibility of banning relatively 
hard tied aid financing for large projects altogether. Also for the DAC/FA, large projects had long been a 
matter of contention, which is given special attention in the New Measures in the Field of Tied Aid 
(SG/PRESS(92)35).  
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Box 6: The Concept of Commercial Viability 
 
“I guess in trade terms the tariffs didn’t work so we wanted quotas. So we tried to create a 
more robust system which was either yes or no – you could not just pay more and get away 
with it” (Interview VI). 
As the term “commercial viability” already suggests, the concept places the ability of a project 
to financially sustain itself at the heart of the Participants’ approach. The basic idea behind 
was that government aid funds should be reserved for aid projects that were worthwhile, for 
instance, projects with considerable external benefits, but that nevertheless were not able 
“[…] either to generate sufficient financial returns to make them attractive enough for com-
mercial financing or to attract officially supported export credits” (TAD/PG(2012)9: 21). Aid 
funds deployed following this reasoning would be truly “additional”. In contrast, commercially 
viable projects should henceforth be financed by commercial banks or ECAs only (on Ar-
rangement terms). Ensuring good aid quality of the financed projects would remain the re-
sponsibility of aid agencies. According to Ray this transfer of competences to aid agencies 
was due to the realization gained from earlier attempts among Participants that aid quality 
“was not a subject within their expertise” (Ray 1995: 92). With regard to the concept of 
commercial viability two of our interview partners (both from the Export Credit Division) were 
keen on emphasizing that the proposal to use this concept came from the then Chairman of 
the DAC Working Party Barrie Ireton (Interview VI and VII). Also Ray mentions the close coor-
dination with the DAC in this matter and explains that Mr. Ireton could draw on the experience 
of the UK, where the “Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) already stipulated that tied aid would 
not be available for business that could reasonably be won on commercial terms” (Ray 
1995: 91). 
 
 
Already at the time of the adoption of the disciplines the Participants were aware that 
the rules would leave a large grey area since they did not cut clear lines – a fuzziness 
the Participants were ready to accept considering the long and difficult negotiation 
process that lay behind them (Ray 1995: 98). In order to deal with this fuzziness and 
to discuss controversial cases the Helsinki Package provided the Participants with a 
consultation mechanism. This gave any Participant to the Arrangement the opportunity 
to request consultation for projects the tied aid eligibility of which was thought to be 
questionable (Ray 1995: 98 et seqq.). The challenged projects were and occasionally 
still are taken to the Consultations Group, in which usually national experts from ECAs 
and delegates from Ministries of Finance investigate the conformity of the project with 
Arrangement rules (Interview VI). 
Today the consultation procedures for tied aid can be found in paras. 51, 52, 53 of 
the Arrangement (TAD/PG(2012)9: 28, 29). A Participant may, for instance, request 
the supply of a full Aid Quality Assessment, which is to be done in accordance with 
the Checklist of Developmental Quality131 (see Annex IX of the Arrangement). Howev-
                                                            
131  In the run-up to the Helsinki Package the Participants requested the Secretariat to bring together the most 
important DAC development principles, which were being dispersed across several separate documents, 
“and to put them in a form acceptable to the DAC as well as usable by export credit agencies”. The result-
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er, if a project is challenged and – even after the presentation of detailed feasibility 
studies to the Consultations Group – does not gain “substantial support” from the 
other Participants, the notifying country can make use of the so-called “escape 
clause”. This clause provides that if a donor wishes to proceed despite the lack of 
support, it has to explain in a letter to the Secretary General of the OECD “[…] the 
over-riding non-trade related national interest that forces this action” 
(TAD/PG(2012)9: 29). Unfortunately, the archive documents available to us do not 
allow drawing any conclusions on whether the Secretary General has ever rejected 
such a project.  
With these consultation processes a body of experience was expected to develop 
that should lead to an Ex-ante Guidance providing aid and export credit agencies with 
more detailed information on how to evaluate the commercial viability of a project in 
question (TAD/PG(2012)9: 21 et seqq.; Ray 1995: 99 et seqq.). 
5.4.1.3. Minimum Concessionality Level 
In addition to the newly introduced criteria of country and project eligibility, the Helsin-
ki Package reaffirmed the requirement of a minimum concessionality level of no less 
than 35 %, respectively 50 % if the recipient country is a Least Developed Country 
(LDC) (TAD/PG(2012)9: 22). Exempt from this discipline as well as from the notifica-
tion procedures is tied aid “[…] where the official development aid component con-
sists solely of technical co-operation that is less than either 3 % of the total value of 
the transaction or one million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), whichever is lower“. 
Likewise, “capital projects of less than SDR 1 million that are funded entirely by 
development assistance grants“ do not have to meet the concessionality requirement 
and the notification standards (TAD/PG(2012)9: 22). 
5.4.2. Exemptions from the Helsinki Disciplines 
The country and project eligibility criteria laid down in the Helsinki Package do not 
apply to tied aid inferior to SDR (Special Drawing Rights132) 2 million or with a level of 
concession above 80 % – unless it forms part of an associated financing package. 
Furthermore, tied aid to LDCs, as defined by the United Nations133, is exempted from 
the project and country eligibility provisions (TAD/PG(2012)9: 22). This exemption is 
justified with the difficulty faced by the group of Least Developed Countries to attract 
                                                                                                                                       
ing list – as such "summary statement of relevant parts of various DAC principles" (DCD/DAC/FA(95)1) – 
was then approved by the DAC and became the above mentioned “Checklist of Developmental Quality 
(of Aid Financed Projects)” (Ray 1995: 89).  
132  A relic of the Bretton Woods system, SDR are international reserve assets the value of which is based on 
a basket of four international currencies, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm 
133  Currently 49 countries are classified as LDC, the majority of which are African states. Detailed information 
on the UN’s classification of “Least Developed Countries” can be found on the homepage of the United 
Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS), see http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/  
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financing regardless of how attractive a project might be. In such a situation the com-
mercial-viability key test becomes obsolete (OECD 1995: 4; Ray 1995: 98).  
Screening documentation of the Participants’ meetings suggests that the latter two 
exemptions from the Helsinki rules (transactions with a concessionality level > 80 % 
as well as tied aid credits to LDCs) have been widely accepted by the Participants 
and did not provoke much controversy. These findings are confirmed by the “Assess-
ment of the Tied Aid Disciplines” conducted by the DAC Secretariat in 1998 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)13). With regard to the “LLDCs exemption” the Secretariat con-
cludes that “… there is no evidence to suggest that the Disciplines have been 
associated with any measurable diversion of (tied) aid to the LLDCs” (DCD/DAC/FA 
(98)13:10).  
Furthermore, while the study finds some prima facie indication of diversion from tied 
aid credits to highly concessional tied aid loans or grants, the Secretariat does not 
interpret this as an attempt of circumventing the disciplines. Rather this diversion is 
interpreted as part of “… the general shift away from loans to grants, the debt situa-
tion of partner countries, a changing focus towards activities traditionally supported 
through grant aid etc.” (DCD/DAC/FA(98)13: 11).  
The increase in small transactions below a volume of SDR 2 million after the adoption 
of the disciplines, in contrast, led to vivid discussions throughout the 1990ies. These 
shall briefly be addressed below.  
5.4.2.1. De Minimis Projects: Small Transactions as Circumvention Strategy?  
As some of our national interview partners mentioned some degree of confusion with 
regard to the applicability of the Helsinki disciplines to small transactions (Interview I), 
discussions in the Participants Group on this exemption shall be investigated in great-
er detail. 
“De minimis” transactions134 are aid transactions with a value inferior to SDR 2 million 
(TD/CONSENSUS(96)14). These de minimis projects were excluded from the Hel-
sinki Package largely due to administrative convenience. Since the total value of these 
notifications has never been very significant in terms of total tied aid credits (Hanssen-
Bauer/Owen/Grimsrund 2000: 9), the Participants considered it appropriate to ex-
empt these transactions from administrative burdens. This means that they are ex-
empted from the administrative requirements of the Helsinki Package – essentially the 
consultation procedure –, but should nonetheless be administered “in the spirit” of the 
Arrangement, meaning primarily that they should finance commercially non-viable 
projects only. The importance of distinguishing “exemption from administrative proce-
                                                            
134  To interpret statistical evidence correctly it must be noted that untied aid, aid credits for LLDCs, ships 
derogation and aid credits with a concessionality level above 80 % are not included in the definition ap-
plied in the statistical reports provided by the Secretariat (TD/CONSENSUS(96)14). 
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dures” and “exemption from the rules in principles” is repeatedly evoked in Partici-
pants’ meetings throughout the 1990ies (e.g. TD/CONSENSUS(95)54).  
Why the threshold was set at SDR 2 million is not explicitly explained in any of the 
documents at our disposal. However, following Participants’ meetings shortly before 
and after the adoption of the Helsinki disciplines shows that different options had 
been under discussion. Proposals ranged from setting the threshold at SDR 1 up to 5 
million. Some countries (Australia, Canada and Switzerland) even suggested to ban 
tied aid credits (not outright grants) for projects below SDR 5 million 
(TD/CONSENSUS(91)23). Eventually, the threshold was set at SDR 2 million, pre-
sumably because this threshold was perceived as an acceptable compromise 
(TD/CONSENSUS(92)12).  
This exemption provoked some controversies and led to intensive discussions on de 
minimis projects during the mid-90ies, especially in the years 94, 95, 96 (see for 
instance TD/CONSENSUS(95)12; TD/CONSENSUS(95)17; TD/CONSENSUS(95)43; 
TD/CONSENSUS(95)54; TD/CONSENSUS(96)20; TD/CONSENSUS(96)39 etc.).  
In this early and turbulent period of implementing the Helsinki rules, the Participants 
revived older discussions, which they had had in the run-up to the Helsinki package. 
All of these can broadly be described as concern about potential circumvention of the 
disciplines. In the first place, this concerned the temptation to “contract-split” or to 
provide “associated financing”, a circumvention strategy feared by Japan and the U.S. 
already before the adoption of the rules (and its exemptions). These possible circum-
ventions resulted from the fact that by splitting projects into units below SDR 2 mil-
lion, Participants technically had the opportunity to avoid tied aid consultation proce-
dures (see for instance TD/CONSENUS(91)32; TD/CONSENSUS(95)11; 
TD/CONSENSUS(96)39). This scenario was even more likely due to the lack of a 
clear-cut definition of “project” in the early post-Helsinki years. Only with accumulated 
experience the Consultations Group was able to give a straightforward definition 
thereof, which eventually became part of the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid. 
With regard to potential weaknesses of the tied aid disciplines, Frans Lammersen, 
looking back at his experiences as Chair of the Consultations Group, observed in 
1998 that “small projects under SDR 2 million are now being used, contrary to the 
spirit of the disciplines. … This constitutes a loophole which, in the long run, might 
undermine the credibility of the disciplines” (Lammersen 1998: 64). Members of the 
DAC/FA, who followed closely developments in tied aid spending, expressed similar 
concerns. They feared that “… procurement based on small projects can easily 
escape a regime of fair international competition. The impact of this, though seeming-
ly small, can be fairly considerable particularly because projects in the sphere of 
consultancy/feasibility studies and technical assistance fall in this category. These 
projects can have a strategic impact on the procurement patterns for the whole sub-
sequent project. One possibility would therefore be to consider fully untying all 
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projects that are too small to be covered by the discipline rather than exclude 
them from it“ (DCD/DAC/FA(93)3; emphasis added). 
Figure 5.2: De Minimis Notifications (1991-2005) 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
All these concerns about de minimis projects were triggered by early statistical evi-
dence that showed a twofold increase in de minimis and small project notifications in 
the period from 1988 to 1992 (TD/CONSENSUS(93)23). As Figure 5.2 illustrates 
this trend continued until 1995 when the number of de minimis notifications reached 
its peak. This was particularly worrisome considering that de minimis transactions 
were predominantly notified for types of projects135 which were most frequently deter-
mined commercially viable by the Consultations Group (TD/CONSENSUS(95)43). 
These were primarily projects in sectors such as manufacturing, telecommunications 
and energy/power (TD/CONSENSUS(95)12). This, of course, substantiated the 
suspicion among both the Participants and the DAC/FA that the Helsinki rules were 
being undermined with de minimis projects.  
In view of these undesired trends, the Participants discussed a number of options 
regarding the treatment of de minimis aid credits. The following four options were 
proposed by the Secretariat: 
  
                                                            
135  While recipients of de minimis transactions roughly corresponded with the beneficiary countries of Hel-
sinki-type aid notifications above SDR 2 million, big donors of de minimis aid credits support were not 
generally the same as the main providers of non-de minimis Helsinki type aid credits. Relatively small do-
nors such as Austria, Denmark, Sweden, for instance, made for larger proportions of de minimis notifica-
tions (TD/CONSENSUS(95)12); TD/PG(2006)23). 
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 “to retain existing threshold and continue to monitor small transactions; 
 to abolish the de minimis exemption; 
 to reduce threshold to SDR 1 million as an interim measure; and  
 to retain the threshold but a) enhance notification requirements to include an 
explanation why the project would be financially non-viable (the first key test); b) 
allow the Secretariat (in its role of monitor of Arrangement) to seek further infor-
mation if deemed necessary; and c) mandate the Secretariat to provide an updat-
ed list on Bulletin Board detailing all de minimis notifications”  
(TD/CONSNSUS(95)12; TD/CONSENSUS(95)54) 
The U.S., for instance, suggested that reduced notification requirements should be 
applied to de minimis projects, whereby full Aid Quality Assessments and detailed 
feasibility studies would not have to be conducted (TD/CONSENSUS(95)17: 9). 
Decision-making on how to proceed further with de minimis transactions was post-
poned several times. Initially the Participants were expected to make a decision in 
1995, or in early 1996. By 1997, however, still no decision had been made 
(TD/CONSENSUS (97)16). In 1997 the Chairman of the Redrafting of the Arrange-
ment Group (RAG) reported that no objections had been received to prohibiting de 
minimis tied aid transactions for countries above the GNP/capita eligibility threshold 
for receiving tied aid. Accordingly, this possible measure was to be considered by the 
Participants (TD/CONSENSUS(97)45: 5).  
After several years of “deadlock” in negotiations on de minimis projects the Secretari-
at concluded in 1997 that due to the lack of consensus on how to proceed it “… 
continues only to monitor de minimis notifications” (TD/CONSENSUS(97)57: 10). 
This means the “status quo” scenario presented above as “Option 1” remained in 
place. The fact that de minimis rules eventually did not change their original shape, is 
certainly connected to a decreasing number of de minimis notifications after its peak 
in 1995 as well as to a shift in project concentration towards “community and social 
services” (TD/CONSENSUS(2001)6), that is in tendency commercially non-viable 
sectors.  
Roughly coinciding with the statistical downward trend in the volume of de minimis 
transactions from 1995 onwards (see Figure 5.2), the Participants’ interest in these 
small transactions faded. De minimis projects were only addressed as part of the 
regular statistical reviews conducted by the Secretariat in form of the so-called “Mid-
Year Review of Experience with the ‘Helsinki’ Tied Aid Disciplines of the Arrangement” 
(see for instance TD/PG(2006)23: 21, 22). 
This silence around de minimis disciplines suggests that today a widespread consen-
sus exists that this exemption concerns only the administrative disciplines of the Hel-
sinki Package and that the projects should nevertheless be in conformity with the 
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basic idea of not financing commercially viable projects (Interview VII). In a similar vein, 
in 2005 in one of the few late comments on de minimis projects also the U.S. – which 
previously had been particularly concerned with de minimis practices of other Partici-
pants – stated that while de minimis tied aid used to be a major loophole of the Ar-
rangement, considerable progress had been made over the years so that sectors 
considered financially-viable had been subject to fewer de minimis notifications 
(TD/PG/M(2005)13/FINAL: 7).  
5.4.3. The Consultations Group and the Development of the Ex Ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid (1996, 2003, 2005) 
In 1991, when the Participants agreed on the Helsinki tied aid rules, it was expected 
that over time a body of experience would develop that “would more precisely define, 
for both export credit and aid agencies, Ex-ante guidance as to the line between 
projects that should be financed with tied aid or on commercial terms” 
(TD/PG(2005)20: 2). And indeed – in 1996136 the Participants published the Ex ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid, which should become an integral part of the disciplines on tied 
aid credits and main guarantor of their success.  
As foreseen by the Participants this Ex-ante Guidance evolved out of practical difficul-
ties in implementing the Helsinki tied aid rules (TD/PG(2005)20). The resulting guid-
ance can thus be seen as the tip of the iceberg of several years of extensive debates 
within the Consultations Group, which took off its work in 1992. The early consulta-
tion process, that is up to the adoption of the Ex-ante Guidance, consisted of two 
types of formal meetings: those in which the compliance of specific tied aid financed 
projects with the Helsinki rules was discussed; and those in which more generic 
topics such as methodological questions were being addressed (Lammersen 1998: 
60).  
It soon became apparent that first conceptual and methodological issues had to be 
solved in order to be able to judge on the appropriateness of tied aid financing in the 
case of the projects called for consultation (Lammersen 1998; Nygren 1998). These 
early problems concerned the definition of “project”, the appropriate calculation of 
“cash-flows” as well as ways of “appropriate pricing” (Nygren 1998: 57). With regard 
to the project definition it was eventually agreed that a “project” should be “the small-
est complete productive entity, physically and technically integrated, that fully utilizes 
the proposed investment and captures all financial benefits that can be attributed to 
the investment” (Lammersen 1998: 62; TD/PG(2005)20: 13). With regard to “appro-
priate pricing”, for instance, the negotiators of the Helsinki Package had decided that 
“appropriate pricing based on market principles” should be used to assess the com-
mercial viability of a project. This general statement then led to extensive technical 
                                                            
136  For the 1996 version, that is the first draft of the Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid, see for instance 
TD/CONSENSUS(96)23.  
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debates within the Consultations Group on what constituted “market principles” 
(Lammersen 1998: 61; TD/PG(2005)20: 16).  
Once these basic components for project evaluation had been agreed upon, a Check-
list for Information in Feasibility Studies was produced that should guide export and 
aid agencies in gathering the relevant information needed to make informed decisions 
on a project’s commercial (non-)viability (Lammersen 1998: 62). Today, this Checklist 
for Information in Feasibility Studies, part of which is an appraisal of development aid 
aspects, is provided in the Annex of the Ex-ante Guidance. This attached list provides 
guidance in preparing aid quality assessments (AQuA), which include criteria for 
project selection, project preparation and appraisal as well as procurement practices 
(TD/PG(2005)20: 10 et seqq.).  
In parallel to removing methodological ambiguities, the Consultations Group worked 
towards the establishment of an ex-ante guidance (Lammersen 1998: 62). Derived 
from evaluation results of over 131 individual project notifications, this guidance was 
designed by the Participants to the Arrangement in order to guide project planners 
and aid agencies in their decision-making on whether projects are eligible for tied aid 
(as defined by the two key tests of the Helsinki Package) (OECD 1998: 26). Analyses 
of evaluation reports and especially a study conducted by Prof. Tony Owen137 – an 
independent consultant hired for that purpose – suggested that financially non-viable 
projects were primarily projects that touched upon the provision of public goods or 
that were especially capital-intensive “with high per unit production costs and slow 
capacity uptake, and/or where the beneficiary group (normally household consumers) 
is deemed unable to afford the output at the appropriate market-determined price” 
(TD/PG(2005)20: 5). In contrast, manufacturing projects, for instance, are shown to 
be frequently commercially viable, and are hence in tendency not eligible for tied aid 
credits (TD/PG(2005)20: 7).  
Despite this appraisal of the financial viability of projects in specific sectors, the Ex-
ante Guidance emphasizes the necessity of case-by-case analysis and recognizes 
that each project needs to be considered in relation to its particular circumstances 
(TD/PG(2005)20: 5). This means that in principle no sector-specific rules are set – a 
step that would have probably gone too far for influential industries fearing to lose 
competitiveness.  
By summing up the very logic of the Ex-ante Guidance, Frans Lammersen, one of the 
principle constructors of the Guidance, states: “In short, the guidance brings aid 
financing into line with general economic thinking. Projects are considered commer-
                                                            
137  Anthony Owen was professor at the University of South Wales and was hired as consultant to assess the 
projects that were brought to the Consultations Group in the early post-Helsinki years (Owen 1998: 67). 
In 2004, he presented a second evaluation report of the work of the Consultations Group 
(TD/PG(2004)17). On the basis of his findings, the Ex-Ante Guidance was revised (TD/PG(2004)26).  
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cially viable, and thus do not require subsidies, when the project can be linked to the 
international market for goods and services” (Lammersen 1998: 62).  
The Ex-ante Guidance released in 1996 and marginally revised in 2003 and 2005 is 
the last amendment to the Arrangement directly dealing with tied aid credits. Ever 
since the question of appropriate regulation of tied aid credits has seemed to be 
surrounded by peaceful silence. Their tying status, however, remains a heavily con-
tested characteristic.  
5.4.4. Financial Terms and Conditions for Export Credits According to 
the Arrangement138 
The provisions on tied aid credits constitute only a small part of the Arrangement. The 
main financial terms and conditions defined by the Arrangement shall be outlined 
hereafter. The Arrangement applies exclusively to official support provided by govern-
ments or by institutions acting on behalf of a government. Private forms of export 
promotion are excluded. The Arrangement covers any form of official support for ex-
port of goods or services, with the exception of military equipment and agricultural 
commodities. The framework also applies to financial leases (Article 5). A number of 
special guidelines, so called sector understandings, complement the Arrangement. 
Currently such sector understandings exist for nuclear power plants, civil aircraft, 
ships and renewable energies and water projects.  
Forms of official support defined by the Arrangement are export credit guarantees or 
insurances, direct credit/financing and refinancing, interest rate support, or any com-
bination of the listed (Article 5). The Arrangement contains regulations that particularly 
apply to tied aid. Notification procedures and matching also concern trade-related 
untied aid.  
The core elements of the financial terms and conditions regulated by the Arrangement 
are the following:  
 minimum and maximum credit periods for different types of goods,  
 minimum advance payments,  
 maximum official support, 
 repayment structures,  
 minimum government-supported interest rate levels, and  
 premium rates for country risk.  
  
                                                            
138  This subchapter and the provided analysis of the Arrangement is based on the version TAD/PG(2013)1 of 
the Arrangement. All other references are cited separately. The Arrangement on Officially Supported Ex-
port Credits is constantly revised by the Participants. Minor adjustments have been made but no major 
changes have been introduced in the past years 
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5.4.4.1. Repayment Terms  
The Arrangement regulates export credit support for goods and services with credit 
periods of more than two years. Financial arrangements with credits periods of less 
than two years are normally covered by the private sector. Regarding the duration of 
the credit the Participants follow the principle by which the “[…] repayment terms do 
not exceed the useful life of the good” (TAD/PG(2013)1: 7).  
The recipient or buyer countries are divided into two categories in order to grant dif-
ferent repayment terms: category I comprises the industrialized countries, that is to 
say high income OECD countries, all other countries are credited category II. The 
categorization is determined by World Bank classifications of borrowing countries and 
is based on GNI per capita. The maximum repayment terms for category II countries, 
which includes all developing countries, is set at ten years. Shorter periods may apply 
for certain goods or lower contract values (Article 12). 
The Arrangement regulates that the purchaser is required to make a down payment of 
at least 15 % of the export contract at or before the starting point of credit. The start-
ing point varies depending on the good or service purchased. The maximum provision 
of official support is therefore limited to 85 % of the export contract value. This may 
include third country supply, but excludes local costs. Official support for local costs 
is limited to 30 % of the contract value. Exceptions on the maximum amount of official 
support for local costs are possible, but are subject to prior notification (Article 10). 
The Arrangement further regulates repayment of principal sum and payment of inter-
est. Generally, it allows for payments with a maximum interval of six month in equal 
installments. Installments include interest rate payments. On a justified basis unequal 
installments in payment terms are possible, maximum frequency of principal repay-
ment, as well as interest payment, may be extended to a frequency of up to twelve 
month (Article 14). 
5.4.4.2. Interest Rates  
The guidelines set the minimum level for government-supported fixed interest rates. 
According to the Arrangement, the minimum interest rate applied to loans with a fixed 
interest rate is the Commercial Interest Reference Rate. CIRRs should represent 
market interest rates. In this regard the Arrangement states: “CIRRs should represent 
final commercial lending interest rates in the domestic market of the currency con-
cerned“ (Article 19). CIRRs correspond to a rate given to first class borrowers and are 
revised monthly (Grath 2012: 154). Currently, the CIRRs are available for 15 curren-
cies, including each national currency of members of the Participants Group. Officially 
supported interest rates are usually given on a fixed-interest basis (Grath 2012: 155). 
Floating rate loans may be provided. 
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5.4.4.3. Credit Risk Premiums  
The Arrangement highlights that an appropriate credit risk premium shall be charged. 
Premiums should reflect the risk elements (country risk, buyer risk) involved in the 
transaction and the period of the transaction (Grath 2012: 155), mitigation and credit 
enhancements for country and buyer risk, as well coverage for political and commer-
cial risk, and the quality of the product (Article 24). The borrower countries are classi-
fied according to risk of non-repayment of their external debt into eight categories. 
High income OECD and Euro-zone countries are listed in category 0. For the catego-
ries 1 to 7 minimum premium rates have been established. In order to ensure greater 
flexibility, the sovereign risk and buyer risk are assessed and sovereigns and buyers 
(obligators or guarantors) are identified that face higher or lower risks than the esti-
mated country risk (Articles 23-27). 
5.5. Recap and Concluding Remarks  
This chapter set out with an inquiry of the historical roots of tied aid credits and 
showed that this hybrid instrument has been inextricably linked with export credits. 
The tightening of rules on traditional export credits paired with a severe debt crisis in 
the developing world, had placed tied aid credits at the heart of national export poli-
cies of many industrialized countries and made them become somewhat of a “protec-
tionist device” (DCD/DAC/FA(93)3, prepared by C. Jepma). In these circumstances, 
the original motivation behind giving tied aid credits was one of gaining competitive 
advantages for the donors’ domestic enterprises; development goals were thereby at 
best pursued as an add-on that should conceal the trade distorting effects of the 
practice. The term “aid” in tied aid credits, therefore, was not necessarily to be asso-
ciated with development of recipient countries, but might as well be interpreted as aid 
to national industries, which saw their international competiveness declining. In this 
respect John Ray says: “When governments succumb to this temptation [of using 
this sort of aid as a mercantilistic device to enhance the competitive position of 
their exporters], there is indeed aid. But the target is the donor country’s exporter, 
not the developing country. This is industrial policy, not aid policy” (Ray 1995: 
28; emphasis added). 
Considering that tied aid practices were an “integral part of national export trade 
philosophy” of some OECD countries (Mendelowitz 1989: 12) it is not astonishing 
that outlawing these very practices proved to be a cumbersome undertaking. Gradual-
ly the Participants – the main body negotiating on the use of both export and tied aid 
credits – increased the minimum permissible grant element (later renamed conces-
sionality level) for tied aid credits hoping that this would provide enough of an incen-
tive to discourage these harmful practices. An increasing number of tied aid credit 
notifications after the renewed raise of the minimum concessionality level in the 
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Wallén Package, however, proved the idea of discouraging these practices by simply 
making them more expensive insufficient. With the Helsinki Package the Participants 
shifted their strategy and introduced the concept of commercial viability, which should 
henceforth ensure the separation of commercially motivated export credits and devel-
opment motivated tied aid credits.  
These tied aid disciplines, valid up to today, are centered around two key tests essen-
tially examining the financial viability of a project as well as the access to finance in the 
country where the project would be implemented. Exemptions from the project eligibil-
ity tests are provided for highly concessional transactions, tied aid credits to LDCs 
and de minimis transactions below SDR 2 million. Furthermore, in order to provide 
practical assistance to implementing agencies and the applying company an Ex Ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid was developed. 
Looking back at the history of tied aid credits gives reason to presume that on an 
international level tied aid credits have been designed from a liberal economist per-
spective striving first and foremost to eliminate trade distortions. Development con-
cerns have thereby at best been of secondary importance. Keeping the export credit 
race of the 1970ies (and its predecessor which could be labeled a tied aid credits 
war) in mind, it becomes evident that the rules that were designed to discourage this 
behavior primarily appeal to the trade distorting features of this financial tool rather 
than to its aid quality. Whether these original motivations have vanished and new, 
more development-oriented motivations prevail remains to be seen. The analysis of the 
national implementation of the Arrangement rules and/or deviations thereof, provided 
in the four analyzed case studies, will give answers to this question.  
Another question, as a link to the subsequent chapter, concerns the compatibility of 
goals: is it possible to achieve, both a donor’s export promotion goals and develop-
ment targets through tied aid credits and are these goals equally weighted in today’s 
design of tied aid credits? Do tied aid credits allow donors to “kill two birds with one 
stone” – a saying used by several of interview partners (Interview IV, V) – or do they 
(still) result in the suboptimal allocation of resources from both aid and trade perspec-
tives? 
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
6. Aid Considerations and the Role of the  
Development Assistance Committee 
“It seems to be desirable for the clarity of analysis and discussion to keep the problems  
which mixed credits may raise in aid and trade rather distinct –  
notwithstanding overlaps in practice” 
(DAC/FA(82)2: 13) 
Following this recommendation by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
Secretariat, the analysis of tied aid credits was divided as best as possible along the 
line of aid and trade considerations. While the previous chapter approached tied aid 
credits, the problems arising from using them and measures taken to prevent negative 
effects from a trade angle, this chapter examines the “development finance instru-
ments” in question and the making of rules governing them from a development per-
spective. This structure seems even the more natural considering that these two dif-
ferent, albeit connected, sets of concerns about aid and trade implications stemming 
from tied aid credits were dealt with by different OECD or quasi OECD bodies – the 
Participants Group (PG) and the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Devel-
opment Assistance (DAC/FA) respectively.  
This chapter pursues several goals. First of all, it aims at grasping the role and influ-
ence of the DAC in the making of today’s rules governing tied aid credits and the 
resulting traces of development aspects in the Arrangement. Furthermore, it shall give 
an overview of the main issues related to tied aid financing and mixed credits dis-
cussed within the DAC/FA. Contrary to the previous chapter on the evolution of to-
day’s regulatory framework it does, however, not follow a chronological approach, but 
tries to cluster issues around subject matters. This choice results primarily from the 
fact that most issues discussed were long-lasting matters of concern. Large projects, 
for instance, became a hotly debated issue in the 1980ies and remained so until the 
closure of the DAC/FA in the early 2000s. Also, from the very onset the role of aid 
agencies in designing and implementing projects financed with tied aid credits was 
estimated to be a decisive factor in determining the developmental outcome. In addi-
tion to this overview, concerns raised about potential negative effects of tied aid fi-
nancing on development cooperation are identified. Furthermore, proposals made and 
guidelines adopted by the DAC/FA Members to ensure the development character of 
tied aid financing are presented. Both, the Participants and the DAC, on the basis of 
several mandates attributed to them by the Ministers, put tied aid credits high on their 
agenda. Consequently, most actions in the field of trade distortion were paralleled by 
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discussions on aid distortion within the DAC. Whenever this is the case, references to 
parallel developments in the Participants Group will be made. This concerns primarily 
discussions in the run-up to the Wallén Package (in particular the concessionality 
level) and the period before and immediately after the adoption of the Helsinki Pack-
age (mainly concerning the newly introduced key tests).  
In order to avoid misunderstandings or confusion, first some clarifications on the used 
terminology have to be made. While the DAC Guiding Principles of 1987 (which 
together with the used terminology have remained the benchmark up to today) “define 
separately ‘Associated Financing’, ‘Tied ODA’ and ‘Partially Untied ODA’, the Ar-
rangement includes ‘Associated Financing’ in its definitions of ‘Tied aid financing’ and 
‘Partially untied aid financing’”. This entails different interpretations or usage of the 
term “aid”. In the DAC usage “aid” is synonymous with Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA), whereas in the Participants’ wording “ ‘aid’ may be ODA, may have an 
ODA component, or may not contain any ODA at all” (DAC/FA(87)6: 4). The latter is, 
for instance, the case for Other Official Flows (OOF) including grants and loans with 
the exception of officially supported export credits that are in conformity with the Ar-
rangement. These flows are subsumed in today’s Arrangement under paragraph 34 
setting out forms of tied aid (TAD/PG(2013)1: 19). 
This study is first and foremost interested in those tied aid financing packages that 
contain an element of ODA. This section is primarily based on the documentation of 
meetings of the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance, 
which have been retrieved from the OECD archives. By combining the findings of this 
document analysis with the interviews of OECD officials, who dealt in one way or 
another with tied aid financing, development policy aspects in the Arrangement will be 
traced and DAC positions on the issue over time will be examined. 
6.1. Pushing Development Interests in and through the 
 DAC/FA  
“The development community had, once again, to accept  
that the Participants to the Arrangement had taken a decision affecting  
their area of competence without their direct consent“ 
(Nygren 1998: 56) 
Taking this quote by Birgitta Nygren, Chairwoman of the Consultations Group for Tied 
Aid139 from 1992 to 1995 and Vice-Chairwoman of the Participants, as starting point, 
this chapter approaches the issue of tied aid credits from a development angle and 
                                                            
139  The Consultations Group discussed (and on request still discusses) projects, the conformity of which with 
Arrangement rules was being challenged. This happened frequently in the first years after the inception of 
the Helsinki Disciplines, when definitions and methodologies were still blurry and weak. Experience gained 
with these consultations led to the formulation of the so-called Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid.  
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aims at grasping the role played by the DAC in establishing rules on tied aid credits. 
Examining the DAC’s position towards this financial instrument and its capacity of 
influencing the Participants’ work is thought to be an approximation of the weight of 
development aspects in today’s design of this instrument of development finance. 
At an early stage tied aid financing aroused the attention of the DAC. It was in particu-
lar within the Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance that 
Members discussed potential repercussions of these practices on their development 
policies and recipients’ development prospects.  
The DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance was set up 
in 1975 (DCD/DAC/FA(99)6: 5) and was operational up to the Rome Conference in 
2003 when it was officially merged with the Task Force on Donor Practices to be-
come the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices (WP-EFF) (De 
Milly 2012: 3). While in Participants’ meetings mainly representatives of Ministries of 
Finance and Export Credits Agencies participate(d), DAC/FA meetings brought to-
gether representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Development Cooperation (or 
any other Ministry in charge of development cooperation) and aid agencies. Here 
again national differences prevail. Austria, for instance, sent delegates from the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Chancellery respectively, reflecting the domestic 
back and forward shift in competences over development cooperation.  
At its inception in 1975 the DAC approved the following mandate for the Working 
Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance, henceforth referred to as 
DAC/FA: 
“The Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance will include in 
its purview: consideration of the terms of aid with particular emphasis on the ques-
tion of appropriate terms and on the harmonization of the terms of aid to the poorer 
countries; the analysis of debt problems of developing countries, taking into ac-
count the various types of flows from all sources which lead to indebtedness, i.e. 
official development assistance, export credits and other capital transfers. The 
Working Party will keep under consideration the technical problems related to 
partial or general untying of aid. It will also deal with any other related subject 
referred to it by the DAC. Close working relationships will be maintained with the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees of the 
Trade Committee of the OECD. The Working Party will report to the DAC as appro-
priate” (DAC(75)18; quoted in DCD/DAC/FA(99)6: 13; emphasis added). 
6.1.1. Concerns over Limited and/or Negative Development Impact of 
Tied Aid Credits  
In 1981, with the circulation of a Note by the DAC Secretariat on the “Scope and 
Problems of New Forms of Less-concessional Financial Co-operation with Developing 
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Countries”, discussions on associated financing and tied and partially untied aid took 
off among the members of the working party (DAC/FA(81)1). From the very onset, the 
DAC/FA’s work covered those transactions in which an element of ODA was involved, 
while Participants were and still are interested in all transactions that contain an aid 
element, meaning a subsidy element regardless of whether this comes from the aid 
budget or any other government fund.  
At least for the subsequent three decades aid considerations with regard to tied and 
associated financing should become the dominating matter of concern for the Work-
ing Party. Only after the adoption of the Helsinki Disciplines and New Measures on 
Tied Aid respectively, the Working Party gradually shifted its attention to other issues. 
Especially from 1994 onwards, when the DAC had made it clear that the Working 
Party was expected to “[…] develop its agenda in areas other than aid tying” 
(DCD/DAC/FA(94)8: 2), the DAC/FA diversified its field of interest.  
Within the DAC/FA, concerns were raised with regard to both actual associated 
financing practices and tied and partially untied aid financing and envisaged measures 
by the Participants to deal with the former. Struggles over finding common positions 
on the usefulness of associated financing for development purposes characterized the 
first years of the DAC/FA’s work on these tools of development finance. Furthermore, 
this first period required intense discussion on definitions of and differentiation be-
tween different financial flows – the Participants’ understandings thereof included.  
While from an early stage reciprocal untying was recognized as the ideal solution to 
problems arising from associated financing and tied and partially untied aid, the DAC 
Members only hesitantly adopted corresponding measures. In the meanwhile the 
DAC/FA sought ways to strengthen the development orientation of projects financed 
with tied aid credits. This strategy was still pursued in the 1990ies, as illustrated, for 
instance, in the following quote by Bill Nicol, representative of the Development Co-
operation Directorate, who stressed in 1994 that the DAC was concentrating its 
efforts on “… making more effective the existing disciplines: whilst there is a clear 
preference for untied aid over tied aid, the view is that aid can be ‘good’ but there 
was need to improve the quality of aid that will continue to be tied” 
(TD/CONSENSUS(94)50; emphasis added).  
6.1.1.1. Approaching the Issue: ODA Stretching and Debt Servicing Capacity 
As has already been demonstrated on the example of the untying of aid, strong na-
tional interests made committing members to such initiatives a cumbersome and long-
lasting undertaking. Hence, it is not much of a surprise that also DAC discussions on 
how to proceed with tied and partially untied aid as well as associated financing were 
characterized by diverging country positions and very careful proposals by the Chair-
men so as not to scare off any member state and threaten a fragile consensus.  
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The first DAC/FA document dedicated to the topic – titled “Scope and Problems of 
New Forms of Less-Concessional Financial Co-operation with Developing Countries” 
– was circulated by the DAC Secretariat in 1981 and addressed potential problems 
that might arise from a development perspective when using these financial instru-
ments (DAC/FA(81)1). Conclusions drawn in this note are to a certain extent contra-
dictory in themselves – possibly a result of the fact that associated financing and tied 
and partially untied aid were still a rather new phenomenon and that members were 
only just about to form positions on the issue and had not yet elaborated fully-fledged 
negotiation strategies (hence also the emphasis on New Forms of Financing in the 
Note’s title). Practices of associated financing and tied and partially untied aid were 
placed in the wider context of the scarcity of ODA resources and compared to finan-
cial needs of developing countries as well as to the growing diversity of their debt 
servicing capacity. While country positions varied, the note stressed that most DAC 
members considered it – in view of scarce aid resources and compared to less favor-
able traditional export credits – reasonable to combine ODA and non-ODA resources, 
for instance, in the form of mixed credits.  
The idea that associated financing had to be assessed against the background of 
scarce ODA resources also dominated another Note on the “use of ODA in Associ-
ation with Export Credits” distributed by the Secretariat in 1982. In view of this scar-
city, it was concluded that it would not be desirable to discourage all associated use 
with less-concessional sources of financing, but that criteria and procedures had to 
be designed which would ensure the compatibility of associated financing with devel-
opmental objectives and fair competition (DAC/FA(82)2: 10).  
Interestingly, in light of the aid scarcity debate and an increase in non-concessional 
export credits, the use of mixed credits was interpreted as the result of a number of 
factors among which was listed the desire of aid agencies to leverage ODA and to 
improve overall financial terms for recipients (DAC/FA(81)1: 16). The following main 
motivations of mixed credits extended by individual DAC donors were identified: 
a) “the desire to ‘stretch ODA’, given its scarcity against the financing needs of 
recipient countries, by using it in combination with more easily available export 
credits; 
b) an effort to improve the terms of financial transactions, to make them compatible 
with the recipient’s debt servicing capacity, by associating soft funds with more 
expensive export credits; 
c) trade promotion, especially under the impact of present economic circumstances 
in donor countries (notably employment and balance of payments deficits); 
d) the perceived need to match, in defensive action, favourable terms offered by 
competitors from other donor countries“ (DAC/FA(82)2: 10).  
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The first two motivations listed were frequently brought forward in DAC/FA meetings 
by those members who sought to justify their recourse to associated financing. Fur-
thermore, these two topics have been peculiar to the discussions within the DAC and 
were not addressed by the Participants while (c) and (d), referring to export promotion 
and matching practices140, were also extensively discussed by the Participants.  
Despite the emphasis being put on the potential usefulness of associated financing to 
stretch scarce ODA resources, in both 1981 and 1982 early concerns were ex-
pressed that the use of ODA for mixed credits might tend to divert aid away from 
poorer countries and from projects (particularly in the social and rural areas) which 
were less attractive for commercial financing. This was also expected to distort project 
design to meet commercial interests rather than development objectives. In addition, it 
was thought to be likely that the reduction of the competitive focus on price and quali-
ty might put developing countries in a situation in which their gains in financial terms 
were offset by losses in price and quality – one of the strongest arguments up to 
today brought forward against tying in general. Last but not least, the potential distor-
tion of the choice of investment projects with regard to their economic viability was 
mentioned by the DAC Secretariat (see for instance DAC/FA(81)1: 16). A combina-
tion of these possible negative repercussions led some commentators to conclude 
that mixed credits may be “bad aid and bad business” (DAC/FA(81)1: 16). This as-
sessment matches fairly well John Ray’s observation according to which aid policy 
had to be separated from trade policy if one wanted to avoid to “have bad aid and 
bad trade policies” (Ray 1996: 5). 
In view of the little information available on national systems of mixed financing, in a 
concluding remark the DAC Secretariat asked Members to present their views on the 
usefulness of associated financing as a tool of development finance. By doing so, it 
avoided making judgments thereof itself. In order to get a clearer picture of the diverg-
ing national policies and practices, a questionnaire was distributed to DAC/FA Mem-
bers in 1982, which was also expected to provide preliminary statistical data 
(DAC/FA(82)2: 9). The return rate of completed questionnaires, however, was fairly 
low.  
Partly as a consequence of the little information available to the DAC/FA, in this early 
period the Working Party was reticent or unable to make clear statements on the 
expected utility or harm respectively of associated financing from a development per-
spective. In an attempt to maneuver around one-sided statements, the Secretariat 
stressed that it made a difference whether ODA was stretched with less-concessional 
financing or whether an export credit was the starting point the terms of which “were 
                                                            
140  In case of deviation from Arrangement terms “a Participant may match, according to the procedures set 
out in Article 45, financial terms and conditions offered by a Participant or a non-Participant“ 
(TAD/PG(2013)1: 24). This matching procedure laid down in today’s Arrangement provides an ECA to 
adapt its offer and set the same terms as the derogating agency.  
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softened by associating concessional funds in the financial transaction“ 
(DAC/FA(82)2: 10). 
This line of reasoning is reflected in a statement by the Japanese delegate at the DAC 
High Level Meeting in 1981, in which he argued that in the case of a shortage of ODA 
resources export credits could sometimes supplement ODA. On the contrary, he went 
on, Members should refrain from using ODA to promote exports, which would cause 
trade distortion and was incompatible “with the principle of optimum use of ODA for 
the development of developing countries” (quoted in DAC/FA(82)2: 4, 5). 
At several occasions in the 1980ies the need to thoroughly study national policies, 
which were evidently differing, was stressed. These differences concerned not only 
the budgetary provenance141 of the concessional parts of the financing packages, but 
also reporting practices, implementation policies and so forth (DAC/FA(82)2: 13). 
These variations reflected differing national systems and priority settings of aid pro-
grams. Since members formed their position towards proposed measures against the 
backdrop of expected repercussions on their respective aid and export promotion 
systems, finding an agreement proved difficult (see e.g. DAC/FA/86)12; 
TD/CONSENSUS/86.53: 12). 
6.1.1.2. Distorting Aid Distribution Patterns  
From the viewpoint of aid policy the major concern about mixed credits was that “… 
scarce funds devoted to development assistance programmes – i.e. ODA – should 
not be diverted from poorer developing countries to wealthier ones, or from higher-
priority development projects to those of lesser priority” (DAC/FA(82)2: 13). 
The distortion of the overall geographic, functional and sectoral balance of aid pro-
grams through the use of aid funds for mixed credits resulted from the commercial 
character of many projects that were financed with mixed credits, which were more 
likely to be accepted by middle and higher income developing countries. Hence, ODA 
was shifted from low to higher income countries (DAC/FA(82)2: 14). In order to ob-
serve this worrisome situation, the DAC/FA Secretariat regularly produced reports on 
trends in associated financing and circulated the so-called the “Reviews of Associ-
ated Financing”142.  
Furthermore, it was suggested that recipient countries themselves were the best 
judges of the value of projects undertaken on the basis of relatively more expensive 
mixed credits (compared to “normal” ODA). The rationale that this way the compatibil-
ity of chosen projects with the overall development priorities and strategies of the 
                                                            
141  The question here is whether the funds come from a budget explicitly earmarked for aid and might thus 
compete with the aid agency’s budget (DAC/FA(82)2: 13). 
142  The 1987 Guiding Principles instructed the DAC Secretariat to regularly undertake these Reviews and to 
present them at High Level Meetings (OECD/DAC 1987: para. 12). For an example of such a Review see 
DAC/FA(87)5.  
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recipient country was likely to be given, resembles the ownership and alignment prin-
ciples as laid down in today’s Paris Declaration. The dilemma that might also apply to 
today’s ownership principle was and is that “… this independent project evaluation 
and implementation capacity is likely to be stronger on the part of more advanced 
developing countries which on the basis of the need criterion should be less eligible 
for ODA than the less-advanced developing countries” (DAC/FA(82)2: 14).  
With regard to whether the disciplines curbed the shift of resources from poorer to 
richer developing countries, the Participants and the DAC/FA respectively draw 
somewhat contradicting pictures. While a review undertaken by the Secretariat of the 
Trade Directorate finds that the Helsinki Disciplines have certainly curbed this trend of 
shifting flows from poorer to richer developing countries (TD/PG(2003)7), an earlier 
study issued by the DAC Secretariat was less enthusiastic and stressed that a con-
siderable portion of associated financing flows still went to “strong” developing coun-
tries, such as China, Vietnam etc. The DAC Secretariat finds that “in terms of indi-
vidual country concentrations of tied aid credits, the data shows virtually no change 
between pre- and post-Disciplines periods. Indonesia, Egypt, India and China were, 
and continue to be, the major recipients, together accounting for about 30 per cent 
of the total. This finding also supports the view that the Disciplines have not been 
associated with any reallocation of tied aid credits towards countries with little or no 
access to market financing“ (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 5). However, one needs to go 
beyond aggregated statistics to see variations from donor to donor.  
6.1.2. “Development Safeguards” in Historical Perspective 
Several proposals of how to increase the development orientation of tied aid credits 
have evolved out of the discussions within the DAC/FA. This section contains prac-
tice-oriented information and might also guide subsequent studies on national soft 
loan policies. 
In order to assess the Arrangement from a development perspective it does not suf-
fice to examine the disciplines in existence – one also needs to look for loopholes and 
ask for potential repercussions thereof on aid and development practices. Hereafter, 
these loopholes will be identified by examining measures that had been proposed by 
the DAC/FA. In this respect it is valuable to trace alternatives that have been dis-
cussed but have never made it into the final Arrangement text. Eventually, this also 
tells something about power (im)balances among different interest groups with regard 
to their leverage to impose their respective proposals.  
In an early Note by the DAC Secretariat (DAC/FA(82)2) development oriented as well 
as trade oriented objectives were presented and more specific norms for the use of 
ODA in association with export credits were examined. The development-oriented 
objectives tried to ensure that tied aid and mixed credits were assessed against the 
same criteria as any other ODA flow (despite considerable analytical efforts related to 
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this objective). That way it should be guaranteed that they were not used for activities 
of low developmental value that diverted ODA away from countries most in need, but 
were concentrated on those countries that did not have access to other external re-
sources and had a limited debt servicing capacity. Furthermore, competitive procure-
ment practices and reciprocal untying as well as a shift towards multilateral develop-
ment finance were discussed under the heading of development-oriented143 objectives 
(DAC/FA(82)2: 16, 17).  
At this early stage the Secretariat concluded that if agreement on the above present-
ed aid-oriented principles was found, members would either have to stop using asso-
ciated financing for commercial purposes, or take the concessional funds and subsi-
dies other than the aid budget. Should these practices be continued, the Secretariat 
urged members to make a clear distinction between commercial and concessional 
financing terms to avoid “leapfrogging” competition and to stop spoiling certain mar-
kets and sectors – especially those with a worldwide overcapacity of production. 
Furthermore, members were advised to “… collectively resist demands from devel-
oping countries buyers that they include (concessional) financing terms with their 
bids” – a matter that was also of major concern to the Participants (DAC/FA(82)2: 
18). 
Interestingly, already in 1982 the Secretariat asked whether members thought it fea-
sible to differentiate a priori with the help of “positive” and “negative” lists between 
types of projects or fields of activity to be financed. The objective of these lists would 
“… not be to ‘ban’ aid financing for particular activities but to strengthen the posi-
tion of aid agencies in reviewing applications for use of ODA for mixed credits” 
(DAC/FA(82)2: 20). This proposal reminds us of the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid 
that from 1996 onwards should help responsible agencies to make decisions on the 
eligibility of a given project. However, while the 1982 proposal focused on a priori 
assumptions with regard to the ability of a project to meet development criteria, the 
Ex-ante Guidance is rather concerned with commercial viability.  
In a draft progress report on “improving transparency and discipline of Associated 
Financing and similar transactions” circulated to the DAC/FA Members in 1985, it 
was expressed more precisely what these afore mentioned development criteria could 
be. Members recognized that a project is more likely to be developmentally sound if 
“(i) It is part of investment and public expenditure programmes already approved by 
the central financial and planning authorities of the recipient country; 
(ii) it has been the subject of review and general endorsement in such international 
aid co-ordination arrangements as may exist; 
                                                            
143  Strikingly, terms such as “developmental value” or “development-orientation” are repeatedly used without 
ever being defined.  
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(iii) it is being co-financed with an international development finance institution; by 
contrast, there might be doubt that a project has developmental priority if it has 
been rejected by an international development finance institution for reasons oth-
er than shortage of funds; 
(iv) In the case of ‘stronger developing countries’, it serves to meet specialized ad-
vanced technical need and/or addresses major social problems, including rural 
and smallholder agricultural development” (DAC/FA(85)2: 10). 
These “criteria”, defined in pre-Helsinki times, are still valid and provide orientation for 
the case study analysis of national soft loan policies and their development content. 
With the exemption of provision (iv) on “stronger developing countries”, they are repli-
cated almost in identical wording in 1987 DAC Guiding Principles for Associated 
Financing and Tied and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance 
(OECD/DAC 1987: para. 13). Furthermore, they are reflected in the Checklist of 
Developmental Quality provided in the Annex of the Arrangement (TAD/PG(2013)1) 
and are described in greater detail as part of the Checklist for Information in Feasibil-
ity Studies annexed to the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid (TD/PG(2005)20).  
In addition, the 1987 DAC Guiding Principles and the therein mentioned provisions 
with regard to associated financing are reiterated in the DAC Principles for Project 
Appraisal144, which were adopted in 1988 and which have been referred to in the 
Arrangement up to today (see TAD/PG(2013)1: 134). These DAC Principles contain 
a section – Section VIII – on “special considerations in the case of associated fi-
nancing and tied aid”. Therein, the DAC emphasizes that “… where procurement is 
tied, it should be flexibly administered, including careful choice of supplies in which 
the donor is competent and competitive” (OECD/DAC 1992: 46). 
6.1.2.1. Strengthened Role of Aid Agencies 
Considering the general mandate of the DAC and the composition of delegates in 
meetings of the Working Party, it comes as little surprise that one of the main topics 
dealt with by the Working Party concerned the role of aid agencies in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of associated finance projects and tied aid financing.  
In the first note dedicated to the topic in 1981 members were urged to think about 
possible measures to maximize the development impact of mixed credits – provided 
that this mode of financing should continue to exist. In the following proposals aid 
                                                            
144  The DAC Principles for Project Appraisal set out project selection criteria and appraisal procedures that 
should ensure that investment projects are of high development quality (OECD/DAC 1992: 33-47). The 
principles state that the recipient is responsible for project identification, design and implementation 
(OECD/DAC 1992: 33) However, according to Chang, Fell and Laird, “donor experience shows an 
activist approach is needed to select good projects and that competition for good projects may occur” 
(DCD(99)6: 93).  
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agencies were attributed a greater role in the design and implementation of projects 
financed by mixed credits (DAC/FA(81)1: 18 et seqq.; emphasis added):  
“(i)  Aid agencies should be fully consulted on the projects/programmes which are 
proposed for mixed credit financing and should review these projects/ 
programmes, applying the standards and criteria used for activities financed 
with ODA only. 
(ii)  As in the case for aid financed projects, mixed credit financed projects should 
be the subject of inter-governmental agreements between borrower and 
lending countries. 
(iii)  Efforts to ensure that the provision·of mixed credits is compatible with the debt 
servicing capacity of recipient countries, 
(iv)  Aid agencies should watch closely the implications of the use of ODA for 
mixed credits for the overall geographic, functional and sectoral balance of 
their aid programmes. 
(v)  There should be an international understanding that large mixed credit fi-
nanced projects (exceeding a certain size) should be subject to international 
competitive bidding (possibly with the tender documents soliciting information 
on credit amounts and terms)”  
The above measures have partly been put in place. With regard to the compatibility of 
financing packages with the overall debt servicing capacity of recipients, one could, 
for instance, think of the sustainable lending initiative, which was initiated in the late 
2000s by the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund) and adopted by the Export Credit Group in the form of Principles and Guide-
lines in to Promote Sustainable Lending Practices of Official Export Credits to Low 
Income Countries (TAD/ECG(2008)1).  
Also, the mandatory inter-governmental agreements are a widely common practice 
today and the call for International Competitive Bidding (ICB) for large projects be-
came an integral part of the 1992 New Measure for Tied Aid (SG/PRESS(92)35: 4). 
The Secretariat stressed already in 1982 that projects financed with mixed credit 
should be assessed and implemented under the same standards, criteria and proce-
dures as projects financed exclusively by aid resources. The extent to which this pro-
posal has become common practice today, will have to be assessed on a national 
level. 
Coming back to what has been mentioned before on the specific composition of 
associated financing packages, the weight given to the development impact of the 
financed project can be expected to be greater in cases where ODA constitutes the 
dominant portion of the financing package. In the opposite case, where the aid agen-
cy is the “junior partner” in the transaction, its influence in selection, design and im-
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plementation is likely to be rather limited. The role of aid agencies is also bound to be 
limited when considering that “the number of qualified staff in aid agencies which 
could participate in the review and execution of such projects is limited” 
(DAC/FA(82)2: 14). Interestingly, also in two interviews the educational background 
of staff of both DCD/DAC and aid agencies was addressed and one-sided compe-
tences in qualitative social sciences rather than economics were identified as an 
obstacle to effective involvement in mixed credit policies (and policy making) (Inter-
view IV, V). This way, the capability of aid agencies to take a more active role in asso-
ciated financing was questioned.  
These doubts do not change the fact that the importance of proper participation of aid 
institutions in the design and implementation of associated financing projects was 
stressed over and over again by the DAC/FA. The continuity of these discussions is 
reflected in the fact that, for instance, in 1999, that is after the Ex ante Guidance had 
been published, it was still of major concern. In a study of “management systems for 
development cooperation”, of DAC members, the authors recalled that the participa-
tion of ministries and agencies that administered development co-operation in project 
appraisal and decision making in relation to associated financing varied significantly 
among members. Considering that aid funds were involved, the role of these institu-
tions, however, was crucial in ensuring that development objectives inherent in aid 
were properly taken into account also in the selection of projects to be funded with 
associated financing (Chang et al. 1999; see DCD(99)6: 88).  
Not only a strengthened role of aid agencies, but also closer cooperation and coordi-
nation in capitals between aid agencies and export credit agencies were called for by 
the DAC/FA. This should, for instance, ensure that delegations to the Participants’ 
consultation meetings were fully briefed on aid-related issues and concerns that 
needed to be addressed in these consultations (DAC/FA(92)1: para. 20; 
DCD/DAC/FA(96)6: 3). Departing from Lammersen’s and Owen’s statement that 
“the Consultations Group does not consider the development benefits of a project 
(that is the role of the DAC)” (Lammersen/Owen 2001: 77), the DAC/FA’s success 
in fostering this cooperation, however, seems questionable.  
6.1.2.2. Development of a Consensus on Objective Development Criteria for 
Pre-Mixed Financing 
In 1987 one specific form of associated financing, so-called pre-mixed credits, was 
heavily discussed by the members of the DAC/FA. Concerns arose especially with 
regard to the calculation of the overall grant element of such packages. The DAC/FA 
speaks of pre-mixed credits when resources from a donor’s budget are combined with 
funds raised on capital markets to form a single “pre-mixed” loan. “The limited availa-
ble information suggests that the main pre-mixing techniques are (i) blending budget 
  19  117 
and market funds and (ii) subsidising the interest rate of market funds by grants from 
the budget” (DAC/FA(87)2: 3).  
Considering that up to today pre-mixed financing has been part of some donors’ port-
folios145, these discussions – although somewhat technical – will briefly be touched 
upon. Details of reporting practices, however, will be left aside because these have 
repeatedly undergone changes since the 1980ies. The grant element thresholds set 
out in the 1987 DAC Principles apply in the same way to post-mixed and pre-mixed 
transactions and thus prevent the circumvention thereof by adapting institutional or 
technical arrangements for this purpose. Nevertheless problems with regard to the 
reporting of pre-mixed transactions as ODA persist. Such concerns about the report-
ing of pre-mixed credits resulted from the fact that while usually in associated financ-
ing packages the commercial flows were and still are assigned a zero grant element, 
in a pre-mixed single loan, the grant element of all the components were automatically 
taken into account. Hence, when using the DAC’s 10 % discount rate, “all component 
flows with an interest rate below 10 per cent, would have a positive grant element 
and convey it to the total grant element” (DAC/FA(87)2: 12). Similar debates are held 
today on how to proceed with loans that meet the required grant element as a result 
of low government interest rates and without a budgetary effort on the donor-side 
(DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)20/DRAFT; see articles by Lomoy 2013; Manning 2013). 
Confronted with controversially discussed pre-mixed credit practices, the DAC Secre-
tariat proposed to DAC/FA Members to collectively work towards a consensus on 
objective criteria that would allow to determine the developmental character – or the 
lack thereof – of the “project and the (concessional) financial transaction and the 
financing scheme from which it flows” (DAC/FA(87)2: 13, 14). For that purpose, 
members were invited to gather a number of positive and negative aspects that should 
help them agree on a consensus on development criteria. The suggested negative 
and positive aspects essentially recalled those mentioned already in a Note by the 
Secretariat in 1985. These included, for instance, the project’s incorporation in in-
vestment and public expenditure programmes, the degree of involvement of the aid 
agency, the presumptive presence or absence of development orientation etc. 
(DAC/FA(85)2: 10; (DAC/FA(87)2: 14). An additional negative criterion not men-
tioned in the 1985 Note concerned the use of (pre)mixed credits for matching 
(DAC/FA(87)2: 14).  
6.1.2.3. Aid Quality: Improved and Mandatory Aid Quality Assessment  
Members of the DAC/FA considered it their main task to make sure that projects 
proposed for tied aid financing represented good investments in development. Alt-
hough the Working Party had put its focus on aid quality much earlier, it was in the 
                                                            
145  The Austrian export credit agency (OeKB), for instance, offers pre-mixed credits. For an overview of the 
different credit modalities see BMF 2010. 
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1990ies that discussions on how to achieve this goal were the most intense 
(DCD/DAC/FA/M/(93)2-PROV). This agenda-setting is also to be seen in the context 
of a general rethinking of development co-operation in the 1990ies when the effec-
tiveness and quality of aid were seriously challenged and an “aid fatigue” translated 
into reduced ODA volumes. 
Called on by export credit agencies that were seeking advice from the DAC on how to 
ensure good developmental quality of projects, in 1990 an informal joint meeting 
between the Participants and the DAC/FA was held in which also aid agencies partic-
ipated. In this constellation first suggestions for an Aid Quality Checklist were made 
which should form the basis for assessing the development content of projects fi-
nanced in developing countries (DCD/DAC/FA(91)1: 2 et seqq.). One of the sugges-
tions made during discussions was that “…an aid quality assessment, essentially by 
thorough and effective project appraisal, will have to be made before a financial 
commitment is made” (DCD/DAC/FA(91)1: 3). Due to the considerable administra-
tive burden this move would possibly have posed on export credit agencies, the par-
ticipating experts thought it reasonable to limit the application thereof to certain cate-
gories of transactions (e.g. large projects) or to follow a “two-pronged approach”, i.e. 
a basic appraisal in a first step and a more detailed one in a second step (DCD/DAC/ 
FA(91)1: 3, 4). 
Eventually, the DAC’s 1992 New Measures in the Field of Tied Aid presented in its 
Annex a “Check-list of Development Quality of Aid-Financed Projects” (OECD/DAC 
1992: 16), which was also attached to the Arrangement. This checklist, based on 
older DAC principles, was and still is expected to assist export credit and/or aid 
agencies to assess the aid quality of a proposed project. When in 1996 the first ver-
sion of the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid was released, an enlarged checklist for 
development quality became part of this Participants’ document. The Aid Quality 
Assessments (AQuAs) to be undertaken along the criteria laid down in this checklist 
have a dual function. Firstly, it is their objective to demonstrate the contribution of a 
tied aid credit project to sustainable development, that is to "… provide the donor 
community with an 'at a glance' assurance that tied aid proposals represent an effec-
tive use of scarce aid resources" (DCD/DAC/FA(95)1: 4). Secondly, AQuAs might 
be used by the Participants to signal concerns about quality to the DAC/FA 
(DCD/DAC/FA(95)1: 5). 
In the mid-1990ies, when numerous projects called for consultation showed the diffi-
culties of implementing the newly adopted rules and in view of the unsatisfactory 
quality of those Aid Quality Assessments146 conducted, the DAC/FA emphasized their 
                                                            
146  The DAC Secretariat criticized that often there was no or very little information on the development 
aspects of a project. Frequently only very general statement were being made, such as “… telecommu-
nications projects in rural areas promote development or that the health benefits form a project producing 
iodised salt justify the use of aid funding” (DCD/DAC/FA(94)9: 4, 5).  
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important role in confidence building among tied aid giving states and made precise 
proposals147 for improving this “mechanism” (DCD/DAC/FA/M(94)1/PROV; DCD/ 
DAC/FA(95)1). First of all, AQuAs should be provided as an integral part of the feasi-
bility studies prepared by countries in support of their projects. Furthermore, they 
should provide sufficiently detailed statements and explanations justifying the appro-
priateness of aid funding, so as to allow other donors to form an opinion on the devel-
opment quality of the project and to raise issues on this if necessary. Since, according 
to the Secretariat, countries preparing proposals for tied aid financing are expected to 
have already performed this analysis, this should not be an onerous task. In addition, it 
was proposed that AQuAs be mandatory for all projects called for consultation. This 
would mean, that all large projects automatically had to provide an Aid Quality As-
sessment (see e.g. DCD/DAC/FA/M(94)1/PROV: 2; DCD/DAC/FA/M(94)2/PROV: 
3; DCD/DAC/FA(94)3). Discussions on large projects popped up again in the 
DAC/FA when the Participants changed their rules for large projects. 
Under the Helsinki Disciplines large projects initially were subject to automatic consul-
tation. As most of these projects in the early years, however, received the support of 
the Consultation Group, the Participants amended their procedures, replacing the 
automatic consultations by “enhanced” notification requirements (DCD/DAC/FA 
(96)6: 5). In addition, the Secretariat proposed to invite the Participants Group to 
enhance the standard notification form for all tied aid credit projects by adding ques-
tions designed to assess aid quality. Recalling earlier discussions, this could mean 
requesting information on both financial and economic internal rates of return of pro-
jects (DCD/DAC/FA(94)3).  
In parallel, DAC/FA members agreed on the formation of an informal "Friends of the 
Chair" group, which should help the Chair and the Secretariat discuss issues related 
to aid quality and to draft proposals for follow-up action by the DAC/FA. As a reaction 
to the insufficient consideration of aid quality aspects in the Participants’ consultations 
(DCD/DAC/FA(95)3/REV1), the “Friends of the Chair” produced several Aid Quality 
Guidance Notes, which focused on issues signaled in the review of tied aid credits to 
support projects. Although the guidance provided was thought to be valuable for the 
preparation of aid supported projects in general, members were particularly expected 
to take the guidance into account in the preparation of future tied aid financing 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)6; DCD/DAC/FA(97)10: 3; DCD/DAC/FA(95)3/REV 1). In the 
attempt to develop sector-specific guidance/checklists, guidance notes were pre-
pared, for instance, on “environmental projects”, “water projects” and “project sus-
tainability” (DCD/DAC/FA(96)6: 3; DCD/DAC/FA(97)10: 3).  
                                                            
147  The DAC Secretariat appears rather reluctant and cautious not to interfere in the Participants’ work. In this 
vein, the DAC Secretariat, for instance, stressed that “the above proposals have no implications for the 
way in which the Participants conduct their business; aid quality issues would remain outside their exami-
nation of projects and AQuAs would continue to function as a signaling device for issues to be followed 
up in the DAC/FA” (DCD/DAC/FA(95)1: 11). 
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6.1.2.4. Greater Importance of Development Content in Consultation Proce-
dures  
According to Frans Lammersen, who chaired the Consultations Group between 1995 
and 1997 and who today works for the Development Co-operation Directorate, the 
“developmental quality of the projects did not play a major role during the consultation 
process”. “Indeed”, he goes on, “anecdotal evidence suggests that Member coun-
tries remain more concerned with the promotion of their domestic support export 
industries than with the effectiveness of these scarce resources in promoting 
development” (Lammersen 1998: 64; emphasis added). 
In a similar vein, Anthony Owen, who, as an independent consultant, analyzed the 
body of experience gained since 1992 under the tied aid disciplines, addresses this 
problematique. Even though the raison d’être for the Helsinki tied aid disciplines is the 
prevention of trade distortion, he reminds us that the financial support for the com-
mercially non-viable projects usually comes from the “aid” budgets (Owen 1998: 68; 
Lammersen/Owen 2001: 77). Consequently, Owen stresses that “… more empha-
sis should be placed on a sound economic justification for investing in an otherwise 
financially non-viable project” so as to prevent projects form “becoming a financial 
bottomless pit” (Owen 1998: 68)148. Giving greater weight to the analysis of economic 
benefits of a project financed with tied aid credits was also one of the DAC/FA’s key 
proposals in order to improve development quality. In a Note by the Secretariat circu-
lated in 1994 this suggestion is clearly expressed: “The Working Party also suggest-
ed that countries provide estimates of the economic internal rates of return … to 
complement those on the financial internal rates of return, in the sense that the 
gap between these two rates would be indicative of the development contribution 
of the project. Countries should, of course, explain the mechanism by which the 
subsidy involved in the projects makes this development contribution” 
(DCD/DAC/FA (94)9: 5; original emphasis). 
In an early draft report to the Ministers on the implementation of the tied aid disci-
plines, the DAC Secretariat identifies the adequate representation of aid authorities in 
Consultation Group discussions as a precondition for the efficient implementation of 
the DAC disciplines (DCD/DAC/FA(93)6, para. 10).The idea that the role of aid 
agencies in the consultation process should be strengthened was recalled at several 
occasions, but did not have any significant effect on the composition of national dele-
gates sent to consultation meetings (DCD/DAC/FA(96)6: 3).  
                                                            
148  In 1998, both Lammersen (1998: 61 et seqq.) and Owen (1998: 68) identify the treatment of environ-
mental projects as another major outstanding issue that the Consultations Group will have to address. A 
detailed analysis of the potential environmental consequences of the Helsinki rules, not discussed here, is 
given by Peter Evans (2003). Breuss (2005) tackles the treatment of environmental projects under the Ar-
rangement on the Austrian example.  
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6.1.3. Communicating Aid Considerations: the DAC/FA’s Relation to the 
Participants 
As has been shown, tied and partially untied aid credits as well as associated financ-
ing ranged high on the agenda of the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of 
Development Finance. From the early 1980ies onwards, the DAC/FA repeatedly 
voiced concerns about the development impact of these instruments. Most notably 
these concerned the distortion of aid flows for commercial purposes, leading to an 
undesired geographical and sectoral shift in the distribution of aid. In view of the fact 
that eliminating these practices altogether was not a conceivable option, the Working 
Party proposed measures of how to enhance the development orientation of these 
official flows. The question, thus, arises, how the DAC/FA tried to articulate these 
concerns and suggestions vis-à-vis the main negotiating body, the Participants 
Group. In search of answers, this section explores the means that were at the Work-
ing Party’s disposal to “confront” the Participants Group with its expectations regard-
ing developmentally effective rules of aid resources. The extent to which the DAC/FA 
made use of these will briefly be touched upon and taken up in the conclusions drawn 
from this chapter. 
6.1.3.1. Monitoring the Participants Group 
Already with the DAC Guiding Principles on Aid in Association with Export Credits 
and other Market Funds of 1983 Members declared that the Working Party on Finan-
cial Aspects “… will follow closely relevant developments in the Group on Export 
Credits and Credit Guarantees of the Trade Committee and co-operate with this 
Group as required” (DAC(83)7: 6). In 1985 DAC/FA Members reaffirmed this com-
mitment and stated that they “… are following the work under the Consensus 
which is directly relevant to their concerns. The respective parts of the Secretariat are 
in touch to promote reconcilable approaches by both groups to the same issues” 
(DAC/FA(85)2: 12). Over the years, the role of the Secretariat should become crucial 
in increasing awareness of aid concerns of the DAC/FA among the Participants and 
of trade considerations among the DAC/FA, respectively. In a way these “awareness-
raising measures” by the Secretariat paved the way for informed discussion of matters 
of mutual concern.  
The issues which were of concern for the DAC included the “[…] definition of ‘tied 
aid credits’ and the calculation of the grant element; prior notification requirements; 
common line consultations; proposal to raise the minimum permissible grant element 
threshold for tied aid credits and other proposals to strengthen discipline” 
(DAC/FA(85)2: 12 et seqq.). 
Discussions on changes in the minimum permissible grant element in the run-up to the 
Wallén Package exemplify how closely the DAC/FA followed negotiations within the 
Participants Group. In essence, discussions among the Participants were observed 
122 
and the potential repercussions of proposed measures on development (aid) in gen-
eral, and DAC principles in particular, were assessed (see for instance the Note “Im-
plications of strengthened export credit arrangement disciplines for the DAC Guiding 
Principles” – DAC/FA(87)1). The DAC discussions on the appropriate calculation of 
the grant element which were triggered by changes made by the Participants in com-
puting the grant element, henceforth called concessionality level, also show that the 
influence we try to capture is not a one-way street and that discussions in the Partici-
pants Group also spilled over into the DAC/FA.  
Since country positions on the usefulness of the envisaged measure diverged consid-
erably, a Note by the DAC Secretariat of the year 1986 studied possible scenarios 
resulting from an increase in the grant element threshold. In the first scenario, the 
proposed measure would lead to a reduction of resource transfers, essentially be-
cause for budgetary or institutional reasons it would become more difficult to stretch 
ODA. In a second scenario, donors would discontinue ineligible associated financing 
and tied and partially untied ODA as well, but this time re-direct at least some of the 
newly available aid resources to their more concessional aid programs. In the third 
scenario, the new concessionality threshold would result in a new clustering of aid 
transactions just above the permissible grant element and could imply “intensified 
credit terms competition” (DAC/FA(86)8: 6).  
The increased minimum concessionality threshold, which the Participants were about 
to agree on, was thought to disincentive the use of tied aid credits for commercial 
purposes149. In another Note circulated by the OECD Secretariat in 1986, however, it 
was stressed that there was no certainty that increases in the grant element (at either 
uniform or differentiated discount rates) would significantly improve development 
quality. The OECD Secretariat stated that the requirement of a grant element regard-
less of whether it was set at 25 or 35 % could not replace ”… careful economic 
appraisal and cost-effective procurement methods” (DAC/FA(86)12; 
TD/CONSENSUS/86.53: 30). In addition to an increased minimum permissible grant 
element, strong DAC guiding principles, combined with standards for project apprais-
al and procurement, were thought to be necessary to make sure that development 
goals could be met with tied aid credits. Finding agreement on principles that “really 
bite, however, had not been possible at that stage“. This lack of progress was ex-
plained by the Secretariat with the “… unwillingness by Member governments to 
accept restrictions on the use of their aid, inherent difficulties in determining devel-
opmental criteria and, in consequence, scepticism that such criteria would be applied 
uniformly by all members” (DAC/FA(86)8: 6, 7). The first reason mentioned, the 
standstill due to unwillingness of members to accept restrictions, reflects the very way 
                                                            
149  Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the third scenario described above came to be true, i.e. the 
extension of rather hard credits just above the new minimum threshold. 
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of the functioning of the OECD150. Although the Secretariat is the heartbeat of the 
Organization (Woodward 2009: 49 et seqq.), its members are the reins – or as Rich-
ard Woodward puts it: “They are the gatekeepers for the issues that enter the organi-
zation, they hold the purse strings, and their representatives far outnumber those of 
the OECD” (Woodward 2009: 60 et seqq.). This means that no important decisions 
can be made without the agreement of all members. Consequently, diverging opinions 
on the usefulness of mixed credits might have weakened the position of the DAC/FA 
as a whole vis-à-vis the Participants.  
While DAC/FA Members recognized that aid could be improved through an increase 
in the grant element, if “… acrimony and suspicion among donors about the use of 
aid for commercial advantage could be reduced” through the measure envisaged by 
the Participants, potential trade-offs between the development assistance and the 
trade impact of the proposed measures were addressed in the Note. Especially the 
potential loss of flexibility in ODA-stretching was recalled and the fear that such a 
measure might make aid management somewhat more complicated for certain donors 
was addressed (DAC/FA(86)12; TD/CONSENSUS/86.53). Concerns about stagnat-
ing or decreasing ODA volumes due to fewer possibilities of ODA-stretching were an 
integral part of early DAC/FA discussions on the issue. Up to today this argument 
paired with concerns about reduced public support for aid spending has been 
brought forward as a justification of slow progress in untying or rather of the refusal to 
consider the untying of certain activities. The Note concluded by saying that “a clear 
signal to the business community and to developing countries that Official Devel-
opment Assistance is for financing development and not for gaining commercial 
advantage over competitors would in any case be useful” (DAC/FA(86)12; 
TD/CONSENSUS/86.53: 30; emphasis added). Unequivocally, this statement re-
flects the need to take into account the interests of the business community, which 
appears as an important interest group influencing national policy-making. Excluding 
or insufficiently accommodating these interests, it was feared, could lead to the ero-
sion of the adopted rule set.  
These discussions on the modification of the grant element illustrate how attentive the 
DAC/FA was towards the developments in the Participants Group. But which possi-
bilities did the DAC/FA have to communicate its objections or proposals to the Partic-
ipants? The circulation of the same Notes of the Secretariat to both the Participants 
and the DAC/FA suggests that the respective directorates of the Secretariat ex-
changed views and expertise. The next section will examine the forms of interaction 
which took place on the level of the two groups.  
                                                            
150  Examples such as the U.S. Tied Aid War Chest show that the lack of sanctioning power of the 
Organization leads to a situation in which “it is up to each government to … follow up on violations” 
(Forster/Stokke 1999a: 39-40, 50; quoted in Petermann 2013: 421).  
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6.1.3.2. Forms of Interaction between the Two Groups 
In the mandate given to the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development 
Assistance it says that the Working Party will maintain close relationships with the 
Export Credit Bodies, that is the ECG and the Participants Group (DAC(75)18 quot-
ed in DCD/DAC(/FA/99)6: 13). At several occasions, for instance in 1989, DAC/FA 
Members reaffirmed older commitments and “… stressed the need to move in tan-
dem with progress made in the export credit bodies and to co-operate with them to 
the maximum extent possible. It was felt, however, that on aspects of particular 
importance for aid and development policies the DAC should have the leader-
ship” (DAC/FA/M(89)1(Prov.): 2; emphasis added). 
Also the Participants acknowledged the aid distorting effects of tied aid financing and 
declared from an early stage on that it was necessary to cooperate with the DAC on 
this issue. And indeed, the document analysis shows that reciprocal reporting and 
(informal) joint meetings151 between the DAC Working Party and the Participants 
Group took place and opened communication channels between delegates in the 
respective groups. Forms of direct contact between members of the DAC/FA and the 
Participants Group were preceded and accompanied by cooperation between the 
Directorates of the Secretariat, which jointly prepared Notes to be considered by both 
the Participants and the Working Party and which should increase a mutual under-
standing of each other’s concerns and goals. 
The most frequent form of communication between the two groups was the reporting 
done by the respective Chairman to members of the other group. Especially, though 
not exclusively, in the difficult period shortly before the adoption of the Wallén and up 
to the agreement on the Helsinki Package – the respective Chairmen were invited to 
report to the other body on relevant developments in the field of associated financing 
and tied aid credits. The most obvious act of cooperation on the level of Chairmen can 
be seen in the well-coordinated reports and recommendations presented by the 
DAC/FA’s and the Participants’ Chairman to the Ministerial Council in 1991 (Ray 
1995: 94 et seqq.). 
The second communication channel that the DAC/FA could use to present its ideas 
to the Participants Group, were the joint meetings, which took place on an ad hoc 
basis. The first one of these meetings was held following the recognition by the Partic-
ipants Group of the need to coordinate measures taken in the field of tied aid credits:  
“In order to improve coordination and communication, especially where ‘unwritten 
rules’ are being developed, the Secretariat proposes that the Participants decide to 
co-operate with the DAC/FA in mutually extending and accepting standing invita-
                                                            
151  Occasionally – and especially in the early years – also joint meetings between the DAC/FA and the Export 
Credit Group (ECG) were held.  
  19  125 
tions to conduct jointly discussions on individual transactions” (TD/CONSENSUS/ 
89.4: 2; emphasis added).  
Based on the discussion of individual transactions as well as the implementation of 
the 1987 DAC Guidelines and the Arrangement on the example of projects, the joint 
meetings provided an opportunity to make recommendations to both the DAC/FA and 
the Participants. The Participants and the DAC/FA decided not to set up a separate 
Working Group to deal with issues of mutual interest. Instead, joint meetings were to 
take place whenever the DAC/FA or the Participants were in sessions and were 
chaired by either the DAC/FA Chairman or by a member of the bureau of the Partici-
pants if the meeting took place within the framework of a Participants’ meeting. 
Hence, meetings “[…] would be composed, on an ad hoc basis, of participants in the 
two parent bodies”152 (TD/CONSENSUS/89.4/Annex: 3). It needs to be noted, how-
ever, that these meetings aimed at discussing specific transactions, not at the negoti-
ation of rules per se. Although commenting on the problems that stemmed from exist-
ing disciplines might have given the DAC/FA in specific cases a means of indirectly 
influencing the Participants’ perception of the rules or the problems, the Working 
Party was never a negotiator of the rule set-up itself. When putting the making of tied 
aid disciplines into the broader context of the pursuit for untying aid in general, the 
picture becomes more nuanced. Joint meetings between the two groups happened 
more frequently after the Helsinki disciplines had been adopted and concerned im-
plementation problems, the development of the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid and/or 
specifically addressed initiatives of how to foster “Global Untying” and how to deal 
with untied aid (see for instance TD/CONSENSUS(91)31).  
6.1.4. “(Re-)Claiming its Territory”: Adoption of Complementary Guide-
lines by the DAC 
In addition to monitoring the Participants’ work, reporting to them on relevant devel-
opments within the DAC/FA and occasional joint meetings on specific issues such as 
untying, the Development Assistance Committee itself also adopted a series of Guid-
ing Principles in the field of associated financing and tied and partially untied ODA, 
thereby ascertaining its role in designing tied aid disciplines.  
                                                            
152  In 1990, for instance, DAC/FA members were invited by the Participants to jointly discuss the “Krakatau 
Steel Project”. Several Participants (Austria, Germany, Japan and Spain) were involved in the bidding pro-
cess for the project. Japan sought clarification on the offers made by OeKB to the potential supplier Voest 
Alpine (DCD/DAC/FA(90)5; TD/CONSENSUS/90.26; TD/CONSENSUS(90)43/Annex I). The project in-
volved the construction of a slab steel plant for the Indonesian Krakatau Steel Company 
(TD/CONSENSUS(90)43/Annex I: 4). Although several questions with regard to the project’s develop-
ment impact and compliance with DAC standards were on the agenda, not a single member of the 
DAC/FA participated in the meeting. Another joint meeting, actually deserving the name “joint” meeting, 
took place in 1990, this time under DAC/FA Chairmanship. In this meeting participating delegates investi-
gated terms and procedures of the “Second Digital Exchange Project” in Indonesia (TD/CONSENSUS/ 
90.52; DCD/DAC/FA(90)8). 
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Already in 1984 the then Chairman of the DAC/FA Group, Robert Ainscow, stated 
that “[i]t was … apparent that both Participants and the DAC/FA are interested in 
the same kind of transactions whilst they look at them from different angles” 
(TD/CONSENSUS/84.23). While the Participants’ efforts in the 1980ies resulted in 
the Wallén Package (1987), the DAC’s discussions led to the adoption of the Guid-
ing Principles for the Use of Aid in Association with Export Credits and Other Market 
Funds (1984) and subsequently the DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financ-
ing and Tied and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance (1987), in which 
the foundation-stones were laid for defining and distinguishing tied aid, partially untied 
aid, and untied aid and wherein the importance of greater transparency in the use of 
these financial packages was stressed (OECD/DAC 1987). 
However, neither the measures taken by the Participants nor those adopted by the 
DAC put an end to trade and aid distorting practices. Consequently, the DAC worked 
in parallel to the Participants on fulfilling the Ministers’ mandates formulated at the 
Ministerial Council Meeting of 1990 and 1991, which had urged both competent 
bodies to take further action. The same year that the Helsinki Package came into 
effect (1992), the DAC also approved New Measures in the Field of Tied Aid 
(SG/PRESS(92)35). This new set of measures, which was also adopted by the Par-
ticipants, built on older DAC guidelines on tied aid credits and especially strength-
ened the 1987 DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and 
Partially Untied Official Development Assistance as well as the 1988 DAC Principles 
for Project Appraisal (SG/PRESS(92)35: 3).  
With the intermediate goal of disciplining tied aid credits achieved, the DAC re-
intensified its efforts to fully untie ODA, which eventually culminated in the adoption of 
the DAC Recommendation on Untying of Official Development Assistance to Least 
Developed Countries in 2001.  
6.1.4.1. Guiding Principles for the Use of Aid in Association with Export 
Credits and Other Market Funds (1983) 
Early DAC discussions on associated financing led to the adoption of the Guiding 
Principles for the Use of Aid in Association with Export Credits and Other Market 
Funds in 1983.  
In the preamble DAC members recognized the need to avoid aid and trade distortion 
and declared to “… undertake to ensure that associated financing will promote 
priority developmental objectives and is consistent with fair trade competition” 
(DAC(83)7: 3). Under this first version of Guiding Principles DAC members undertook 
to “… confine Associated Financing to priority projects and programmes which are 
carefully appraised against the developmental standards and criteria applicable to 
official development assistance programmes and which form part of the recipient 
country’s development programme” (DAC(83)7: 4 et seqq.; DAC/FA(85)2: 4).  
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Furthermore, members committed themselves to undertake actions to “strictly restrain 
the use of Official Development Assistance for associated financing in the case of 
stronger developing countries” and to “assist developing countries to receive a fair 
value for the price paid and, in particular in case of large projects, use associated 
financing as far as possible on the basis of international competitive bidding” 
(DAC(83)7: 5; DAC(83)17). Through the Working Party on Financial Aspects mem-
bers also agreed to review their policies concerning associated financing against the 
new set of guidelines” (DAC(83)7: 5).  
The adoption of these early guidelines was considered by the DAC Secretariat a “… 
result of major negotiation effort and … a difficult compromise between widely 
varying country positions” (DAC/FA(85)2: 5). Similarly, when presenting the pro-
posed text for agreement, the then Chairman of the DAC/FA, Mr. Ainscow, empha-
sized that the “… adoption of this text would be an important step towards fore-
stalling the potential distorting effects of associated financing on aid and trade” 
(DAC(87)17: 2). 
Discussions accompanying the adoption of the Guiding Principles had been charac-
terized by intense bargaining between those who considered associated financing 
valuable additional financial flows to developing countries which could counteract 
overall stagnating ODA and declining bank credits and those stressing the risk of aid 
distorting effects stemming from associated financing practices. Members had to 
accept that these considerable differences in view could not be resolved for the time 
being (DAC/FA(85)2: 5). 
6.1.4.2. DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and  
Partially Untied Official Development Assistance (1987) 
In 1987 the DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially 
Untied Official Development were adopted. They superseded the Guiding Principles 
for the Use of Aid in Association with Export Credits and Other Market Funds of 
1983 and stressed that the DAC was aiming at re-negotiating associated financing 
programs in conjunction with the Participants Group (OECD/DAC 1987). Further-
more, this document laid the cornerstones for defining and distinguishing tied and 
partially untied aid and associated financing (OECD/DAC 1987: paras. 2-7) and put 
particular emphasis on the importance of greater transparency in the use of these 
financial instruments. The latter, for instance, shall be ensured by using a system of 
national contact points and by promptly providing information on specific projects to 
other members if requested (OECD/DAC 1987: paras. 8, 17).  
Earlier in 1987, the Wallén Package was agreed upon by the Participants Group in 
which they decided to increase the grant element, henceforth called concessionality 
level, to 35 and 50 % for LDCs and changed the method of computing the 
concessionality level by no longer using the DAC’s uniform 10 % discount rate but a 
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more market-oriented Differential Discount Rate (DDR). These newly adopted rules 
were incorporated into the DAC Guidelines. Henceforth, the DAC Guiding Principles 
no longer had an independent paragraph on the minimum grant element, but cited the 
Arrangement rules on the required concessionality level153. Accordingly, the 1987 
Guiding Principles replaced the notion of grant element by the Participants’ wording 
and method of computation of the “concessionality level”154. This usage of Arrange-
ment definitions concerns, however, only the stage of notification of tied aid transac-
tion and affects neither the DAC’s ODA definition per se (based on a 25 % grant 
element) nor the reporting of ODA disbursements or commitments (SG/PRESS 
(92)35: 6). In essence, this means that these flows must meet both the special 
concessionality tests for tied aid credits and associated financing as set out in the 
Arrangement and the DAC grant element (OECD/DAC, ODA Factsheet 2008). 
The integration of Arrangement components into the DAC Guiding Principles, howev-
er, was not a one-way street. In a similar vein, also the Participants adapted elements 
of the DAC’s “rule set”, most notably the definition of associated financing and tied 
and partially untied development assistance provided in the DAC Guiding Principles. 
Therein, members reiterated those considerations that according to them needed to 
be taken into account when examining ”… the developmental priority of all projects 
and programs financed with ODA” (OECD/DAC 1987: para. 13). Essentially, they 
recall earlier proposals. Furthermore, the Guiding Principles instructed the DAC Sec-
retariat to establish a reporting system to monitor the tying behavior of its members 
and to integrate the findings thereof into so-called Associated Financing Reviews to 
be produced regularly by the Committee and to be submitted to the DAC High Level 
Meeting (OECD/DAC 1987: para. 12). In addition to monitoring, the Guidelines 
spelled out that evaluation of the untying measures should take place ex-post 
(OECD/DAC 1987). 
Concluding, the Guiding Principles suggested that as follow-up to the then present 
guidelines, more stringent guiding principles should be developed in cooperation by 
the DAC/FA and the Export Credit Group and all other parties to the Arrangement 
(Petermann 2013: 216). 
  
                                                            
153  Since agricultural products were (and still are) not covered by the Arrangement, the Secretariat urged 
DAC members to examine these cases (DAC/FA(87)6: 3). Up to today, the failure to integrate agricultural 
products is considered one of the main weaknesses of the Arrangement rules. One interview partner con-
sidered this loophole even the “single biggest failure” of the Participants (Interview VI).  
154  As has been mentioned before, the mode of computing the concessionality level differs from the usual 
(and up to today used) DAC practice in that a differentiated discount rate rather than the uniform 10 % 
discount rate is used. This entails varying results: when using a differentiated discount rate transactions in 
currencies with market rates higher than 10 % the conveyed concessionality level is higher than the grant 
element in other DAC purposes, and vice versa (DAC/FA(89)2: 8, 9). In a later Note the differences not 
only in discount rate, but in the perspective behind the calculations are recalled (DCD/DAC/FA(2002)2:  
2, 4; see also DCD/DAC/FA(2002)9). 
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6.1.4.3. New Measures in the Field of Tied Aid (1992) 
“Policies for export credit and aid credit should be complementary:  
those for export credits should be based on open competition and the free play of market forces 
and those for tied aid credits should provide needed external resources to countries, sectors  
or projects with little or no access to market financing, ensure best value for money and  
minimise trade distortion and contribute to developmentally effective use of these resources“ 
(SG/PRESS(92)35: 3; original emphasis) 
None of the above measures truly succeeded in containing aid and trade distorting 
practices of Consensus and DAC Members via tied aid credits. A major breakthrough 
in negotiations was reached in 1992 with the adoption by both DAC Members and 
Participants of New Measures in the Field of Tied Aid (SG/PRESS(92)35). This new 
set of measures built on older DAC guidelines on tied aid credits and especially 
strengthened the 1987 DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied 
and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance as well as the 1988 DAC Prin-
ciples for Project Appraisal (SG/PRESS(92)35: 3).  
The rules set out in this document parallel the Arrangement rules agreed upon by the 
Participants and pursue the same goal of separating export credits and tied aid cred-
its by redirecting tied aid credits away from richer to poorer development countries 
and from commercially-motivated to developmentally-sound projects (SG/PRESS 
(92)35). The document is divided into a chapter on large projects, a second one on 
limitations on use of tied aid credits and a section on future work.  
In the chapter on the limitations on the use of tied aid credits, repeatedly references to 
the Arrangement are made and the DAC’s commitment to contribute to the implemen-
tation of the Helsinki Discipline155 is declared. The measures presented not only take 
up the Helsinki Disciplines (most notably the key tests and the concessionality level) 
but also contain the same exemptions as the Helsinki Package with regard to very 
concessional loans (above a concessionality level of 80 %) or grants that go to Least 
Developed Countries and do not cover projects smaller than SDR 2 million (de 
minimis projects) (SG/PRESS(92)35: 5).  
In addition to the incorporation of tied-aid relevant elements of the Arrangement on 
Officially Supported Export Credits, the 92 Measures contain some additional devel-
opment assistance oriented principles such as the provision of a checklist of consid-
erations along which the development priority of projects or programs should be 
assessed (Chang et al. 1999: 88; see (DCD(99)6: 88). 
                                                            
155  Petermann (2013: 217) even concludes that the Helsinki Package “… paved the path for further ap-
proaches to discipline policies of export promotion with the help of tied aid”, such as the 1992 DAC 
Measures in the field of tied aid. This statement suggests that he assumes an influence of the Partici-
pants on the DAC’s work. A spill-over of ideas and concepts from the DAC into the Participants work is at 
this point not mentioned by the author.  
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Another specificity of the 92 DAC Measures, which is not part of the Participants’ 
Helsinki disciplines, concerns highly concessional credits directed to “better-off” 
developing countries (DCD/DAC/FA(92)1: para. 13). With regard to these the 92 
DAC Measures state that “… they might be used mainly for exceptional balance-of-
payments support and for financing of projects in such areas as the social field, 
environment, good governance and emergency aid” (SG/PRESS(92)35: 5). 
Petermann interprets this as ruling “out the permission of tied and partially tied cred-
its for richer developing countries” (Petermann 2013: 217). Since this provision is 
specific to the DAC rules, the Secretariat urged members “… to consider appropri-
ate procedures to ensure that credits to the ‘better-off’ developing countries with a 
concessionality level of 80 per cent or above are notified and, as appropriate, dis-
cussed by Members” (DCD/DAC/FA(92)1: para. 14).  
As large projects have been a matter of concern for the DAC/FA basically since the 
Working Party started to deal with associated financing and tied and partially untied 
aid, some more light shall be shed on the agreed principles for large projects. With 
regard to projects above SDR 50 million, which are subject to mandatory consulta-
tion, the DAC agreed on mutual appraisal, appropriate financing terms as well as 
procedures of International Competitive Bidding (ICB)156. Mutual appraisal means that 
DAC members should cooperate with each other as well as with the World Bank 
Group “… on project preparation and appraisal, including a joint review of the 
project prior to the final commitment of aid funds”. In addition, consultation among 
DAC members and with recipient countries should lead to an agreement on appropri-
ate financing terms which are “consistent with the economic situation of the recipient 
country” (Ray 1995: 94, 95). The DAC’s call for using international competitive bid-
ding means that tied aid credits should be awarded to the lowest evaluated bid, con-
cerning both price and technical factors. As a supplement to older recommendations 
on ICB157, the 92 Measures state that financing terms should be taken into account in 
a second step only (SG/PRESS(92)35: 4). This clause introduced a mechanism of 
“advance bidding”, trying to ensure that “tied-aid financing is only extended in cases 
where the donor’s exporter would have won the contract anyway”. By this proce-
dure158 both trade distortion and aid diversion provoked by tied aid credits are thought 
be minimized (Ray 1995: 95). It is, however, recognized in the 1992 Measures that 
“seriously resource-constrained poor countries, in awarding a contract, may need to 
take into account the availability of financial resources at concessional terms, provid-
                                                            
156  This required also recipient authorities to undertake arrangements for international competitive bidding 
(Ray 1995: 95).  
157  Most notably these were addressed in the DAC Good Procurement Practices, published in 1986 
(OECD/DAC 1992).  
158  According to John Ray (1995: 95) this system works best “when an aid credit line or protocol is in place. 
Then the recipient country is assured that, if it does not find that the potential donor’s exporter has 
submitted the lowest evaluated bid, the aid credit will not be lost to it but will remain available for future 
projects”. 
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ed the award goes to a supplier which ranked second or third in bid evaluation for 
price and quality or where the price margin is reasonable” (SG/PRESS(92)35: 4). 
6.1.4.4. Global Untying and Good Procurement Practices: Mutual Concern 
and Ongoing Struggle? 
“The ideal solution would be international agreement on reciprocal 
untying of ODA loans along the lines of the earlier DAC proposals” 
(DAC/FA(81)1: 19) 
Already in its first note on tied aid credits and associated financing, the DAC Secre-
tariat presented aid untying as the ideal solution to problems stemming from the use 
of these instruments (DAC/FA(81)1: 19). Over the years the DAC did not get tired of 
promoting this goal, albeit with sobering results. Still, these continuous efforts show 
that tied aid credits and associated financing packages cannot be understood without 
the context of the larger (un)tying debate. This section complements an earlier chapter 
on the “Untying Debate” by breaking it down to discussions within the DAC/FA and 
the Participants Group. The issue of untying is of interest here for yet another reason. 
It is in the field of untying that mutual interests between the two groups crystallized 
and vivid interaction took place.  
After an agreement on tied aid disciplines was reached in Helsinki, both the Partici-
pants’ and the DAC/FA’s focus159 shifted from disciplining tied aid credits to propagat-
ing untying, thereby pushing negotiations to the next level. From 1991 onwards, most 
Aide-Mémoires of Participants’ meetings and Notes by the Secretariat contain a sec-
tion dedicated to "Global Untying". This shift was prepared by the Helsinki Package, 
in which the Participants agreed to develop targets for the global untying of aid, be-
lieving this to be “one of the best ways to reduce trade distortions” (Lammersen 
1998: 64; TD/CONSENSUS(92)12). Not only did the Participants declare their will to 
cooperate with the DAC in developing these targets, but on several occasions also 
acknowledged the DAC’s expertise in the field (see for instance TD/CONSENSUS 
(91)31; TD/CONSENSUS(92)12; TD/CONSENSUS(92)42). The following state-
ment made in a follow-up paper to the Helsinki Package illustrates this recognition of 
the DAC’s leading role: 
“The field of global untying may be new to the Participants, it is not new to the 
DAC. The DAC is currently studying the subject. At the same time, it is considering 
the issue of the definition of untying: in practice it is sometimes very difficult for 
exporters that are not from the donor country to use untied aid. … The DAC will 
seek to improve the situation so that the environment for global untying will improve. 
There is at the moment little the Participants can add to this effort” 
(TD/CONSENSUS (92)12; emphasis added).  
                                                            
159  In parallel, emphasis was put on the effective implementation of the rules.  
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So in a way, the Helsinki Package provided the DAC with a quasi “mandate” to take 
steps towards the untying of aid. This declared preference of the Participants for 
untied aid, certainly gave leverage to the DAC’s untying agenda.  
In the following years, the Secretariat and the DAC/FA investigated the feasibility and 
implications of different approaches160 towards greater untying. Confronted with slow 
progress in untying due to “commercial pressures” in donor countries, the DAC Sec-
retariat stressed that in order “to counter accumulated rent-seeking pressures for 
tying, exporters have to be convinced of the benefits of this initiative. In line with 
the approach shared by OECD countries in general, their support should be forth-
coming in the expectation of competitive access to a much larger pool of untied 
aid offers, as opposed to preferential access to a much smaller domestic pool” 
(DCD/DAC/FA(97)8: para. 17; emphasis added). This liberal underpinning of the 
OECD in general, had pushed Bill Nicol, from the Development Co-operation Direc-
torate, to conclude that “… the Participants’ and the DAC/FA objectives were similar 
and compatible and need not move along divergent tracks” (TD/CONSENSUS 
(94)50)161.  
In an attempt to minimize mixed financing practices still at disposal to member states, 
DAC Members at the DAC High Level Meeting in 1998 (DCD/DAC/FA(98)12) re-
called their willingness to phase out tying practices and mandated the DAC/FA with 
preparing a recommendation for the untying of aid. In a Note by the Secretariat a 
series of proposals was made of how to carry out the HLM mandate on untying ODA 
to the least developed countries. The Secretariat therein recalls that in carrying out 
this mandate “… it will be important to co-operate with the Participants to the 
Export Credit Arrangement, who have reconfirmed their willingness to contribute 
relevant experience in consultations with the DAC on the development of procedures 
to assist with the implementation of the initiative“ (DCD/DAC/FA(98)3: 5; original 
emphasis). 
                                                            
160  For instance, Members of the DAC/FA discussed the pros and cons of “global” and “selective” strategies 
and the usefulness of setting quantitative targets for untying (see for instance DCD/DAC/FA/M(92)3; 
DCD/DAC/FA(93)3; DCD/DAC/FA/M(97)1). In preparation of the DAC/FA’s spring meeting in 1993, the 
Note “Greater Untying of Aid”, prepared by Professor Jepma, was distributed to the Working Party’s 
members. In this paper Jepma outlined several policy options for further untying and identified the follow-
ing policy directions: a standstill scenario, a gradual reduction of aid tying, a greater use of earmarked fa-
cilities as well as selective untying (DCD/DAC/FA(93)3). With regard to scenario 3, which may not be 
self-explanatory, Jepma explained that “… the emphasis would be put on the option to earmark parts of a 
donor’s tied aid budget for the financing of projects to be procured through international competitive bid-
ding (ICB). When the latter is not the case, the project would not be financed by that donor, but the aid 
would continue to be available to the recipient for future projects on the same provisions” 
(DCD/DAC/FA(93)3: para. 13).  
161 The mutual interest in pushing for economic liberalization alone, however, is an insufficient explanation of 
why the untying agenda gained momentum in the past two decades. Petermann’s analysis of the rationale 
behind untying suggests a gradual shift form “donor interests” to “recipient needs”, a shift conducive to 
the DAC’s untying agenda (Petermann 2013: 409 et seqq.).  
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Intense discussions162 as well as an exchange of views between the respective Chairs 
and Secretariats took place concerning the areas which should be covered by re-
spectively exempted from such a recommendation. On the of basis the discussion 
outcomes an agreement was reached in 2001 in the form of the Recommendation on 
Untying of Official Development Assistance to Least Developed Countries and Heav-
ily Indebted Poor Countries (DCD/DAC(2001)12/FINAL/Annex III: 10)163.  
In line with the general approach of the OECD of combining discipline with transpar-
ency (Interview VII), also the DAC/FA and the Participants regarded parallelism in 
addressing both disciplines and transparency as important (TD/CONSENSUS 
(94)50). While the DAC/FA was preparing what became known as the 2001 Rec-
ommendation on Untying and even more so after its adoption, transparency issues 
related to the untying of ODA came to the attention of both Participants and DAC/FA. 
The lack of transparency in the use of untied aid, as such not covered by the Helsinki 
rules, was increasingly perceived as disguising de facto tying practices.  
The post-Helsinki movement away from tied aid credits, which were subject to the 
new rules, towards untied credits, which were not touched by the new provisions, 
made transparency in aid procurement become an ever more indispensable condition 
of the elimination of distorting practices (Ray 1995: 108). Already in 1993, several 
Participants such as Canada, the European Commission, and the U.S. expressed 
concern in a Participants’ meeting about insufficient transparency with regard to un-
tied aid (TD/CONSENSUS(93)46). In response, the DAC/FA issued a questionnaire 
on untied aid practices, policies, and procurement (DCD/DAC/FA(93)10/REV1; 
TD/CONSENSUS(93)46). The following year, a joint meeting between the DAC/FA 
and the Participants was held on the need for greater transparency in the use of (de 
jure) untied aid credits (mentioned in TD/CONSENSUS(94)12). Just as in the case of 
untying, the DAC/FA claimed leadership in further sharpening definitions of untied aid, 
thereby contributing to filling this transparency gap. In this respect, John Ray states 
that “in this urgent work, the Participants needed to cooperate with the DAC, which 
has primary responsibility for rules and guidelines covering aid procurement” (Ray 
1995: 109).  
Because of the absence of concrete steps taken in subsequent years, Stafford re-
marked on the occasion of the Arrangement’s 20th birthday that “as the tied aid 
credit disciplines bite, there has been a shift toward untying of aid credits – which is 
another example of efforts to avoid the Arrangement disciplines” (Stafford 1998: 48). 
                                                            
162  Similar to earlier discussions on the appropriate regulation of tied aid credits, concern was raised about 
the potentially adverse effects of additional rules on total ODA volumes. The same argument had earlier 
been brought forward with respect to the potential effects of the disciplines for tied aid credits. Thus, find-
ing agreement appears as a balancing act. 
163  Petermann (2013: 218) underlines the comprehensive importance of this event in stating that “at that 
point, demand for more effective inter-donor coordination of aid commitments also became part of the ge-
neral policy debate”.  
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In line with proposals made by the U.S. delegates, he suggested that the Helsinki test 
of “non-commercial viability” should be extended to all aid credits so as to avoid fur-
ther circumvention and an eventual breakdown of the rules (Stafford 1998: 49).  
Based on findings of a series of “Shadow” Helsinki Review of Untied Aid Credit 
Notifications164 conducted on yearly bases from 2001 onwards and with input of the 
DAC Secretariat (TD/PG(2005)8), the Participants finally concluded in 2004 the 
Agreement on Untied ODA Credits Transparency, which is thought to complement 
both the DAC Recommendation on Untying and the Helsinki Disciplines 
(TD/PG(2005)8/Annex).  
In the Agreement, the Participants recognized that untied ODA “… can offer en-
hanced development benefits from increased efficiency in procurement of goods and 
services, and better value for money to the recipient. In their continuing effort to 
enhance transparency on untied ODA credits generally, and to enhance confidence 
in, and therefore the use of, untied aid as a developmental tool, OECD Participants 
… agree to implement a pilot programme to provide ex-ante and ex-post transpar-
ency over the use of untied ODA credits that finance the provision of goods and 
services in developing countries“ (TD/PG(2005)8/Annex: 2). Therein, they laid down 
transparency modalities, agreed on procedures for information exchange, and commit-
ted themselves to use procedures of international competitive bidding “… where 
possible and practical” (TD/PG(2005)8: 5). For instance, as a central mechanism of 
increasing ex-ante transparency, Participants were encouraged to make notifications 
of untied aid credits available to Participants through either the DAC’s Internet bulletin 
board165 or the Export Credit Secretariat (TD/PG(2005)8/Annex: 3).  
In a similar vein, the afore mentioned 2001 Recommendation on Untying suggests 
that procurement procedures should follow the DAC practice and that international 
competitive bidding should be applied (DCD/DAC(2001)12/FINAL). Thus, the Com-
mittee’s work in the field of aid procurement practices is related to the DAC’s call for 
the untying of aid. Just like untying, good procurement practices are thought to be 
critical for the effectiveness of aid projects and programmes. Accordingly, the DAC 
recommended that procurement should be seen as an integral part of the whole pro-
ject cycle – from design to implementation (Jepma 1991: 25).  
In the 1986 DAC document on Good Procurement Practices for ODA, up to today 
referred to in the Arrangement (TAD/PG(2013)1: 124), a distinction is made between 
international and national competitive bidding, informal competition or direct negotia-
                                                            
164 In November 2000, the Participants “commissioned” the Secretariat to “prepare an analysis of untied aid 
credit notifications simulating the application of the so-called "Helsinki" tied aid rules of the Arrangement“ 
(TD/PG(2003)8). For the reports see, for instance, TD/PG(2003)8; TD/PG(2004)8; TD/PG(2005)7; 
TD/PG(2006)9).  
165  In order to increase transparency and prevent de facto tying, untied aid credits should be notified on the 
so-called “Untied Aid Notification Bulletin Board”, see  
 https://community.oecd.org/streamPage.jspa?cwsDb=Xuntied&community=2249 
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tions and the importance of transparency in rules of procurement and in information 
on individual supply contracts is stressed (OECD/DAC 1992: 113-115; DCD(99)6: 
96).  
The underlying assumption for good procurement practices is that transparency pre-
conditions competition and competition in turn increases the efficient use of aid re-
sources. By describing International Competitive Bidding as the best way of proceed-
ing with aid-related procurement of goods and services, the principles suggest that 
untied aid is a prerequisite for good and effective procurement.  
“However, since most Member countries feel obliged to tie large parts of their 
bilateral aid to procurement from the donor country or permit only partial untying, it 
is useful to develop and apply procurement practices that promote the efficient use 
to tied-aid funds” (DAC Good Procurement Practice for Official Development Assis-
tance see Ray 1995, Annex F: 240-246; emphasis added). The Principles state that in 
cases where ICB166 is or cannot be applied, members should use National Competi-
tive Bidding as the main procedure for procurement under tied aid conditions 
(OECD/DAC 1992: 113). 
With regard to the relation of the untying initiative and procurement practices, one of 
our interview partners explained: “I keep saying, look untying is an instrument, it is a 
tool. Look beyond the tool to see what it exactly is you are trying to achieve. It’s 
development. In terms of the areas where this can have an impact, it’s government 
procurement systems in developing countries” (Interview V). This emphasis put on 
conceptualizing untying as means and not an end in and of itself, is also reflected in 
donors’ commitments in Paris and Accra. At the High Level Forum in Accra 2008 
donors, for instance, reaffirmed that they “… will promote the use of local and re-
gional procurement by ensuring that their procurement procedures are transparent 
and allow local and regional firms to compete”. This way, aid’s “value for money”167 is 
thought to increase (OECD 2005-2008: 18). 
  
                                                            
166  Again cautious formulations are chosen. For instance, it is recommended that Members use International 
Competitive Bidding ”to the extent compatible with their procurement policies” (OECD/DAC 1992: 113).  
167  Numerous DAC documents (e.g. 1992 Measures, Paris Declaration, Busan Declaration, etc.) refer to the 
concept of “value for money” (VFM). Essentially, “VFM” is described as “a way of thinking about using re-
sources well” by “striking the best balance between … economy, efficiency, effectiveness” (Jackson 
2012). Aid effectiveness, as described most notably in the Paris Declaration constitutes an important 
component of “value for money” and its focus on the quality of outcomes. A description of the often cited 
though not uncontested concept is provided by Penny Jackson (2012) in the document “Value for money 
and international development: Deconstructing myths to promote a more constructive discussion”. 
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6.2. Tracing Development Policy Aspects in Today’s  
Arrangement 
“So in terms of aid, I think I would like to hear a critique that the development  
and aid elements of the Helsinki rules undermine development.  
I think I could argue from almost every angle  
that these are actually good for developing countries” 
(Interview VI) 
As has been described, the DAC/FA made a series of proposals with regard to tied 
aid credits and associated financing. Up to the agreement on the Helsinki Package 
discussions concerned the fundamental question of whether tied aid credits could be 
considered an instrument of development finance and policy on the one hand and 
technical/conceptual issues such as the appropriate calculation of the grant element 
on the other hand. With the adoption of the Helsinki Disciplines and the New 
Measures in the Field of Tied Aid respectively, the DAC/FA shifted its focus and con-
centrated on ways of assessing the development content of tied aid credits as well as 
revived the discourse on untying. As shown development and trade concerns, dis-
cussed in two separate bodies, overlapped at times. Whenever this was the case, a 
number of “communication channels” between the two groups (reporting by the 
Chairmen to the other group respectively, joint meetings and “coordination” efforts by 
the Secretariat) allowed the exchange of views. This section tries to trace those de-
velopment policy aspects that entered the Arrangement. With the exception of explicit 
references to the DAC principles, direct causalities between the DAC/FA’s sugges-
tions and the actual outcome in form of “development aspects” in the Arrangement 
can, however, not be assumed. In the above quote reference is made to the “devel-
opment and aid elements of the rules”. This makes us wonder what these “develop-
ment elements” are and where they can be found in the Arrangement. 
6.2.1. The Key Tests – Capable of Assessing Aid Quality?  
“The two key tests for aid eligibility described in …  
the Arrangement concern commercial viability, not aid quality“ 
(TD/CONSENSUS(93)6, para. 8) 
“So in some sense creating a market test for the investment in capital goods actually is smart 
for long term development. It ends up allowing you to choose appropriate technologies, it al-
lows you to choose168 appropriate levels of capital intensity and scope of capital intensity” 
(Interview VI) 
                                                            
168  Considering that tied aid credits, however, are per definition tied to the procurement of goods and ser-
vices from donor countries reduces the ability of recipients to truly chose the most appropriate technolo-
gy, equipment and so forth.  
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The two key tests on financial and commercial viability, the heart of the Arrangement’s 
provisions for tied aid credits, directly investigate the potential commercial distortions 
resulting from a transaction, but do not explicitly target potential aid distortions. Con-
clusions on the soundness of a project for financing development are derived from the 
results of the commercial-viability test, to the design of which the former DAC/FA 
Chairman Barrie Ireton decisively contributed (Interview VI; Ray 1995: 91). The core 
idea of the “market test” – as the commercial viability test was referred to by the 
above interview partner (Interview VI) – is that commercially viable projects should not 
be financed with official support and certainly not with aid monies which should be 
reserved for projects in countries with no or severely restrained access to finance and 
which otherwise would certainly not take place. This being achieved, officially sup-
ported flows in form of a tied aid credit are truly additional and contribute to the maxi-
mization of total flows to developing countries.  
When examining the concept of commercial (non-)viability from the perspective of aid 
quality it becomes evident that this key test is based on several assumptions with 
regard to the basic relationship between investment in the provision of (quasi) public 
goods and development.  
“When the rules started, tied aid was happening in a number of sectors including 
quite commercial ones, so you had tied aid for instance in power generation, in pow-
er transmission to name a few because these were probably some of the best exam-
ples. And with the rules tied aid has been eliminated and has been concentrated on 
a limited number of projects. Most projects of tied aid now are in water, water sanita-
tion, water treatment, and urban transportation – these are the big fields nowadays 
for tied aid. And these are sectors, erm I mean, you still have commercial aims, 
but you are doing things which are not really profitable in the short term and 
which benefit the development of countries” (Interview VII). 
Following this logic, the commercial viability test, is occasionally also referred to as 
“aid quality test” and wants to ensure that projects financed by tied aid credits repre-
sent good development projects. The Participants see the “contribution” to develop-
ment as a welcome by-product of the disciplines, legitimizing the use of what would 
otherwise be forbidden subsidies. Understanding this very logic seems important if 
one wants to judge on the ODA-eligibility of these flows. In order to fall into the ODA 
category official flows have, by definition, to be driven by an intention of the donor to 
promote development in the recipient country.  
Furthermore, the country eligibility criterion laid down in the Arrangement tries to 
prevent not only trade, but (indirectly) also aid distortion, in that it hinders the use of 
tied aid financing to richer countries and channels resources to those most in need. 
As was shown, this distortion of flows in terms of recipient countries was one of the 
main concerns raised by the DAC.  
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In addition, tied aid credits going to LLDCs must have a concessionality level of 50 % 
– an attempt to assure softer terms for those countries that have a lower debt servic-
ing capacity. By this rule the Helsinki Disciplines aim at containing another core con-
cern, repeatedly evoked in the DAC/FA over the years – the accumulation of external 
debt in large parts of the developing world.  
Box 7: DAC Members’ Views on the Commercial Viability Key Tests    
A Questionnaire circulated by the DAC Secretariat in the late 1990ies revealed that a number 
of Members judged the commercial viability tests as being too inflexible to assess the eligibility 
of a project for tied aid financing and called for greater importance of aid quality (and other non-
commercial factors) in determining tied aid eligibility. These concerns were brought forward 
much earlier and were discussed extensively by the DAC/FA Members. In the responses to the 
questionnaires others, however, “ […] emphasised that the sole aim of the Disciplines was to 
avoid trade distortion, and that aid issues should remain solely within the domain of the relevant 
Member state“ (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 9; emphasis added). These contrasting perceptions of the 
rules and their purpose are yet another illustration of the ambiguity surrounding the use of tied 
aid credits as an instrument for development policy.  
The analysis of the questionnaires also suggests that “there was limited support for extending 
the coverage of the Disciplines to include more specific provisions concerning the assessment 
of the aid quality of specific projects. The general view was that the aid quality of projects was 
primarily a donor responsibility. Joint (i.e. trade and aid) evaluation of tied aid project pro-
posals would be both burdensome and rather difficult to manage” (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 9). 
Likewise, in a note circulated in 1998, the Secretariat stated that it had generally been consid-
ered infeasible that the Participants and the DAC/FA jointly discussed both commercial viability 
and aid quality of a project. Such a procedure, believed to be valuable by the Secretariat, was 
thought to be not feasible and partly even inappropriate by the majority of member states 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)4: 8). With regard to the tools available for assessing the relevance of a 
project for development, the returned questionnaires revealed the limited usefulness of the 
AQuA – Checklist to be found in the Arrangement’s Annex and in a more detailed version in the 
Ex-ante Guidance. This was due to the fact that most Members reported to have their own 
internal aid quality guidelines. Some, however, recognized that the AQuA-Checklist was a 
useful benchmark that helped develop their internal guidelines (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 8). 
 
6.2.2. Explicit and Implicit References to DAC Principles  
The Participants’ rules on tied aid credits clearly overlap with principles for develop-
ment co-operation, but the Participants perceived it neither as their duty nor within 
their field of competences to tackle issues related to development co-operation. In 
order to fill this gap, development-related topics were “outsourced” to the DAC. 
Following this strategy, the Arrangement contains several references to official DAC 
documents that acknowledge the expertise of the Committee in the field of develop-
ment and development co-operation. Most notably the Arrangement follows the defini-
tion of tied, partially untied and untied aid in the form of ODA loans and grants as laid 
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down in the DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially 
Untied Official Development Assistance from the year 1987. The adoption of the 
DAC´s definition of tied ODA by the Participants demonstrates that the issue of tied 
aid credits is subject to both groups, the DAC and the Participants, and it clearly 
reaffirms the “monopoly position” of the DAC on conceptual matters of Official Devel-
opment Assistance. 
Furthermore, in Annex IX the Arrangement provides a Checklist of Developmental 
Quality, which is reproduced in a more detailed version in the Ex ante Guidance for 
Tied Aid in the section on Aid Quality Assessment. The latter was prepared by the 
DAC and demonstrates that questions regarding the developmental quality of projects 
that are partly or entirely financed by ODA fall into the competence of the DAC. The 
Checklist – as such a summary statement of various DAC principles (DCD/DAC/ 
FA(95)1: 5) – draws on older sets of guidelines and gathered those components that 
were particularly relevant in the case of tied aid financing. The following three docu-
ments are referred to by the Participants as benchmark, as status quo of good devel-
opment practice: 
 DAC Principles for Project Appraisal (1988)  
 DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially Untied 
Official Development Assistance (1987)  
 Good Procurement Practices for Official Development Assistance (1986) 
The main components, combined in the Checklist of Developmental Quality, are 
grouped into three main areas: i) Project selection on grounds of recipient country´s 
investment priorities; ii) project preparation and appraisal; and iii) procurement proce-
dures (TAD/PG(2013)1/Annex IX: 133-135).  
In Article 33 c of the Arrangement the Participants state that the principles on tied aid 
credits do not prejudge the views of the DAC on the quality of tied and untied aid, 
which implicitly goes along with the DAC’s call for untying. The Participants’ recogni-
tion of the DAC’s competences in the field of development co-operation might also 
entail a shift of responsibility for the developmentally effective use of aid resources 
from the Participants to the DAC exclusively. If in an institutional setting, in which tied 
aid credits are dealt with by export credit agencies, aid agencies have the means to 
ensure the developmentally effective allocation of aid funds, however, requires further 
examination. In this respect, development considerations might have been of higher 
priority, had they become an integral part of the Helsinki package and not an add-on 
referred to “en passant”. Whether this fragmentation and dispersion of responsibilities 
hamper the appropriate consideration of development aspects will depend on the 
institutional set-up in the individual donor country.  
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While it can be concluded that the explicit development content in the Arrangement is 
rather limited, one has to bear in mind that the Arrangement deliberately leaves con-
siderable room-for-maneuver to the national implementers and actively encourages 
them to follow DAC Guidelines. On a national level countries are free to apply stricter 
rules, for instance in assessing the development impact of a supported project. One 
way to give non-commercial aspects, not specifically development considerations, 
more weight – as suggested by the Trade Union Advisory Committee of the OECD 
(TUAC) – would be to make government support for exporters subject to adhering to 
the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises169 (Interview VIII). 
6.2.3. Grasping the Participants’ Notion of Development 
“I don’t think the Export Credit Group has a perception of development other than  
the development of their own export subsidies. Sorry (Laughter)” 
(Interview Vl) 
The Arrangement was designed in the attempt to prevent trade distortion stemming 
from the use of export and tied aid credits. Since the Participants’ rules, however, 
clearly touch upon the provision of development assistance and overlap with the 
DAC’s ODA criteria, the question of the Participants’ notion of development comes 
up. Considering that not even the DAC – as such the body of the OECD in charge of 
development co-operation issues – gives an explicit definition of what constitutes 
development, it comes of little surprise that the Participants Group does not explicitly 
define its understanding of development either. Tracing a subtle or implicit notion of 
development in archive documents and in the Arrangement itself proved difficult. 
Directing this question to our interview partners was not very fruitful either. Only two 
of them gave, somewhat hesitantly, answers that can help us understand what devel-
opment and development assistance mean for the Participants Group.  
When asked about the Participants’ notion of development, a representative of the 
Export Credit Division explained: 
“This is a question which is a bit difficult to answer because really, the Arrangement 
guys they do not discuss on development per se. They don’t have the discussion 
you could have within the DAC on what is development and what would be strate-
gies for development and what would be necessary for recipient countries” (Interview 
VII).  
Considering, however, his subsequent explanations on the public goods character of 
most projects financed with tied aid credits and putting it in the context of the re-
                                                            
169  Further information on these OECD guidelines setting voluntary principles and standards for responsible 
business conduct can be found on the OECD’s homepage, see http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/. There-
in, traditional export credits rather than tied aid financing are addressed; development policy is indirectly 
touched upon by calling for compliance with labor rights, environmental standards etc.  
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quired commercial non-viability, give reason to presume that above all it is a sectoral 
approach that is the basis of the Participants’ understanding of development: The 
provision of public goods, which in absence of the tied aid financing would not have 
been produced or not in the required amount by the market, is key a to the develop-
ment170. The explanations provided in the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid back up this 
assumption Therein, the Participants conclude that “the general characteristics of 
financially non-viable projects include projects whose principal output is a public 
good, capital-intensive projects with high per unit production costs and slow capaci-
ty uptake, and/or where the beneficiary group (normally household consumers) is 
deemed unable to afford the output at the appropriate market-determined price“ 
(TD/PG(2005)20: 5; emphasis added). 
Another interviewee provided a somewhat vague definition of development assistance 
or rather development finance:  
“Development assistance is any financing that actually supports a development pro-
cess. The terms of that financing are the only thing at issue. So in some sense export 
credits and the market can actually finance development, it’s just that they finance it 
on market terms whereas aid finances development on concessional terms” (Inter-
view VI). 
Considering that the need for external resources in many developing countries cannot 
be met due to persisting ‘financial gaps’, any financial flow to developing countries 
might in this reading contribute to growth and with that to development. These pre-
sumed linkages between financial flows and development on the ground suggest that 
the Participants Group adheres to a rather “traditional” economic notion of develop-
ment, by equaling investment with economic growth with development that will even-
tually trickle down and benefit the “local population”. On the other hand, the fact that 
tied aid credits primarily flow into sectors such as health or water is used as a legiti-
mation of their development impact. Consequently, this contrasts the above statement 
that Participants have a predominantly macroeconomic and aggregated understand-
ing of development. The concentration of projects in health, water and sanitation, 
education and the like resulting from the Arrangement rules could also be interpreted 
as sign of a concept focused on “human development”.  
In any case, the lack of a definition of development confirms what has been said earli-
er on the motivation and field of interest of the Participants: Development aspects are 
not and never have been their main concern or driving force. Everything explicitly 
referring to development was left to be dealt with by the DAC. While this means the 
                                                            
170 The role of public goods for development, and more recently the importance of “global public goods” is 
discussed extensively in the development literature; see for example the UNIDO (2008) report “Public 
goods for economic development”, in which the importance of public goods for any poverty reduction 
strategy is emphasized. The key role, which is attributed to public goods, is reflected in the MDGs’ focus 
on indicators of health, education, environment etc.  
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acknowledgement of the DAC’s expertise on development issues, it is partially also a 
way of shifting responsibilities for the developmental impact of tied aid financing to the 
DAC and its national counterparts. Whether this is in the spirit of concept of Policy 
Coherence for Development will be assessed in the subsequent chapter. The analysis 
of the Arrangement’s evolution has shown that from the very beginning the Partici-
pants Group did not deal with tied aid credits because they wanted to design particu-
larly effective development policies, but because tied aid credits happened to be a 
tool of backdoor subsidization with trade distorting effects. The Participants’ attempt 
to eliminate the latter, led to their rising interest in tied aid credit. So in some sense 
they were interested in another form of aid: the aid given to domestic companies. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Arrangement as such does not deal with the devel-
opment quality of tied aid finance projects per se, but refers those responsible to 
various DAC guidelines that should be applied in addition to the Arrangement so as to 
ensure the developmental soundness of selected projects.  
6.3. Assessment of the DAC/FA’s Influence on the Partici-
pants Group  
“Well, the DAC was upset when the tied aid credits were agreed on by the Partici-
pants” (Interview IV) – after all this meant a partial loss of control over an issue inter-
fering in the DAC’s very field of competence.  
Throughout this chapter it has been shown that in parallel to the Participants Group 
the DAC/FA dealt with tied aid credits and associated financing. In order to increase 
the weight of aid considerations in tied and associated aid financing, the DAC adopt-
ed several sets of guidelines, the importance of which was also recognized by the 
Participants and which up to today have been referred to in the Arrangement. The 
most apparent “intervention” of the DAC into the Participants’ work, was the prepara-
tion and subsequent incorporation of the Aid Quality Assessment into the Partici-
pants’ Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid. It is here that the respective rules and guide-
lines by the DAC/FA and Participants overlap. These overlaps and cross-references, 
which illustrate that the respective sets of rules do not merely co-exist, might be at-
tributed to the cooperation and coordination between the two groups in the course of 
the decades of rule-making.  
At several occasions from the 1980ies onwards both the Participants and the 
DAC/FA declared the importance of cooperating with each other and of coordinating 
certain measures. The effectiveness of this cooperation declared on paper was expe-
rienced or perceived differently by different observers. 
Steve Tvardek (2011) – from the Export Credit Division – underlined the close coop-
eration between the two groups in designing the rules. In contrast, Birgitta Nygren 
(1998: 56) argued in an OECD publication on the occasion of the Arrangement’s 
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anniversary that the aid community found itself in a situation where it had to abide to 
rules that it had not designed. Her statement gives reasons to presume that she ob-
served or experienced only low levels of cooperation. Otherwise the role of the “aid 
community”, that is the DAC, in making the rules would have probably been described 
as a more active one. In a similar vein, the interviews with OECD representatives 
delivered mixed results with regard to the importance of the DAC for establishing and 
implementing rules for tied aid credits. Strikingly, the perception of the DAC’s degree 
of influence varied with the “institutional background” of the interview partners. While 
those working for the Trade and Agriculture Directorate (Export Credit Division) tend-
ed to emphasize the DAC’s involvement and hence stressed the Participants’ willing-
ness to consider development issues, representatives of the Development Co-
operation Directorate were less enthusiastic about the DAC’s degree of influence and 
were skeptical about the Participants’ intentions behind the occasional involvement of 
DAC representatives. These contradictions, or at least inconsistencies, also become 
apparent when comparing the following interview extracts: 
“Well, when we designed the rules we consulted closely with the DAC. I can tell 
you that the commercial viability concept came from a previous DAC Chairman, we 
were trying to figure out how to discipline and the concessionality itself wasn’t going 
to be the answer, so we needed to find some other common measurement. And it 
was actually the DAC chairman, who was I think the head of the UK’s aid depart-
ment – I forgot the name of the institution…Anyways, the guy who suggested the 
concept of commercial viability was Chairman of the DAC the DAC/FA. So it was 
never done in a vacuum” (Interview VI). 
This emphasis of close cooperation between the two bodies is, if not contradicted, so 
at least interpreted differently by one of our interview partners affiliated with the De-
velopment Co-operation Directorate: 
“No...my friends in the export credit world, they were really nice to me, ya, but basi-
cally they kind of keep the aid people in a cupboard and bring them out from time 
to time and shake them about and show them, you know, we are politically cor-
rect, we have someone from the aid side and then put them back into the cup-
board and get out of our way...these guys do not want to know...they really don’t 
want to know...they appreciate that certain things they can kind of get away with, but 
certain things they must do...but aid considerations were not – and never were – a 
very big influence. And anything – in my perspective – anything, any concessions 
that were made towards the development side of things was to commit them to still 
use aid in the mixed credits“ (Interview V).  
Departing from this description of the DAC’s role as a rather limited one, the question 
arises why the DAC, via its Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assis-
tance, did not more emphatically articulate its concerns and suggestions, which it 
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evidently discussed intensively in the framework of the DAC/FA, to the Participants. 
The analysis of the interviews shows that reasons for the DAC’s limited role in negoti-
ating rules for tied aid credits can be seen both in the Committee’s own shortcomings 
and the Participants’ rather closed character and highly specialized field of expertise.  
All of our interview partners saw the somewhat “secretive”171 or “exclusive” character 
of the Participants Group as an obstacle to stakeholder participation. When asked for 
outside influences in the Participants’ work one interviewee, for instance, argued:  
“No, there is not an awful lot. I mean it's a very closed group in many ways and I 
don't mean that in a negative way. But technically it is a very complex area which 
serves a little bit as an excluding device, it's a massive investment to actually get 
into it“ (Interview V).  
From what he explained afterwards, not many representatives of the aid community 
were willing or in the position to make this investment. Above all the technicality of the 
issues at hand figured as an entry barrier for non-experts to participate in discussions 
on tied aid credits. Whether this high degree of technicality, which was also reflected 
in the language and structure of the Arrangement, resulted solely from the complexity 
of the issues discussed or was intentionally introduced as a subtle barrier to limit 
outside involvement remains open for discussion172. The latter interpretation was sug-
gested by one of our interview partners, who labeled the Arrangement the “most 
reader unfriendly book you have ever seen” (Interview V). The fact that the Partici-
pants undertook major efforts from 1995 to 1997 to rewrite the Arrangement173 might 
undermine this hypothesis.  
In cases in which the DAC sought involvement despite these obstacles, for instance, 
in form of the afore mentioned reporting, our interview partners estimated the real 
influence exerted to have been rather low. In this respect, a representative of the De-
velopment Co-operation Directorate (DCD), who personally believed to have a good 
working relationship with the Export Credit Bodies, argued: ”I mean I go there period-
ically, I give them a 10 minute speech on aid untying and there is barely ever a ques-
tion. … Yeah, you know it, it doesn't really ‘pierce the skin’, it doesn't influence or 
change their behavior, I don’t think, but it looks good on their agenda” (Interview 
V). Aide-Memoires of Participants’ meetings provide further evidence of this observed 
limited interest among Participants in the reporting by DAC representatives. After the 
                                                            
171  Even the OECD archive staff, whom we informally spoke to, was astonished to find out that a 
considerable number of documents from Participants meetings we requested were up to today held 
confidential. This was interpreted as a sign of the closed character of the group due to sensitive issues at 
stake during negotiations. 
172  This evokes Dorothy Smith’s idea “… that written texts are not passive interpretations of reality handed 
over, so to speak, to its interpreters but that they actively structure its social readability“ (Wolff 2004: 
287). 
173 In a report to the Ministers in 1997 the Chairman of the Participants Group considered the new Arrange-
ment text “user-friendly, comprehensive and a vast improvement on its predecessor” (TD/CONSENSUS  
(97)21: 3).  
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presentation of development-related issues given by a DAC rapporteur, the Chairman 
usually asked the Participants for follow-up observations, comments and questions. 
Noticeably, there were hardly ever any replies from delegates of the Participants 
Group (see for instance TD/CONSENSUS(96)20: 35). 
Moreover, the limited influence of the DAC was explained with the hierarchy between 
different ministries transplanted to the OECD level. In a somehow provocative way 
one of our interview partners affiliated with the Development Co-operation Directorate 
put it the following way: “The representatives of the Ministry of Finance in any nation-
al government, they are the boss, the aid agency is at the bottom“ (Interview IV). This 
observation of hierarchies and power imbalances between actors involved can be 
subsumed under what Jakobi and Martens label “internal dynamics”. Jakobi and Mar-
tens (2010b: 13) use this term to describe the structure which constrains the organi-
zation. In this respect, internal dynamics refer “… to organizational conditions that 
most organizations face: the competition or frictions among different organizational 
units, as well as different or even conflicting aims, targets and politics” (Mar-
tens/Jakobi 2010b: 13). In a similar vein, Roche (2007: 281) emphasises the “frag-
mented realities” of organizations and indentifies functional divisions between different 
departments as one of the factors on which diverging interests and power relations 
might be based. Consequently, he states that organizations are not monolithic entities, 
but are characterized by internal divisions and that their actions are “… the result of 
the interactions of sets of rational actors pursuing material goals” (Moore et al. 1994; 
quoted in Roche 2007: 277, 281).  
Interestingly, however, the reasons for the DAC’s limited influence were not solely 
attributed to the Participants’ unwillingness to cooperate or to at least consider out-
side proposals or to OECD internal dynamics, but rather turned into criticism on the 
DAC itself and the “aid community” in general. Several interviewees – amongst them 
also two DCD representatives – criticized the preoccupation of the DAC with qualita-
tive issues and buzzwords such as “gender mainstreaming” or “ownership” at the 
expense of an examination of the technical details of, for instance, different aid modali-
ties (Interview IV, V, VI)174.  
Furthermore, long-lasting difficulties with formulating a common position on tied aid 
credits within the DAC/FA suggest that internal difficulties due to suspicion among 
DAC members additionally weakened their position towards the Participants. While 
there might have existed a minimum consensus among the DAC/FA members in the 
analyzed time-period that untied aid was in principle more favorable than tied aid, 
country positions and members’ willingness to undertake corresponding measures 
varied considerably. According to one interview partner this reluctance to make deci-
sions and adopt guidelines contributed to the loss of competence of the regulation of 
                                                            
174  Repeatedly this argument was also evoked when addressing the DAC’s decision to stick to the 10 % 
uniform discount rate to compute the grant element (Interview IV, V, VI).  
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tied aid credits. Due to their tied nature these have been a matter of concern for the 
DAC from the very onset – before it made its way to the centre of attention of the 
Participants Group, in fact before the Group even became operational. The DAC, 
however, missed its opportunity to take the lead in regulating tied aid credits (Inter-
view IV).  
When imagining the outcomes of a scenario in which the DAC was the main “regula-
tor”, one should not forget that the DAC is, just as the rest of the OECD, driven by its 
member states. This important feature of the Organization constrained the Commit-
tee’s scope of action (Interview IV, V, VII). In this respect, at times discussions within 
the DAC/FA resembled those led in the Participants Group and were “blocked” by 
omnipresent concerns about potentially negative repercussions of regulating tied aid 
on domestic companies. Whenever we asked why the DAC did not take a more “pro-
gressive” stance by threatening to no longer accept tied aid credits being reported as 
ODA, if the Arrangement did not incorporate more “development safeguards”, we 
were referred to the fact that “everything that is black and white like that is too harsh” 
(Interview VI). Considering the very functioning of the Organization this question 
seemed to be absurd or at least irritating to some of our interview partners. This sug-
gests that the institutional setting made such a mechanism not only impossible but 
even inconceivable. Similar dynamics can be found also with regard to the DAC’s 
ODA reporting in general. As long as most members have an interest in producing 
high ODA volumes (numbers) and peer pressure is rather low, they will not agree on 
too restrictive reporting practices.  
Concluding this assessment of the DAC’s role it can be said that ever since tied aid 
and associated financing appeared on the DAC/FA’s agenda, the DAC/FA has de-
fined its work in relation to the Participants Group. The screening of Aide-Memoires 
from the 1980ies up to Helsinki and of the New Measures on Tied Aid gives the im-
pression that discussions within the DAC/FA mainly pop-up as a reaction to Partici-
pants’ undertakings. The best example of how discussions in the Participants Group 
spilled over is the debate on the appropriate computation of the grant element and the 
concessionality level respectively.  
Putting the struggle over the appropriate regulation of tied aid credits in the broader 
context of the untying discourse reveals that the role of the DAC is more nuanced 
than it might appear at first glance. In all the years in the run-up to the Helsinki Pack-
age, the DAC/FA was following closely Participants’ discussions, but the Participants 
had the primacy over the regulation of tied aid credits. The untying issue has some-
what reversed this relationship (see e.g. TD/CONSENSUS(93)55) and illustrates that 
the role of the DAC was more sophisticated in shaping the rules on tied aid. While 
already the adoption of DAC guidelines on tied aid and associated financing were an 
attempt by the DAC to claim its role in dealing with development-related issues, it is 
especially when taking the lead in the untying initiatives of the second half of the 
  19  147 
1990ies that the DAC/FA ascertained its role in the field. The DAC appears to have 
managed to make use of external developments in the field of officially supported 
export credits in particular and the international trading system in general to push one 
of its utmost concerns, the untying of aid. 
6.4. Recap and Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has approached the evolution of the regulatory framework for tied aid 
credits and associated financing from a development angle. For that purpose minutes 
and room documents of meetings of the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of 
Development Assistance (DAC/FA) in the period from 1981 to 2003175 have been 
analyzed with regard to concerns voiced about the use of these instruments as well as 
the taken measures by the Participants. Unlike in the Participants’ meetings, the use-
fulness of these instruments for development finance was discussed against the 
backdrop of the indebtedness of many recipients on the one hand, and the scarcity of 
aid resources on the other hand.  
Soon it became apparent that these mostly commercially-motivated flows triggered 
the distortion of aid flows from countries most in need to those developing countries 
and projects that promised to be profitable for donors’ domestic businesses. Not only 
was this allocation pattern running against the DAC’s philosophy of what aid should 
achieve and whom it should benefit, but it also undermined recipients’ “rights” to 
determine their own development strategies. In this respect, it was certainly the tied 
nature of these finance instruments that was the biggest thorn in the DAC/FA’s side. 
Confronted, however, with the reality of aid politics, a strategy of containing the most 
harmful effects was chosen, joining the Participants efforts to design them in a way 
that would lead to less aid and trade distortions. For that purpose the DAC adopted a 
series of guidelines to increase the transparency of donors’ policies in the field of tied 
aid and associated financing and to enhance their development orientation. One of 
the most emphatically pursued proposals by the DAC/FA was the call for a greater 
role of aid agencies in the design and implementation of projects financed with tied 
aid credits.  
Central to the DAC/FA’s discussions was the idea that it is the degree of 
“additionality” of resources channeled through tied aid and mixed credits that deter-
mines their “usefulness” for development (finance), their “development scoring”. Fur-
thermore, if the resources used to fund the concessional component compete with 
the general aid budget their additionality has to be questioned. In this case, other 
forms of aid, which are de-coupled from potentially contradictory commercial goals, 
might be more favorable. Likewise, if the financial flow would also occurred in the 
                                                            
175  In 1981 the DAC Secretariat circulated the first note on tied aid credits and associated financing. In 2004 
the group was closed and was officially merged with the Task Force on Donor Practices to become the 
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices (WP-EFF) (De Milly 2012: 3).  
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absence of the concessional element, that is on market (or Arrangement) terms, they 
would also not be additional and the concessional element would be better invested 
otherwise, so as to maximize total flows. The underlying question, implicit to the 
DAC/FA’s reasoning, is how these public monies would have been invested alterna-
tively.  
The DAC/FA’s treatment of tied aid credits is to be understood as embedded in the 
larger untying discourse that the DAC triggered early on. A look at the minutes of 
DAC/FA meetings and distributed room documents from 1981 onwards gives the 
impression that the DAC/FA was torn between calling for untying (and thus for the 
elimination of tied aid credits) and on the other hand, trying to improve the develop-
ment quality of tied aid financing packages (hence de-facto accepting their very exist-
ence). In a pendulum-like fashion the DAC/FA had promoted the untying of aid in the 
1960ies and 70ies. Confronted with the reticence of members to adopt correspond-
ing measures and in view of parallel efforts undertaken in the Participants Group with 
regard to export credits and tied aid credits, the DAC/FA shifted its strategy in the 
1980ies and joined the Participants in the more moderate attempt of disciplining tied 
aid use, that is accepting their existence, but at improved conditions. Once disciplines 
had successfully been set up with the adoption of the Helsinki rules and the New 
Measures in the Field of Tied Aid in 1991/1992 and in the light of a general shift in 
development policy from “donor interests” to “recipient needs” after the end of the 
Cold War (Petermann 2013), the DAC/FA reiterated its call for the untying of aid 
altogether, a first step of which was certainly accomplished with the adoption (and 
implementation) of the 2001 Recommendation on Untying Bilateral Development 
Assistance to Least Developed Countries.   
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7. Statistics on Tied Aid Credits 
The quantitative analysis of tied aid credit flows provided in the following aims at 
complementing the predominantly qualitative analyses of the regulatory framework in 
which these hybrid instruments are in embedded.  
From the introduction of the Helsinki tied aid disciplines in 1992 onwards, the Partici-
pants Group and the Secretariat respectively, has conducted a semi-annual review of 
notifications. The following chapter is almost exclusively based on Participants’ rec-
ords monitoring tied aid notifications provided in the document TD/PG(2006)23. The 
data corresponds to the time span from 1991 to July 2006. More recent data is not 
available for public purposes due to restricted access to Participants’ documents. 
Additionally, the DAC databases were consulted with the aim of identifying data on 
tied aid credits. Given the short time span a comprehensive quantitative analysis of 
tied aid credits is not feasible. Therefore this chapter provides a descriptive analysis of 
quantitative data on tied aid credits. For future quantitative research more data is 
needed.  
In order to get a better understanding of the different forms of notifications monitored, 
which is needed for the following analysis, 7.1 classifies tied aid according to the 
overall concessionality level (OCL) and amount.  
Figure 7.1 summarizes different forms of tied aid which are defined by the Arrange-
ment terms. Financing arrangements with an Overall Concessionality Level (OCL) of 
less than 35 % and less than 50 % for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are not 
conform to Arrangement terms except small technical assistance projects or small 
capital projects. De minimis tied aid is in conformity with the minimum concessionality 
levels for tied aid but it is not subject to consultation procedures. Helsinki-type tied 
aid, on the other hand, is subject to consultation procedures and corresponds to an 
OCL between 35 % (50 % for LDCs) and 79 %. Tied aid with a concessionality level 
of 80 % and more is called highly-concessional tied aid. 
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Figure 7.1:  Classification of Tied Aid Based on the Overall Concessionality Level (OCL)  
and Amount  
 
 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The classification does not apply to tied aid for LDCs except for the minimum OCL (50 %). 
  
  19  151 
7.1. Introduction to the DAC Statistical Concept 
Since tied aid credits are also a form of development finance and their subsidy ele-
ment is Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligible, it was investigated how they 
are reflected in the statistics published by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC). In order to understand the DAC statistics and interpret the data well, context 
information was needed. Further information was collected through interviews. The 
problems of statistical recording of aid will be addressed in depth. An introduction to 
the DAC’s recording practices of aid and other developmentally relevant flows is 
provided in the following paragraphs.  
The DAC statistics record flows to developing countries in different categories. Cred-
its are categorized according to the grant element, motivational objective, and tying 
status. The DAC distinguishes credits according to their motivation, whether a credit 
is aid or trade motivated. Credits that have as a main motivation “contribution to de-
velopment” qualify as ODA. Export credits per definition are not ODA eligible, but a 
developmentally motivated subsidy to an export credit can be reported as ODA. In 
order to be ODA eligible loans additionally have to pass two tests. They require a 
grant element of at least 25 % (calculated at a discount rate of 10 %) and to be con-
cessional in character. The second test is rather vague and leaves room for interpreta-
tion. So far the DAC has not agreed on an operationalization of the term “concession-
al in character” and has not determined any measurable criteria (Interview X). Aid is 
recorded according to its tying status (tied, untied, or partially untied). The following 
analysis looks exclusively at tied aid and the recording of export credits. “Partially 
untied” refers to a selection of countries eligible to enter competitive bidding. “Untied” 
refers to procurement which is not limited to certain countries and subject to Interna-
tional Competitive Bidding (ICB). This can be achieved through publishing an offer on 
an internationally recognized bulletin board. The problematic issue regarding “untied 
aid” as well as a discussion about the ODA criteria “concessional in character” will be 
picked up at the end of this chapter with the help of a recent example of the ODA 
statistics. 
The DAC statistics further distinguish between commitments and disbursements. A 
commitment is “[…] a firm written obligation by a government or official agency […] 
to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and con-
ditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilat-
eral agency” (OECD stats 2013a). On the other hand, disbursements represent actu-
al flows of resources e.g., to a recipient country or agency. The ODA/GNI ratio of a 
donor is calculated based on disbursements (Interview X). A loan may be disbursed in 
several tranches and consequently each tranche is listed in the ODA statistics ac-
cording to the year of disbursement.  
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7.2. Evolution of Quantitative Importance of Tied Aid  
After this overview on statistical recording of the DAC and the Participants, the im-
portance of tied aid credits as an instrument of development finance will be examined. 
The first two figures of this chapter show the quantitative importance of tied aid cred-
its as well as the DAC category “officially supported export credits” and compare their 
volume with total and bilateral ODA. Additional information is needed in order to read 
and interpret the figures. The evolution of the quantitative importance of tied aid cred-
its cannot be identified properly for two reasons. First, OECD members restrict com-
prehensive access to data on officially supported export credits. The DAC’s Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS) database records ODA flows as well as Other Official Flows 
(OOFs) to developing countries. Access to data on OOFs including officially support-
ed export credits is restricted. Data is published in aggregate form only 
(DCD/DAC(2007)39/FINAL: 5 et seqq.). Second, the descriptions provided by the 
DAC to read and interpret properly the statistics on ODA and OOFs to developing 
countries are lacking for most categories. The latter argument explains why misinter-
pretation constitutes a serious problem for anyone attempting to work with the statis-
tics. Expert support is inevitable in order to interpret the statistics accurately. Based 
on the limited data, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 show the volume and quantitative im-
portance of tied aid credits compared to total ODA. 
Figure 7.2: Quantitative Evolution of Tied Aid and Export Credits compared to ODA 
 
Source: OECD stats (2013b), TD/PG(2006)23, TD/CONSENSUS(97)57  
Note:  Participants’ data on tied aid credits (notifications) is available for the years 1991 to 2005. The DAC category “Official  
 export credits to developing countries” (code 265) is only available as net disbursements. The category applies to export  
 credits from official ECAs to developing countries. (DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1: 30) 
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Figure 7.3: Evolution of Tied Aid and Official Export Credits to Developing Countries 
 
Source: OECD stats (2013b), TD/PG(2006)23, TD/CONSENSUS(97)57 
Note:  Participants’ data on tied aid credits (notifications) is available for the years 1991 to 2005. The DAC category “Official  
 export credits to developing countries” (code 265) is only available as net disbursements. The category applies to export  
 credits from official ECAs to developing countries. (DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1: 30) 
 
These two figures compare the volume of tied aid notifications with ODA. Yet, these 
data have to be interpreted with great caution – in particular so with regard to the 
volume of tied aid (notifications) as percentage of “Bilateral ODA (Net Disburse-
ments)”. First of all, the data presented is calculated using three different sources: 
Participants’ semi-annual reports, DAC statistics, and historical exchange rates data-
bases. Participants report the tied aid notifications. The amount notified as tied aid 
corresponds to the nominal value of the loan. The notification of a credit represents an 
offer. Not all notifications necessarily lead to the finalization of a contract and conse-
quently a resource flow. With regard to the category “Official export credits to devel-
oping countries (Net Disbursements)”, the category does not include the concession-
al element (DCD/DAC(2007)39/FINAL: 25). In the case of officially supported export 
credits which are classified by the DAC as associated financing, the concessional 
element is reported as ODA grant and the non-concessional element as OOF. These 
facts explain why the Participants’ statistical recording of tied aid does not match the 
DAC statistics. Further the Participants use SDR to notify loans, the DAC uses USD. 
All data is based on current prices. Additionally, it has to be highlighted that data on 
ODA includes the concessional element of a tied aid credit (if it was reported).  
Keeping these constraints in mind, Figure 7.2 and 7.3 provide a rough comparison 
between the amount of tied aid as recorded by the Participants and total ODA report-
ed to the DAC. These figures show that in more recent years tied aid constitutes a 
154 
small fraction relative to ODA or rather compared to ODA. Looking at the volume of 
tied aid (notifications) expressed as percentage of total bilateral ODA (net disburse-
ments) in a given year, it becomes visible that tied aid has lost importance over the 
years. This is almost exclusively explained by the increase of bilateral ODA as from 
2002. In 1991, prior to the inception of the Helsinki rules, tied aid (notification) 
amounted to 19 % of the volume of bilateral ODA. Tied aid (notification) experienced 
a sharp fall as percentage of bilateral ODA in the following two years. From 1994 to 
2001 the volume of tied aid compared to bilateral ODA remained fairly stable.  
The following figures will focus on the different forms of tied aid as described at the 
beginning of the chapter. They are entirely based on the Participants’ statistical review 
of tied aid. Figure 7.4 shows the volume of total tied aid and Helsinki-type tied aid 
notifications. The figure reveals a sharp decrease in the volume of tied aid notifications 
in the first years of the 1990ies. After a 2-year transition period, following the incep-
tion of the Helsinki disciplines in 1992, the volume of Helsinki-type tied aid remained 
fairly stable. Additionally, Figure 7.5 focuses on the effect of the introduction of the 
Helsinki criteria. 
Figure 7.4: Overview of the Volume and Number of Tied Aid Notifications (million USD) 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  Data for the number of tied aid notifications is not available for the years 1991 to 1994. The category “All tied aid  
 notification” includes Helsinki-type tied aid notifications.  
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Figure 7.5: Overview of the Volume of Tied Aid and Helsinki-Type Tied Aid (1991-1995) 
(million USD) 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
 
Figure 7.5 demonstrates the sharp drop of tied aid not being in conformity with the 
Helsinki criteria in 1992. 57 % of total tied aid in 1992 was notified in the first two 
month prior to the introduction of the Helsinki Package.  
The Participants differentiate between different forms of tied aid based on the Ar-
rangement terms. This differentiation is demonstrated in Figure 7.1 above. Figure 7.6 
gives an overview of the volume and composition of different forms of tied aid and 
untied aid notifications.  
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Figure 7.6: Composition of Tied Aid and Untied Aid Notifications  
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  Data for untied aid notifications is available as from the year 1995. The category highly-concessional tied aid  
 (OCL ≥ 80 %) includes tied aid for ships for the years 1992-1994. 
 
The aim of Figure 7.6 is to demonstrate the absolute volumes of different forms of tied 
and untied aid. It clearly shows that the greatest part of aid is attributed to untied aid 
notifications. 42 % of all aid notified falls under the category tied aid176. 
Looking at Figure 7.6, some trends are observable. Given the short period of data, 
reliable trends are difficult to observe. Helsinki-type tied aid as already stated re-
mained fairly stable as from 1993 on. The use of highly-concessional tied aid dropped 
sharply in the year 1992 and remained at a fairly stable level until 1999. The years 
2000 to 2004 show an even lower level of highly-concessional tied aid. In 2005 a 
comparably high amount of highly-concessional tied aid was notified. Small projects 
(SDR < 2 million), most of which is attributable to de minimis tied aid, experienced a 
downward trend starting in 1996. Furthermore Figure 7.6 clearly demonstrates a 
downward trend for untied aid notifications until 2002 and a subsequent increase in 
the years 2003 to 2005. Due to lack of data for the years after 2005 it is unclear 
whether increased volumes for untied aid, Helsinki-type tied aid and highly-
concessional tied aid in 2005 represent an outlier or mark the start of a new upward 
trend. 
                                                            
176  The calculation is based on notifications during the period from 1995 to 2005. 
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7.3. Donors 
After the brief overview on the different forms of tied and untied aid, the following 
figures show the donor’s side. Figure 7.7 shows all donors according to the accumu-
lated volume of Helsinki-type tied aid as well as total tied aid notifications for the peri-
od 1995-2005.  
Figure 7.7: Donors According to the Volume of Helsinki-Type Tied Aid and Tied Aid per 
Donor Country (1995-2005)  
Source: TD/PG(2006)23; TD/CONSENSUS(97)57 
Note:  The data represents the tied aid (notifications) from 1995 to 2005. USD-based calculation. 
 
Figure 7.7 shows that in the period from 1995 to 2005 the five donors notifying the 
largest amount of tied aid were Japan, Spain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Additionally it identifies those donors having high volumes of Helsinki-type tied aid.  
million USD 
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Table 4 lists the donors’ share of Helsinki-type tied aid as percentage of total tied aid. 
The table shows that Germany and Italy have low shares of Helsinki-type tied aid 
given their large volume of total tied aid. This means that the share of tied aid must 
consist of small projects and/or highly-concessional tied aid. 
Table 4:  Relative Shares of De Minimis, Highly-Concessional, and Helsinki-Type Tied Aid of 
Total Tied Aid (1995-2005) 
percentage of
 
Donor country 
de minimis 
tied aid  
highly-concessional 
tied aid  
Helsinki-type  
tied aid  
Australia 14.56 % - 85.44 % 
Austria 12.71 % 4.45 % 79.86 % 
Belgium 6.44 % 0.33 % 86.13 % 
Canada 24.84 % - 75.16 % 
Czech Republic 0.00 % - 100.00 % 
Denmark 6.60 % - 82.08 % 
Finland 9.01 % 18.80 % 39.31 % 
France 4.64 % 3.06 % 75.90 % 
Germany 0.10 % 25.60 % 41.96 % 
Hungary 0.00 % - 100.00 % 
Italy 1.68 % 74.83 % 11.95 % 
Japan 0.48 % - 99.52 % 
Korea 0.73 % 5.58 % 68.79 % 
Luxembourg 0.00 % - 0.00 % 
Netherlands 7.42 % 0.66 % 53.84 % 
Norway 12.97 % - 63.14 % 
Poland 13.39 % - 86.61 % 
Portugal 3.10 % 5.80 % 65.87 % 
Spain 4.02 % 4.93 % 77.22 % 
Sweden 14.14 % 4.93 % 63.09 % 
Switzerland 44.59 % - 55.41 % 
United Kingdom 0.00 % 40.65 % 21.30 % 
United States 0.00 % 78.18 % 4.14 % 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The calculation is USD-based and presents values for the time period 1995-2005. The percentage values do not  
 necessarily add up to 100 % because tied aid (notifications) additionally include tied aid for LDCs and other small  
 (SDR < 2 million) tied aid. 
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Table 4 shows that in the cases of the United States, Italy, and also to some extent 
the United Kingdom and Germany most of their non-Helsinki-type tied aid is explained 
by highly-concessional (OCL > 80 %) tied aid notifications. Switzerland and Canada 
notify a fairly small volume of tied aid but have comparably high shares of de minimis 
tied aid. The countries United Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, and Germany have 
large shares of tied aid which is attributable to neither Helsinki-type tied aid, de 
minimis tied aid, nor highly-concessional tied aid. There is no detailed country data 
available for categories such as tied aid for LDCs and other forms of small (SDR < 2 
million) tied aid which is not de minimis tied aid.  
 
Figure 7.8: Relative Shares of the Cumulated Volume of De Minimis Tied Aid by Notifying 
Country  
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Hungary, and the United States did not notify de minimis tied aid. The 
data presents the volume of de minimis tied aid (notifications) from 1995 to June 2006; SDR-based calculation. 
Figure 7.8 demonstrates that a group of three countries, Spain, Austria, and France, is 
responsible for almost half of all de minimis tied aid (1995-June 2006). When looking 
at the relative share of de minimis tied aid to total aid on a country level, the above 
figure in combination with Table 4 shows that those countries with a great share of de 
minimis tied aid have a small absolute volume of total tied aid. 
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7.4. Recipient Countries and Regions 
The figures above have focused on donor’s use of different forms of tied aid. The 
following figures provide an overview of the recipient countries. The first two figures 
show the distribution of tied aid and Helsinki-type tied aid notifications according to 
the beneficiary region. This section further provides more detailed information on the 
recipient countries.  
 
Figure 7.9: Recipient Regions of Total Tied Aid Notifications 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents the total tied aid from 1995 to June 2006; SDR-based calculation.  
 
Figure 7.10: Recipient Regions of Total Helsinki-Type Tied Aid Notifications 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents the total Helsinki-type tied aid from 1995 to June 2006; SDR-based calculation. 
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Figure 7.9 and 7.10 demonstrate that 45 % of tied aid and more than half (53 %) of 
Helsinki-type tied aid goes to the region East Asia and the Pacific. This suggests that 
most Helsinki-type tied aid was concentrated on emerging economies in Asia, while 
the poor developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia received dispro-
portionally higher shares of non Helsinki-type tied aid, i.e. either de minimis or highly-
concessional aid.  
Figure 7.11 takes a look at absolute changes in the geographic distribution of tied aid 
over time. It demonstrates that tied aid fell sharply in the East Asia and Pacific region 
having an exceptionally high peak in the year 2000 of USD 2675 million.  
Figure 7.11:  Geographic Distribution of the Volume of Tied Aid by Recipient Region  
According to Time Periods 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Downward trends over time can also be observed in all other regions, with only Latin 
America and the Caribbean experiencing a modest upward trend. 
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Figure 7.12: Absolute Helsinki-Type Tied Aid and Total Tied Aid by Recipient Country  
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents notifications from 1995 to 2005. 
Figure 7.12 clearly demonstrates that the largest share of tied aid and Helsinki-type 
tied aid goes to a small selection of countries. Only four countries, China, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines, received roughly half of all Helsinki-type tied aid.  
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Between 1995 and 2005 China received 20 % of all Helsinki-type tied aid, Indonesia 
14 %, Vietnam 10 %, and the Philippines 9 %. In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa, as a 
region, only accounts for a share of 6 % of total Helsinki-type tied aid and 10 % of 
total tied aid (Calculation based on TD/PG(2006)23). According to the World Bank 
classification (2013a) China, Indonesia, and the Philippines were lower middle income 
countries in 2005. Vietnam was categorized as a low income country in 2005. 
The subsequent set of figures illustrates the distribution of tied aid, Helsinki-type tied 
aid, and non-Helsinki-type tied aid according to the World Bank Analytical classifica-
tion. The classification lists countries according to their GNI per capita (USD) in four 
categories: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and high income 
countries. 
Figure 7.13 shows that 71 % of total tied aid notified goes to lower middle income 
countries, and 26 % to low income countries. Lower middle income countries receive 
76 % of total Helsinki-type tied aid, but only 61% of non-Helsinki-type tied aid (see 
Figure 7.14 and 7.15). In contrast, low income countries receive 21% of Helsinki-type 
tied aid, but 36 % of non-Helsinki-type tied aid (see Figure 7.15). Upper middle in-
come countries are not eligible for tied aid. Note that changes in the classification 
during the observed period are the reason why the figures display tied aid for upper 
middle income countries. Some countries, e.g. Turkey, had received the status of an 
upper middle income country by 2005. 
 
Figure 7.13: Total Tied Aid According to World Bank Analytical Classification 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23; Word Bank 2013a 
Note:  The data represents the cumulative volume of tied aid (notifications) from 1995 to June 2006. Recipient countries were  
 classified according to World Bank estimates of 2005. Changes in the classification are the reason why the figure displays  
 tied aid of upper middle income countries. 
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Figure 7.14: Helsinki-Type Tied Aid According to World Bank Analytical Classification 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23; Word Bank 2013a 
Note:  The data represents the cumulative volume of Helsinki-type tied aid (notifications) from 1995 to June 2006. Recipient  
 countries were classified according to World Bank estimates of 2005. Changes in the classification are the reason why  
 the figure displays tied aid of upper middle income countries. 
 
Figure 7.15: Non-Helsinki-Type Tied Aid According to World Bank Analytical Classification 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23; Word Bank 2013a 
Note:  The data represents the cumulative volume of non-Helsinki-type tied aid (notifications) from 1995 to June 2006. Recipient  
 countries were classified according to World Bank estimates of 2005. Changes in the classification are the reason why  
 the figure displays tied aid of upper middle income countries. 
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7.5. Sectors  
In addition to the distribution of tied aid according to donor and recipient country or 
region the Participants further record tied aid notifications according to sectors.  
Figure 7.16: Total Tied Aid by Sector  
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents the cumulative volume of tied aid (notifications) from 1995 to 2005.  
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Analysis of statistical data on the total tied aid notifications by sector suggests that a 
large share of tied aid is fuelled into the sectors transportation and storage, water 
supply and sanitation, and energy generation and supply. It is very likely that projects 
in these sectors are large capital-intensive projects and infrastructure projects. Be-
tween 1995 and 2005 35 % of tied aid was provided for projects in the sector 
Transport and Storage. The sector Water Supply and Sanitation accounts for 16 % 
and Energy Generation and Supply for 15 %. The sectors Health and Education have 
shares of 7 % and 4 %, respectively.  
Figure 7.17: Sectoral Distribution of Tied Aid – Changes Over Time 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents the volume of tied aid (notifications, USD). 
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The figures above illustrate that in all of the periods analyzed the largest sector is 
Transport and Storage, before Energy Generation and Supply and Water Supply and 
Sanitation. These three sectors account for roughly two thirds of the volume (USD) of 
tied aid notifications and Figure 7.17 demonstrates that the sectoral distribution is 
persistent over time.  
Differences in the distribution are very susceptible to outliers. Due to the fact that data 
is only available for the period 1995-2005, conclusions about sectoral changes have 
to be drawn with caution. The most notable change is the large share (8 %) of the 
sector Government and Civil Society in the time period 2004-2005, which had only 
passed the 2 % mark in the time period 1995-1997. Further the sector Transport and 
Storage increased its share to 43 % in the period 2004-2005.  
Examining the sectoral distribution of tied aid the question arises whether specific 
forms of tied aid show a similar or divergent distribution. Unfortunately, the Partici-
pants do not provide comprehensive data to answer that question in detail. 
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Table 5: Volumes of Helsinki-Type and Non-Helsinki-Type Tied Aid, De Minimis, Highly-
Concessional, and Other Non-Helsinki-Type Tied Aid 
Notifications 
(1995-2005) 
Helsinki-type tied aid  Non-Helsinki-type tied aid 
Volume 
(USD)
average 
volume 
(million 
USD)
no. Volume 
(USD)
average 
volume 
(million 
USD) 
no. 
Education 902.2 8.8 102 400.5 2.9 138 
Health 1601.1 6.8 237 534.8 2.0 264 
Population policies / pro-
grammes and reproductive 
health 25.8 12.9 2 33.9 2.3 15 
Water supply and sanitation 3861.1 8.2 473 1225.2 3.6 343 
Government and civil society 88.3 6.8 13 701.9 10.8 65 
Other social infrastructure and 
services 573.4 8.1 71 472.4 3.2 147 
Transport and storage 8689.1 23.5 369 3248.9 6.4 505 
Communications 812.5 8.2 99 494.5 2.7 181 
Energy generation and supply 3100.7 11.5 269 1532.6 3.8 399 
Banking and financial services 19.0 3.8 5 57.7 2.3 25 
Agriculture 787.7 8.0 99 359.0 1.9 185 
Forestry 157.7 17.5 9 51.5 1.8 28 
Fishing 87.2 5.8 15 47.9 1.9 25 
Industry 456.7 7.1 64 668.0 1.4 476 
Mineral resources and mining 116.4 9.0 13 46.1 1.4 33 
Construction 2.6 2.6 1 45.5 2.5 18 
Trade policy and regulations 10.3 10.3 1 35.2 11.7 3 
Tourism 2.9 2.9 1 1.5 0.4 4 
Multisector / Crosscutting 921.0 12.8 72 487.6 4.0 123 
Commodity aid and general 
programme assistance 0.0 - 0 3.9 1.9 2 
Emergency assistance 105.5 52.8 2 0.3 0.3 1 
Support to nongovernmental 
organisations 0.0 - 0 2.0 1.0 2 
Unallocated / Unspecified 146.2 20.9 7 68.9 3.6 19 
All sectors 22467.8 - 1924 10519.9  3001 
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  Non-Helsinki-type tied aid includes de minimis and highly-concessional tied aid, as well as other small projects  
 (SDR < 2 million) tied aid. 
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Looking at the average volume of Helsinki-type tied aid notifications in Table 5, the 
sector Emergency Assistance, accounting for only two notifications, accounts for the 
largest average volume (USD 52.8 million). Notifications of the sector Transport and 
Storage have an average volume of USD 23.5 million. The sectors Forestry and Popu-
lation Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health account for only small numbers 
of projects but their average volume of notification is USD 17.5 million and USD 12.9 
million respectively. Data on average volumes is less susceptible to outliers the higher 
the number of notifications is. Therefore, when looking only at sectors with a high 
number of notifications, apart from the sector Transport and Storage (USD 23.5), also 
Multisector/Crosscutting (USD 12.8 million) and Energy Generation and Supply (USD 
11.5 million) show high average volumes. The sectors Education, Communications, 
Water Supply and Sanitation, Other Social Infrastructure and Services, and Agricul-
ture all have average volumes between USD 8 and 9 million. The sector Health ac-
counts for a high number of notifications (237) and an average volume of USD 6.8 
million. 
When looking at the absolute volume of non-Helsinki-type tied aid177 the three largest 
sectors are Transport and Storage (USD 3248.9), Energy Generation and Supply 
(USD 1532.6), and Water Supply and Sanitation (USD 1225.2). The sectors Trade 
Policy and Regulations, Government and Civil Society, and Transport and Storage 
have the highest average volumes of non-Helsinki-type tied aid. The sector Trade 
Policy and Regulations accounts for only three notifications of non-Helsinki-type tied 
aid, of which two are highly-concessional tied aid notifications. 43 % of non-Helsinki-
type tied aid notifications of the sector Government and Civil Society are attributable 
to highly-concessional tied aid notifications. In the case of Transport and Storage 
48 % of all non-Helsinki-type tied aid notifications are de minimis tied aid notifications. 
Sectors having a large share of de minimis projects are the following: Industry, 
Transport and Storage, and Energy Generation and Supply.  
                                                            
177  Non-Helsinki-type tied aid is calculated as the difference between tied aid and Helsinki-type tied aid. 
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Figure 7.18: Share of De Minimis Tied Aid by Sector  
 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents the number of notifications of de minimis tied aid from 1995 to June 2006. 
 
Figure 7.19: Share of Helsinki-Type Tied Aid by Sector 
Source: TD/PG(2006)23 
Note:  The data represents the number of notifications of Helsinki-type tied aid 1995 to June 2006 
Comparing Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19, it becomes visible that a quarter of all de 
minimis tied aid notifications were made in the sector Industry. This sector only ac-
counts for 3 % of all Helsinki-tied aid notifications. This leads to the question whether 
this difference is a consequence of the nature of the projects or of different proce-
dures for de minimis tied aid. De minimis tied aid is in conformity with the minimum 
concessionality levels for tied aid but it is not subject to consultation procedures.  
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7.6. Summary of the Findings of the Statistical Data 
The following paragraphs summarize the findings drawn from the statistical data. The 
data above is almost exclusively based on Participants semi-annual review of notifica-
tions. The data covers a period from 1991 to 2005 but note that not all data is availa-
ble for the entire period. Due to limited access to Participant’s data there is no availa-
ble data as from 2006 onwards.  
The most obvious question regards the importance of tied aid as a form of develop-
ment finance. From a bird’s eye view, the quantitative importance of tied aid credits 
compared to the volume of total bilateral ODA is declining. This is largely explained by 
the absolute increase of bilateral ODA. In 1991, prior to the inception of the Helsinki 
rules, tied aid, expressed as percentage of the volume of bilateral ODA, accounted for 
roughly one fifth. The relative importance of tied aid experienced a sharp decline in 
1992 and 1993. In the period from 1994 to 2001 the relative volume of tied aid re-
mained fairly stable. As from 2002 tied aid constitutes a small fraction (less than 4 %) 
relative to bilateral ODA. Looking at the volume of tied aid expressed as percentage of 
total bilateral ODA in a given year it becomes visible that tied aid has lost most of its 
relative importance over the years.  
When looking at tied aid notifications and more particularly at Helsinki-type tied aid 
notifications one sees that the overall number of notifications has declined over the 
years. The volumes experienced a sharp decline after the inception of the Helsinki 
rules. However, neither a clear upward, nor a downward trend can be observed for the 
following years up to 2005.  
Other forms of tied aid, such as small projects (SDR < 2 million), of which most part is 
attributed to de minimis tied aid notifications, have experienced a downward trend 
since its peak in 1996. The use of highly-concessional tied aid (OCL > 80 %) 
dropped sharply in the year 1992 and remained fairly stable until 1999. In the period 
from 2000 to 2004 highly-concessional tied aid remained at an even lower level. In 
2005 a comparably high amount of highly-concessional tied aid was notified. 
In the next step, the focus was put on the donor’s side. Donors with the largest vol-
umes of tied aid (1995-2005) were Japan, Spain, France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands. Germany and Italy have low shares of Helsinki-type tied aid given their compar-
atively large volumes of total tied aid. The United States, Italy, and also to some extent 
the United Kingdom and Germany have high shares of highly-concessional tied aid 
(OCL > 80 %). Switzerland and Canada notify a small volume of tied aid but have 
comparably high shares of de minimis tied aid. When looking at the biggest donors of 
de minimis tied aid Spain, Austria, and France account for almost half of the volume of 
total de minimis tied aid.  
When looking at the recipients’ side the region East Asia and the Pacific receives 
45 % of total tied aid and 53 % of Helsinki-type tied aid. On a country level, China is 
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by far the largest recipient of tied aid, receiving 18 % of all tied aid and 20 % of Hel-
sinki-type tied aid. China is followed by Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Tur-
key. 69 % of all tied aid goes to only 12 countries. In case of Helsinki-type tied aid 10 
countries receive roughly three quarters the volume.  
Looking at the distribution of tied aid according to the World Bank Analytical classifi-
cation, we see that 71 % of all tied aid goes to lower middle income countries, and 
26 % to low income countries. Lower middle income countries receive a share of 
76 % of Helsinki-type tied aid. 36 % of non-Helsinki-type tied aid goes to low income 
countries and 61 % to lower middle income countries. 
Referring to the sectoral distribution, the statistical data shows that the largest sector 
is Transport and Storage with a share of 36 % of total tied aid, followed by Water 
Supply and Sanitation (15 %) and Energy Generation and Supply (14 %). The large 
average volume of notifications leads to the assumption that projects in these sectors 
are large capital-intensive projects and infrastructure projects. Further, these three 
sectors account for roughly two thirds of the volume (USD) of tied aid notifications 
and Figure 7.17 demonstrates that this sectoral distribution persists over time. It is 
likely that projects in these three sectors generate revenues. Sectors, which typically 
receive more grants, such as health or education, appear to receive comparably small 
shares of tied aid. Further the question arises whether sectors with large shares of 
tied aid match those sectors in donor countries that are strong in exports, e.g., about 
40 % of the sector Transport and Storage is attributable to the subsector Rail 
Transport. It is generally acknowledged that European companies are market leaders 
in this field. If this assumption holds true, the hypothesis is supported that the selec-
tion of projects financed by tied aid credits is donor driven. The sectors health ac-
count for 6 % and education for 4 % of the volume of tied aid. When looking at highly-
concessional tied aid one observes that most notifications are attributed to the sec-
tors water supply and sanitation (91), transport and storage (59), and energy genera-
tion and supply (58). Health accounts for 33 and education for 32 notifications. The 
distribution changes when looking at the de minimis tied aid. 26 % of all de minimis 
tied aid notifications (number) were made in the sector industry.  
7.7. Reading and Interpreting the DAC Statistics 
The analysis of the statistical records has shown that tied aid credits are reported 
differently by the Participants and the DAC and that detailed data is partly not availa-
ble. The aim of reviewing the DAC statistics was to understand how the DAC reports 
grants to export credits and gain more information e.g., on the concessional level of 
credits. The following paragraphs show that the field of tied aid credits is character-
ized by a lack of transparency.  
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First, the DAC collects data on financial commitments and disbursements, pledges 
are not covered in the statistical collection. Data users often mix up commitments and 
pledges. The DAC statistical directives define the term commitment as a binding 
(contractual) obligation to provide a specified financial volume for a specified under-
taking (project or activity), whereas pledges are political promises of a more general 
nature, usually made at high-level international meetings. Disbursements represent the 
actual transfer of resources (cash flow in a given period) (Interview X).  
The DAC publishes quantitative but also descriptive data on ODA and other resource 
flows. It records four different flows of resources to developing countries, of which 
ODA is one – the one most closely defined and monitored (Interview X). This distinc-
tion is made based on the sector-source of funds (official or private) and whether they 
are extended at concessional or non-concessional terms.  
 
Table 6: Main Types of Resource Flows 
 concessional non-concessional 
official ODA  OOFs 
private 
private charitable flows  
(from NGOs, foundations etc.) 
private flows at market 
terms 
 
Source: Own Elaboration, based on Interview X 
The typology demonstrates that ODA is one of four resource flows to developing 
countries captured in DAC statistics. Within the DAC context, “aid” is often used as a 
synonym for ODA or a concessional flow178. In contrast, the Participants use the term 
“aid” to describe an official subsidy to a credit. This leads to different interpretations of 
the term “tied aid credit”. DAC Statistics uses the term “tied aid credits” to describe 
tied ODA loans (“aid” being understood as a synonym for ODA). The DAC makes a 
distinction between tied ODA loans and official export credits, because export credits, 
by definition in the statistical directives, are excluded from ODA (Interview X). The 
Participants, on the other hand, use the term “tied aid credits” to describe tied credits 
with a concessional element (subsidy). The Participants’ concept, therefore, includes 
export credits.  
This leads to the question how the DAC statistics record financing that is subject to 
the Arrangement’s tied aid disciplines. Export credits (i.e., credits extended by export 
credit agencies under an export-promotion framework), by definition in the statistical 
                                                            
178  “Official aid” is a synonym for ODA and “private aid” for charitable giving by NGOs, foundations or private 
companies (Interview X). 
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directives, are excluded from being classified as ODA. They are understood as being 
extended with a primarily commercial – not developmental – motive and therefore are 
recorded in the OOFs category (DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1: 9, 12). However, any 
government subsidies to these credits for developmental purposes (financially non-
viable projects) can be reported as ODA grant (Interview X). 
In order for a loan to qualify as ODA, the following criteria must apply. Promotion of 
the economic development and welfare of developing countries must be the main 
objective. DAC statisticians refer to this criterion as “motivational test” (Interview X). 
And flows must be concessional in character. Both criteria are fairly vague. The 
“concessionality in character” requirement of the ODA definition is not underpinned 
by additional detailed criteria and therefore leaves wide room for interpretation.  
This leads to the question what criteria determine whether a credit is granted based 
on developmental or commercial motives. According to DAC representatives, the 
motivation is derived from the institutional and legal framework of the credit. Whether 
an ECA or a bilateral DFI (development bank or a comparable institution) issues a 
credit gives an indication of the underlying motivation. The motivation is assumed to 
be a commercial rather than a developmental one for export credits. Official ECAs 
have a distinct mandate, often backed by a detailed legal framework, to promote na-
tional exports (Interview X). Development finance institutions (DFIs), such as bilateral 
development banks, on the other hand, operate based on a mandate to promote de-
velopment in recipient countries and often have mechanisms for development results 
management in place. Therefore, loans extended by DFIs can be reported as ODA 
loans, provided they meet the other criteria for ODA, including on concessionality. 
Although bilateral DFIs act upon the mandate to promote development, they also 
operate in a commercial environment and often with market-like instruments (Interview 
X). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they also support the interests of the 
national economy. This can be seen as a secondary objective or side benefit.  
The DAC records gross disbursements of loans and repayments of principal. The 
difference gives net disbursements, which is the basis for calculating the ODA/GNI 
ratio (UN ODA target of 0.7 % of GNI) (World Bank 2013b). Interest payments are 
recorded as well, but separately – they do not enter the ODA/GNI calculation (Inter-
view X). 
There are many different forms of debt instruments that receive government support, 
which often takes the form of an official guarantee. However, guarantees are contin-
gent liabilities and therefore not covered in DAC statistics, which is a flow-based 
system at present. But guarantees can be developmentally motivated and are deemed 
relevant in promoting development in many contexts, therefore the DAC is elaborating 
options for valorizing guarantees in order to incorporate them in a new statistical 
measurement framework post 2015 (Interview X). 
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7.8. Problems of Statistical Recording of Development  
Assistance 
This chapter addresses three problems arising from the current statistical recording of 
official development assistance. The first issue focuses on the tying status of credits 
and whether a loan is in effect tied or untied. The second issue relates to the motiva-
tion of a credit and its subsequent statistical recording. The third issue addresses the 
question whether a loan is considered “concessional in character” or not. Related to 
that is the problem of a low grant element (measure of concessionality in an aid loan). 
These aspects will be analyzed using a recent example from ODA statistics. The fol-
lowing example is relevant in a broader context and demonstrates that the analysis of 
“tied aid credits”, as the Participants define it, is too narrow. The existence of instru-
ments, that fall under the definition of ODA, having similar financial terms as “tied aid 
credits” give rise to the questions (a) whether the Arrangement is effective in monitor-
ing ”de facto” tied aid credits and (b) whether all ODA flows reported by DAC mem-
bers are credible. 
7.8.1. The Tying Status of ODA and ”De Facto” Tying  
The DAC and the Participants distinguish tied from untied aid. This differentiation is 
important because DAC member countries have committed to untie their aid. As 
already stated the tying status is published only for ODA179.  
The existing definitions of tied and untied aid are rather general and difficult to apply in 
practice, because there are only few additional, detailed criteria (on what types of aid 
are considered as tied or untied by their nature) that would help operationalize the 
rules. In practice, some donors use the timely publishing of an untied aid offer on an 
international bulletin board in English language as a criterion for untied aid. Reasons 
why DAC members have not been able or willing to agree on a more detailed defini-
tion of untied aid and more guidance for operationalization of existing rules, is that for 
some DAC members this is a highly political issue related to international pledges to 
untie aid. Since some types of ODA simply cannot be untied e.g., in-donor-country 
costs for asylum seekers, there is an on-going discussion whether or not such types 
should be excluded from tying status reporting and from the coverage of the untying 
ratio published by the OECD in the Development Co-operation Report. With no final 
consensus on this issue, the existing definition cannot be amended and, given the lack 
of operational guidance, too much room is left for interpretation and thus differing 
reporting practices (Interview X).  
 
                                                            
179  Of the four main types of flows, the tying status is only recorded for ODA (commitments) and excluding 
technical cooperation. 
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The definitions of untied and tied ODA are rather general and practical guidance is 
scarce. For example, the DAC states that if a credit is under suspicion of being tied 
the donor shall present evidence in support that such practice is untied. The DAC 
does not provide details on the form of evidence that should be provided, nor on the 
process of how to challenge aid that is suspected of being tied.  
DAC members are obliged to report the tying status for ODA (commitments). In prac-
tice, the de facto tying status of a concessional credit may not be transparent. Credits 
reported as untied may be in effect tied to donor country procurement. For example, 
some “hidden” contract terms could favor national exporters even in ICB processes. 
Furthermore, publication of offers in less common donor languages can de facto 
exclude a wide range of potential bidders.  
Apart from issuing biased tender documents in order to favor national exporters, do-
nors may prefer to finance projects in certain sectors where national businesses have 
a competitive advantage and are likely to win the contract. In this case we would not 
speak of manipulation leading to market distortion. But donors may have a preference 
for financing certain sectors and projects. Taken to the extreme this could lead to 
distortion of aid allocation. Recipient countries and donors need to identify sectors 
and projects with the highest potential to enhance development for priority funding by 
ODA. In extreme cases donors can limit their support to sectors that are most attrac-
tive to their national exporters, while recipient countries will aim at their national devel-
opment and sector priorities.  
There is reason to doubt that all ODA loans reported as untied are in fact untied. 
However, if those loans are in some form tied to procurement from the donor country, 
this would require them to comply with Arrangement terms. If de facto tying would be 
uncovered, donors would suffer political damage by losing credibility and missing their 
targets for untying of ODA (Interview X).  
7.8.2. Reporting of Credits According to their Motivation 
DAC statistics distinguish ODA loans from commercial credits based on their primary 
motivation (developmental versus commercial). Export credits are understood as 
commercially motivated, since their main objective is export promotion, and thus are 
excluded from ODA by definition. Loans with a primarily developmental objective are 
ODA eligible, if they meet the other criteria for ODA.  
As already stated, export credits are not ODA eligible, but the concessionality element 
(i.e., a subsidy to lower the lending costs) to an export credit can be ODA eligible. In 
DAC statistics this is recorded as an ODA grant in an associated financing package, 
with the loan component of the package being recorded as official export credit in the 
Other Official Flow category (Interview X). The ODA eligible subsidy to an export 
credit can derive from an interest rate subsidy, grace periods, long maturity, coverage 
of credit fees, premium charges, or part of principal payment. Unfortunately detailed 
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data such as the maturity of the loan or the concessionality level of OOFs are not 
publicly available. The DAC only publishes aggregate data on OOFs. This makes in-
depth analyses impossible for external researchers. 
7.8.3. The Term “Concessional in Character“ in the ODA Definition 
The last issue to address regards the interpretation of the term “concessional in char-
acter” which is part of the ODA definition. The question is whether all ODA loans 
meet the criteria of “concessional in character”. In this respect, it needs to be kept in 
mind that “[th]e ODA concept was developed within a measurement system based 
on actual cross-border transfers of resources” (OECD/DAC 2012b: 8). Some experts 
use a more restrictive understanding of ODA. ODA should represent a budgetary 
effort by the donor country. Using the more restrictive concept, if the concessional 
element of a credit is the result of a budgetary effort of the donor country this element 
may qualify as ODA. In contrast, if solely the favorable interest rate of a donor country 
is passed on to the developing country no budgetary effort is necessary. According to 
the restrictive concept of ODA, the latter flow would not qualify as ODA. Neverthe-
less, also these non-concessional credits can be developmentally relevant.  
The DAC currently discusses whether certain ODA loans are “concessional in charac-
ter”. Particularly France and Germany issue ODA loans that have a low 
concessionality level, close to the 25 % grant element margin (see Table 7). As has 
been mentioned earlier in this study, Richard Manning, the former DAC chair, recently 
stated that “[t]he OECD is now quietly allowing large volumes of loans to be count-
ed as ODA even though they do not meet any reasonable definition of being “con-
cessional in character”, which is the basis of the OECD’s definition of aid” (Manning 
2013). The DAC measures concessionality using a universal 10 % discount rate. A 
25 % grant element calculated at this fixed discount rate makes even loans with a very 
low concessionality level eligible as ODA: “In an era of low interest rates this can be 
reached by loans made with no government subsidy whatsoever” (Manning 2013). 
Richard Manning (2013) explains that in the past donor countries “[…] used to re-
spect the overall intention by refraining from making loans that only narrowly met the 
metric”. A possible reason why some donors have become impudent in their ODA 
reporting practices by applying a broad interpretation of “concessional in character” is 
that donors have pledged to achieve the ODA target of 0.7 % of GNI by the year 
2015 and national budgets currently suffer from austerity. Therefore, there is an incen-
tive to report low-concessional loans as ODA loans. This reporting practice is only 
effective as long as more ODA loans are disbursed than repaid. DAC members have 
agreed to revise the ODA concept by 2015 (OECD/DAC 2012b: 8). There is reason 
to assume that those members which are currently applying a broad definition of 
“concessional in character” speculate that the new definition will leave uncovered 
future reflows stemming from repayments of ODA loans. The current DAC definition 
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for the ODA criterion “concessional in character” leaves ample room for interpretation 
and thus allows for reporting of credits as ODA that some DAC members and stake-
holders consider as non-concessional. The defined grant element of 25 % is not 
effective in measuring concessionality under the current capital market conditions 
(Interview X). Further, it is not appropriate to use the uniform 10 % discount rate in 
times when donor countries are able to borrow capital at very low interest rates. Rich-
ard Manning (2013) requests the OECD to “[…] put in place a definition of 
concessionality that reflects the real cost of capital and requires real fiscal effort”.  
Table 7 show recent data published by the DAC. Based on these data one can ques-
tion whether all of the recorded ODA loans are “concessional in character”. 
 
Table 7: Selected Parameters of ODA Loans (Commitments) 
  Aus-
tralia 
Bel-
gium 
Finland France Ger-
many 
Italy Japan Korea Portu-
gal 
Spain Total 
DAC 
Loan share of total ODA (%) 1,2 0,3 0,0 27,4 17,4 3,3 43,4 54,7 45,8 1,2 
 
11,8 
Terms of 
bilateral 
loans 
Average maturity
(years) 40,0 30,0 3,1 16,5 16,1  32,4 32,0 41,3 31,6 
 
12,0 
 
26,6 
Average grace 
period 
(years) 10,0 11,0 3,1 6,8 5,4 17,9 8,8 13,7 12,8 
 
1,0 
 
8,1 
Average interest 
rate 
(per cent) 0.0  1,6  0.0  3,3 2,1 0,0 0,7 0,1 1,8 
 
1,5 
 
1,4 
Grant element 
(per cent) 87,4 70,4 30,2 42,5 47,3 88,2 75,0 88,9 70,5 
 
36,7 
 
64,3 
Terms of the 
bilateral 
loan with 
the lowest 
grant 
element 
Maturity 
(years) 40,0 30,0 3,1 25,0 8,0 21,0 18,1 35,0 31,1 
 
12,0 
 
22,2 
Grace period 
(years) 10,0 11,0 3,1 6,0 3,0 10,1 0,1 11,1 22,1 
 
1,0 
 
4,4 
Interest rate 
(per cent) 0.0  2,0  0.0  5,0 3,4 0,2 2,5 0,1 3,3 
 
1,5 
 
1,7 
Grant element 
(per cent) 87,4 66,9 30,2 25,0 26,0      75,5 40,3 85,1 61,5 
 
36,7 
 
52,6 
Concessionality
 level b 80,4 53,8 13,3 7,1 1,7      57,0        5,0      70,7 34,6 
 
11,8 
 
.. 
Volume of loans below 50% 
grant element (USD million) - - 1 2 167 2 053 -       240 - -
 
56 4 518 
 
Source: OECD/DAC 2011b 
Note:  The data does not include debt reorganization and equities. The concessionality level uses discount rates calculated on 
 the basis of CIRRs. The grant element for ODA loans uses a flat discount rate of 10 %. The table is published by the DAC 
 Statistics on resource flows to developing countries and shows commitments of ODA loans according to country. Note 
 that some countries do not give ODA loans and are therefore not listed in the table. 
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As already stated, export credits by definition do not fall under the category ODA 
loans. Assuming that some ODA loans are also commercially motivated, the data in 
Table 7 appear relevant in the context of this study. Two countries, France and Ger-
many, are selected because of their large amount of ODA loans with a grant element 
of less than 50 %. They attract attention in respect of high average interest rates 
combined with a comparably low grant element. Looking at the terms of the bilateral 
loan with the lowest grant element it becomes clearer that donors issue loans with a 
grant element that barely meets the ODA criterion. Keeping in mind that the grant 
element is calculated using a fixed 10 % discount rate180, there is reason for doubt 
that these loans meet any reasonable definition of “concessional in character”. In the 
German example, the concessionality level calculated on the basis of CIRRs is even 
negative. Currently the DAC Secretariat is investigating with France and Germany 
whether all the loans included in their ODA figures are truly concessional in charac-
ter181. The example above highlights that certain flows are eligible as ODA but do not 
translate into a real fiscal effort of donor governments. It demonstrates that ODA 
figures are the result of what is reported as ODA by donors. When looking at the 
figures and tables on ODA loans, the motivation to promote development on conces-
sional terms is not visible.  
  
                                                            
180  The Participants, on the other hand, uses a more accurate discount rate based on the respective CIRR. 
181  OECD/DAC, aid statistics: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/concessionality-note.htm 
180 
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8. Critical Assessment of the 
Institutional Framework for Tied Aid 
This chapter brings the jigsaw pieces together and assesses tied aid credits as well 
as the disciplines governing them (essentially the Helsinki tied aid disciplines) against 
the conceptual framework that has been elaborated by the DAC on good develop-
ment policy. As will be shown tied aid credit disciplines and policies are in overt con-
tradiction with some of the pillars of the international development architecture, in 
particular the principles of ownership, alignment and (global) partnership. 
8.1. Assessment of the Arrangement Terms 
The Arrangement regulates terms and conditions for official support for export credits 
and tied aid. “Goods and services exported to the most developed OECD countries 
on credit periods less than two years (consumer goods, raw materials, and certain 
lighter capital goods) can […] be covered by the private sector […], while govern-
ment-supported insurance is usually only allowed for longer periods or for covering 
other countries where the private insurance market generally is less competitive” 
(Grath 2012: 118). This timeframe is also reflected in the Arrangement terms. The 
Arrangement limits official support to projects where market failure occurs. The 
framework applies to export credits with a maturity of more than two years. Therefore 
the intervention in the market and the provision of credits by governments or its exe-
cuting entities is justified. 
Regarding the duration of the credit the Participants follow the principle by which the 
“[…] repayment terms do not exceed the useful life of the good” (TAD/PG(2013)1: 
Article 10). Applying this principle to an investment appears reasonable because 
revenues generated by the investment should be used for repayment of the credits. 
The life of the good represents the maximum duration of the credit. Some goods such 
as social infrastructure, may take decades to generate economic return to investment. 
Therefore, those goods and services should be financed by grants rather than loans. 
Long repayment periods, on the other hand, can create a problem of ownership and 
accountability because of changing political leadership. 
The Arrangement regulates that official support for local costs is limited to 30 % of 
the contract value and by that limits the amount that can be spend in the recipient 
country. Local procurement supports the private sector in the recipient country. Since 
tied aid credits are also used as an instrument of development finance, in order to be 
developmentally sound local procurement should be maximized. Sheppard et al. 
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(2009: 566) state that in case of tied aid the recipient “[…] country must rely more in 
the secondary long-term impact of foreign aid on development, and less on the im-
mediate impact of the money lent”. Imports from donor countries may represent es-
sential inputs for an investment. If substitutes are not domestically available recipient 
countries are dependent on imports anyways . In conclusion, it is questionable wheth-
er this limit is appropriate. The limit can be interpreted as a mechanism which favors 
donor countries’ exporters.  
The minimum interest rate applied to official financing support for loans is the Com-
mercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR), which should represent market interest rates. 
Whether interest rates for tied aid credits are appropriate has to be studied empirical-
ly. Additionally, according to Arrangement terms, appropriate credit risk premiums 
shall be charged. In practice, credit risk premiums for some high-risk developing coun-
tries may not fully cover credit risk (Interview X). In cases, in which there is no func-
tioning credit market e.g. LDCs, the calculation of premiums is problematic.  
8.1.1. Assessment of Eligibility Criteria 
The Arrangement sets rules for limiting eligibility of tied aid to certain countries. It is 
reasonable to assume that richer countries have enough resources and sufficient 
access to financial markets to finance projects. As already stated, the country eligibil-
ity criterion can be interpreted as a targeted subsidy strategy. Only lower middle and 
low income countries are eligible for tied aid. This is a very rough form of targeting and 
does not take into account regional differences within countries. The country-eligibility 
criterion is a weak targeting strategy because it can be interpreted as a strategy to 
exclude richer countries rather than defining an intended target group of beneficiaries. 
The Participants do not define who the intended beneficiaries of tied aid credits are. A 
reasonable explanation is that the original purpose of the Arrangement was not to 
provide financing for developing countries, but to limit market distortions following an 
export credit race among industrialized countries.  
The Participants have agreed on a targeting strategy for tied aid credits based on 
project characteristics. Only financially and commercially non-viable projects are eligi-
ble for tied aid. The so called two key tests assess whether projects (1) have the 
capacity to generate sufficient cash flow to cover the project’s operating costs and 
additionally service the capital employed (financially viability) and (2) are able to ac-
cess financing for the project at market or Arrangement terms (commercial viability).  
The first key test on financial viability is grounded in economic reasoning. As de-
scribed earlier, certain goods, either public goods, or goods with public-good charac-
teristics “[…] lack capacity with appropriate pricing determined on market principles” 
(TAD/PG(2013)1: 21). Consequently these goods are not produced in a socially 
desired quantity, if left to the market. In this case market intervention is justified. The 
second key test on commercial viability assesses whether a project can be financed 
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on market or Arrangement terms. Financial non-viability most likely leads to commer-
cial non-viability. But even if a project is financially viable it can lack access to financ-
ing on market terms. Consequently, market intervention is justified. Concessional 
financing by donors should only be provided for those projects that would otherwise 
not be funded.  
The two criteria financial and commercial non-viability can be interpreted as a needs-
oriented targeting strategy justified on economic grounds. According to the Arrange-
ment terms, the key tests inter alia do not apply for tied aid with a concessionality 
level of 80 % or more, except for associated financing packages. Highly-concessional 
loans and grants are therefore not subject to the eligibility criteria. If however it is true 
that the key tests are an instrument to identify market distortions and consequently 
enhance transparency, it is hard to see why highly-concessional tied aid should not in 
principle be subject to the two key tests. 
The country and project criteria are specific but not easily measurable. Consultation 
procedures are intended to discuss eligibility of projects. The Participants have re-
sponded to this problem by providing ex ante guidance to potential exporters and 
financial institutions on whether a project is likely to be eligible for tied aid, or not. 
8.1.2. Assessment of Minimum Concessionality Levels  
The Arrangement defines a minimum concessionality level for tied aid of 35 and 50 %, 
if the recipient country is a Least Developed Country (LDC). The required higher 
minimum concessionality level for LDCs is based on the assumption that projects in 
poor countries lack commercial viability to a greater extent and have a higher need of 
affordable external resources. Consequently the higher required concessionality level 
appears reasonable in principle. The concessionality thresholds define a lower bound 
of the subsidy element, irrespective of the specific financing need of individual pro-
jects. It is, certainly, economically reasonable that the concessionality level should vary 
according to the project, sector, and country. Nonetheless, the two thresholds are to 
some extent arbitrary and may lead to inefficient allocation of financial resources in the 
case that a project would need a concessionality level below the respective threshold. 
On the other hand, the Arrangement terms set no explicit rules for maximum 
concessionality levels. Implicitly, official support is limited to 85 % of the contract 
value because the Arrangement terms require a down payment of at least 15 %. Em-
pirical research is needed to show if national programs apply additional criteria and if 
concessionality levels vary according to sector, country, or project. The case study 
analysis provided in Part III of this study will inter alia shed light on this aspect.  
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8.2. Assessment of Tied Aid Credit Policies against the 
‘Principles of the OECD’s Development Agenda 
“Do you believe in silver bullets, you know the silver bullet that kills two guys at one go? 
This does not work” 
(Interview V) 
With tied aid credit policies and programs OECD member states claim to “kill two 
birds with one stone”: Export promotion benefiting domestic enterprises and promo-
tion of economic development and welfare in the recipient country. They are, thus, are 
located at the “strategic nexus between external trade and international development” 
(Petermann 2013; back cover). Resulting from the hybrid nature of the instrument, 
corresponding policies draw on two fields of reference – export promotion and devel-
opment policy – and claim to bridge these. In the following, the emphasis will be put 
on assessing the consistency and compliance of tied aid credits as stipulated by the 
Arrangement with the reference field of development policy, more precisely the DAC’s 
guidelines and principles of development policy.  
As a result of this officially stated motivation to contribute to economic development 
and welfare (and complying with the 25 % grant element threshold set by the DAC), 
the concessional part of a tied aid credit becomes ODA eligible. Consequently, if it is 
reported to the DAC, it contributes to a donor’s overall ODA performance182. While 
tied aid credits may be a “hybrid”, they officially endeavor to contribute to develop-
ment, are included in ODA statistics and might use resources from the aid budget. 
Therefore, their effectiveness and appropriateness to finance development with donor 
public resources should be assessed against the same set of criteria applied to any 
other flow of Official Development Assistance. This attempt to assess the compliance 
of tied aid credit policies with the DAC’s ideas on good development assistance can 
also be interpreted as an analysis of the OECD’s internal coherence, i.e. coherence 
type (i)183 of the Policy Coherence for Development concept transplanted from the 
national to the international/regional level. It is not the consistency of various elements 
of development assistance policy of one single donor that is of interest here, but the 
consistency of aid policies of an international organization – the OECD. 
In short, this chapter brings together the jigsaw pieces and assesses tied aid credits 
as well as the disciplines governing them (essentially the Helsinki Tied Aid Disciplines) 
against the conceptual framework that has been derived from the DAC’s debates; 
thereby grasping the extent to which the OECD lives up to its own promise of coher-
                                                            
182  Especially in the context of the approaching 2015 target the political dimension of ODA reporting be-
comes evident.  
183  Picciotto identifies four dimensions of Policy Coherence for Development. Type (i) coherence is defined 
as “the consistency between goals and objectives, modalities and protocols of a policy or program carried 
out by an OECD government in support of development (e.g. aid)“ (Piccitto 2004: 8). 
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ence. Where appropriate the subsequent analysis takes into account both the pro-
cess of negotiating the rules as well as the resulting set of rules, which decisively 
determines the basic design of the instrument. 
In Part II of this study, three highly intertwined and largely DAC-driven debates on 
what constitutes effective development policy and practice have been identified. At 
the core of the DAC’s agenda lie the Paris Principles of ownership, harmonization, 
alignment, mutual accountability and managing for results. Furthermore, the idea of 
Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), as well as the long-lasting call for the 
untying of aid flows were presented as core debates characterizing the DAC’s work in 
the past twenty years. The categories analyzed below are derived from these debates 
on development policy and will be assessed through the lens of Policy Coherence for 
Development, particularly the internal coherence of the Organization’s aid policies. For 
that purpose the Participants Group is treated as part of the OECD despite its de jure 
autonomous character. Considering that the group is served by the Secretariat and 
that the participating states are for the most part OECD and DAC members, this 
subsumption seems justified.  
8.2.1. The OECD – Living up to Policy Coherence (for Development)? 
“We resolve to continue our efforts to ensure that development concerns are taken into account 
across relevant policies inter alia through improved impact analyses and better  
policy co-ordination both at country level and within the OECD, taking into account in particular 
the impact on the international development objectives of our environmental, agricultural,  
fisheries, economic and financial policies, as well as our policies in the areas of trade,  
migration, security, energy, science and technology.” 
(OECD 2008b, Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development, original emphasis) 
Departing from the OECD’s, and particularly the DAC’s, vehement call for Policy 
Coherence for Development, it shall be asked to which extent the Organization lives 
up to its own principle of coherence. Due to their hybrid nature and the myriad of 
institutional actors involved, tied aid credits appear to be perfectly suited for studying 
the OECD’s policy coherence as well as the internal coherence of policies subsumed 
under the concept of Official Development Assistance. 
In its basic meaning, the idea of policy coherence means that development policy shall 
cross-cut through all relevant policy fields to ensure that development co-operation 
efforts are not (or no longer) offset, but actively supported by donors’ policies in other 
fields. In the more sophisticated concept of Policy Coherence for Development, this 
aspect, however, constitutes only one of at least four dimensions of PCD:  
“(i)  Internal coherence: the consistency between goals and objectives, modalities 
and protocols of a policy or program carried out by an OECD government in 
support of development (e.g. aid). 
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(ii)  intra-country coherence: the consistency among aid and non-aid policies of an 
OECD government in terms of their contribution to development. 
(iii)  inter-donor coherence: the consistency of aid and non-aid policies across 
OECD countries in terms their contribution to development. 
(iv)  donor-recipient coherence: the consistency of policies adopted by rich and 
poor countries to achieve shared development objectives” (Picciotto 2004: 8) 
Even if the institutional set-up184 at first glance might suggest otherwise, applying a 
“do no harm” approach as stipulated in the above introductory quote and traditionally 
applied to assess the coherence of a policy area with development policy, i.e. depart-
ing from the existence of two separate policy areas, is too narrow considering the 
postulated goal of contributing with tied aid credits to development processes in the 
recipient country. As tied aid credit policies are here considered to be part of both 
development aid policies and trade (export promotion) policies, dimension (i) of the 
concept of Policy Coherence for Development will be at the centre of this chapter. By 
assessing the compatibility of the regulatory framework for tied aid credits with the 
DAC’s principles of ownership, harmonization and alignment as well as with the key 
concept of (global) partnership, however, also other dimensions of PCD are indirectly 
addressed, i.e. inter-donor coherence, and donor-recipient coherence.  
In a first step, it shall briefly be recalled how the Arrangement, the reference document 
giving tied aid credits their basic design, deals with the DAC’s principles for develop-
ment co-operation. This is expected to give a hint as to whether the policy framework 
is conducive to the creation of coherent policies or gives reasons to presume that 
incoherencies are likely to occur. The Participants left topics explicitly referring to 
development (co-operation) to be dealt with by the DAC. While this can be interpret-
ed as an acknowledgement of the DAC’s expertise on development issues, it is par-
tially also a way of shifting responsibilities for the developmental impact of tied aid 
financing on the DAC and its national counterparts. This argument builds on the as-
sumption that development would probably be promoted more actively, if aspects of 
development policy had become an integral part of the Arrangement and not only 
references to the DAC principles had been made. In view of potential frictions result-
ing from this “fragmentation”, studying the compatibility of tied aid credits with the 
DAC’s development principles appears to be crucial for any assessment of the ade-
quateness of the instrument as a tool of development policy.  
Essentially, this means assessing whether the Organization’s own policies (or policy 
recommendations) in the field of export promotion actively take into consideration 
repercussions on development (co-operation). Even more so, not only the coherence 
                                                            
184  Often tied aid credits are administered by the export promotion institutions, i.e. the export credit agency, 
not the governmental bodies charged with development co-operation. At first glance, this would suggest 
an analysis of policy coherence between different policy fields. 
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of trade/export policies with development policies, but the internal coherence of the 
OECD’s development policy itself is to be examined – after all, tied aid credits claim 
to be an instrument of both aid and trade policy.  
Living up to the premise of Policy Coherence for Development would mean to more 
actively take into account the repercussions of the Arrangement rules on development 
prospects of recipients, thereby not merely trying to “do no harm” (as such a rather 
passive approach), but to pro-actively make a positive contribution. The ODA-eligibility 
of the concessional element of those credits provides the main justification for the call 
for alignment with development co-operation principles in the whole project cycle of 
tied aid financed projects.  
8.2.2. In Line With the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness? 
In an assessment of the Helsinki tied aid disciplines conducted in 1998/99, the DAC 
Secretariat found the disciplines to be broadly compatible with the goals and objec-
tives of the DAC’s Strategy for the 21st Century (OECD/DAC 1996; DCD/DAC/FA 
(99)6: 7) – the key document paving the way to the Paris Declaration. Even more 
positively, it is concluded in the summary report that the disciplines promote the 
DAC’s strategic objectives (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 8).  
In its undertaking to assess the 1992 tied aid disciplines, the DAC Secretariat circu-
lated a questionnaire among its members asking them to present their opinion on the 
effectiveness of the existing rules and procedures. Unfortunately, only the DAC Secre-
tariat’s interpretation of the returned questionnaires is at our disposal, whereas the 
individual country replies could not be retrieved from OLIS. Despite the fact that the 
findings are presented on aggregated levels and do not give very detailed information 
on country positions, they are worth looking at and help identify major strengths and 
weaknesses of the regulatory framework from a development perspective (for the 
subject matters to be addressed in the questionnaire please see DCD/DAC/ 
FA(98)4/Annex I).  
In the questionnaire Members were asked to present their views on whether the 92 
Disciplines were compatible “... with the strategic goals and modalities for devel-
opment co-operation – i.e. as they stand, are the Disciplines a useful discipline to 
contribute positively to the implementation of the 21st Century Strategy185, e.g. in 
terms of promoting ownership, partnership, capacity development, local impact of 
ODA disbursements, etc.?” (DCD/DAC/FA(98)4: 5).  
Answers concerning the compatibility of the disciplines with the Development Part-
nerships Strategy (OECD/DAC 1996), varied considerably among Members. While 
                                                            
185  In 1996 the DAC published the key document “Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of development 
co-operation”, in which the foundations for the DAC’s development strategy were laid (OECD/DAC 
1996). Therein, the idea of partnership appears as fundamental to any further efforts of the OECD in the 
field of development co-operation.  
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some saw the disciplines as not fitting in well with the concept of partnership, others 
stressed that “… by encouraging the use of more untied aid, the Disciplines pro-
moted the strategic goals and modalities of the Partnerships Strategy”. When asked 
to describe changes in the uses of tied aid credits arising from the Disciplines, most 
emphasized that “… any changes in their uses of tied aid were predominantly part-
ner-country-driven”. More precise information on these changes is, however, not given 
in the summary report by the Secretariat. Also with regard to the question whether 
there exists a “… systemic and coherent approach to implementing the Disciplines 
given the different perspectives of the Participants (trade distortion) and the DAC 
(aid quality)“, a mixed picture is drawn (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 8). 
Building on these findings, this section will further explore the consistency of the 
OECD’s rules for export promotion practices in the form of tied aid credits with the 
Organization’s development co-operation principles, thereby taking into account more 
recent debates, most notably the call for greater effectiveness of invested aid funds. 
Given the centrality of the Paris Principles in the DAC’s work, the question arises 
whether the tied aid disciplines actively promote compliance with these principles, 
strengthen these or are potentially even counteracting the DAC’s intentions. The 
subsequent analysis will focus on the principles of harmonization, ownership and 
alignment. The two remaining pillars of the Paris Declaration – mutual accountability 
and managing for results – are of very technical nature and are best examined on the 
national level.  
8.2.2.1. Harmonization 
“Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective” 
(Paris Declaration, OECD 2005-2008: 6) 
At a relatively early stage, harmonization of donor practices became one of the core 
tasks of the DAC. Eventually, the idea that harmonized policies could considerably 
contribute to the improvement of donor-recipient relations and concomitantly increase 
aid effectiveness led to the adoption of the “Rome Declaration on Harmonization” in 
2003 and was reiterated at several occasions, most notably at the Paris High Level 
Forum in 2005, where DAC Members upgraded the principle of harmonization to one 
of the 5 pillars for effective development co-operation. 
Unequivocally, the adoption of the Helsinki disciplines on tied aid has contributed to 
the harmonization of tied aid credit practices among the participating states. By 
agreeing on a set of rules covering tied aid credits, the Participants succeeded in 
leveling the playing field and contained a disguised export credit race. Up to today the 
minimum conditions laid down in the Helsinki Package and further elaborated in the Ex 
ante Guidance provide a common basic framework for “soft loan” policies of partici-
pating states, most notably by requiring a minimum concessionality level of 35 % and 
the application of two key tests, by limiting the pool of recipients and harmonizing 
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notification procedures. Nevertheless, the fact that the concessionality level may lie 
between 35 and 80 % of the loan amount provides a considerable range for diverging 
national practices, which has an impact on the presumed development orientation and 
aid quality of a tied aid financed project. 
Also with regard to implementation procedures the loose character of the Arrange-
ment – as such the product of negotiations between sovereign states on a sensitive 
issue – leaves considerable room for maneuver to national actors. This “flexibility” of 
the rules potentially results in diverging national policies and implementation practices. 
It is interesting to see that the Arrangement and the Ex ante Guidance respectively do 
not spell out any preference for which kind of national agency should be in charge of 
soft loan programs. Hence, the responsible agency might be an export credit agency, 
an aid agency or a bank commissioned by the state, for instance. This means that the 
implementing agency might or might not have a “development mandate” to fulfill. It is 
thus conceivable that the governmental institution in charge of development co-
operation does not have any decision-making power with regard to the selection, 
implementation and/or evaluation of tied aid financed projects. This raises the ques-
tion if – in an institutional setting in which tied aid credits are dealt with by the export 
credit agency – the aid agency has the means to ensure the developmentally effective 
allocation of aid funds. In this respect, development considerations in soft loan prac-
tices might have been of a higher priority, had they become an integral part of the 
Helsinki Package. Whether this ambiguity with regard to the institutional responsibili-
ties hampers the appropriate consideration of development aspects will crucially 
depend on the institutional set-up in place in the individual donor country. However, it 
appears likely that the lack of integration confronts “practitioners” with implementation 
difficulties. 
Considering that the development of recipient countries is an officially stated goal 
pursued with tied aid credits and results in the ODA-eligibility of the concessional 
element inherent to tied aid credits, states running tied aid credit programs should 
ensure that the responsible implementing agencies have the necessary development 
competences in order to attain the stated goal of promoting development.  
By means of clearer Arrangement provisions in this field, not only practices could have 
been harmonized, but also the development orientation of tied aid programs could 
have been fostered, if not increased. It would be an important step towards a greater 
transparency of national practices if this insufficient harmonization were to be ad-
dressed. So far inconsistent wording, differences in reporting of tied aid credit flows 
to the DAC, diverging systems of and requirements for project selection, implementa-
tion and evaluation have somewhat obscured the transparency of tied aid credit prac-
tices. 
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8.2.2.2. Ownership 
“You know, he who provides the money should have the say in how it is used” 
(Interview VI) 
At the High Level Meeting in Paris in 2005, DAC members declared that partner 
countries should “… exercise effective leadership over their development policies, 
and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD 2005-2008: 3).  
Any analysis of the space given to ownership within the regulatory framework (as well 
as in the design of specific projects) must set out with an examination of recipients’ 
ownership in setting the rules in the first place. 
The screening of Participants’ documentation has shown that recipient countries did 
not participate in negotiations on the regulation of tied aid credits and that the Partici-
pants did not take their perspective into account. The fact that recipient countries 
were left outside the negotiation room raises questions with regard to the OECD’s 
self-obliged commitment to ownership of and partnership with recipient (or rather 
partner) countries in setting development strategies. One might argue that ownership 
had not yet been as big an issue at the time the Helsinki Tied Aid Disciplines were 
negotiated. However, also today, with the principles of ownership and partnership 
ranging high on the OECD’s agenda, active engagement186 of recipient countries with 
regard to tied aid credits has not been sought. A possible way of integrating the recip-
ients’ perspectives and expectations towards the instrument would have been to hold 
consultation meetings with groups of recipients, such as the G77. Furthermore, the 
tied aid disciplines do not provide any specific mechanisms for ex post project evalua-
tion in a systematic manner. Thus, recipients’ possibilities of commenting on imple-
mented tied aid projects appear to be rather limited. It is incumbent upon the donor’s 
national institutions to conduct ex post evaluations and to provide sufficient space for 
exchanges with recipients. An inquiry of how to repair the “broken feedback loop”187 
which is characteristic for aid planning, would hence be particularly interesting in the 
case of tied aid credits.  
                                                            
186  To put this lack of recipient involvement in the Participants’ work into perspective, it needs to be noted 
that also in the work of the DAC/FA recipient or later labelled “partner” countries were not actively 
involved. The archive material at our disposal suggests that the only exemption constituted a workshop 
held on procurement practices in which a number of recipient countries were invited to participate (see 
e.g. DCD/DAC/FA(95)14; DCD/DAC/FA(96)1). With the exception of this “event”, the recipients’ 
perspective on the appropriate regulation of tied aid credits was of astonishingly little interest to the 
members of the Working Party. Although no direct voice was given to recipients, the DAC/FA at least 
attempted to design rules in the interest of recipients, e.g. the emphasis put on prevention of 
indebtedness. 
187  According to Owen Barder (2009: 10) this broken feedback loop, which is challenging aid administration, 
results from the political and geographical dispersion of donors and beneficiaries. The author argues that 
the feedback loop is not functioning in foreign aid, “because there is a lack of both information and politi-
cal influence connecting decision makers to the intended beneficiaries” (Barder 2009: 11).  
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A second important component of ownership affects the implementation of policies on 
national levels. The importance thereof is illustrated by the following quote taken from 
a Note by the DAC Secretariat: “The greater the recipient’s “stake” in the project, the 
more will this contribute, in general, to its sustainability. “Stake” has many dimen-
sions, e.g. ownership of the project and related processes, the degree to which its 
benefits depend on the recipient’s involvement, the extent to which the project meets 
high priority recipient needs, financial commitment, etc. This is valid for all projects 
(whether tied or untied) but may be more difficult to attain for tied aid projects. 
Donors thus have a stronger challenge to achieve a meaningful recipient stake in 
such projects, but at the same time it is all the more essential for sustainability” 
(DCD/DAC/FA(95)3/REV1: 7; emphasis added). 
In how far ownership has been implemented by the parties to the Arrangement will we 
scrutinized by the country case studies in Part III of this study.  
Finally, the consistency of the instrument “tied aid credits” itself with the call for recip-
ient owned development co-operation shall briefly be addressed. At a fundamental 
level, the tied nature of the instrument appears to raise concerns with regard to the 
compatibility of tied aid credits with both ownership and alignment claims such as 
stipulated in the Paris Declaration. As has been addressed earlier, several studies find 
that tying practices might interfere with ownership of recipients with regard to their 
development processes. Tied aid in general is judged by the DAC to be incompatible 
with ownership principles and in contradiction with the call for demand-driven pur-
chases as particularly stressed in the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 2005-2008: 
16: para. 14a). The extent to which the tied nature of the instruments constitutes an 
irresolvable contradiction to the principles of ownership and alignment will be ad-
dressed in greater detail in the subsequent section of this chapter188.  
8.2.2.3. Alignment  
In the Paris Declaration donors commit themselves to “… base their overall support 
on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures” 
(OECD 2005-2008: 3). Part of this commitment to align donor interventions with the 
recipient country’s poverty reduction strategies, as well as thematic and sectoral 
priorities (Harmer/Ray 2009: 8) is the target of “making continuous progress” in unty-
ing aid (OECD 2005-2008: 10). 
On the level of formal statements evidence can be found that the Participants’ rule set 
is taking this call for “alignment” into account. In the Participants’ Ex ante Guidance 
for Tied Aid the DAC gives guidance in preparing Aid Quality Assessments (AQuAs), 
which can be requested by any Participant on a notified project whose aid quality is 
                                                            
188  This structure has been chosen because the Paris Declaration discusses the tying status of aid under the 
heading of alignment. It is, however, obvious that the untying of aid is closely intertwined with the call for 
ownership. In a way, if ownership is not acknowledged, alignment will not take place.  
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questioned. As part of such an Aid Quality Assessment, the potential donor should 
demonstrate the “… consistency of the project with the recipient country's overall 
investment priorities“ (TD/PG(2005)20: 10). In this way, the recipient’s ownership 
as well as the need for alignment with national development priorities and strategies 
are recognized. 
“This section of the AQuAs should also state whether the project in question is in a 
sector for which there is a sectoral adjustment programme agreed between the 
recipient and donors and, if so, the compatibility of the project with that reform pro-
gramme. Where there is no such adjustment programme for the sector in question, 
the donor should give its views on the adequacy of the recipient's sector plan, how 
the project in question is related to or compatible with that plan, and the extent of 
donor co-ordination, to ensure a coherent approach to supporting projects in the 
sector in question“ (TD/PG(2005)20: 10; emphasis added).  
The reasoning underlying the above guidance for conducting an assessment of aid 
quality reflects the spirit of the Paris Declaration and recalls the importance of aligning 
donor practices with recipients’ development strategies and priority setting so as to 
ensure the ownership of the latter. In calling for donor coordination, also the principle 
of harmonization of donor practices and requirements is reflected189. Despite the for-
mal acknowledgement of the need to align donor practices to recipient strategies, 
there appear to be contradictions inherent to the instrument that undermine the prin-
ciple of alignment. In an Aid Quality Guidance Note circulated in 1995 the Secretariat 
expresses this concern:  
“Particularly when projects are supported through tied aid credits, care must be 
taken not to bias priority setting. Recipients should not have to take undue account 
of the fact that the ODA availability may be conditional on its procurement being 
tied to the donor. Donors must, therefore, discipline their use of tied aid project 
support by offering tied aid credits only for those projects with a clear and high 
recipient priority” (DCD/DAC/FA(95)3/REV 1: 8; emphasis added).  
Assessed against the backdrop of alignment efforts, the most obvious incoherence of 
tied aid credit practices with the principles of development policy certainly stems from 
the tied nature of the instrument. Especially indicator 8 of the Paris Declaration reiter-
ates the principles laid down in the DAC Recommendation on Untying of Bilateral 
Development Assistance to Least Developed Countries and formulates the goal of 
untying aid to this group of countries to the maximum extent (OECD/DAC 2001). 
Thereby, untying is seen as a means to a greater end, i.e. the development of local 
and regional markets, the local creation of value etc. At the High Level Forum in Accra 
2008, for instance, donors reiterated their commitment to alignment by reaffirming that 
                                                            
189 Although the Ex ante Guidance was last updated in November 2006, the Paris Principles are not directly 
referred to in the Ex ante Guidance, not even in the guidance for aid quality assessment, which was 
prepared by the DAC itself.  
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they “… will promote the use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that 
their procurement procedures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to 
compete” (OECD 2005-2008: 1; emphasis added). This way, aid’s “value for mon-
ey”190 is thought to increase (OECD 2005-2008: 18) and the local private sector and 
economy are expected to develop, thereby making the impact of a project more sus-
tainable and durable.  
In an attempt to solve this contradiction between the principle of alignment and tied 
aid financing or at least to limit the losses in effectiveness resulting thereof the DAC 
Secretariat issued the following guidance in 1995, which still seems of relevance 
today:  
“When aid is tied to procurement in the donor country (or partially untied to permit 
procurement from developing countries too), donors should take all necessary steps 
to avoid or minimise the losses the recipient would otherwise gain from interna-
tional competitive bidding regimes. In particular, donors are encouraged to:  
 Give procurement responsibility to recipient countries. This may require or be 
associated with institutional and capacity-building assistance. Donors should also 
ensure that recipient procurement regimes are compatible with DAC principles.  
 Take all steps necessary to maximise competition between eligible suppliers to 
ensure value for money, including statements or guarantees of value for money 
from suppliers.  
 Promote, in carrying out procurement, linkages between development projects 
and the local economy” (DCD/DAC/FA(95)2/REV 1: 10; emphasis added).  
Still, one of the fundamental defining features of tied aid credits – their tied nature – 
clearly appears to be in contradiction with the principle of alignment. Thus, the ques-
tion arises if they can be designed in a developmentally sound way (as in a way sug-
gested in the above extract from the Secretariat’s Note) or whether the analysis pro-
vided in this study must result in a call for the “abolition” of tied aid credits as instru-
ments of development finance altogether. In the context of tensions between the tied 
nature of soft loans and the importance given to local procurement in fostering sus-
tainable development, one specific Arrangement provision requires further examina-
tion: the permissible share of local costs. In 2007 the Participants raised the maximum 
threshold for local costs from 15 to 30 % (OECD 2008a), allowing for more local 
creation of value. This was the Participants’ reaction to an increasingly globalized 
economy paired with the necessity of procuring certain local goods and services 
                                                            
190  This is assumed to be the case because, inter alia, the price for the procured goods and services is lower 
due to the competitive market environment, in which the procurement takes place. As mentioned earlier 
numerous DAC documents refer to the concept of “value for money” (VFM), which is described as “a way 
of thinking about using resources well” by “striking the best balance between … economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness” (Jackson/OECD/DCD 2012).  
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when setting up a project. If one assumes that the higher the share of local costs, the 
more goods and services can be locally procured, and the greater the presumed 
impact on development will be, this change might be judged positively from a devel-
opment perspective.  
8.2.2.4 Aid Quality Matters: Assessing the “Demonstrated” Development 
Quality of Tied Aid Credit Projects  
The realization that the quality of aid must and can be improved is inextricably linked 
with the call of the “aid community” for a greater effectiveness of aid. Throughout this 
study concerns about the “quality” of tied aid credit projects as they are shaped by 
the Helsinki Tied Aid Disciplines have been addressed. Albeit in-depth examination of 
the concrete project implementation on national levels appears to be indispensable, 
the DAC Secretariat has strived to provide preliminary conclusions on the demon-
strated aid quality of tied aid credit projects to the extent possible on the OECD level.  
This section is based on the findings of the study “Assessment of the Tied Aid Disci-
plines”191 issued by the DAC Secretariat and conducted by an independent consult-
ant, as well as on the analysis of a questionnaire circulated among the DAC/FA Mem-
bers in 1998. The essential question the study tackles is whether there is reason for 
“… concern about the development quality of projects financed by tied aid credits”. 
In case the aid quality of tied aid financed projects was found to be poor, the report 
should draw inferences form the available information base and inquire policy-options 
for improvement of the disciplines. The emphasis of “demonstrated” aid quality gives 
hints to the methodology underpinning the study. For his assessment the author of the 
study drew on the information provided in the feasibility studies and/or aid quality 
assessments (AQuAs)192 submitted by the Participants to the Consultation Group in 
support of the contention that the project in question was compatible with the Helsinki 
tied aid disciplines, i.e. essentially the commercial non-viability requirement 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)13: 4).  
This means that only projects that were challenged and brought to the Consultations 
Group for discussion were considered for the assessment, leaving aside a considera-
ble number of projects, the commercial viability of which went unchallenged irrespec-
tive of their aid quality. Hence, another weakness inherent to the sources results from 
the Participants’ focus on the commercial-viability of a project rather than on its aid 
                                                            
191  This appears to be the only OECD internal evaluation of the aid quality of tied aid credits, most other 
studies are preoccupied with quantitative trends.  
192  The Arrangement provides special consultation processes for tied aid credits. If a Participant suspects 
that a tied aid offer has been made based on trade, rather than aid motivations, it may request a full Aid 
Quality Assessment (TAD/PG(2013)1: 28), which is to be undertaken following the criteria laid down in 
the Checklist of Developmental Quality of Aid-Financed Projects (TAD/PG(2013)1: 134) and explained in 
greater detail in the Ex ante Guidance (TD/PG(2005)20: 10-12). Donors are expected to demonstrate a 
project’s compatibility with criteria on project selection, preparation and appraisal as well as on procure-
ment procedures.  
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quality. Consequently, development-related information was often found to be rather 
poor, which put limits to the quality of the study. In this respect it needs to be borne in 
mind that in feasibility studies Participants usually demonstrate the tied aid eligibility of 
a project with the help of cash-flow analyses. Cost-benefit analyses including econom-
ic and not only financial viability and usually applied by the development community to 
assess development co-operation projects, are not conducted. As a consequence of 
this priority setting the author found information on the economic benefits of a project 
to be at best scant, if not entirely unavailable. This information would, however, be 
crucial, since it could provide the “… only available quantitative monetary measure 
of aid quality”. In addition, more qualitative aspects of aid quality, such as “… tech-
nical suitability, environmental assessment or impacts with respect to social, gender 
or distributional considerations” were rather poor (DCD/DAC/FA (98)13: 5). This lack 
of reliable information on the aid quality of tied aid projects itself gives further rise to 
the assumption that the developmental impact of the invested (at least partially aid) 
resources is not the driving force behind tied aid credit practices. On the basis of the 
information available, the author of the study found that “… on average, tied aid 
credit projects were close to the top of the ‘adequate’ development quality range” 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)13: 7). Especially projects in the transport and communication 
sectors “… were found to lie near the top of an ‘adequate’ development quality 
range“ (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 3). 
Although overall compliance with the disciplines seemed satisfactory, the author 
found that compliance with the disciplines on large projects was fairly low 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)13: 9). To our knowledge, however, measures to improve the 
disciplines on large projects193 or the compliance therewith were not taken as follow-
up of the report.  
The limited information pool194 as well as the fact that the consultant drew on the 
assumed/demonstrated aid quality rather than on an ex post evaluation of actual aid 
quality and/or developmental impact, make his findings methodology-driven (see also 
DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 6). While the results presented might give some indications of 
the aid quality of a tied aid credit project, the findings have to be interpreted cautious-
ly and require further examination of de facto aid quality.  
  
                                                            
193  After a change in disciplines covering large projects, the Participants no longer required mandatory 
consultations for projects above SDR 50 million (see for instance DCD/DAC/FA(98)4: 7). 
194  Resulting from a reduction in the number of challenged projects due to the establishment of the Ex ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid, the information basis for the assessment further diminished from 1996 onwards 
(DCD/DAC/FA(98)13: 8). 
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8.2.3. In the Spirit of Partnership? Global Partnership and the Role of 
Recipient aka Partner Countries  
Emphasized already in the DAC’s Strategy for the 21st Century, gradually widened and 
put at the center stage at the High Level Meeting in Busan 2011, the key words 
“partnership” and “global partnership” entered the rhetorical repertoires of the interna-
tional development community in the past decade. Concomitantly, and expressing the 
shifting rhetoric, the term “partner (country)” has largely replaced the word “recipient” 
and partially also “developing” country in the DAC’s official language. The wording 
used in the Paris Declaration is the perfect illustration thereof (see OECD 2005-
2008).  
The early idea of North-South Partnership, which has been dominating the DAC’s 
development agenda since the publication of the key document “Shaping the 21st 
Century”, is clearly linked to the recognition of the “recipient’s” ownership claim. In 
this respect, the fact that recipient countries did not have a say in making tied aid 
credit rules suggests that the OECD did not only neglect its promise of ownership, 
but also did not strive to live up to its principle of partnership in its interaction with 
developing countries.  
Most recently, the Busan Declaration expanded the idea of partnership on the North-
South axes by two more dimensions, namely South-South cooperation and the inclu-
sion of the “new” actors in the aid architecture, as well as partnership between public 
and private actors, explicitly emphasizing the key role of the private sector in promot-
ing development (OECD/DAC 2011a, Busan Declaration). With regard to the call for 
intensified partnership between DAC and newly emerging donors, no major contradic-
tions with the tied aid disciplines can be found. On the contrary, both the Participants 
and the DAC share a mutual interest in leveling the playing field by including new 
donors (of tied aid credits), such as China, that do not adhere to the same rule set 
and therefore, threaten to undermine OECD procedures. In contrast, taking the Busan 
call for partnership with the private sector and the greater role attributed to actors in 
the private sector seriously, means questioning the appropriateness of tied aid credits. 
After all, the tying of aid to imports from the donor country rather hampers than stimu-
lates the development of the local/national private sector. Furthermore, the role of an 
“engine for development”, which is attributed to the private sector, must go hand in 
hand with new responsibilities of private sector actors and raises the question of how 
to strengthen the development dimension in the private sector in both donor and 
recipient country. The key question to address in this context is which development 
policy commitments should and could be imposed on donor domestic companies 
participating in tied aid credit programs.  
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8.2.4. Untying: Is the OECD Coherent in its Quest for an Untying Re-
gime? 
“The extent of tying can be interpreted  
as evidence of incoherence within the aid policy” 
(Morrissey 1999: 379) 
Although already addressed above in the context of alignment, the incompatibility of 
tied aid credits with the OECD’s quest for untying of aid deserves further examination.  
In a Note distributed in 1997, the Secretariat examined strategies for the promotion of 
untied aid. Therein, the compatibility of untying with other DAC and OECD policy 
objectives is stressed and the “goal of leveling the playing field among exporters” is 
identified as a mutually reinforcing objective (DCD/DAC/FA(97)8: 3) This implicit 
reference to the Participants’ work shows that in principle the Participants and the 
DAC share a preference for untied aid over tied aid. Albeit for different, partially over-
lapping reasons, both groups perceive(d) the untying of aid (or at least the restriction 
of tied aid to certain projects and countries) as a means to achieve their respective 
end: “Fair” export competition based on liberal market forces and recipient-led devel-
opment policies ensuring aid’s “best value for money”. While the untying debate was 
initiated by the DAC, the Participants objective of limiting export promotion in the 
guise of tied aid boosted the DAC’s efforts to increase both ownership of recipient 
countries and aid’ “value for money”. After all, this mutual interest has to be seen in 
the context of the OECD’s overall liberalization agenda as derived from the Organiza-
tion’s Convention (OECD Convention; quoted in Jepma 1991: 2). 
Although the 1992 Helsinki disciplines have not been introduced with the principle 
aim of reducing the use of tied aid per se, the DAC Secretariat finds some prima facie 
indication that “… the Disciplines may have had some impact on the recorded 
decline in both the volume and share of tied aid in total bilateral aid. Further support 
for this is found from the trend in 'procurement-related tied aid' – on which the Dis-
ciplines have focused. The declining trend for procurement-related tied aid was 
much more sharply downward after 1992 than that for tied aid in general, as 
would be expected” (DCD/DAC/FA(98)4: 11; emphasis added). 
Similar results – carefully formulated – are recalled in the summary report of the ques-
tionnaire conducted in 1998/98 among DAC Members. Although there was disa-
greement among DAC/FA Members on whether the Disciplines were an initiating or a 
reinforcing factor (of older trends), the contribution of the Disciplines to the reduction 
of flows of aid funds into tied aid projects was highlighted (DCD/DAC/FA(99)8: 7).  
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8.2.4.1. Provisions for Least Developed Countries 
A potential inconsistency between the DAC and the Participants Group can be de-
tected in the treatment of the group of Least Developed Countries under Arrangement 
provisions and the DAC Recommendation on Untying. With the adoption of the Hel-
sinki Package, Participants agreed that tied aid credits to Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) must have a concessionality level of at least 50 %, but do not have to pass the 
two key tests assessing the commercial-viability of a project. This way, a donor’s 
administrative burden is reduced and tied aid credit flows to LDCs are encouraged in 
order to maximize total flows to those countries. In contrast, the DAC specifically 
targets flows to LDCs and its members have agreed to untie their aid to this group of 
countries to the maximum extent.  
Hence, the question can be formulated whether contradictions are inherent to the 
policies towards and the treatment of LDCs by the respective bodies. While one 
forum – the development co-operation body – emphasizes that untying is especially 
important in cases where the recipient country is an LDC (because here the impacts 
of tying might be particularly detrimental), another forum – the export credit body – 
does deliberatively exclude flows to this same group from certain requirements and 
obligations because the poorest countries do not range among the main beneficiaries 
and/or the interesting markets. According to one interviewee this might lead to “forum 
shopping” – essentially a situation in which inconsistent rules can be played off 
against each other (Interview V): 
“There is concern – certainly on my behalf – that some might want to do a bit of 
forum shopping, you know play one forum against the other. You know we say, 
you can’t do it, but a different body in the OECD says, you can”. 
This inconsistency might have limited consequences as long as LDCs are not attrac-
tive for donor domestic enterprises. However, in a situation in which African markets 
with high growth potential come to the attention of business communities, this inco-
herence might provide a basis of legitimation for continued tying practices such as 
“allowed” by the Helsinki rules and excluded from the commercial non-viability criteria. 
With regard to the group of Least Developed Countries, another potential incon-
sistency between Arrangement rules and DAC principles should be mentioned. Alt-
hough the Arrangement requires tied aid credits to LDCs to meet a minimum 
concessionality level of 50 % (in contrast to 35 % for the remaining tied aid eligible 
countries), they essentially remain loans, thus requiring repayment. Already in 1978 
(and reiterated at several occasions especially in the wake of the devastating debt 
crisis of the 1980ies), however, DAC Members agreed in principle that ODA to the 
group of Least Developed Countries should be provided in the form of grants (see 
OECD/DAC 1978: 2).  
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8.3. Concluding Remarks: Of Conflicting Policy Goals and 
Magic Bullets  
Departing from the assumption that tied aid credits are – at least as long as donors 
claim their ODA-eligibility – part of the development policy field, this chapter has 
assessed the compliance of tied aid credit disciplines with some of the core principles 
of the DAC’s development policy. In all the categories analyzed, contradictions were 
found. In order not to threaten the internal coherence of the OECD’s development 
policy and to not lose credibility, ways of increasing policy coherence should be ex-
plored.  
For example, although the Arrangement has contributed to some harmonization of 
donor tied aid credit practices, further steps in this direction are necessary. The most 
obvious sign of diverging tied aid credit practices is the incoherent wording used by 
national authorities and different (quasi) OECD bodies to describe the financial prod-
ucts and packages. Regarding the OECD's usual “fetish” for setting standards and 
harmonizing policies, this incoherence in using terms such as tied aid credit, soft loan 
or mixed credit is striking. Increasing transparency must start with harmonizing termi-
nology across groups and countries. A way of increasing the transparency of the 
variety of products offered by national ECAs (or other institutions involved in tied aid 
financing) would be to establish a matrix, clearly defining the products that are offered 
across countries. In a subsequent step this would contribute to a better mapping of 
remaining tied aid credit practices in OECD donor countries, would increase compa-
rability and make it easier to draw lessons learnt and identify “second best” practices 
(considering untied as best).  
The most apparent and seemingly irresolvable incoherence lies in the tied nature of 
the instrument. It is also this characteristic that leads to the (partial) incompatibility of 
tied aid credits with the Paris Principles of alignment and ownership. If tied aid credits 
are interpreted as aid policy, the specific objective of which is to induce development 
and eradicate poverty, then tied aid is to be seen as incoherent with this overall aid 
policy. In Picciotto’s (2004: 8) terms this means that the internal coherence, i.e. “… 
the consistency between goals and objectives, modalities and protocols of a policy 
or program carried out by an OECD government in support of development (e.g. 
aid)” is not given. The source of such incoherence can be seen in the fact that aid 
policy is influenced by a myriad of interest groups. Studying the role of the different 
actors in policy-making processes on the national level would be crucial to identifying 
if and potentially why “… development interest and objectives are weak relative to 
donor self-interests” (Morrissey 1998: 248). 
While the rules adopted by the DAC and the Participants Group – despite minor 
inconsistencies – tend to be mutually reinforcing in their quest for a system of liberal-
ized aid procurement, political realities have resulted in the “failure” to eradicate tied 
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aid credit practices, which by their very definition contradict the OECD’s “liberal phi-
losophy” and provide a breeding ground for potential policy incoherence.  
Such discrepancies between proposals of the OECD Secretariat and respective 
outcomes in form of declarations, guidelines and recommendations, remind us that 
any assessment of OECD guidelines (the Participants’ disciplines included) must take 
into account the “constraints” under which the Organization and its bodies operate 
and adopt “rules”. The most apparent “constraint” is the institutional framework under 
which the negotiations of Helsinki tied aid disciplines and DAC guidelines on untying 
were held. These were negotiations between sovereign states on what was consid-
ered a core national issue. Understanding that the OECD is a forum, which does not 
provide for any sanctioning mechanisms or hold any implementation powers, helps to 
see that the rules cannot be better than the minimal consensus that all negotiating 
parties could agree upon – or as the former Chairman of the Participants said: “Final 
results cannot be better than the lowest common denominator (Chairman Report 
Wallén; quoted in Ray 1995: 81, 82). In the case of the Arrangement, the negotiators 
were neither ready to entirely abolish this relic of mercantilist use of aid nor to incorpo-
rate more far-reaching provisions on aid quality. The statement below by one inter-
viewee is exemplary for this relation between the Secretariat (and its Directorates) and 
OECD member states: “We are all here to serve our clients. I mean I can’t do things 
against my member countries’ interest. … Of course not, that is the political reality 
of it all” (Interview V).  
By concluding this assessment, it needs to be borne in mind that due to the consider-
able room for maneuver left by the Arrangement to its national implementers, only 
preliminary conclusions can be drawn at this stage. These are likely to be indicative of 
the development orientation of this hybrid instrument, but analysis of national policies 
and programs will be required to substantiate and potentially differentiate the findings 
derived from the international institutional and regulatory framework covering tied aid 
credits.  
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9.  Introduction 
In the previous part of this study the evolution and institutional structure of tied aid at 
the international level has been portrayed. To approach the complex interface of ex-
port and development interests, that part of the study adopted a historical perspec-
tive. Thus it was possible to see the historically grown interlinkages between the two 
fields of reference, which have shaped the design of tied soft loans. An analysis of the 
debates in the Participants Group between 1978 and 2005 has shown that tied aid 
credits originated out of the interest to promote and increase export capacities of 
OECD member states. The Participants’ attempt to eliminate the latter, led to their 
rising interest in tied soft loans. Their efforts to curb tied aid practices ultimately re-
sulted in the Helsinki tied aid disciplines of the Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits195. At the heart of these disciplines lie the key tests for commercial 
viability which are focused on the commercial aspects, not the developmental aspects 
of tied aid financing. Although the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) also 
tackled tied aid credits as part of its untying quest, aid considerations clearly played a 
subordinate role in assessing the eligibility of a project for tied aid financing. 
Yet the assessment provided in Part II demonstrated that the international regulatory 
framework leaves considerable room for maneuver to the national implementing agen-
cies, in particular with regard to the development orientation of the institutional setting 
as well as of potential projects. Furthermore, over time the field of soft loan financing 
has changed and new instruments have been designed, which are not covered by the 
international framework, mainly because they are formally not tied to the procurement 
of goods and services from the donor country. Particularly since the adoption of the 
tied aid disciplines under the Helsinki Package of the Arrangement in 1991/1992, soft 
loan programs and their successors have evolved into different directions. In the light 
of these observations, a profound analysis of national implementation strategies of 
Arrangement terms as well as of analogous programs becomes indispensable.  
Thus, in order to substantiate and potentially differentiate the findings derived from the 
international institutional and regulatory framework, in Part III of this study attention is 
shifted to the national scale and the implementation of and deviations from the interna-
tional guidelines will be examined. For that purpose, soft loan policies of four Europe-
an donor countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands) will be analyzed 
and the development orientation of the respective programs will be assessed. The 
countries in the sample were selected because of their importance as European soft 
                                                            
195  The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits is hereafter simply referred to as the Arrange-
ment.  
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loan donors, their common status as open, export-oriented economies, and/or their 
strong commitment to development assistance. Notably, the sample of case studies 
encompasses both de jure tied and formally untied forms of financing and includes a 
variety of institutional arrangements with regard to soft loan and concessional financ-
ing.  
In the analysis of the respective case studies, attention will be given above all to the 
extent to which development policy actors are involved and development aspects are 
considered at both institutional and policy levels as well as in the implementation of 
programs, i.e. to the level of project selection and approval. More precisely the ways 
of articulating development policy aspects in the institutional set-up, decision-making 
processes, project monitoring and evaluation procedures as well as transparency and 
accountability provisions of the four national soft loan programs will be explored.  
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10. Austria 
10.1. Country Facts and Figures 
10.1.1. Economy and Foreign Trade 
Austria is a highly developed industrialized country with a small, open and highly ex-
port-oriented market economy and an important service sector. The most important 
industries are food products and luxury commodities, mechanical engineering and 
steel construction, chemicals and vehicle manufacturing. Austria had a positive foreign 
trade balance in 2011, with an increase in exports by 7.9 % as compared to 2010. 
“Austria mainly exports machines and vehicles, processed goods (leather and leather 
products, iron and steel) as well as chemicals”196. Apart from the most important 
trading partners within the EU, most notably Germany, Italy, and France, in recent 
years the country has increasingly exported to Eastern European markets. Important 
third country trading partners include the USA, China, the Russian Federation and 
Switzerland197 (Statistik Austria 2013). 
10.1.2. Austria’s Donor Profile 
10.1.2.1. ODA Performance 
According to Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistical data on develop-
ment cooperation, in 2012 Austria’s net Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
amounted to USD 1112.4 million. Compared to 2011, the preliminary 2012 ODA 
level increased slightly by 9 %. The Austrian ODA to GNI ratio remained stable as 
compared to 2011 and amounted to 0.28 % in 2012, despite Austria’s commitment 
to reach the EU target of 0.7 % ODA/GNI.  
The bilateral share of Austria’s ODA rose by four percentage points in 2012 and is 
currently at 48 %. The development cooperation report (OECD/DAC 2012c: 196) 
highlights that in 2010 only 17 % of gross bilateral ODA was country programmable, 
which is far below the DAC members’ average of 57 %. Country Programmable Aid 
(CPA) is defined as “the portion of aid donors program for individual countries, and 
over which partner countries could have a significant say”198. Austria focuses its CPA 
primarily on its priority countries. In 2011 52 % of Austria’s bilateral aid was untied, 
representing a decline compared to the level of 68 % in 2010 (OECD/DAC 2012c: 
                                                            
196  BMeiA: http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/austria/facts-and-figures/economy.html 
197  Ibid. 
198  OECD/DAC: http://www.oecd.org/development/aid-architecture/cpa.htm 
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197, OECD.stats). The DAC has urged Austria to accelerate efforts to untie its aid 
(OECD/DAC 2012: 197). 
Figure 10.1: Quantitative Evolution of Austrian ODA (1998-2012) 
 
Source: OECD.stats (2013), [DAC 1] (6.11.2013) 
Note:  * Data for 2012 is preliminary. 
10.1.2.2. Institutional Setting of Austria’s Development Cooperation  
Austrian development cooperation is part of Austrian foreign policy and its strategic 
programming is the responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (BMeiA). Austrian 
development policy positions are outlined and published in a Three-Year Program 
(Dreijahresprogramm). The legal framework for the Austrian development cooperation 
is the Federal Development Cooperation Act (EZA-G), which was adopted in 2002 
and amended in 2003. The EZA-G includes a list of objectives and principles, which 
present relevant criteria for all measures undertaken by the federal government, repre-
senting the imperative for policy coherence for development. § 22 EZA-G states that 
all flows which are reported as ODA are to be designed according to the objectives 
and principles of development policy as well as guidelines set out in the Three-Year 
Program.  
The operational unit of the Austrian development cooperation is the Austrian Devel-
opment Agency (ADA) established in 2004 as a limited liability company, assigned 
with the implementation of all bilateral programs and projects in priority countries of 
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the Austrian development cooperation and administration of the respective earmarked 
budget199. 
Table 8: List of Key Regions and Priority Countries of Austrian Development Cooperation 
Region Countries 
The Caribbean and Central America Nicaragua 
West Africa Burkina Faso, Ethiopia°, Uganda° 
Southern Africa Mozambique* 
Himalayas-Hindukush Bhutan 
Danube Region/Western Balkans 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
Kosovo*, Serbia 
Black Sea Region/South Caucasus  Moldova*, Armenia*, Georgia* 
Palestinian Territories 
Source: ADA homepage200 
Note: Countries or regions marked with a * are eligible for soft loan financing. Countries or regions marked with a ° are currently 
 only eligible for project preparation program. 
With regard to financing ODA, the Austrian government does not provide for an ex-
plicit ODA budget. ODA “[…] flows comprise all official Austrian development dis-
bursements which are accredited by the [DAC]” 201. ADA’s budget constitutes a small 
part of total ODA flows and is used to finance bilateral programs and projects. In 
addition to flows from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Finance (BMF), as well as provinces and communities contribute to Austri-
an ODA202. 
10.2. Profile of the Program 
The Austrian soft loan program is considered a hybrid instrument between export 
promotion and development cooperation (Interview A4). Soft loans are further consid-
ered an instrument of development finance because any subsidies, such as interest 
rate support or guarantee charge reductions, are ODA eligible. 
Soft loans are provided for a limited circle of countries and sectors, which is primarily 
defined by OECD criteria and additional Austrian criteria. In 2011, the Austrian soft 
loan program offered financing for mostly upper and lower middle income countries, 
as classified by the World Bank (2013a). Soft loan-financed projects are as prede-
                                                            
199  ADA: http://www.entwicklung.at/en/ 
200  Ibid. 
201  ADA: http://www.entwicklung.at/en/austrian-development-cooperation/actors/ 
202  Ibid. 
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fined by the OECD criteria for tied aid and have to be financially and commercially 
non-viable. Selected projects are generally located in developmentally relevant sec-
tors, such as health, water, etc. In order to assess whether projects are developmen-
tally oriented, the program design includes a questionnaire for exporters. In the Austri-
an context soft loans are also referred to as Framework II export credits.  
10.2.1. Objectives of the Soft Loan Program 
According to the Austrian soft loan policy, the program aims at (1) assisting Austrian 
exporters competing in international markets and (2) fostering sustainable develop-
ment in recipient countries203. The soft loan program is established, organized and 
promoted through the Austrian export promotion organization. The objective of sus-
tainable development presents the base for ODA eligibility of grants to a loan (Inter-
view A4).  
10.2.2. Legal Basis of the Soft Loan Program  
The legal basis of the soft loan program is the Export Promotion Act (Ausfuhr-
förderungsgesetz – AusfFG) and the Export Finance Promotion Act (Ausfuhr-
finanzierungsförderungsgesetz – AFFG). The AusfFG regulates issuing of guarantees 
for transactions and provides the framework for financing arrangements. The AFFG 
authorizes “[…] the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the Federal government, to 
issue export guarantees for the benefit of creditors and for the raising of capital by 
OeKB” (OeKB 2010: 2).  
The soft loan program is a program of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry is respon-
sible for the design, strategy and content of the soft loan program including the selec-
tion of target countries. Other ministries can issue comments and recommendations 
via the inter-ministerial coordination procedure (Interview A4). An example is the chap-
ter on developmental relevance and sustainability in the soft loan questionnaire, which 
was designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
In order to frame bilateral financial relations and facilitate soft loan financing for pro-
jects the Austrian Ministry of Finance has signed bilateral agreements with some 
recipient countries’ governments. In principle, soft loan financing works with and with-
out a bilateral agreement (Interview A4). In the latter case, such as Mozambique, 
contracts are negotiated case by case (Interview A2). Bilateral agreements are signed 
to demonstrate political support for bilateral financial relations, in the first place (Inter-
view A5). Apart from intensifying bilateral economic and political contacts and coop-
eration, bilateral agreements generally contribute to facilitating projects and accelerate 
project approval in the recipient country (Interview A5). The ministry or public entity in 
charge of the project always requires a guarantee for the credit from the Ministry of 
                                                            
203  OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/export-services/financing/soft-loans/pages/default.aspx 
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Finance or central bank in order to cover the risk from loan default vis-à-vis the Repub-
lic of Austria. In some countries contracts even need to be approved by the parlia-
ment. It is easier to get approval from the respective entities involved if there is an 
agreement the ministry in charge can refer to. In addition, an acceleration of proce-
dures in the recipient country generally benefits the exporter (Interview A4).  
Bilateral agreements are negotiated by the Austrian Ministry of Finance with the Minis-
try of Finance of the recipient country (Interview A5, A4). The OeKB homepage cur-
rently lists bilateral agreements with the following countries: Egypt, Cap Verde, Koso-
vo, Mongolia, Tunisia and Vietnam204. Recipient countries sometimes ask for conces-
sional programs and initiate bilateral agreements (Interview A1, A4). Bilateral agree-
ments are beneficial for those recipient countries that aim at a certain volume of soft 
loans (Interview A4). Agreements include an indicative financial framework generally 
set for a period of two years ranging from EUR 20 million for Kosovo to EUR 150 
million for Vietnam. Some bilateral agreements stress in a separate article that project 
procurement is to be made in conformity with the recipient country’s laws and regula-
tions (e.g. bilateral agreement with Mongolia). On the other side, the agreement with 
Kosovo, which ran out at the beginning of 2013, states that bidding limited to Austrian 
companies and direct contracting may also be used. Only some agreements state that 
the soft loan program finances projects with a development purpose.  
As already stated, bilateral agreements are not obligatory for soft loan financing. Pos-
sible reasons against negotiating an agreement are that Austrian actors do not want 
to raise expectations in the recipient country, or want to explore new markets as a first 
step (Interview A4). The Ministry of Finance always decides on a case by case basis 
to which country it offers a bilateral agreement (Interview A1).  
10.2.3. Financing of the Soft Loan Program 
Soft loans are financed by two sources. The OeKB re-finances soft loans issued by 
the exporter’s principal bank through pool financing on the financial market, based on 
revenues of AFFG-guaranteed credit operations. Additionally the Ministry of Finance 
provides interest rates subsidies and finances reductions of guarantee charges. Cur-
rently, no additional grants are provided to subsidize soft loans. Subsidies by the 
Ministry of Finance are financed by the general budget of the state. These flows are 
subsequently reported as ODA.  
10.2.4. Institutional Environment  
Austrian institutions in charge of the soft loan program are the Ministry of Finance 
(BMF), Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB), Austrian Chamber of Commerce 
(WKO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMeiA), Austrian Chamber of Labor (AK), and 
                                                            
204  OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/export-services/Financing/soft-loans/requirements/Pages/eligible-countries.aspx 
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Ministry of Economic Affairs (BMWFJ). They are members of the two committees 
competent for approval for soft loan financing: the export financing committee (EFK) 
and export guarantee committee (AusfFG Beirat). Furthermore, exporting businesses 
and recipient governments’ entities, e.g. respective ministries or local governments, 
are key stakeholders of the soft loan program. Soft loans have generally not received 
much attention from Austrian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or the Austri-
an Parliament.  
Figure 10.2: Model of the Institutional Environment of the Austrian Soft Loan Program 
 
 
 
Source: Own Elaboration, based on Interviews   
The soft loan program is in the political responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The 
implementing agency of the soft loan program is the OeKB. OeKB’s tasks include 
communication with applicants, assessment of applications and monitoring. Further 
OeKB administers obligatory export guarantees for soft loan-financed projects (OeKB 
2011: 8). The OeKB is owned by Austrian commercial banks and provides services in 
the field of export promotion since 1950. The bank issues and administers guarantees 
on behalf of the Republic of Austria represented by the Ministry of Finance and refi-
nances export credits205 (OeKB 2012: 10). It raises funds from the money and capital 
markets to finance export transactions such as soft loans (OeKB 2010: 2). Additional-
ly subsidies for interest rate support or guarantee charge reductions are provided by 
                                                            
205  OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/about-oekb/pages/default.aspx 
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the Ministry of Finance. In order to ensure that the political mandate of the Ministry of 
Finance is being fulfilled, the Ministry of Finance cooperates closely with the OeKB by 
exchanging information about soft loan projects and financing (Interview A5). The 
exporter’s principal bank is responsible for the administrative management of credit 
agreements. 
Officially the Minister of Finance has to approve soft loan financing for projects (OeKB 
2011: 7). Practically two committees are involved in the selection of projects and 
approval of soft loan financing. The EFK exclusively deals with soft loans, the AusfFG 
Beirat reviews applications for the obligatory guarantee for soft loans as well as trans-
actions financed on commercial terms.  
Founded through a decision by the ministerial council, the EFK is the official body for 
selecting projects for soft loan financing (Interview A 4). EFK members are the Minis-
try of Finance (chair), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Austrian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Austrian Chamber of Labor, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. OeKB and the Aus-
trian National Bank are non-voting members of the committee. The committee decid-
ing on project eligibility for soft loan-financing is composed of representatives of se-
lective organized political interests. EFK members are not selected on grounds of 
professional expertise. They are internally nominated by the respective bodies. EFK 
members are obliged to respect official secrecy. 
Additionally any soft loan application requires approval from the AusfFG Beirat, a 
committee which is comprised of all members of the EFK as well as representatives of 
various other ministries and social partners (Federal Chancellery, Ministry of Agricul-
tural and Environmental Affairs, Chamber of Agriculture, Federation of Trade Unions, 
National Bank). According to § 5(2) AusfG the AusfG Beirat was established to re-
view applications for export guarantees for commercial and non-commercial transac-
tions in the light of the overall economic situation as well as ecology and employment 
respectively. Just as the EFK members, members of the AusfFG Beirat are internally 
nominated by the respective bodies. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible for Austrian development coopera-
tion is involved in the soft loan program through its membership in the EFK and 
AusfFG Beirat. Further the BMeiA created the chapter on sustainability and develop-
mental relevance which is part of the soft loan questionnaire for exporters. The Austri-
an Development Agency, Austria’s executive agency for development cooperation, is 
not mandated to be involved in the program. From the perspective of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs soft loans are not an instrument of the Austrian development coopera-
tion but operate at the interface with Austrian development cooperation (BMeiA 2010: 
26). This becomes evident when looking at the current official three-year-program of 
the Austrian development cooperation (BMeiA n. s.) issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The program does not mention soft loans. In an older program, one finds that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not explicitly refer to soft loans as an instrument of 
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development cooperation but describes the Ministry of Finance as ODA provider and 
partner of the Austrian development cooperation (BMeiA 2010: 36 et seqq.).  
As already stated, the ADA as executive branch of the Austrian development coopera-
tion is not formally involved in the soft loan program. This also counts for ADA’s re-
gional offices (Koordinationsbüros), ADA’s operational branch in recipient countries. 
ADA’s regional offices are not mandated to be involved in the soft loan process. 
ADA’s regional offices have a development cooperation mandate, but also consider 
export promotion (Interview A4). However, they act upon request from various parties, 
e.g. Austrian Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respective ministries and 
authorities of the recipient country, other donors, or companies. They are providers of 
local information, e.g. on national politics of the recipient country. Embassies are also 
involved by providing local services for exporting companies. Apparently, embassies 
prioritize their export promotion mandate over their development cooperation mandate 
(Interview A4). 
The Austrian Chamber of Commerce plays a double role in the soft loan program. On 
the one side, the chamber is a member of the EFK and AusfFG Beirat, and on the 
other side, it is involved through its foreign trade organization activities (Außen-
wirtschaftsorganisation). Their regional offices, Austrian foreign trade offices (Außen-
handelsstellen) provide information services, usually for exporters (Interview A3). 
Austrian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are not systematically involved in 
the soft loan program, project selection, or individual projects. NGOs such as KOO 
(Koordinierungsstelle der Österreichischen Bischofskonferenz für internationale Ent-
wicklung und Mission) or ECA-Watch generally focus their attention on commercial 
export credits, e.g. infrastructure projects, such as large damn projects. They are 
generally considered more controversial than soft loan-financed projects.  
The same holds true for the Austrian parliament, which has focused its recent interest 
on environmental or socially sensible projects. The Austrian parliament periodically 
receives reports from the AusfFG Beirat about Austria’s overall export guarantee 
commitments. Reports are not specific and do not explicitly address soft loans (Inter-
view A7). The publicly available report of the AusfFG Beirat of 2012 does not mention 
the soft loan program (BMF 2013). Within the Parliament the general committee 
(Hauptausschuss) is responsible for the soft loan program and the financial committee 
(Finanzausschuss) for export promotion (Interview A7). 
Generally customers of soft loan-financed projects in recipient countries are minis-
tries, state or local authorities, or other public agencies (OeKB 2011: 8). In addition to 
the public customer, the Ministry of Finance or the central bank decide on approving a 
specific project in the last place because it has to issue an obligatory government 
guarantee for loan default. In some recipient countries the parliament additionally has 
to approve a soft loan-financed project because repayment requires budgetary re-
sources. The actual loan agreements are negotiated directly between commercial 
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banks as lenders and the recipient country, represented by the Ministry of Finance. 
OeKB provides refinancing for those credits (see BMeiA 2011: Article 4). 
10.2.5. Complementary Programs 
The soft loan program is complemented by a technical assistance program. In 2007 
the OeKB established a project preparation program (Projektvorbereitungsprogramm 
Soft Loan) for identification and preparation of projects in soft loan eligible countries 
and sectors (BMWA 2008: 105). The program is also available for Sub-Sahara-
African countries, for which soft loans are currently not provided. The Ministry of Fi-
nance finances up to 80 % of the contract value and requires a minimum 20 % down 
payment of the total expected price of the service by the recipient. Studies financed 
by the program are published on the OeKB homepage206. So far only 11 studies have 
been published by November 2013. In practice there is a slow uptake of the program 
because of the 20 % down-payment requirement (Interview A4).  
The Austrian Development Bank (OeEB), which is an affiliated company of the OeKB 
provides long-term loans at near-market conditions for developing countries and 
emerging markets. OeEB finances commercially viable projects. Its services can be 
considered complementary to the soft loan program (Interview A4). Further, financing 
instruments of the OeEB are primarily tailored to private-sector investments.  
Third, the ADA supports development projects in the private and public sector in 
priority countries and key regions. The agency exclusively issues grants (Interview A4). 
Its programs and grants are currently not linked to the soft loan program.  
Currently, none of the Austrian agencies, i.e. OeKB, OeEB, and ADA, does provide 
untied loans on concessional terms. 
10.2.6. Guidelines for the Austrian Soft Loan Program 
10.2.6.1. Soft Loan Eligibility Criteria 
Criteria for soft loan financing guide the selection of recipient countries and projects. 
Both sets of criteria are shaped by the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits, as well as additional Austrian criteria defined by the Ministry of Finance.  
10.2.6.1.1. Soft Loan Eligibility of the Recipient Country  
Soft loan eligibility of recipient countries is determined by the OECD Consensus, the 
Austrian export guarantee policy for middle- and long-term financing, as well as the 
Austrian soft loan policy of the Ministry of Finance207. According to OECD rules coun-
tries eligible for tied aid must not exceed the current limit of USD 4.085 per capita 
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214 
GNI208. Therefore the selection of eligible countries changes dynamically over time. As 
GNI increases, countries graduate from tied aid eligibility. Furthermore, the Austrian 
guarantee policy influences the set of eligible countries. Countries with low stability, 
highly-indebted countries, or countries that already have too many loans carry a high 
risk and therefore do not receive a guarantee (Interview A4). Besides, guarantees for 
those countries would be prohibitively costly (Interview A4). The Ministry of Finance 
further specifies the set of eligible countries. The Ministry publishes a list of target 
countries characterized by economic growth and potential market opportunities for 
Austrian businesses (Interview A4). Soft loan target countries are selected by the 
Ministry of Finance after closely consulting Austrian business associations (Interview 
A4). On a case by case basis also other countries receive soft loans (Interview A4). In 
principle soft loans can be provided for any country receiving an export guarantee 
from the Republic of Austria, if approved by the AusfFG Beirat.  
Table 9: Soft Loan Target Countries  
Region Recipient Country (country risk classification) 
Western Balkans Kosovo (cat 7) 
Black Sea Region 
Armenia (cat 6)  
Georgia (cat 6) 
Moldova (cat 7) 
Asia 
India (cat 3) 
Mongolia (cat 5) 
Vietnam (cat 5) 
Central and South America 
El Salvador (cat 4) 
Guatemala (cat 5) 
Honduras (cat 6) 
Sub-Saharan Region* 
Cameroon (IMF, cat 6) 
Kenya (IMF, cat 6) 
Middle East / North Africa 
Egypt (cat 6) 
Morocco (cat 3) 
Other Countries in Africa Cape Verde (cat 6) 
Source: OeKB homepage209 (27.1.2014) 
Note:  The OECD country risk classification (cat 3 to cat 7) and the IMF calculation method determine the soft loan terms and 
 conditions of soft loans for recipient countries. 
Table 9 lists the target countries for soft loan financing selected by the Ministry of 
Finance. The OeKB mentions that in the case of negative economic and/or political 
developments, “[…] country and transaction limits may be applied for selected coun-
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tries eligible for soft loans”210. Additionally a special window was established for “fast-
track” projects with short implementation periods as a response to the Tsunami catas-
trophe for the countries Indonesia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka211 (Interview A4). 
The soft loan program is currently not available for Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), in particular Angola, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, Senegal, Tan-
zania and Uganda. Basically, the reason for this is that under prevailing capital market 
conditions with very low interest rates soft loan financing currently requires an in-
creased budgetary effort in order to meet the minimum concessionality level for LDCs 
(50 %). Nevertheless, the project preparation program is available for those countries. 
This can be interpreted as a commitment towards continuing the soft loan program in 
the future (Interview A4). The Ministry of Finance currently provides pre-mixed credits 
which are budget-friendly loans achieved by a combination of low interest rates, long 
repayment and grace periods. It is expected that the Ministry of Finance will be able to 
provide soft loans to LDCs once interest rate levels increase again.  
10.2.6.1.2. Soft Loan Eligibility of Products and Projects  
Similarly to country eligibility, project eligibility for soft loan financing is determined by 
OECD criteria on financial and commercial non-viability, as well as additional Austrian 
criteria. According to the Austrian soft loan policy, project eligibility is determined by 
the criteria (i) market entry, (ii) the project’s relevance in terms of economic policy for 
Austria (including technological spillover effects), and (iii) the contribution of the pro-
ject to sustainable development in the recipient country212. For the purpose of as-
sessing eligibility, applicants must fill out a questionnaire addressing these criteria. 
Ad (i): Soft loan-financed projects are intended to function as “a ‘door-opener’ [origi-
nal emphasis] into a new market with the expectation that in the foreseeable future 
soft loan projects will be followed by transactions financed on commercial terms”213. 
Soft loans are intended to be granted for a unique occasion. There is no official limit 
on the number of projects per sector or country but a regional or sectoral concentra-
tion of projects is not intended (Interview A5, A4). The objective of market entry is 
further weighted against what recipient countries need and demand (Interview A5).  
Ad (ii): The Austrian soft loan policy provides that soft loans are granted for projects 
involving products or services which impact on other sectors of the Austrian economy, 
e.g. through technological spillovers214. This criteria is complemented by the applica-
tion of a foreign content rule which should ensure that the Austrian economy benefits. 
The foreign content rule operationalizes the criterion “tying financing to the procure-
                                                            
210  OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/export-services/financing/soft-loans/requirements/pages/eligible-countries.aspx 
211  Ibid. 
212  Ibid. 
213  Ibid. 
214  Ibid. 
216 
ment” to Austrian goods and services. The foreign content rule provides for a limit for 
local costs and third country procurement to 50 % of the contract value215.  
Ad (iii): Furthermore, the sustainability is stressed as a key objective of the soft loan 
program. Projects “should foster economic growth and consequently contribute to 
the sustainable development in the recipient country”216. The soft loan program in its 
present form focuses on the sustainability of projects (e.g. degree of utilization) and 
on this basis assumes their contribution to sustainable development.  
As already stated, the derived criteria are presented in the soft loan questionnaire. 
Additionally all Austrian export credits, including soft loans, have to pass the “export 
control” of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which checks whether products are dual 
use goods and whether the exported good or recipient country face sanctions. Under 
normal conditions, soft loan projects are not affected by these issues (Interview A1). 
10.2.6.1.3. Eligible Sectors  
The Austrian soft loan program focuses on sectors in which projects are expected to 
be financially and commercially non-viable as defined by the Participants to the OECD 
Arrangement (Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid). Consequently, projects in the sectors 
water, primary and secondary education, health, railway and urban transport, disaster 
and civil protection do not face problems of being accepted by the Participants to the 
Arrangement at the OECD level and are therefore financed by the Austrian program 
(Interview A4).  
Soft Loans usually apply to goods or the combination of goods and services, but 
generally exclude the sole provision of services. In principle also services are eligible 
for soft loan financing, but in practice few services meet the criteria for soft loan fi-
nancing. Credit periods should not extend longer than the life-cycle of the product or 
services and soft loans are characterized by long repayment periods. Loans for ser-
vices usually have shorter credit periods (Interview A5).  
Additionally representatives of the soft loan program argue that the justification for 
ODA reporting of subsidies to a loan is based on the project sectors. Soft loans are 
only provided for projects in sectors which are considered developmentally relevant 
(Interview A5). Therefore it is not a question whether soft loan-financed projects are 
developmentally relevant, but to what extent they are, e.g. with regard to generating 
employment or contribute to environmental protection (Interview A5). Development 
specialists, on the other hand, argue that no developmental rationale for sector selec-
tion exists (Interview A4). 
                                                            
215  OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/export-services/financing/soft-loans/pages/default.aspx  
216  OeKB: http://www.oekb.at/en/export-services/financing/soft-loans/requirements/pages/eligibility-product.aspx  
  19  217 
10.2.6.2. Terms and Conditions for Soft Loan Eligible Countries  
Soft loans are provided in the form of pre-mixed credits characterized by low interest 
rates, a long grace period, and long repayment terms. Additionally, the Ministry of 
Finance partially takes over guarantee charges. In the past the Ministry of Finance 
offered mixed credits, which are comprised of a soft loan and an additional grant 
element. Currently only pre-mixed credits are offered. This form of financing is consid-
ered budget-friendly because subsidies included are spread throughout the duration 
of the loan, and little public money is required. All soft loans are issued in EUR217. 
The terms and conditions for soft loan eligible countries, as presented on the OeKB 
homepage, vary by the OECD and IMF country risk categories. The concessionality 
level of soft loans varies, according to the OECD country risk category. It is just above 
the 35 % margin or in the case of LDCs 50 % margin. The concessionality level does 
reflect sector or project characteristics. Also grace periods, interest rates and credit 
periods do not vary. The published terms and conditions are exactly those, which 
apply for individual projects, if certain requirements apply (Interview A5). In the past 
some variation in the credit terms was applied. Currently the Ministry of Finance/ 
OeKB offer loans with a zero interest rate and a 21-year credit period including a 
grace period of 5 years. The reduction of the guarantee charges offered by the Minis-
try of Finance varies between 0 % for OECD country risk category 3, 10 % for cate-
gory 4, 30 % for category 5, 40 % for category 6, and 50 % for category 7 country 
(currently no category 7 countries is on the list of eligible target countries). Soft loan 
conditions are calculated on a yearly basis and depend essentially on the discount 
rate, as a determinant for calculating the concessionality level (Interview A5).  
There are indicative volumes for single transactions depending on the country risk 
category. Additionally for some recipient countries maximum overall volumes are de-
fined (Interview A5). Further bilateral agreements include an indicative financial 
framework for country volumes. 
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Table 10: Terms and Conditions for Soft Loan-Eligible Countries 
Terms of the contract 21-year soft loan, 32 half-yearly installments, the first 
being due after a 5-year grace period 
Interest rate 0 % p.a. 
Concessionality level ≥ 35 % 
Development-policy motivated 
reduction of the guarantee charge 
10 % of the up-front guarantee charge (cat 4) 
30 % of the up-front guarantee charge (cat 5) 
40 % of the up-front guarantee charge (cat 6) 
50 % of the up-front guarantee charge (cat 7) 
Guarantee charge 0.700 % p.a. (cat 3) 
Reduced guarantee charge 0.800 % p.a. (cat 4) 
0.900 % p.a. (cat 5) 
1.000 % p.a. (cat 6, cat 7, IMF cat 6) 
Source: OeKB homepage218 (22.10.2013) 
10.3. Program Performance 
The analysis of statistical data provided in the following presents the quantitative 
evolution of Austrian soft loans as well as their sectoral and geographical distribution. 
The chapter draws on aggregate data extracted from the OECD statistical database 
complemented by more precise information from the DAC’s Creditor Report System 
(CRS). Any subsidy to a loan in soft loan financing, comprising interest subsidy and 
guarantee charge reductions can be reported as ODA. Soft loans are therefore re-
ported to the DAC as two flows. The subsidy is reported as grant in associated fi-
nancing (AF grants) and ODA eligible. The loan component is characterized as Other 
Official Flows (OOFs) and reported in the category official export credits to develop-
ing countries. Data on commitments of this category is not publicly available. The CRS 
database was filtered identifying projects with reference to “soft loans” or “framework 
II”. Data was analyzed for the time period 2001 to 2011. Note, that DAC data does 
not correspond with the number of projects approved by the EFK. Underlying reasons 
are different reporting periods, but also that not all approved projects are finally signed 
and realized (Interview A4). 
10.3.1. Development of Austrian  Soft Loan Financing 
Figure10.3 depicts the volume of subsidies in soft loan financing (AF grants). The 
figure clearly shows that the yearly volume is fluctuating. Nevertheless an upward 
trend can be observed as from 2005 onwards. For the upcoming years high volumes 
are expected because an exceptionally high number of projects (67 project applica-
tions) with an overall project volume of EUR 455 million was approved by the EFK in 
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2012 as a consequence of the closing opportunity to fund projects in graduating 
countries, above all China.  
Figure 10.3:  Volume (Commitments, million USD) of Austrian Soft Loans reported to the  
DAC as AF Grants (2001-2011) 
Source: OECD.stats (2013), [DAC1] (6.11.2013) 
Note: Data for AF grants is available as from 2001 
10.3.2. Recipient Countries  
Figure 10.4 clearly illustrates that the soft loan program has focused on only a few 
recipient countries, above all China. An examination of the annual distribution of AF 
grants commitments among recipient countries reveals a rather heterogeneous picture 
of annual commitments. An upward trend is observable for China peaking in 2010. 
Clear trends for other recipient countries cannot be extracted given great fluctuations 
throughout the examined period 2001 to 2011.  
During the program period the economic situation of some recipient countries has 
significantly improved and countries have graduated from the OECD status “eligible 
for tied aid”. Among those countries are also partner countries of the Austrian devel-
opment cooperation in southern Europe. As a result of graduation, the Ministry of 
Finance has fundamentally changed the list of target countries for soft loans in 2010 
and soft loan financing was opened up for countries in Asia, Latin America, Sub-
Sahara Africa and the Black Sea Region, as well as the Kosovo for the first time 
(BMeiA 2010: 26). Some newly added countries are at the same time priority coun-
tries of Austrian development cooperation. The latter countries are Kosovo, Georgia, 
Armenia, Moldova, Ethiopia, Uganda und Mozambique (BMeiA 2010: 9). Neverthe-
less, the soft loan program is currently suspended for some of these countries.  
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Figure 10.4: Cumulative Volume of AF Grants by Recipient Country (2001-2011) 
Source: OECD.stats (2013), ODA commitments to countries and regions [DAC3a] (6.11.2013) 
Note:  Percentage is calculated based on the cumulative volume (USD), 2001-2011. Countries grouped in the category “other”  
 are Pakistan, Montenegro, Laos, Mali, Tunisia, Cape Verde, Indonesia, Honduras, and Morocco. 
Looking at the distribution of recipients with a different lens, the following figures 
present the volume of AF grants by recipient country according to the World Bank 
classification. Accordingly, countries are clustered in the following groups: Upper 
Middle Income Counties (UMICs), Lower Middle Income countries (LMICs) and Low 
Income Countries (LICs). Figure 10.5, 10.6 and Figure 10.7 show the distribution of 
recipients according to the World Bank Classification for the calendar years 2001, 
2006 and 2011 with the aim to track changes in the priority country setting.  
When comparing Figure 10.5, 10.6 and Figure 10.7 above a shift from lower income 
countries to richer recipient countries can be observed. In 2001, 44 % of the volume 
of AF grants was directed to Low Income Countries, in 2011 Low Income Countries 
accounted for only 1 % of AF grants. Partly the shift is explained by the most im-
portant recipient, China, which became an Upper Middle Income country in 2010. 
Changes in the composition of country categories towards richer developing coun-
tries lead to the conclusion that the Austrian soft loan program has primarily targeted 
emerging countries, above all China. 
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Figure 10.5:  Annual Distribution among Country Groups According to World Bank 
 Classification 2001  
Source: OECD.stats 2013, AF grants (commitments) to countries and regions [DAC3a] (6.11.2013),  
World Bank 2013a 
Note:  World Bank country classification is based on the data for the respective calendar year. Percentages are calculated  
 based on country volumes of AF grants. 
Figure 10.6:  Annual Distribution among Country Groups According to World Bank  
 Classification 2006 
 
Source:  OECD.stats 2013, AF grants (commitments) to countries and regions [DAC3a] (6.11.2013),  
World Bank 2013a 
Note:  World Bank country classification is based on the data for the respective calendar year. Percentages are calculated based  
 on country volumes of AF grants. 
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Figure 10.7:  Annual Distribution among Country Groups According to World Bank 
Classification 2011 
 
Source: OECD.stats (2013), AF grants (commitments) to countries and regions [DAC3a] (6.11.2013),  
World Bank (2013a) 
Note:  Country classification is based on the data for the respective calendar year. Percentages are calculated based on country  
 volumes. 
10.3.3. Sectors 
Based on projects reported to the DAC as tied grants (commitments) with reference 
to “soft loans” or “framework II” respectively, listed in the CRS, Figure 10.8 illustrates 
the sectoral distribution of soft loan-related AF grants in the period 2001-2011.  
Figure 10.8 shows a concentration of projects in the health sector, followed by 
transport and storage, education, water supply and sanitation, and government and 
civil society. Based on the assumption that the number of Austrian companies in indi-
vidual sectors is small, the observed concentration leads to the conclusion that a 
small number of companies providing infrastructure for the health sector benefits most 
from the Austrian soft loan program.  
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Figure 10.8: Sectoral Distribution of Soft Loans (2001-2011) 
 
Source: OECD.stats (2013), CRS 
Note: Percentages are calculated based on the cumulative volume of AF grants (USD), 2001-2011. 
10.4.   Program Implementation 
10.4.1. Procurement in Soft Loan-Financed Projects 
The Austrian soft loan policy provides that procurement practices for soft loan-
financed projects have to be in line with the public procurement act of the recipient 
country (Interview A4). Consequently, soft loans are provided for projects procured 
through international competitive bidding (ICB), limited bidding (to Austrian compa-
nies), but also direct award of contract. The issue of procurement is further addressed 
in some bilateral agreements and project contracts. In the case of ICB, the Austrian 
exporter has to inform the OeKB of his intention to take part in bidding219. The supply 
contract is signed after “disclosure of the decision taken by the relevant Austrian 
committees [EFK and AusfFG Beirat]”220. Some recipient countries provide for direct 
award of contract. Common cases of direct contracting are follow-up contracts (Inter-
view A5). In such cases proof of conformity with national procurement regulation has 
to be presented (Interview A5). Direct award of contract is quite common though 
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(Interview A4). In case of contract award by means of direct negotiation, the OeKB 
intends to get involved “[…] at the beginning of the delivery contract negotiations”221. 
The supply contract is signed after approval of the relevant Austrian committees and 
after a valid OECD-notification is available222.  
The issue of procurement is linked to the question of how exporters get involved in the 
process prior to contract award. Financing is already considered in the design of the 
project. Exporters typically develop projects with partners in the recipient country 
(Interview A4). They can already be involved in the phase of project identification and 
preparation of the call for tenders, by e.g. carrying out needs assessments or provid-
ing expertise (Interview A5).  
10.4.2. Application Procedure for Soft Loan Financing 
The Austrian soft loan program provides that the exporter is responsible for applica-
tion for soft loan financing and for the provision of respective documentation. Which 
documents have to be handed in depends entirely on the project (Interview A8). Ex-
porters have to fill out a questionnaire which addresses the Austrian criteria for soft 
loan eligibility of the projects, including on developmental aspects. According to the 
OeKB (2010b: 4) the application does not regularly require an Aid Quality Assess-
ment (as stipulated by the Ex Ante Guidance, Annex I) for evidence of development 
aid qualification. Chapter III of the questionnaire represents the instrument for as-
sessing the development aid qualification of projects (OeKB 2010b, 2013: 4). A 
monitoring concept is required for projects larger than SDR 2 million to demonstrate 
the success of the project with regard to sustainable development. Further the ques-
tionnaire asks for, but the soft loan application does not explicitly require, a cost-
benefit analysis or an equivalent assessment. Applications for de minimis projects 
must include a proposal for the documentation of the project`s successful implemen-
tation. This is to be provided through e.g. a final project report. During the application 
procedure exporters present the project at the OeKB. Thus OeKB creates an oppor-
tunity to comment and give feed-back to the exporter. 
10.4.3. Questionnaire 
Soft loan-financed projects should have an impact on economic growth and sustaina-
ble development in the recipient country (OeKB 2010b: 19). Developmental policy 
aspects of projects are assessed by means of a questionnaire (chapter III) which the 
exporter applying for soft loan financing and an export guarantee has to complete 
(Interview A4). The respective chapter was designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Interview A4). The OeKB provides two versions of the questionnaire, a long version 
for regular soft loan projects, and a short version for de minimis projects (projects with 
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a contract value below SDR 2 million). Answers given should lead to the conclusion 
whether and to which extend projects will have a positive impact on sustainable de-
velopment in the recipient country, or whether expected impacts are on balance nega-
tive (OeKB 2010b: 6). The questionnaire contains questions concerning the character 
of the project itself as well as questions about the exporting company. The information 
is provided by the exporter (Interview A4). 
The questionnaire on developmental relevance and sustainability addresses questions 
with regard to the developmental impacts of the project in the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions. Questions relate in particular to:  
 demand for the project 
 project’s inclusion in a development strategy 
 co-financing or prior rejection of the project by other institutions or donors 
 project risks with regards to sustainable development 
 project location as possible region of conflict 
 expected micro- and macro-economic impact in recipient country 
 inclusion of local expertise in project design 
 local capacity and know-how of the recipient and appropriateness of technology 
selected  
 inclusion of capacity development 
 local availability of services and spare parts  
 necessary investments 
 financing of operating costs 
 form of procurement (public tender, limited tender, direct award) 
 project’s impact on specific development areas, such as health care, securing the 
supply of drinking water, regional development etc. 
 project’s impact on the environment, as well as social impact on target group 
The shortened version of the questionnaire for de minimis projects briefly addresses 
developmental aspects, such as the projects’ inclusion in development strategies, as 
well as social, health-related, ecological, and other impact in the recipient country, and 
volume of training of personnel.  
The questionnaire captures whether the project is part of a development strategy. 
Projects are preferably supported if they have a high priority in the recipient country 
(Interview A5). High priority is expressed in development strategy papers, or by ap-
proval of the Ministry of Finance or the ministry in charge of the project. Also exporters 
are interested if a project is in conformity with the national development strategy pa-
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pers signaling whether projects have priority and receive support from the respective 
authorities (Interview A3).  
Various stakeholders have raised concerns about the limited impact of the question-
naire. They question whether a questionnaire is able to adequately capture issues of 
sustainability (Interview A3). According to some the quality of the given answers varies 
and some applicants fill out the questionnaire quite superficially (Interview A4). It can 
be assumed that the questionnaire is filled out at a late stage of the project applica-
tion (Interview A4), thus limiting its influence on the project design. 
In the field of export financing the OeKB assesses projects based on their environ-
mental and social impact based on the OECD Common Approaches. Soft loans are 
usually not assessed in this way, because they are generally not implemented in risky 
sectors, classified by OeKB as category A projects. According to the OeKB “[…] 
projects involving tied aid credits will be assessed separately and only to the extent 
necessary, as environmental and social issues are taken into account in line with the 
Helsinki – procedure by assessing the aid quality according to the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC)’ s Guidelines. These issues are dealt within the 
Sustainability Part of the soft loan Questionnaire” (OeKB 2013: 5). It has to be men-
tioned, that the Helsinki criteria on financial and commercial non-viability do not ad-
dress the environmental impact of projects. The questionnaire, which is filled out by 
the exporter, does however address environmental and social impact of projects.  
10.4.4. Project Appraisal 
Within OeKB, the project and environmental analyses department is in charge of 
assessing projects and evaluating the questionnaire. The department checks whether 
answers are comprehensive and whether exporters provide sufficient information. The 
questionnaire is send back to the exporter for revision or amendments. When as-
sessing questionnaires the OeKB project and environmental analyses department 
does not apply standardized instruments of evaluation, such as rating instruments 
(Interview A8). Questions or answers respectively are not weighted (Interview A4). 
10.4.5. Engagement of other Actors During the Application Process  
The Austrian Ministry of Finance and the OeKB cooperate closely. They are in contact 
with the Ministry of Finance in the recipient country and ministries in charge of pro-
jects. Whether local actors, e.g. local NGOs, are consulted is entirely at the discretion 
of the recipient. The soft loan program does not provide for a systematic engagement 
with NGOs or other civil society organizations. This is based on the consideration that 
soft loan-financed projects are not problematic with regard to their social or environ-
mental impact because they are public-sector projects and financially non-viable. 
Controversial projects are generally financed on a commercial basis, e.g. large dam 
projects (Interview A4). The OeKB does inform and consult with WKO Foreign Trade 
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Offices in the respective countries during the application process (Interview A3). 
Generally local information helps the exporter to assess project risks.  
Expertise from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or ADA is not sought on a systematic 
basis during the application process. ADA’s regional offices are not mandated to be 
involved in the assessment process of projects. However, some regional offices act 
upon request from various actors, e.g. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
respective recipient countries’ ministries and authorities, other donors, companies, 
etc. (Interview A6, A2). Nevertheless, once the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives the 
project documentation prior to the EFK meeting. ADA’s respective regional office is 
consulted on specific projects. If the project is located in a priority sector of ADA’s 
country strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently receives a critical as-
sessment (Interview A4). Some projects are discussed in the local media and regional 
offices can provide information e.g. on national or regional politics. Further ADA’s 
regional offices are involved by acting upon request of recipient country’s authorities 
to relay messages to the Ministry of Finance, clarifying questions, or supporting the 
Austrian Ministry of Finance, if required (Interview A6, A2, A4). They may advice the 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding national procurement law 
and quality of national procurement processes, or alert the Ministry of Finance if prob-
lems arise e.g. regarding donor coordination, quality of deliverables, procurement 
processes, etc. (Interview A6). Since there is no structural involvement of ADA’s re-
gional offices, the latter’s involvement depends on their relationship with the respec-
tive WKO foreign trade office, embassy, or recipient country’s government (Interview 
A2). Further, Austrian and recipient country’s companies interested in soft loan financ-
ing approach ADA’s regional offices (Interview A6). Austrian companies contact 
ADA’s regional offices, as well as WKO foreign trade offices regarding information 
about key actors, sector developments, trends etc. (Interview A6, A3). Upon request 
of other donors, ADA’s regional offices try to coordinate and facilitate project coordi-
nation with other donor-funded projects during the design, planning and implementa-
tion phase. However, the spirit of cooperation of Austrian companies varies as their 
main interest is to pursue their business ventures while ADA’s interest is to contribute 
to development effectiveness in the interest of recipient country’s citizens and in 
alignment with the national strategies and plans (Interview A6).  
10.4.6. Project Approval Process  
Within OeKB, the department for project and environmental analyses is in charge of 
assessing project applications. Once all application forms and documents are com-
plete, the approval process takes about 8 to 12 weeks (OeKB 2011: 8). The rapidity 
of the procedure is considered a competitive advantage in international competition 
between exporters (OeKB 2011: 8; Interview A4). After revision of the project appli-
cation OeKB sends reports to the EFK members about one week prior to the commit-
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tee’s meeting (Interview A4, A1). The EFK is an official body mandated to select pro-
jects for soft loan financing. After the approval by the EFK, the minister of finance 
formally approves an application223. The EFK traditionally decides by consensus (Inter-
view A4). If a project is considered as problematic, issues are raised prior to the meet-
ing and the Ministry of Finance can then decide to take projects off the agenda to 
address the issue separately. In previous years all projects which were listed on the 
agenda were approved by the EFK (Interview A4). The underlying reason, why pro-
jects are not blocked in the EFK is that they are already so advanced when they are 
discussed by EFK members, so that no significant hurdles remain before final approv-
al. EFK members appreciate the time and effort that was put into project development 
and application. Nevertheless, concerns are raised by members at this stage with the 
intention to build for future projects (Interview A4). This is considered a useful way to 
deal with problematic issues and the OeKB is judged as cooperative when it comes 
to new proposals (Interview A4). Decisions against projects are only thinkable if re-
cent political changes have occurred in the recipient country. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs but also the Ministry of Economic Affairs would then address the issue and the 
project would be put on hold, e.g. if new UN sanctions were agreed on (Interview A1). 
But again those issues would be raised prior to EFK meetings. 
10.5. Monitoring and Evaluation  
10.5.1. Monitoring  
The objective “contribution to sustainable development” of soft loan-financed projects 
is specified as the sustainability of the projects proper. As part of the application 
procedure, exporters are obliged to propose a monitoring concept and consequently 
monitor projects, in order to assess the project’s sustainability. The specific definition 
of a project’s sustainability is always dependent on the sector and project characteris-
tics (Interview A8). Monitoring relies on data which is collected during the implemen-
tation of the projects, such as delivery of components, trainings held, as well as by the 
operation of the facility, e.g. degree of utilization (Interview A4, A8). It comprises a 
series of reports, including final project acceptance by the customer, confirmation that 
the project was built properly and is ready for operation (Interview A4). Monitoring 
reports are generated by the exporter. Similarly to the questionnaire’s assessment, 
further information from the exporter may be requested by the OeKB (Interview A8). 
De minimis projects (SDR < 2 million) require reduced monitoring. In this case export-
ers have to hand in a final report after project implementation or product delivery, 
respectively. Monitoring is limited to the guarantee period. The exporter is responsible 
for monitoring and the contractually agreed monitoring functions as long as the ex-
porter is on the site. After completion of the guarantee period the exporter has no 
                                                            
223  BMF: https://www.bmf.gv.at/wirtschaftspolitik/aussenwirtschaft-export/softloans.html 
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formal possibility to measure the success of the project (Interview A8). Monitoring 
reports are not publicly available on OeKB’s homepage. 
10.5.2. Evaluation  
The expected developmental impact of projects is assessed ex ante by means of the 
questionnaire. The Austrian soft loan program does not provide for systematic ex post 
evaluation of the developmental impact of projects. Occasionally projects are visited 
together with the exporter, e.g. within the scope of business missions. The selection 
of projects to be visited is then based on pragmatic considerations (Interview A5). 
Certain stakeholders state that exporters have an interest in the sustainability of pro-
jects because they desire follow-up contracts and a good reputation (Interview A5, 
A3).  
The economic, social, and ecologic impact of 5 individual soft loan-financed projects 
was evaluated in the course of a study carried out by ETA Umweltmanagement and 
ARBOS (2010a). The study was initiated by the Austrian Parliament (Entschließungs-
antrag) in 2007. It does not explicitly focus on the developmental impact of soft loan-
financed projects. Nevertheless, with regard to developmental relevance of soft loans, 
the study finds that exporting firms have the possibility to exert more influence on 
project design in case of soft loan-financed projects compared to commercially fi-
nanced ones (ETA Umweltmanagement/ARBOS 2010a: 41, 46). Not distinguishing 
between soft loans or commercially financed projects, the study concludes that little 
information regarding social aspects, as well as aspects on (macro-) economic sus-
tainability was available. Thus, the reliability of ex ante assessments of project impacts 
on the respective areas was limited (ETA Umweltmanagement/ARBOS 2010a: 16). 
The authors identify that project appraisal for ecologically or socially sensible projects 
is in conflict with  Austrian export promotion objectives and other requirements such 
as cost, fast application processing, confidentiality, flexibility, etc. (ETA Umwelt-
management/ARBOS 2010a: 46). This argument also holds true for assessment of 
development cooperation and policy aspects, respectively. With respect to ex post 
project evaluations ETA Umweltmanagement and ARBOS (2010a: 17) highlight that 
evaluations serve as an important feed-back mechanism and quality control of instru-
ments used for project appraisal. Furthermore, the study recommends to increase the 
participation of local NGOs in project appraisal and planning (ETA Umweltmanage-
ment/ARBOS 2010: 48).  
ETA Umweltmanagement and ARBOS (2010a: 5) argue that the hierarchy between 
policy objectives and possible conflicting policy objectives has to be taken into ac-
count when analyzing the programs. The underlying legal act of Austrian export pro-
motion and consequently the basis for soft loan financing, the AusfFG, primarily aims 
at facilitating market entry and promoting Austrian exports. At the same time the Aus-
trian government has committed to policy coherence for development as laid down in 
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the Federal Development Cooperation Act (§ 1 EZA-G). Weight given to the objec-
tives is, however, a political decision of the responsible institutions (ETA Umwelt-
management/ARBOS 2010a: 5). With the aim to strengthen policy coherence, the 
study recommends that the development policy objective should be integrated in the 
AusfFG (ETA Umweltmanagement/ARBOS 2010a: 45).  
Apart from the most recent evaluation, the soft loan program has been subject to 
evaluations in 2003 (Wolfmayer-Schnitzer et al.) and 1992 (Bayer/Stankovsky/Url). 
The study Wolfmayer-Schnitzer et al. (2003) provides a critical view on soft loans as 
an instrument of development cooperation, as well as Austrian development coopera-
tion as such. Wolfmayer-Schnitzer et al. remark in particular that although soft loans 
are a (partly) ODA-eligible instrument, financial returns are expected. The authors 
further highlight that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ mandate for development coopera-
tion is not underpinned by leadership in the allocation of funds (Wolfmayer-Schnitzer 
et al. 2003: 31 et seqq.) 
10.6. Accountability and Transparency 
The AusfFG Beirat, the committee reviewing applications for export guarantees, has to 
report to the Austrian parliament according to AusfFG (BMF 2013). As the report 
2012 demonstrates, soft loans are not directly addressed. The parliament has the 
option to ask questions. It makes use of its right but focuses its interest on commer-
cial export credits. Searching the Austrian parliament’s archive224 shows that the soft 
loan program has not been discussed by the parliament and only little information on 
the program was requested by the parliament.  
Public information on the soft loan program is available on the OeKB website publish-
ing relevant information for exporters. The information provided presents the current 
soft loan policy. Additionally soft loans are mentioned by Ministry of Finance and 
OeKB publications on export promotion and financing schemes. The OeKB does not 
publish information on individual soft loan-financed projects. It does so for projects 
which are environmentally sensitive (OeKB category A and B) and projects with a 
volume of more than EUR 10 million. NGOs claim that there is little information on 
projects publicly available, limiting possibilities to comment on individual projects 
(Interview A7). The committee mandated to approve project eligibility, the EFK, neither 
publishes any information on project decisions, nor statements justifying their deci-
sions or minutes of committee meetings. Searching Austrian newspapers shows that 
a public debate in the donor country about the program per se or individual projects is 
absent.  
The Austrian soft loan program does not provide for stakeholder consultations with 
civil society actors. NGOs are not systematically included in any stage of the program. 
                                                            
224  Austrian parliament: http://www.parlament.gv.at 
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According to NGO representatives, direct involvement in the program may not be 
advisable for NGOs because of two reasons. NGOs do not have an interest in being 
a member of the official project approval committees, such as the EFK, because, first, 
the distribution of power within the committee favors business’ interest and NGOs 
would be outvoted anyways. And second, membership obliges members to official 
secrecy and NGOs could not communicate any information received to the public 
(Interview A7). In summary, the OeKB publishes relevant information on the current 
terms and conditions for soft loan financing primarily focusing on their customers. No 
systematic information is publicly available on individual projects, limiting possibilities 
to comment on individual projects or decisions by the EFK. 
10.7. Conclusion and Outlook  
The analysis of the developmental orientation of the Austrian soft loan program made 
apparent that the program is predominantly oriented towards export promotion. The 
program’s objectives, the institutional distribution of competences and the program’s 
procedures and implementation clearly show that the soft loan instrument is designed 
to promote exports in order to strengthen the national economy. The developmental 
orientation of projects and the ODA eligibility of subsidies are considered as benefi-
cial additional characteristics of the instrument. 
The promotion of sustainable development in recipient countries can therefore be 
interpreted as a secondary objective of the soft loan program, since the latter is em-
bedded in the export promotion organization rather than the Austrian development 
cooperation. The program is not an instrument used to actively shape development 
cooperation. This is visible through the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which 
has the development cooperation mandate has no formal competence in shaping the 
soft loan policy, e.g. the selection of target countries. The entire program, its policy 
design and strategic programming, is in the sole competence of the Ministry of Fi-
nance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is integrated into the soft loan procedure at a 
very late stage through its membership in the EFK, the committee approving projects 
for soft loan financing. This limits the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ influence to individual 
projects. Thereby, the opportunity for systematically exploiting the development coop-
eration expertise both on a project and program level is largely foregone.  
The legal basis of the soft loan program further stresses the export promotion objec-
tive. The Export Promotion Act and the Export Finance Promotion Act present the 
backbone of the program. In contrast, the Federal Development Cooperation Act, 
creating the legal foundation for policy coherence for development is not explicitly 
considered as the legal basis of the program. In practice policy coherence is not 
promoted by aligning the soft loan program with the Austrian development coopera-
tion. This is underlined by the fact that Austria’s export credit agency, OeKB, is en-
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trusted with the implementation of the program. It is owned by commercial banks and 
does not dispose of profound development cooperation expertise. 
The Helsinki architecture, the Arrangement’s terms on minimum concessionality, coun-
try and project eligibility, constitute an essential framework for the Austrian soft loan 
program. The program currently offers pre-mixed credits which are budget-friendly 
loans achieved by a combination of low interest rates, long repayment and grace 
periods. Soft loan terms and conditions depend essentially on the discount rate ap-
plied, as a key variable for calculating the concessionality level and subsequently 
determining the budgetary effort required to offer soft loan-financing. The terms and 
conditions of soft loans (concessionality level, interest rates, grace periods and credit 
periods) do not vary by sector or project characteristics. Currently the program offers 
loans with a zero interest rate and a 21 year credit period including a five year grace 
period. Soft loan-financed projects comprise products such as medical devices, fire-
fighting vehicles, bridges etc. It is questionable whether all products financed have a 
life-cycle of 21 years. Further long grace periods may create opportunities for moral 
hazard (Interview A4). Ministers and parliamentarians commissioning and approving a 
project may enjoy the benefits while their successors bear the cost.  
As compared to other financing programs for development, the Austrian program 
does not interfere with procurement practices of recipient countries. The Austrian soft 
loan policy provides that procurement for soft loan-financed goods and services has 
to be in line with the regulation of the recipient country. This creates space for owner-
ship but whether the recipient gets value for money depends on its bargaining power 
and access to expertise to review the offer.  
The aim to foster the Austrian economy is further underpinned by the tying criterion as 
well as the selection of target countries and actual distribution of soft loans. The ac-
ceptance of soft loan-financing is tied to the procurement of Austrian goods and ser-
vices, specified by a foreign content rule which limits local costs and third country 
procurement to 50 % of the contract value. Additionally the program focuses on se-
lected target countries with promising markets for Austrian businesses. The selection 
of target countries is not aligned with the country priorities of Austrian development 
cooperation, although recently some soft loan recipient countries coincide to be priori-
ty countries of the Austrian development cooperation. Scrutinizing the actual flows of 
subsidies to recipient countries reveals that the soft loan program has focused on a 
few countries in the last decade, most notably China. Changes in the income (GNI per 
capita) of recipient countries over time underline that the Austrian soft loan program 
has targeted dynamic emerging countries. Soft loans for LDCs require a higher budg-
etary effort in order to meet the minimum concessionality level of 50 %. The analysis 
of statistical data demonstrates that over the last few years soft-loan-financing for 
LDCs constitutes more an exception than the rule of the Austrian soft loan program. 
Focusing this instrument towards emerging countries and not aligning it with the 
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development cooperation strategy signals the high priority, the program gives to ex-
port promotion.  
Coordination with development cooperation actors is also not systematically sought 
with regard to the selection of sectors. The latter is not aligned with the Austrian de-
velopment cooperation and sector coordination with other donors is not part of the 
soft loan procedure. Consequently possibilities to foster the developmental orientation 
of individual projects are foregone. The analysis of statistical data illustrates that most 
soft loan-financed projects were allocated in the sectors health (43 %), followed by 
transport and storage (17 %), education (13 %), water supply and sanitation (8 %), 
and government and civil society (8 %). Based on the assumption that the number of 
Austrian companies in individual sectors is small, the observed concentration leads to 
the conclusion that a small number of companies providing infrastructure for the 
health sector has benefited most from the soft loan instrument.  
In the course of the application for soft loan-financing, development criteria are ad-
dressed by means of a questionnaire designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It 
functions as a checklist for the exporter and the OeKB department for project and 
environmental analyses, which is responsible for project appraisal. The questionnaire 
appears to be a pragmatic form to address developmental aspects in the soft loan 
program, although its influence on project design has been questioned by various 
stakeholders. Answers consist of information provided by the exporter only. The inclu-
sion of addition information is at the discretion of the OeKB department for project 
and environmental analyses. Further, empirical research is needed in order to evaluate 
whether the questionnaire is an effective tool to assess the developmental impact of 
projects. 
The committee approving project eligibility for soft loan-financing, the EFK, is charac-
terized by a selective representation of organized interests. Apart from ministries, 
social partners as well-organized political interest groups are represented in the EFK. 
Representatives of NGO’s or academia do not hold a seat in the committee. EFK 
members are internally nominated by their respective bodies rather than appointed on 
grounds of their expertise. This committee of institutional representatives decides on 
the eligibility of individual projects including its developmental orientation although 
most of its members have no respective professional expertise. On the other side, the 
EFK is not mandated to discuss the soft loan policy as such. Strategic political deci-
sions are devolved solely to the competence of the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, 
the distribution of interests in the EFK appears to favor commercial interests. The 
committee is comprised of five voting members of whom three seem to follow a com-
mercial mandate (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Austrian 
Chamber of Commerce). The Austrian Chamber of Labor’s mandate is to guard work-
ers’ rights. Only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a development mandate. This dis-
tribution of interests among EFK members helps to explain why developmental as-
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pects are a secondary issue in the committee. The selective representation of inter-
ests and absence of professional development expertise in the EFK (with the excep-
tion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as well as the centralized competence in the 
Ministry of Finance supports the conclusion that the development orientation of the 
program is limited and that policy coherence for development as stipulated by the 
Federal Development Cooperation Act is weakly implemented in practice.  
Critically looking at the aspect of accountability of the EFK and its members reveals 
that the Austrian soft loan program lacks transparency. Information on decision mak-
ing is not published, nor does the Austrian parliament receive reports on the soft loan 
program. This leads to the conclusion that the EFK and its members enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy. Although social partners are included, they are obliged to re-
spect official secrecy which limits their freedom to use information publicly. Official 
secrecy of EFK members partly explains why non-governmental interest groups have 
not tried to be represented in the committee, since additional information gained 
through membership could not be communicated to the public.  
The Austrian soft loan program has been in place for many decades and the decision-
making and implementing bodies consider the instrument as successful. Changes of 
the program are currently not planed. Untying the program would represent a para-
digm shift, away from the export promotion objective and organization. Important 
determinants for future program modifications are budgetary resources allocated to 
the program, as well as the future definition of ODA (Interview A5). From a develop-
ment policy perspective changes are however desirable. 
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11. Denmark 
11.1. Country Facts and Figures 
11.1.1. Economy and Foreign Trade 
With a GDP of currently USD 213.6 billion (2012) Denmark is a highly developed 
industrialized country characterized by a small, open and export oriented economy 
(CIA 2013). From the late 1970ies until the mid-1980ies exports as a percentage of 
GDP rose steadily and every year since 1987 Denmark had a trade surplus. During 
the international financial crisis 2008/2009 both exports and imports dropped signifi-
cantly, thereby preserving the traditional trade balance surplus (Agerskov/Bisgaard 
2012). As illustrated in Figure 11.1 below, Denmark’s foreign trade is concentrated on 
a few trading partners, both with regard to imports and exports. While 10 countries 
accounted for 72 % of total Danish exports in 2011 and for 67 % in 2012, the largest 
10 supplying countries made up for roughly 70 % of total imports into Denmark in two 
consecutive years (Agerskov/Bisgaard 2012, 2013). Despite the fact that in recent 
years exports to Germany have been declining in relative terms, Germany remains the 
largest trading partner of Denmark, accounting in 2012 for 21 % of Denmark’s ex-
ports and 15 % of its imports (Agerskov/Bisgaard 2013). In the last ten years China 
has steadily increased its importance as a trading partner of Denmark. In 2011, China 
ranked fourth among the suppliers of goods to Denmark making up for 7 % of overall 
Danish imports. In contrast, only roughly 2 % of Danish exports went to China, putting 
it on the 10th place among Denmark’s export markets in 2011 and on the 8th place only 
one year later in 2012 (Agerskov/Bisgaard 2012, 2013). 
Regarding the composition of Danish exports, Figure 11.2 below indicates that agri-
cultural, oil-based and industrial products dominate. In both 2011 and 2012 Danish 
exports consisted predominantly of agricultural products, oil and a wide range of 
industrial products (Agerskov/Bisgaard 2012, 2013). The group of industrial exports 
is dominated by pharmaceutical products and machineries, but also clothes, furniture 
and food products figure high among Danish exports. In contrast, consumption goods 
and goods for use in the manufacturing industry and other industries make up for the 
main part of Denmark’s import of goods (Agerskov/Bisgaard 2012). Thus, Denmark is 
today a net exporter of food and energy, but depends on imports of raw materials for 
the manufacturing sector (CIA 2013).  
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Figure 11.1: Denmark’s Main Trading Partners 
 
Source: Agerskov/Bisgaard 2013 
Figure 11.2: Denmark’s External Trade in Goods by Commodity Categories 2012 
Source: Agerskov/Bisgaard 2013 
11.1.2. Denmark’s Donor Profile 
11.1.2.1. ODA Performance 
According to preliminary statistical data published by the OECD/DAC, Denmark’s net 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2012 amounted to USD 2.72 billion. Com-
pared to 2011, this constitutes a drop in real terms of 1.8 % and follows the 3 % real 
decrease in 2010 (OECD/DAC 2013a: 190). This slight drop has to be interpreted in 
the context of a freeze in Danish public spending for the period 2011-2013 (Interview 
B1, B4; OECD/DAC 2012c: 204). Denmark intended to sustain ODA at the nominal 
level of 2010 (in DKK) until 2013, but fell short of this goal in 2012.  
Yet from an international perspective, Denmark is generally considered a leading 
donor which from 1978 onwards has consistently devoted more than 0.7 % of its GNI 
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to ODA. With an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.83 % in 2012 (Figure 11.3), Denmark is, thus, 
among the few OECD donor countries having lived up to the international 0.7 % 
target agreed upon as early as 1970 (OECD/DAC 2002). In 2011, besides Denmark 
only Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg and the Netherlands met this, not at last symboli-
cally, important international target (Danish MfA/Danida 2012).  
Figure 11.3: Total ODA Flows and ODA as of GNI 
Source: Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1], (Feb. 2014) 
With roughly 56 % of its gross bilateral ODA being country programmable aid (CPA) 
– often considered the heart of ODA – Denmark’s performance was insignificantly 
below the DAC members’ average of 57 % for the same year (OECD/DAC 2012c: 
204).  
Untying 
Over the last decade Denmark has been actively promoting the untying of develop-
ment assistance and figures today among those DAC members with only a small 
proportion of aid still tied to procurement of Danish goods and services. The propor-
tion of untied aid reached its preliminary climax in 2008 with 99 % of aid untied (ex-
cluding administrative costs and technical cooperation) (OECD/DAC 2012c: 205). 
Today with a share of roughly 4 % of overall aid commitments, some relics of tied aid, 
however, have been preserved, most notably the mixed credit program which lies at 
the center of interest of this case study. 
In line with the traditionally high ODA rates, the latest DAC peer review of Denmark 
(OECD/DAC 2011c) found that development co-operation is well anchored in the 
Danish public and enjoys strong popular support. Furthermore the reviewers noticed 
“[…] public and political backing for implementing cutting-edge development co-
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operation policies and taking up international leadership on key global concerns” 
such as climate change and gender equality (OECD/DAC 2011c: 23).  
Figure 11.4: Share of Tied Commitments  
 
Source: DAC Table 7b (Commitments, Current Prices, Million USD)225  
Note:  Figures for 2012 are based on preliminary data as of November 2013, susceptible to changes  
Furthermore in 2013, Denmark, for the second time in a row, ranked first in the Com-
mitment to Development Index, a composite indicator published yearly by the Center 
for Global Development (Barder/Krylová 2013). In the 2012 ranking, the think-thank 
highlighted the large quantity of high-quality development assistance provided by 
Denmark, the country’s significant contribution of personal and finance to humanitari-
an interventions as well as peacekeeping missions and acknowledged the importance 
ascribed to development research. It argued, however, that Denmark’s performance 
was negatively influenced by “… its barriers against agricultural imports from devel-
oping countries, its lack of policies that promote productive investment in poor coun-
tries, and its high fossil fuel production per capita“226.  
11.1.2.2. Institutional Setting of Denmark’s Development Cooperation  
Denmark’s development policy is integrated in the state’s overall foreign policy and is 
as such part of the daily work of the Danish Foreign Service in both the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen as well as in the Danish missions (embassies) in Den-
                                                            
225 Please see the DAC aid statistics database: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2B# 
226  Center for Global Development (cgdev): http://international.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-
index/index 
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mark’s partner countries. A separate Minister, the Minister for Development Coopera-
tion227, is in charge of development assistance and she/he is served by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Service (Danish MfA/Danida 2012; European Com-
mission 2012: 2). The area of activity under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that deals 
with development cooperation is known as Danida, which, however, does not consti-
tute an independent agency. The term Danida can be traced back to 1963. Today, 
Danida has its own logo on the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlight-
ing it as an independent area of activity of the Ministry228. 
In legal terms, Denmark's development assistance is laid down in and is administered 
on the basis of the Danish Act on International Development Cooperation, Consoli-
dated Act no. 555 of 18.06.2012. This act, which entered into force in 2013, consti-
tutes the first revision of the Danish development cooperation act agreed upon in 
1971 and is considered an attempt to meet the exigencies of the dynamic and chang-
ing international context within which Danish development cooperation is embedded 
today229. 
The amendment of the law for Denmark’s development cooperation was one of the 
first measures by the former Minister for Development Cooperation – Christian Friis 
Bach (Social Liberal Party)230 – after a change in government in 2011. The resulting 
act spells out an increased emphasis on human rights and sustainable growth which 
shall lay the foundation for Denmark’s development cooperation. In addition, to a 
certain degree in the spirit of Policy Coherence for Development, the act states in 
paragraph 2 that “Danish development cooperation shall contribute to promoting 
Denmark’s interests in a more peaceful, stable and equal world. Consequently, de-
velopment policy is a central and integral element of Danish foreign policy, which 
recognizes that developing countries are not only affected by development policies 
but also by other policy areas” (Danish MfA 2012: para. 2). These changes in the 
legislative basis also entailed organizational reforms within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, for instance the abolition of the Board for International Development Coopera-
tion and the creation of a new Council for International Development Cooperation 
designed to act as advisory body to the Minister (Danish MfA 2012: para. 10). The 
council which embodies Denmark’s corporatist public system discusses “… signifi-
                                                            
227  In early February 2014 a cabinet reshuffle brought about changes on the Ministerial-level. Notably, a new 
cabinet-level post of a Minister for Trade and Development Cooperation was established and substituted 
the post of the Minister for Development Cooperation. Since this case study has been completed at that 
point, this notable change as well as potential repercussions thereof on the orientation of Danish devel-
opment cooperation in general and Danida Business Finance in particular can only be considered to a lim-
ited extent. For further information on the composition of the cabinet, please see http://um.dk/en/about-us/ 
228  Danida: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/ 
229  Danida , Act on Denmark’s International Development Cooperation:  
 http://amg.um.dk/en/policies-and-strategies/new-law-development-cooperation/  
230  Christian Friis Bach resigned from his post in November 2013. Following a cabinet reshuffle in February 
2014 Mogens Jensen was appointed Minister for Trade and Development, a cabinet-level post which 
substituted the post of the Minister for Development Cooperation.  
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cant strategic policy initiatives within the sphere of development policy and develop-
ment cooperation, including policy papers for Denmark’s relations with priority coun-
tries, new thematic strategic frameworks, the multilateral analysis, organisational 
strategies for multilateral organisations and progress in country programmes“231. 
Furthermore, in 2012 the Minister at the time launched a new development strategy, 
“The Right to a Better Life”. The strategy which replaced the 2010 Strategy “Freedom 
from Poverty. Freedom to Change” (Danish MfA/Danida 2010) was unanimously 
approved by Parliament (Danish MfA/Danida 2012; European Commission 2012: 2) 
and strategically guides the current Danish development cooperation. The strategy 
defines the following four priorities (which are also reflected in the Finance Act “Priori-
ties of the Danish Government for Development Cooperation 2013-2017”) for Danish 
development assistance: (1) Human rights and democracy, (2) green growth,  
(3) social progress, (4) stability and protection232 (European Commission 2012: 2). 
As illustrated in Figure 11.5, Danida currently concentrates its efforts in 24 priority 
countries. In these, Denmark “[…] is present with a long-term engagement and with 
political and financial weight“ 233. In four of them – Benin (2013), Bhutan (2014), 
Vietnam (2015) and Zambia (2013) – development assistance is currently being 
phased out (Danish MfA/Danida 2012). With regard to the instruments of interest in 
this paper – Danida Business Finance –, it needs to be mentioned that fewer coun-
tries receive mixed credit financing because it is perceived as impossible to use such 
an instrument in countries like Somalia, Sudan or Afghanistan (Interview B1). 
For each of these partner countries, Danida develops a country strategy covering a 
time-span of up to 5 years. These strategy papers contain a planning and operational 
framework as well as “[…] an outline of the planned distribution of resources be-
tween the sectors and the focus areas for each year of the strategy period”. While 
the country strategies are prepared by Danish embassy staff, they need to be en-
dorsed by both the Danish minister in charge of development cooperation as well as 
the responsible authorities in the partner countries. They also build the basis for the 
“[…] statutory rolling five-year plan of Denmark’s total development co-operation 
budget” (OECD/DAC 2009: 124).  
 
  
                                                            
231  Danida, Council for Development Policy: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/danida-
transparency/danida-documents/council-for-development-policy 
232  Danida – Strategic Priorities, http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/strategic/ 
233  Danida – Priority Countries: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/countries-regions/priority-countries/ 
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Figure 11.5: Danida’s Priority Countries 
 
Source: Danida homepage, Activities  
11.2. Profile of the Program 
11.2.1. Background and Objectives 
The Danish mixed credit program was introduced in 1993 (Finance Committee Act 
406 of 7 September 1993) under the responsibility of Danida “[…] as the instrument 
for specific projects in eligible countries including some of the Danish programme 
countries” and in this endeavor succeeded the State Loan Programme which had 
been in place since 1963 and had been abandoned upon a parliamentary decision in 
1988 (Danish MfA/Danida 2004: 37; Folketinget 2013). Up to that point state loans, 
which had subsidy elements between 76 and 86 %, could be combined with com-
mercial credits, thus providing mixed financing. However, unlike in its successor pro-
gram, state loans in combination with a commercial credit were given to creditworthy, 
poor countries and were administered by the Export Kredit Fonden (EKF).  
The phasing out of the State Loan Programme left a vacuum at the interface of export 
promotion and development policy. Hence the Danish Mixed Credit Programme that 
succeeded was designed to fill this gap and intended to act “[…] as an aid instru-
ment for financing specific projects of Danish interest in countries outside of the 
programme countries and outside the selected sectors in the programme coun-
tries” (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 35, emphasis added). By doing so the program was 
originally expected to contribute to “[…] phasing out former Danish assistance in 
non-programme countries and to support non-prioritised sectors in programme coun-
tries” (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 35). 
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Untied Window 
Presumably as a reaction to the untying debate which gained momentum in the early 
2000s with the adoption of a DAC Recommendation on Untying of Official Develop-
ment Assistance to the LDCs, an untied window for mixed credits to Danida’s pro-
gram countries and South Africa was introduced in 2002 with the adoption of Act 
137 of 2 May 2002 (Folketinget 2013). This option only materializes if national com-
petitive bidding under the tied regime is not successful, i.e. if no acceptable number of 
Danish companies participates in the bid and competition therefore is insufficient 
(Danish MfA/Danida 2004: 18). 
2005 – Danish content  
Furthermore, with the adoption of Act 88 of 23 February 2005 the Danish content 
requirement was abolished. This in turn allowed Danish companies, which delivered 
for a project financed by a Danish mixed credit, to outsource as much as they chose 
(Danish MfA/Danida 2006: 51; Folketinget 2013). This measure is described as an 
attempt to adapt to increasingly globalized economies (Folketinget 2013).  
In 2012 the Danish mixed credit scheme was transformed and became known as 
Danida Business Finance. As part of the organizational reforms which inter alia led to 
this name change, the program was clustered with the Business Partnership program 
under Danida’s Business Cooperation activities dealt with by the Green Growth De-
partment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously, from 2000 onwards, the mixed 
credit scheme was attached to Danida’s Business and Contract Department. Prior to 
that it had been an independent entity that was answerable directly to the Under-
Secretary for Bilateral Assistance (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 25). 
Since the inception of the mixed credit scheme in 1993, the program had undergone 
several organizational and procedural changes, the latest of which was undertaken in 
2013. Linked to these reforms was a steadily growing emphasis on the development 
orientation of and the pursuance of poverty reduction goals with this hybrid instru-
ment. While in its beginnings the goals of export promotion seemed to dominate the 
projects funded with a Danish mixed credit, the integration of the scheme into 
Danida’s structures and overall strategies reinforced the development orientation and 
allowed development aspects to gain ground throughout the entire project cycle 
(Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 8; Interview B1). Thus, the original objectives of financing 
projects explicitly outside the scope of development policy have been pushed back 
and the program has changed its character from one somewhat outside the realm of 
development policy into one specific form of the latter. Today the Danish mixed credit 
scheme – Danida Business Finance (DBF) – claims to be guided by the same objec-
tives as Denmark’s overall development cooperation. As a part of Danida, Danida 
Business Finance pursues the strategic goals of Denmark’s development cooperation 
and is focused on Danida priority countries (Interview B1). Accordingly, the main 
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officially stated objective of the Danish mixed credit policy unequivocally is to contrib-
ute to the development of the recipient country (Interview B1).  
11.2.1.1. Program Objectives  
The goal of Danida Business Finance is “… to improve market and living conditions, 
create sustainable, green growth, as well to provide more and better employment in 
developing countries” (Danish MfA/Danida 2011a). For that purpose, the program 
aims at ensuring financing for large-scale public infrastructure projects that would and 
could not be financed on market terms. By facilitating access to financing and by 
engaging commercial partners, the program is expected to act as promoter of invest-
ments in infrastructure, in turn contributing to the creation of a better framework for 
economic growth and employment (Folketinget 2013; Danida Homepage; Danish 
MfA/Danida 2012). Danish export promotion interests – e.g. in the form of stated 
goals such as market entrance or competitiveness of Danish industries – are not 
explicitly mentioned.  
11.2.2. Policy Framework and Legal Foundation 
The main pillars of the strategic orientation of Danida Business Finance are laid down 
in Danida’s overall strategy for development policy (currently “The Right to a Better 
Life”) and are further specified in the strategic framework for Growth and Employment 
and in the strategic framework document on Natural Resources, Energy and Climate 
Change. Danish mixed credits are thus formally integrated in and to be aligned with 
Danida’s overall development strategy and especially with the above mentioned stra-
tegic frameworks for priority areas. 
11.2.2.1. Danida Business Finance in the Overall Development Strategy  
2012: The Right to a Better Life 
Partnering with the private sector is described as an important component of Den-
mark’s development cooperation and in the “Right to a Better Life” emphasis is put on 
the creation of an “[…] enabling environment and opportunities for Danish and inter-
national companies to engage in devising solutions capable of creating jobs, foster-
ing growth and reducing poverty in developing countries, including in fragile states” 
(The Danish Government 2012: 35). For that purpose the Danida business instru-
ments such as Danida Business Finance and Danida Business Partnerships shall 
facilitate investments and partnerships between Danish and local companies thereby 
contributing to combating poverty and to building an inclusive and green economy. In 
order to successfully pursue this endeavor the strategy emphasizes that business 
needs to be conducted responsibly with regard to “… climate and environment, use 
of natural resources, human rights, workers’ rights, occupational safety and health 
and the fight against corruption” (The Danish Government 2012: 35).  
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Recognizing an increasing interest among Danish investors in engaging in responsible 
investments in emerging markets, Danida aims at systematically mobilizing “… pri-
vate capital and innovative financing in order to strengthen development, including 
through the use of guarantee schemes and other types of risk transference” (The 
Danish Government 2012: 34). In this respect, the strategy describes the purpose of 
Danida Business Finance, i.e. of Danish mixed credits, as facilitating “… investment 
in crucial infrastructure, such as energy supply, and aims to contribute to creating a 
more enabling environment for sustainable growth and employment” (The Danish 
Government 2012: 35). 
11.2.2.2. Strategic Framework for Priority Area: Growth and Employment 
2011-2015 
The strategic framework on growth and employment constitutes the main strategy in 
which Danida Business Finance is embedded and explicitly addresses business co-
operation and private sector development instruments in Chapter 3 “The Business 
Community as Partner in Development” (Danish MfA/Danida 2011b: 32-37). Therein 
the importance of conceptualizing the business community as partner in development 
is highlighted. The overall mission of Danida Business Finance in this endeavor is 
seen in the creation of growth and employment and Danida is expected to act “… as 
a catalyst for the transfer of knowledge and technology from Danish to local part-
ners” (Danish MfA/Danida 2011b: 7). Furthermore, the framework document high-
lights the importance of coordinating Danida Business Finance with other instruments 
and program sector efforts and states that “Danida will focus its assessment of pro-
posals on activities that rectify market failures and make environmentally-friendly and 
innovative approaches possible. The assessment of applications and the correspond-
ing support will be managed in a way that causes the least possible market distor-
tion” (Danish MfA/Danida 2011b: 34).  
11.2.2.3. Strategic Framework for Priority Areas: Natural Resources, Energy, 
and Climate Change (2013) 
The recently presented Strategic Framework for Priority Areas: Natural Resources, 
Energy, and Climate Change (NEC Strategy) constitutes the second sub-strategy 
which guides activities under Danida Business Finance. The role of the private sector 
is elaborated on in Chapter 3 “Partners and Implementation”. Therein the importance 
of the private sector as an actor in development processes is reiterated. Moreover, 
this chapter addresses the leverage effect of combining ODA with private financing 
and stresses the need for innovative financing models (Danida 2013a: 28 et seqq.).  
The NEC Strategy explicitly addresses the intersection between development assis-
tance and green business and reiterates the opportunity to expand the use of green 
technology by facilitating investments and transfer of know-how. In addition to the 
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afore-mentioned strategies, the NEC strategy explicitly refers to the interests of Dan-
ish companies and states that “… DANIDA Business Instruments have proven 
useful in supporting the agenda of meeting increasing demand from developing 
countries for trade and investments and, at the same time, supporting Danish com-
panies’ interest in gaining access to new markets” (Danida 2013: 29; emphasis 
added). Simultaneously, it is highlighted that Danida Business Instruments – just as 
any other aid instrument – are expected to follow the principles of ownership, align-
ment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability (Danida 2013a: 30). In short, 
the principles of the Paris Declaration shall be applied.  
Moreover and in accordance with the emphasis put on the “catalytic role of aid” 
(Danida 2013: 28), the increased combination of development assistance and ser-
vices offered on commercial terms by the Danish Trade Council234 is mentioned. This 
is expected to “… facilitate win-wins, benefitting businesses and the green transi-
tion in developing countries, by bringing into play Danish core competencies within 
energy, natural resources, and sustainable food production” (Danida 2013a: 29). 
11.2.2.4. Act No. 64 of 7 February 2013 
The background, purpose and procedures of Denmark’s mixed credit program, Danida 
Business Finance, are laid down in Act No. 64 of 7 February 2013. With the adoption 
of this document in February 2013 the legal and policy basis of Danida Business 
Finance was modified in order to reflect inter alia the changes in Danida’s organiza-
tional structure brought about by the 2012 Act on International Development Cooper-
ation (Act No. 555, 18 June 2012). The explicitly stated purpose of the document is to 
ensure harmonization of Danida Business Finance with Danish overall development 
cooperation and to streamline procedures accordingly (Folketinget 2013). The docu-
ment is publicly available only in Danish.  
11.2.2.5. The Finance Act: § 06.32.05.18  
The annual budget for development cooperation is part of the annual Finance Act 
(Finanslovsforslag) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is presented to the 
parliament (Folketing) each year, by the end of August at the latest, and is approved 
before the new fiscal year starts on January 1. The budget allocated to development 
assistance is submitted on an “accrual” basis and therefore encompasses total annual 
commitments and not annual disbursements (OECD/DAC 2009: 124). A part of 
Danida’s annual budget (Account 6.3.) is earmarked for activities under Danida Busi-
ness Finance and hence the mixed credit scheme (§ 06.32.05.18). As an integrated 
part of Danida’s overall grant budget, the annual frame of Danida Business Finance is 
determined in the regular budget approval process. 
                                                            
234  The Danish Trade Council is the export and investment promotion organization of the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. For further information please see http://um.dk/en/tradecouncil/ 
246 
Table 11: Budgetary Outlook Danida Business Finance  
Development Cooperation on the Finance Act Account 6.3. 
Finance Act 
Account 
Grant 2013 
(DKK million)
2014-prices
2014 
(DKK million) 
2014-prices
2015 
(DKK million) 
2014-prices
2016 
(DKK million) 
2014-prices
2017 
(DKK million) 
2014-prices 
06.32.05 Danidas Busi-
ness Pro-
grammes 
492 542 542 542 542 
06.32.05.12 Danida  
Business 
Partnershiops 
237 237 237 237 237 
06.32.05.13 CSR training 
Fund re.IFU 
investments 
3 3 3 3 3 
06.32.05.16 UN Global 
Compact 
2 2 2 2 2 
06.32.05.18 Danida Business 
Finance 
250 300 300 300 300 
Source: The Danish Government 2013: 11 
Since 2012 the budget for Danish development cooperation is divided into two 
budget frameworks, the poverty-oriented and the global framework (The Danish Gov-
ernment 2012: 7). While the former constitutes the majority of development assis-
tance, the latter is made of development assistance “… that is not necessarily spe-
cifically poverty-oriented, such as stabilisation initiatives, environment and climate 
change assistance, and support for democratic and economic reforms in, for exam-
ple, the Middle East and North Africa” (Danish MfA/Danida 2012). This distinction is 
expected to increase transparency and openness in the use of the development co-
operation budget (Danish MfA/Danida 2012; The Danish Government 2012: 7). Un-
like the other Danida Business Programs, activities under Danida Business Finance 
are part of the global, not the poverty-oriented framework (The Danish Government 
2012: 15). The extract taken from the draft budgetary outlook 2014-2017 Priorities 
for Danish Development Cooperation (Table 11) indicates that for the coming years 
approx. DKK 300 million (approx. EUR 40 million)235 are earmarked for Danida Busi-
ness Finance per year (The Danish Government 2013: 11). Danida’s Internal and 
External Grant Committees assume the implementing roles, through which funding 
from the annual frame of Danida Business Finance is allocated to individual projects 
are allocated (Danida 2013b: Annex 3). 
                                                            
235  Exchange rates from 1/11/2013 taken from the Danish Nationalbank 
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/dnuk/rates.nsf/side/exchange_rates!opendocument 
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11.2.3. Institutional Environment  
The current administrative structure of the Danish mixed credit scheme has been in 
place since 2012/2013, when the re-organization and integration of the former Secre-
tariat for Mixed Credits – henceforth Danida Business Finance – into the Green 
Growth Department as well as the alignment of procedures with overall Danida guide-
lines and practices became effective.  
While Denmark builds on the existing export credit structure when giving mixed credit 
support to projects, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the lead organization of the 
scheme and is both politically in charge of designing the program as well as responsi-
ble for its implementation. Essentially, a Danish mixed credit has similarities to a regu-
lar export credit – the major difference being that Danida pays the totality or parts of 
the interest on the loan, the export credit premium and covers other financial costs 
allowing the exporter to offer the recipient favourable financing conditions. In addition, 
Danida usually provides a cash grant in order to reduce the total loan amount (which 
might be necessary to meet the Helsinki thresholds) (Interview B1).  
Figure 11.6: Main Actors and their Relations in a Danish Mixed Credit  
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Elaboration, following Danish MfA/Danida 2011a 
Following the illustration of Figure 11.6, the paragraphs below shall map the main 
actors in the Danish mixed credit system.  
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Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida 
As the key organization the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida is politically 
responsible for and the main administer of the Danish mixed credit program. Under 
the umbrella of “Business Cooperation” and as part of the Green Growth Department, 
Danida Business Finance unit is also responsible for processing applications for 
mixed credit financing, presents project proposals for approval to the Danida Grant 
Committees and is the central contact point for all actors involved in a project fi-
nanced with a mixed credit (Interview B1, B8, B9). For these tasks Danida Business 
Finance has a staff of four people – two senior advisors, one advisor, one head of 
section – and two student assistants236.  
Although the Danish mixed credit scheme appears to be centrally administered by the 
Danida Business Finance unit in Copenhagen (Interview B1, B7, B10) – and thus 
follows only to a limited extent the decentralization trend in Danish development co-
operation (Interview B3) –, the Danish embassies are occasionally involved in the 
identification of projects and inform relevant Ministries in the partner countries and 
other stakeholders of the possibility to receive a Danish mixed credit (Interview B1; 
Danish MfA/Danida 2011a). 
Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF) 
Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF), which acts upon the provisions laid down in the Act on 
Eksport Kredit Fonden, is Denmark’s official export credit agency. It is a 100 % state-
owned entity, but the board of EKF is entitled to take most decisions in EKF’s day-to-
day business (Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry 2001). The objective of the Dan-
ish ECA as laid down in the Statutes of Eksport Kredit Fonden is “… to secure 
internationally competitive terms for Danish exports with regard to insurance cover 
for extraordinary risk of losses in relation to exports, including ships, and to be re-
sponsible of state support in connection with the financing of such exports” (Danish 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 2001). 
In summer 2013 the Ministry of Business and Growth was replaced by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as guardian authority of EKF. EKF is now under the responsibility of the 
Minister for Trade and European Affairs237. This reorganization is inter alia expected to 
bring EKF closer to important partners within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most 
notably the Trade Council and Danida238. 
As the official Danish export credit agency, EKF is involved in the implementation of all 
Danida Business Finance projects (Interview B1). While up to 2011 EKF as member 
of the no longer operational Committee for Mixed Credits used to be involved in the 
                                                            
236  Danida Business Finance: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/contact/ 
237  As part of this cabinet reshuffle, this cabinet-level post was abolished on 3 February 2014.  
238  The article can be accessed at http://www.ekf.dk/en/News-and-Knowledge/news/Pages/New-ministry-
for-EKF- %E2 %80 %93-same-service-for-Danish-companies.aspx 
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approval of mixed credit projects (Danish MfA/Danida 2011c: 160), the main task of 
EKF in Danish mixed credit financing today consists of the provision of guarantees 
which are issued upon receipt of the application from the lending bank (Interview B8, 
B9).  
The involvement of EKF in Danish mixed credit financing is implicitly referred to in 
Paragraph (5) of the statutes of EKF. Therein it states that it “… shall undertake the 
administration of other government export-financing schemes which are referred to 
Eksport Kredit Fonden. Such schemes shall have independent appropriations in the 
Finance Act, and the administration shall be cost-neutral to Export Kredit Fonden” 
(Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry 2001).  
In order to ensure that the political mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is being 
fulfilled, the role of EKF with regard to the financial transaction as well as the relation 
between Danida Business Finance and EKF is specified in a cooperation agreement 
of 13 September 2001 (Email Correspondence B8). This document, which is held 
confidential, sets the technical details of the cooperation between the respective 
institutions and describes, for instance, the different accounts and how they are to be 
managed (Interview B1, B8, B9). Furthermore, this agreement defines that EKF re-
ceives a fixed administration fee from Danida which means that profit opportunities for 
EKF are circumscribed. Apart from these administrative tasks EKF mainly functions as 
advisor to Danida on issues such as country risk and provides information on the final 
debtor. EKF, however, does not have any formal decision-making powers (Interview 
B8, B9).  
Based on the information provided by Dandia Business Finance, EKF is furthermore in 
charge of notifying the intention to support a project to the OECD “[…] at least 30 
working days before the tender closing date or before Danida issues commitment, 
whichever is the earlier” (Danish MfA/Danida 2007b; Interview B8, B9). If not other-
wise agreed, the initiative for notification must come from the exporter (Danish 
MfA/Danida 2007b).  
Lender/Commercial Bank 
Any acceptable commercial bank with a banking license and representation in Den-
mark can act as the lender in a mixed credit arrangement. The bank enters into a loan 
agreement with the borrower and applies for a guarantee from EKF which will cover 
95 % of losses, the remaining 5 % are the own risk of the bank. The premium for the 
guarantee is, as mentioned earlier, covered by Danida (Interview B1, B8, B9; Danish 
MfA/Danida 2011a). 
Just as is the case with supplying companies in mixed credit financed projects, the 
number of banks having provided the commercial loan has been quite limited (Inter-
view B8, B9). In this vein, a controlled expansion of acceptable banks is currently 
being discussed allowing for instance Swedish banks to act as lenders of the com-
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mercial credit (Interview B8, B9). Upon completion of this report this information has 
not yet been confirmed by those in charge within Danida. 
Supplier 
In the default case of a tied mixed credit any Danish company can participate in the 
national competitive bidding for a mixed credit project according to the tender 
launched by the responsible authorities in the recipient country. In the case of an 
untied mixed credit, international competitive bidding is applied and participation is 
open to all companies (but tied to OECD country contractors or suppliers) (Danish 
MfA/Danida 2007a, Annex D). In both versions the company which wins the bid con-
cludes a commercial contract with the buyer, receives funds according to deliveries 
and provides the goods and services according to contract (see Figure 11.6). 
Furthermore, the supplying companies appear to play a decisive role in the identifica-
tion of potential mixed credit projects (Interview B1, B11). Experience shows that only 
a handful of companies which are aware of the program and familiar with its proce-
dures participate in calls for tenders for mixed credit projects (Interview B1, B8, B9, 
B11). In most cases these “usual suspects” – as one interviewee put it (Interview B1) 
– are large companies that have the know-how necessary to implement large infra-
structure projects in development country contexts (Interview B1). 
Borrower/Buyer 
The Ministry of Finance or a reliable bank in the recipient country is required to act as 
borrower/guarantor in a mixed credit arrangement239. It is also the borrower who offi-
cially applies for Danida Business Finance support by submitting a preliminary project 
document as well as a feasibility study which is to be conducted in compliance with 
Danida’s standard forms/requirements. Once the Danida subsidy has been granted, 
the borrower launches the tender procedure in which the most competitive supplier is 
identified. Subsequently, the borrower/buyer enters into a loan agreement with the 
Danish commercial lending bank and signs a commercial contract with the Danish 
supplier (Interview B1, see Figure 11.6). 
11.2.4. Guidelines for Danish Mixed Credits 
11.2.4.1. Requirements and Eligibility Criteria  
The Danish mixed credit system is essentially one that is based on the tied aid disci-
plines laid down in the Helsinki Package of the Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits. Furthermore and partly in order to accommodate the program in the 
overall development policy, additional national criteria guide Danish mixed credit fi-
nancing, most notably in terms of country and project eligibility. This section lays down 
                                                            
239  Danida Business Finance: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/introduction/ 
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the main international and national requirements for Danish mixed credit support and 
examines the nature of the granted support – i.e. the composition of Danida’s financial 
support as well as the loan conditions. 
11.2.4.1.1. Country Eligibility 
In accordance with Article 36 of the Arrangement, Danida Business Finance is availa-
ble in countries whose GNI per capita lies below the upper limit for lower middle 
income countries (TAD/PG(2013)11: 20). According to the latest World Bank classi-
fication available, the threshold for tied aid eligibility is set at a GNI per capita of USD 
4.086 (2012) (OECD 2013: 9).  
Up to 2012 Danish tied mixed credits were available in all developing countries whose 
GNI per capita was below the above mentioned threshold. Furthermore, untied mixed 
credits could be used in all Danida program countries plus South Africa. In the at-
tempt to better align Danida’s mixed credits with other development programs and 
efforts of Danida, the pool of eligible recipient countries was, however, narrowed 
down to Danida priority countries in 2012 (Interview B1). Developments in the coming 
years will show whether this focus on Danida priority countries means that exclusively 
the latter can benefit from mixed credit financing or whether it rather suggests that 
priority shall be given to projects in those countries, as was argued by one interviewee 
(Interview B11). 
While Danida in principle confirmed that mixed credits were henceforth only extended 
to Danida priority countries (Interview B1), external observers argued that so far the 
above mentioned country criteria have not been applied rigorously. They observed that 
while priority was given to priority countries, exemptions are conceivable if convincing 
arguments are presented (Interview B6, B11). In a similar vein, the formulations on the 
homepage of Danida Business Finance – which speaks of partner, not priority coun-
tries and somewhat misleadingly presents a list of 15 countries only – states that “[…] 
priority is given to projects in Danida’s partner countries“240. This rather hesitant for-
mulation suggests the latter interpretation. The short period since the announcement 
of this new geographical focus, however, does not yet allow to draw unequivocal 
conclusions with regard to country eligibility.  
11.2.4.1.2. Project Eligibility  
In line with the Arrangement, potential projects must be commercially non-viable in 
order to qualify for Danish mixed credit financing. As a result, Danida Business Fi-
nance is mainly financing large infrastructure projects which tend to fulfill this criterion. 
The main sectors receiving mixed credit financing are transportation, energy, water 
supply and sanitation241.  
                                                            
240  Danida Business Finance: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/introduction 
241  Ibid. 
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Apart from the commercial non-viability criterion, mixed credit financing has not yet 
been explicitly restricted to specific sectors, but there is clearly an attempt to narrow 
eligibility down to projects in line with Danida’s green growth agenda (Interview B1; 
Danish MfA/Danida 2011a). This priority setting is reflected in the fact that the Danida 
Business Finance unit is part of the green growth department and is guided by the 
strategic framework for natural resources, energy and climate change (Danida 
2013a).  
Furthermore, the underpinning idea appears to be rooted in the assumption that activi-
ties in the fields of green technology, renewable energy and sustainable food produc-
tion are areas in which the Danish private sector can offer considerable expertise, 
know-how and the latest technology, the classic example being wind-farms (Interview 
B1, B8, B9). The extent to which this priority setting results from consultations with 
important stakeholders in the Danish private sector is difficult to assess at this stage. 
Concern seems to exist certainly on behalf of some actors in the private sector that 
first of all it is insufficiently clear which sectors fall within the green growth agenda 
and secondly that this process of narrowing down eligibility leads to the exclusion of 
many useful and sustainable projects, for instance in the health or education sectors 
(Interview B11).  
With regard to project eligibility, it is further emphasized that, ideally, Danida Business 
Finance should complement the sector programs which guide Danida’s development 
interventions in priority countries (Interview B1; Danida 2007). By complementing 
sector programs and strategies it shall be avoided that mixed credits finance individual 
projects which are detached from other development endeavors, but support those 
activities which are integrated in Danida’s overall strategy and approach (an argument 
which has also been referred to as an explanation for the abolition of the Committee 
for Mixed Credits) (Interview B1). 
11.2.4.1.3. Concessionality Requirements  
In accordance with article 38 of the Arrangement on (TAD/PG(2013)11), Danish tied 
mixed credits to eligible countries are required to have a concessionality level of no 
less than 35, or 50 % if the recipient country is a Least Developed Country (LDC) 
(OECD 2013: 9). Additional sector specific variances in the concessionality threshold 
are not provided for in the Danish mixed credit scheme (Interview B1). 
11.2.4.1.4. Procurement Guidelines  
In compliance with the DAC Good Procurement Practices of 1986 (OECD/DAC 
1992), the general principles applied to development cooperation and the rules set 
out in the Arrangement, competitive bidding is required for the procurement of goods 
and services financed under Danida Business Finance. In cases in which a sufficient 
number of Danish suppliers participates in the tender process, bidding is restricted to 
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these – i.e. national rather than international competitive bidding is applied (Danish 
MfA/Danida 2007a, 2011a; Interview B1). 
The guidelines for procurement and tendering in connection with a Danish tied or 
untied mixed credit are laid down in the documents General Rules and Guidelines for 
Procurement under Danish Tied Mixed Credits to Developing Countries, August 
2007 and Rules and Guidelines for Procurement, Untied Mixed Credits to Pro-
gramme Countries, August 2007. The structure and format of tender documents are 
expected to follow international standards such as those laid down by the Internation-
al Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) 242 (Danish MfA/Danida 2007a: 7, Annex 
A-1). 
In addition to the requirements set out by Danida and EKF, procurement is required to 
be in accordance with the national procurement and tendering laws of the Employ-
er’s243 home country and country of project implementation (should these not be the 
same) (Danish MfA/Danida 2007a: 6). In correspondence therewith, it is under the 
responsibility of the borrower, i.e. in most cases the Ministry of Finance in the recipient 
country, to organize the tender procedure. Danida, however, must give no-objection to 
it (Ministry of Foreign Affaris/Danida 2007a: Annex).  
11.2.4.1.5. Miscellaneous  
In order to be eligible for a Danish mixed credit the following provisions must further-
more be met: 
 The minimum contract amount to be financed is EUR 1 million. A maximum thresh-
old is not set244.  
 An acceptable commercial bank or financial institution with representation in 
Denmark must have agreed to act as lender for the project in question245. 
 The Ministry of Finance or a solid bank in the recipient country is required to act as 
borrower/guarantor246. 
 The project must adhere to international principles for corporate social responsibil-
ity and governance as laid down in the UN Global Compact and the ILO Decent 
Work Agenda247. 
 In 2005 Danish content requirements were abandoned (Danida Annual Report 
2005: 51). Prior to these modifications 50 % of Danish content was required in 
                                                            
242  Further information can be found on the FIDIC homepage: http://fidic.org/node/149 
243  The term “Employer“ is used by Danida to designate the buyer, i.e. “[t]he contracting authority in whose 
name the pre-qualification process, the tender process and the conclusion and execution of the contract 
are carried out and who will be taking over the Work on completion (Danish MfA/Danida 2007a. Annex D-1). 
244  Danida Business Finance, Rules and Requirements: http://um.dk/en/danida-
en/activities/business/finance/introduction/ 
245  Ibid. 
246  Ibid. 
247  Ibid.  
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order to qualify for mixed credit financing (Interview B1). For China, a 25 % Danish 
content requirement was upheld (Danida 2007a: 1; 12 et seqq.). Today, China is 
– due to both Arrangement rules and Danida’s own provisions – no longer eligible 
for tied mixed credit financing (OECD 2013: 9; Interview B1).  
11.2.4.1.6. Specific Requirements for Small Projects (SDR < 2 million)  
A set of specific requirements exists for small industrial projects the volume of which 
lies below the SDR 2 million threshold defined by the Arrangement (TAD/PG(2013) 
11: 22). In order to reduce the administrative burden for small projects, directly 
awarded contracts can be accepted for projects below the de minimis threshold. In 
such a case, the project stakeholders present a contract to Danida which then verifies 
and compares prices. Furthermore, the requirements with regard to the borrowing 
bank are less stringent, for instance lower credit ratings can be accepted (Interview 
B1). Unlike in the case of projects above the SDR 2 million threshold, the buyer has to 
contribute to the total investment and local financial costs. Local costs for bank guar-
antees are to be paid by the buyer (DBF homepage; Danida 2007a: 5-6). 
Furthermore, the commercial non-viability is not applied to de minimis projects. Small 
projects are therefore allowed to generate positive cash-flows (Interview B1). This 
exemption is expected to facilitate projects by Danish small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Concomitantly, the “end-users” in these projects may belong to the private 
sector, which is considered to be indispensable from a development perspective 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland/Water Pro Partners and Associated Firms 2003: 
55). 
Whether this interpretation of the de minimis rules is truly in the spirit of the Arrange-
ment on Officially Supported Export Credits remains open for debate. A recent analy-
sis of the discussion package within the Participants Group on de minimis tied which 
forms part of an associated financing came to the conclusion that small projects 
should adhere to the same rules in terms of country and project eligibility and were 
merely exempted from the attached administrative burden (Chapter 5). 
11.2.4.2. Terms and Conditions  
11.2.4.2.1. Composition of Danida Subsidy in a Mixed Credit  
As illustrated in Figure 11.7, Danida’s contribution comprises a projected amount for 
technical assistance and a subsidy that is first calculated on the basis of the estimat-
ed contract amount at the time of the initial project screening and then based on the 
appraisal report presented for project approval (Danida/Secretariat for Mixed Credits 
2010; Danida 2013d, 2013e).  
The subsidy consists of three main components, namely interest rate support, export 
credit premium and a bank margin. Should the total sum of these components not 
suffice to achieve the concessionality requirements of the Arrangement, Danida fur-
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thermore allocates a cash grant in order to reduce the principal loan amount. With the 
current very low interest rates, this cash grant is usually needed, even for countries in 
which a 35 % concessionality level is required (Danida 2013d; Interview B1). The 
concessionality requirements are in accordance with Arrangement rules set at 35 % 
and 50 % respectively. Sector specific variances are not provided for. As a result of 
the combination of the currently low interest rates (and thus the necessity of an addi-
tional cash grant) and Danida’s geographical focus shift to lower income countries 
(requiring the higher concessionality level of 50 %), the leverage of the instrument 
today seems to be decreasing (Interview B1). Furthermore, it needs to be noted that 
“[i]f, on the other hand, the sum of interest, export credit premium and bank margin 
exceeds the minimum subsidy required by the OECD, part of the interest may be 
charged to the Borrower as a Borrower’s interest” (Danida/Secretariat for Mixed 
Credits 2010: 9). It, thus, appears likely that the concessionality level of a Danish 
mixed credit is pegged just above the minimum requirements of the Arrangement. 
Figure 11.7: Composition of Danida Subsidy 
 
Source: Danida 2013d, 2013e 
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11.2.4.2.2. Loan Conditions  
Danida Business Finance offers interest-free or low-interest loans, typically with a 
maturity of 10 years and issued exclusively in either USD or EUR (Danish MfA/Danida 
2011a).  
The loan in the mixed credit package is to be administered in accordance with Danida 
Business Finance Conditions for Loan Agreements (Danida/Secretariat for Mixed 
Credits 2010). After commissioning of the project, i.e. when the project has been 
handed over, and after the starting point of the loan, the lending bank forwards a 
financial statement for the loan, which is to be audited by Deloitte. In a next step, 
Danida issues a final financial statement to the involved parties which shall ensure that 
the conditions for the loan have been fulfilled and that the concessionality level re-
quired by the Arrangement is being met (Danida 2013d, 2013e: Annex). 
The borrower is obliged to repay the loan principal (less any cash grants) in equal, 
semi-annual installments, normally starting six months after the acceptance and certifi-
cation of the commissioned goods and/or services, i.e. when the project has been 
installed, tested and handed over to the buyer (Danida 2013d). Furthermore, as 
shown in Figure 11.7, the commitment and management fees to the Danish lending 
bank are to be covered by the borrower (Danish MfA/Danida 2011a). 
Budget Margin  
Danida Business Finance projects were found to take on average three years from the 
starting date of the appraisal to the final conclusion of the contract. This leaves a 
considerable time period in which market prices can change significantly. This in turn 
might entail the need for additional funding (Danida 2013d). Furthermore, the loan in a 
mixed credit is, as mentioned above, exclusively issued in USD or EUR while the total 
appropriation is denominated in DKK which makes the Danish mixed credit arrange-
ment vulnerable to “… any adverse exchange rate movements, which could lead to 
the estimated expenditures in foreign currency exceeding the approved amounts” 
(Danida 2013e: 15). In order to deal with these interest rate and currency risks as well 
as changing market prices, the current Danida Business Finance practice foresees 
the inclusion of a budget margin of 25 % in the submitted grant proposals (Danida 
2013d). 
Especially the interest rate and currency risks inherent to the system require further 
examination. Resulting from the fact that in the current system the interest subsidy 
scheme is subject to market conditions, the accrued interest rates are not known at 
the time of calculation which might result in the need for increases in appropriation. 
During the utilization period interest expenses are based upon the short-term market 
interest rates – EURIBOR interest rates. In contrast, the interest expenses during the 
repayment period consist of a 10-year swap rate based on an agreement on fixed 
interest rates, which is determined shortly before the repayment period commences. 
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The latter comprises the main part of the interest expenses in the scheme. As the 
cash grant is determined already at the stage of preliminary approval, an increase in 
market interest rates might lead to additional costs “… not included in the commit-
ment which may exceed the approved amount of interest subsidy. This item will thus 
have to be covered by the total appropriation” (Danida 2013d, 2013e, Annex).  
In the long term Danida aims at minimizing the number of grant increases due to 
changes in interest and exchange rates. In order to reduce the overall currency risk, 
Danida encourages loan financing denominated in EUR. Furthermore, Danida currently 
considers “[t]he possibility of concluding forward contracts with the lending bank” 
which would allow the determination of the interest rate of the repayment period early 
in the funding process and would thus substantially reduce the interest rate risk inher-
ent to the system in place today (Danida 2013e). 
11.2.5. Complementary Programs  
In addition to Danida Business Finance, Denmark provides several business support 
and private sector development instruments which are conceptualized as being com-
plementary to each other and which are expected to create and use synergies as 
effectively as possible. In order to better locate mixed credits in the wider landscape 
of development finance instruments, three of the latter shall be presented here briefly. 
The appraisal reports, which are presented for approval of a mixed credit project, inter 
alia have to describe the complementarity of the project with other Danida business 
instruments. 
The GoGlobal Platform, which is conceptualized as a common point of entry to 
Danida, the Trade Council, the Export Credit Fund (EKF), and the Industrialisation 
Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), reflects this attempt to increasingly link differ-
ent instruments (Danish MfA/Danida 2011b: 37). 
11.2.5.1. Danida Business Partnerships 
Danida Business Partnership is the second component of Danida Business Coopera-
tion and can thus be seen as a complementary program to Danida Business Finance. 
Danida Business Partnerships, formerly known as Private Sector Development Pro-
gramme, is the facility managed by Danida which financially supports the preparation 
and implementation of commercially oriented business partnerships between Danish 
companies and businesses in Danida partner countries. This shall help to mitigate 
some of the risks characteristic for the pursuit of new business opportunities in devel-
oping countries248. With a total amount of DKK 237 million, the annual budget allocat-
ed to Business Partnerships (The Danish Government 2013: 11), the program is 
slightly smaller in volume than Danida Business Finance (DKK 300 million).  
                                                            
248  http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/partnerships/ 
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11.2.5.2. Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) 
The Investment Fund for Developing Countries, short IFU, assumes the role of an 
advisor and co-investor for Danish companies wishing to gain foothold or expand their 
activities in developing countries (Danish MfA/Danida 2011b: 37). The facility invests 
“[…] by committing equity capital or by providing loans or guarantees to project 
companies, the purpose being to promote development in host countries”. Unlike 
Danida Business Finance, the fund operates on commercial terms249.  
11.2.5.3. The Fast-Track Scheme: an EKF – DBF Cooperation  
In mid-2013 the Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF) and Danida Business Finance (DBF) 
jointly launched a new fast-track scheme for sustainable Danish exports to developing 
countries250. 
The main aim of the scheme is to support Danish businesses when bidding for large 
public contracts in the range of USD 50-70 million in developing countries by increas-
ing predictability of financing options for exporters251 (Interview B8, B9). The initiative 
can be partly seen as a reaction to difficulties encountered by EKF in implementing 
the “Principles and Guidelines to Promote Sustainable Lending Practices in the 
Provision of the Official Export Credits to Low Income Countries” adopted by the 
OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG). Agreed upon 
in 2008 in support of World Bank and IMF efforts of providing financing opportunities 
to poor countries without endangering their “… financial future and long-term de-
velopment prospects”252, the principles contain concessionality requirements in ac-
cordance with IMF and/or IDA thresholds (TAD/ECG(2008)15). As EKF works on 
commercial terms and does not allocate any grant money, Danida/DBF comes into 
play by providing the needed financial support for a mixed credit and thus allowing 
EKF to meet the sustainable lending principles (Interview B8, B9). The fast track pro-
cedure designed for such cases in which concessionality requirements are set by 
these principles essentially builds on existing structures and guidelines in the field of 
mixed credit financing, but EKF and DBF step in at a later stage of the project cycle, 
namely when the tender has already taken place (Interview B8, B9). The fast track 
scheme is, however, of limited scope. It is available in pre-defined sectors that are 
either directly linked to or may be demonstrated through detailed assessment to be 
linked to DBF’s green growth agenda. Furthermore, so far a list of eight countries 
(Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania and Ugan-
                                                            
249  Infrastructure Investment Fund: http://www.ifu.dk/en/About+IFU 
250  EKK: http://www.ekf.dk/en/News-and-Knowledge/news/Pages/Fast-track-scheme-for-sustainable-Danish-
exports-to-developing-countries.aspx 
251  Ibid. 
252  OECD, Export Credits: http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/sustainable-lending.htm 
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da) has been pre-approved for the scheme253. On a case-by-case basis, however, 
additional countries may be included (Interview B8, B9). 
The initiative is thus presented as an attempt to integrate as best as possible the 
respective agendas of EKF and Danida (Interview B8, B9, B10). The Development 
Co-operation Minister at that time – Christian Friis Bach – considered the fast-track a 
win-win-win system which “… will help to alleviate poverty and boost development 
in some of our important partner countries where large projects need to be financed; 
it will make Danish businesses' solutions more attractive by improving their chances 
of quickly and efficiently combining soft loans with export credits in developing coun-
tries; and it will ensure the transfer of climate-friendly and green solutions that Den-
mark can supply and developing countries need”254. 
At the time of completion of this report, no projects have been financed under this 
new track (Interview B8, B9). Thus, the extent to which this acceleration of proce-
dures will be detrimental to a careful appraisal of development impacts and if it will 
entail a shift of priorities in the sphere of concessional financing, remains to be seen.  
11.3. Program Performance 
11.3.1. Statistical Issues 
The statistical analysis provided in the following aims at examining the quantitative 
evolution of Danish mixed credits as well as their sectoral and geographical distribu-
tion. In view of the small percentage of untied mixed credits of the overall volume, the 
focus will be put on tied mixed credits from Denmark. The chapter mainly draws on 
information extracted from the DAC’s Creditor Report System, but will also take into 
account information provided by national budget frames, Danida’s Annual Reports, 
and builds on data provided by interview partners (Interview B1, B8, B9). The grant 
provided by Danida in a mixed credit (comprising interest subsidy, premium, technical 
assistance and possibly an outright grant), is reported to the DAC as a tied grant with 
the donor Project ID: 104.O.30. The CRS database was filtered for this code and the 
results were compared to Danida’s program and project database (PPO) as well as to 
project approval lists. While projects and sectors essentially correspond, the year of 
approval is not necessarily the year in which the commitment is reported to the DAC. 
As reporting of the commitment to the DAC does not always correspond with the year 
of the project’s approval, comparison of national approval numbers and DAC figures 
has proven to be difficult. In order to allow for comparison with the other case study 
countries, it has been decided to focus on DAC statistics for the quantitative analysis 
of Danish mixed credits.  
                                                            
253  EKF: http://www.ekf.dk/en/News-and-Knowledge/news/Pages/Fast-track-scheme-for-sustainable-Danish-
exports-to-developing-countries.aspx 
254  Ibid. 
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Furthermore, it needs to be mentioned that increases and decreases of earlier com-
mitments, respectively, which are re-reported at a later stage to the DAC – with the 
same donor project ID but a different code of submission (OECD/DAC 2013b) – 
have not yet been clustered with the original commitment. While this loophole does 
not weaken viability of information gained on volumes of commitments in certain sec-
tors or countries, it does not allow for statements on the number of projects in a given 
year. 
11.3.2. Development of Mixed Credit Financing 
The annual budget, which is earmarked for Danida’s Business Finance Program, has 
on average pledged about DKK 300 million over the last ten years (2002-2012). 
Taking exhange rates used by the DAC in 2002-2012, the following annual amounts 
of Danida Business Finance grants in million USD have been allocated to Danish 
mixed credits. The total budget available in the period 2002-2012 thus amounts to 
roughly USD 580 million.  
Figure 11.8: Budget for DBF Grants  
Source: DBF Database (10/10/2013) 
The the budgetary outlook 2013-2017 indicates that for 2013 DKK 250 million are 
earmarked for the program. For the subsequent years the amount is predicted to rise 
again to DKK 300 million (The Danish Government 2013: 11).  
Comparing the commitments reported to the DAC to the above shown national statis-
tics reveals several inconsistencies. While the total of commitments reported in the 
period 2002-2012255 amounts to USD 580 million – thus equaling the overall budget 
for this period –, annual volumes and the annual number of projects diverge from the 
national information on project approvals due to the fact that commitments might be 
reported at later stage (i.e. when the contract has finally been signed). Drawing on the 
                                                            
255  DAC data for 2012 are still preliminary. 
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data from the Creditor Reporting System, the reported annual commitments for the 
years 2000-2012 are distributed as follows. 
Figure 11.9: Total Mixed Credit Commitments Tied 
Source: DAC/CRS, Commitments, million USD (Current Prices) (1/11/2013) 
While in terms of commitments reported volumes peaked in 2004 with a tied amount 
of 160 million USD, in terms of the number of project approvals the years 2002 and 
2007 figured as record years (DBF Database, provided on 10/10/2013). The number 
of annual project approvals is illustrated in the graph below. 
Figure 11.10: Number of Project Approvals per Year  
 
Source: DBF Database (10/10/2013) 
As of October 2013, EKF, which is responsible for notification to the Participants 
Group, has received three notifications from Danida Business Finance for the year 
2013 to be reported to the OECD (Email Correspondence B8). A notification per se, 
however, does not mean that projects will be approved and eventually materialize. The 
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decrease in the number of annual project approvals from 2009 onwards reached its 
all-time low with zero projects approved in 2012. Whether this development is indica-
tive of future trends remains to be seen. The slight budget cuts predicted by the 
budgetary outlook for 2013-2017, in any case, give rise to the assumption that either 
the number of projects or the volume of projects will have to drop in the years to come 
– the first scenario of which seems more likely.  
11.3.3. Recipient Countries 
Due to the fact that the DAC’s Creditor Reporting System provides disaggregated 
annual data at the project level, the following chapters largely draw on Danida’s com-
mitments related to mixed credits reported to the DAC – despite prevailing discrep-
ancies with national data on project approval. In the period 2000-2012 commitments 
for tied mixed credits for a total of 23 countries have been reported by Danida to the 
DAC’s Creditor Reporting System. Among these, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, China and 
Tanzania can be identified as the four main beneficiaries of tied Danish mixed credits 
in the period 2000-2012. In comparison, on the basis of the number of project ap-
provals in the period 2002-2012, China (1), Vietnam (2) and Thailand (3) can be 
identified as the three main countries attracting Danish mixed credits (DBF Database, 
10/10/2013).  
Figure 11.11: Main Recipients (2000-2012) 
 
Source: DAC/CRS Database, Commitments 2000-2012 (1/11/2013) 
Note:  Percentage is calculated based on the cumulative volume (USD), 2000-2012. Countries grouped in the category others 
 are Jordan, Ecuador, Zambia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Tonga, Mongolia, South Africa  
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A closer examination of the annual distribution of mixed credit commitments among 
recipient countries reveals a rather heterogeneous composition of annual commit-
ments and indicates only to a very limited extent trends and shifts in priority setting. 
This diverse picture is at least partly due to the fact that up to the recent programmat-
ic changes, Danish tied mixed credits have been available for projects in all develop-
ing countries (without explicit policy statements with regard to geographical priority 
setting). 
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of the program’s focus, in the figures 
below, recipient countries have been clustered according to World Bank classification 
into groups of Upper Middle Income Counties (UMICs), Lower Middle Income Coun-
tries (LMICs) and Low Income Countries (LICs). The snapshots of the calendar years 
2000, 2006 and 2012 suggest that while in the beginning the program was concen-
trated on projects in LMICs, this trend was reversed and Low Income Countries 
steadily consolidated their role as recipients of tied Danish mixed credits. 
A comparison of Figure 11.12, Figure 11.13 and Figure 11.14 indicates that while in 
2000 only 9 % of reported commitments concerned projects in Low Income Coun-
tries, the latter had increased their share to 30 % by 2006 and attracted about 42 % 
of all mixed credit projects (commitments) in 2012. This implies that the group of low 
income countries steadily consolidated its role as recipient of tied Danish mixed cred-
its while commitments to lower-middle income countries decreased quasi proportion-
ally. As mentioned earlier tied mixed credits cannot be used in countries with a GNI 
above the LMIC threshold, thus explaining the absence of flows to this group of coun-
tries in the years 2000 and 2006. The share of UMIC’s in 2012 can be explained by 
the graduation of China form LMIC to UMIC status. Following Arrangement rules a 
country’s status is only upgraded after its World Bank category has remained un-
changed for two consecutive years (TAD/PG(2013)11: 8). While in 2010 and 2011 
China was in the transitory phase, as of 2012 it is according to the Arrangement rules 
no longer eligible for tied aid credits and should not be reflected in future statistics256.  
Interpretation of the below graphs requires caution. Data on volumes are sensitive to 
the influence of single (large) projects and it needs to be considered that projects in 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) require a higher concessionality level, thus also 
the reported grants in the group of Low Income Countries tend to be higher in volume 
which consequently does not allow drawing direct conclusions on priority setting. 
                                                            
256  For the analytical country classifications of the World Bank please see 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls 
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Figure 11.12:  Annual Distribution among Country Groups According to World Bank  
Classification 2000 
Source: DAC/CRS, Commitments (USD, current prices); (1/11/2013) 
Note:  Percentage is calculated based on the total annual volume of commitments in 2000; World Bank country classifications  
 is based on the data for calendar year (World Bank 2013a) 
Figure 11.13:  Annual Distribution among Country Groups According to World Bank  
Classification 2006 
Source: DAC/CRS, Commitments (USD, current prices) (1/11/2013) 
Note:  Percentage is calculated based on the total annual volume of commitments in 2006; country classifications is based on  
 the data for calendar year (World Bank 2013a) 
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Figure 11.4:  Annual Distribution among Country Groups According to World Bank  
Classification 2012 
 
Source: DAC/CRS, Commitments (USD, current prices) (1/11/2013) 
Note: Data for 2012 are preliminary; percentage is calculated based on the total annual volume of commitments in 2012; country 
classifications is based on the data for calendar year (World Bank 2013a) 
With the new geographical focus on Danida priority countries a consolidation of the 
focus on Low Income Countries is to be expected. Both China (which has also been 
graduating following the Arrangement’s provisions) and Sri Lanka are not among 
Danida’s priority countries and are no longer eligible for mixed credit support. Thus, 
the composition of recipient countries will be subject to changes over the next decade 
or so, entailing a growing share of Low Income Countries among the recipient coun-
tries. 
11.3.4. Sectors  
Based on the commitments (amount tied, million USD, current prices) reported to the 
DAC in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), the following section inquires the main 
sectors having attracted Danish mixed credit financing in the period 2000-2012.  
The below graph displays all sectors for which mixed credit commitments have been 
reported in the period 2000-2012. Sectors having received less than USD 5 million in 
commitments over the whole period have been grouped in “Others”. In total, mixed 
credit commitments in 16 different sectors (according to DAC sector classifications) 
have been reported.  
The three largest sectors in this period were transport and storage, water supply and 
sanitation and energy, followed by projects in communications as well as in industry. 
It remains to be seen if the recently introduced prioritization of climate friendly and 
clean technology will have substantial effects on the sectoral distribution of mixed 
credit commitments by Danida.  
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Figure 11.15: Main Sectors (2000-2012) 
 
Source: DAC/CRS, Commitments, Million USD (Current Prices) (1/11/2013)  
Note:  Percentage is calculated based on the cumulative volume (USD), 2000-2012. Sectors grouped in other are I.2.a. Health, 
General, III.1.c. Fishing, I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general, I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services, III.2.b. Miner-
al Resources & Mining, I.1.a. Education, Level Unspecified. 
11.3.5. Danish Untied Mixed Credits 
As has been mentioned earlier untied mixed credits are only applied under the condi-
tion that national competitive bidding did not produce sufficient interest among Danish 
companies. According to statistical data provided by Danida Business Finance four 
untied projects have been approved since the inception of the untied window in 2002.  
Amongst these only the wind power project in Egypt as well as the project in South 
Africa (industry/agro-industries) could be identified in the commitments reported in the 
DAC Creditor Reporting System. While also precisely one telecommunications pro-
ject in Bhutan can be found among the commitments in the CRS database, the corre-
sponding amount is reported to be “tied”. 
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Table 12: Untied Mixed Credit Projects Approved (2002-2012) 
Country Category  Amount, million DKK
Bhutan Telecommunications 81
Egypt Wind Power 319
South Africa Agro-industries 9.5
Vietnam Radio/televison/print media 10.6
Source: DBF Database (10/10/2013) 
11.4. Program Implementation 
The current administrative structure of the Danish mixed credit system was introduced 
in 2012 with the integration of the former Secretariat for Mixed Credits – henceforth 
Danida Business Finance – into the Green Growth Department (Email Correspond-
ence B1). The main changes related to the transformation of the mixed credit scheme 
into Danida Business Finance include the alignment of recipient counties with Danida 
priority countries, the focus of the program on projects within the Department’s green 
growth agenda as well as the replacement of the specialized Committee for Mixed 
Credits by the general Danida Grant Committees – hence the administrative integra-
tion of mixed credit procedures in overall Danida structures (Interview B1). 
11.4.1. Application and Project Approval Process 
In the Danish system, the potential borrower/buyer of Danish goods and services 
applies for mixed credit financing. Prospective projects are then assessed and even-
tually approved by Danida. The mechanisms at work in this process starting with the 
initial proposal to the commissioning of a project shall be outlined in this chapter.  
The general procedure for mixed credit financing encompasses the following main 
steps which are illustrated in Figure 11.16. 
On average, the time-span from application to approval and implementation in a 
Danida Business Finance project is estimated to be three years (Danida 2013e: An-
nex 5). It should, however, be considered that the overall project preparation time is 
likely to be substantially longer because, amongst other things, feasibility studies are 
expected to be conducted prior to application. While appraisals should take no more 
than three months starting from the receipt of background material, experience has 
shown that especially in the case of very large projects the appraisal and application 
procedures are often more time-consuming. This is not at last due to the fact that the 
“[…] appraisal may result in specific conditions that have to be fulfilled before sup-
port can be finally committed” (Danish MfA/Danida 2007b).   
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Figure 11.16: Timeline from Application to Project Approval and Implementation 
 
Source: Own Elaboration, modeled after Danish MfA/Danida 2011a 
Major steps in the application, approval and tender process shall be examined in 
greater detail in the paragraphs below.  
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11.4.1.1. Application and Screening Procedure 
The decision-making procedure for mixed credit financing essentially follows the gen-
eral project/program approval process of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida and 
consists of two main steps, the preliminary indication of the project and the final ap-
proval (Danish MfA/Danida 2007b).  
In a first step, in order to apply for Danida Business Finance, a full project description 
needs to be submitted by the potential borrower/buyer to Danida for screening, which 
is expected to contain the following components: 
 “information about project background 
 poverty reduction objectives 
 total project investment incl. detailed budget 
 type of equipment to be delivered  
 contract amount to be financed 
 financial set-up including borrower and guarantor (confirmed by a letter of intent) 
 organisational set-up 
 timetable and milestones in the project“257  
In addition, the applicant is expected to present a feasibility study containing those 
components set out in the standard forms accessible on DBF’s homepage258. Danida 
has a facility which can partly be used to finance feasibility studies. Although feasibility 
studies and other background documentation are often found to be of insufficient 
quality (Interview B1; Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 53), this facility is rarely used. By 
recognizing the responsibility and leadership of the borrower/buyer in drafting the 
initial project proposal and in conducting the feasibility study, Danida aims at 
strengthening the commitment of the applicant for the project (Interview B1). Further-
more, in terms of recipient ownership it is expected that the project idea originates 
from the recipient country and is developed by the borrower/buyer without major 
involvement from the side of Danida. In order to standardize the information provided 
in feasibility studies, guidelines and standard forms for feasibility studies for projects in 
the following main sectors can be accessed on the homepage of Danida Business 
Finance: 
 Standard Form for Wind Energy Feasibility Studies 
 Standard Form for District Heating and Power Supply Feasibility Studies 
 Standard Form for Industrial Feasibility Studies 
                                                            
257 Danida Business Finance, How to Apply for Support:  
 http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/applyforsupport/; emphasis added 
258  Danida Business Finance, Guidelines: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/guidelines/ 
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 Standard Form for Health Care Services and Vocational Training Feasibility  
Studies 
 Standard Form for Water and Sanitation Feasibility Studies259 
Essentially the components of the feasibility study correspond to those which are to 
be covered by the appraisal report. With regard to OECD-wide guidelines, Danida’s 
Standard Forms for Feasibility Studies are broadly consistent with the minimum crite-
ria set by the Participants Group. While the information required in Danida’s Standard 
Forms goes beyond the Checklist for Information in Feasibility Studies of the Ex Ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid (TD/PG(2005)20/Annex) with regard to certain aspects – for 
instance not only financial but also economic analysis is to be provided – the national 
standard forms are less explicit on others, most notably on aid quality aspects which 
are not inquired in a specific chapter. 
After all necessary background documentation has been submitted by the applicant, 
Danida examines the application and decides whether it complies with all the formal 
requirements, e.g. country and project eligibility, sophistication of the feasibility study 
etc. If this is the case, the Danida Business Finance unit presents the project – de-
pending on its volume – to either Danida’s Programme Committee (project grants > 
DKK 35 million) or the Head of Development Policy and Global Cooperation respec-
tively which/who then carries out a preliminary screening of the project.  
In the case of projects above DKK 35 million which require preliminary approval by the 
Programme Committee, concept notes are published on Danida’s transparency 
webpage for public consultation 16 working days prior to the meeting (Danish MfA/ 
Danida 2013c: 7). The results of these public consultations which are mandatory for 
large projects (Email Correspondence B1) – just as for any other Danida activity sub-
mitted – are to be discussed in the corresponding Programme Committee meeting260.  
This first screening process produces a preliminary assessment of eligibility and even-
tually provides a positive indication to go ahead with project preparations261. With the 
basic consent of the Programme Committee or the Head of Development Policy and 
Global Cooperation, respectively, Danida Business Finance assigns an external con-
sultant to appraise the project and consults the expertise of Danida’s Technical Ser-
vice Advisory (TSA). This appraisal includes on-site visits, i.e. a field-trip to the project 
site. If the appraisal is generally positive, Danida Business Finance submits the project 
to Danida’s Grant Committee, which on the basis of the presented appraisal report 
and the project document eventually approves or declines the project. Once the sub-
sidy for a project has been granted by the Grant Committee, Danida Business Fi-
                                                            
259 Danida Business Finance, Guidelines: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/guidelines/  
260  Danida Business Finance, Transparency:  
 http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/danida-transparency/public-consultations/ 
261  Danida Business Finance, How to Apply for Support:  
 http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/applyforsupport/ 
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nance gives green light to the responsible ministry in the recipient country to launch 
the tender process (Interview B1). 
11.4.1.1.1. The Appraisal Report: Testing against Development Criteria  
As Danida Business Finance is guided by Denmark’s overall development strategy, 
contributing to eradicating poverty in recipient countries is described as the overriding 
goal of the Danish mixed credit scheme (Danish MfA/Danida 2007b). 
The project appraisal which is based on on-site visits can be considered the core 
quality check of the project proposal, including an assessment of the expected devel-
opment impact. At the point of the appraisal, all documentation required and stake-
holder commitments should be in place. Danida assigns an external consultant – 
usually a team of three experts (Interview B10) – to appraise the project and to as-
sess whether it is consistent with Danida’s development criteria. Today, in principle, all 
appraisals must contain field visits (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 29 & 2011a). Although 
rare, desk appraisals are conceivable in the case of small projects (Interview B1). 
Just as for feasibility studies, the standard forms for the appraisal of projects in the 
most frequent sectors (Wind Energy, District Heating and Power Supply, Industrial 
projects, Health Care Services and Vocational Training, Water and Sanitation) can be 
found on the homepage of Danida Business Finance and contain the sections listed 
below. In the following, special emphasis will be given to those chapters of the ap-
praisal report expected to demonstrate the development impact of a potential project 
and its compliance with what Danida considers “good” development practice, respec-
tively. 
1) Introduction 
2) Summary 
3) Project Context 
4) Assessment of Project Justification 
5) Technical Assessment 
6) Assessment of Project Organisation 
7) Environmental Impact Assessment  
8) Assessment of Working Environment and Rights at Work 
As compliance with the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work is a requirement for Danida support, the appraisal is expected to assess 
the buyer’s compliance with national laws and regulations regarding fundamental 
rights at work. The assessment of workers and human rights shall inter alia cover 
the following core labor rights: 
o “Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collec-
tive bargaining 
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o The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour 
o The effective abolition of child labour  
o The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation” 
9) Assessment of Planned Procurement Procedure 
10) Assessment of Budget and Financing 
11) Financial Analysis 
12) Economic Analysis 
In this chapter all economic costs and benefits should be listed, explained and if 
possible quantified. Depending on the type of projects this description should 
include the following aspects: 
o “Direct employment and income generation of beneficiaries.  
o Human resource development; economic growth.  
o Subsidies from local/national budgets (to cover operational deficits) or con-
tribution to the local/national budgets (tax payment from the project ser-
vices).  
o Economic quantification of environmental externalities, e.g. benefits from re-
duced emission of CO2, SO2 and NOx”.  
This means that ideally, conducting a cost-benefit analysis is suggested as part 
of the appraisal, thus taking into account one of the main proposals brought for-
ward by the DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assis-
tance (Chapter 5).  
13) Assessment of Assumptions and Risks 
14) Justification for Danida Support 
In this chapter the relevance of the project for Danida support in the form of 
Danish mixed credit shall be assessed and the project’s compliance with 
Danida’s overall objectives and strategies is to be demonstrated. The latter 
demonstration which can be considered the core part of the expected aid quality 
and development impact shall include at least the following elements: 
o “Poverty reduction/social and economic development: target group(s); living 
conditions; employment; economic growth; income distribution; geography 
(development area).  
o Gender: equality; women’s rights; women in employment.  
o Environment: sustainable development; environmental protection; working 
environment.  
o Democracy: human rights; good governance; anti corruption; HIV/AIDS  
control”.  
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With regard to the relevance of the project for Danish mixed credit the following 
aspects need to be covered in the appraisal report: 
o “The project is in compliance with the recipient country’s poverty reduction 
strategy.  
o Satisfaction of Danida’s overall and cross-cutting objectives.  
o Compliance with Danida Policy for the sector.  
o The project complements one or more Danida (or other donors’) sector pro-
grammes.  
o The project has synergy to Danida’s other business support instruments 
(B2B, IFU, OPP, etc.).  
o Employment generation, specific focus on jobs for women.  
o Contributing to viable economic growth.  
o Contributing to improved working environment and rights at work; employ-
ment conditions.  
o Contributing to improved living conditions.  
o Relevant expertise for project implementation available in Denmark.  
o Project after sales service available in the recipient country.  
o The project is non-commercially viable.  
o The project is organisational, technical and financially sustainable”.  
15) Project Monitoring Indicators 
The appraisal report is expected to set measurable indicators for project moni-
toring.  
o “[B]aseline values for the project output/outcome indicators … 
o Target values for each output/outcome indicator to be met after commission-
ing for the timeframe of 5 years. … 
o Describe the indicator monitoring reporting requirements (normally it shall 
take place yearly for a period of 5 years after commissioning)“ 
16) Summary of Conclusions, Recommendations and Conditions 
17) Next Steps, Actions to be Taken 
These appraisals constitute the main basis for the qualitative assessments and sub-
sequent decision-making on project financing by the Danida’s Grant Committee(s). 
According to the information available, the Committee does not make use of additional 
tools for a systematic assessment of the respective components of the project and 
the weight attached to them in the appraisal.  
Taken together, development and aid quality related aspects are to be addressed 
explicitly in several chapters of the appraisal report (Working Rights, Economic Analy-
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sis, Justification for Danida Support, Monitoring Indicators) and are implicit to the 
chapters on environmental assessment and risk assumption. Thus, development crite-
ria are visibly incorporated in the appraisals which – as mentioned earlier – build the 
basis for decision-making on mixed credit funding. The appraisal templates tend to be 
repetitive with regard to certain aspects – employment generation and working rights 
are, for instance, mentioned in multiple sections of the reports and therefore inflate the 
weight attributed to development impact assessment. 
The standard forms for appraisal reports formally reflect the main elements which are 
laid down in the DAC Principles for Project Appraisal (1988) and referred to by the 
Participants in the Checklist of Development Quality attached to the Arrangement 
(TAD/PG(2013)11). Taking these minimum criteria for project appraisal as benchmark 
it can be concluded that the Danish standard forms for project appraisal contain the 
main components suggested by the DAC for sound appraisal practices (OECD/DAC 
1992: 33-47).  
However, the degree of sophistication of the actual reports following the above out-
lined structure cannot be estimated on the basis of the documents available. Criticism 
voiced in 2002 with regard to the “shallowness” of monitoring indicators seems to be 
at least partially still valid. With regard to the impact of specific projects an evaluation 
team in 2002 argued that neither the projects assessed nor the guidelines for feasibil-
ity studies and appraisal reports issued in 2001 provided information on the type of 
impacts to be expected or the indicators needed to measure the achievement of these 
impacts (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 58). Although output and outcome indicators 
have been further developed since then, they often remain vague.  
11.4.1.2. Approval Process 
From 1996 up to 2011 a specialized committee, the Danish Committee for Mixed 
Credits (CMC), was in charge of screening and approving projects applying for mixed 
credit financing (Danida 2013d; Email Correspondence B1). The CMC consisted of 
eight members who were appointed by the Minister for Development Cooperation 
(Danish MfA/Danida 2002) and who represented a variety of stakeholders: Danish 
Industrial Organization, Economic Council of the Labour Movements, Danish Bankers 
Association, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs/EKF, 
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (Danish MfA/Danida 2011c: 160).  
In order to better integrate mixed credit projects into general Danida activities, this 
specialized Committee was abolished in 2011 and was replaced by the regular 
Danida approval process. For a short period of time the Board for International Devel-
opment Cooperation was in charge of approving mixed credit projects (Interview B11; 
Folketinget 2013). With the new Act on International Development Cooperation (Act 
No. 555 of 18 June 2012) the Board, however, was abolished. Today, Danida Busi-
ness Finance projects are subject to regular Danida procedures and have to be ap-
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proved by either of the two Grant Committees (Appropriation Committee) depending 
on the volume of the project grant (Interview B1; Folketinget 2013 ).   
11.4.1.2.1. Composition of the Internal and External Grant Committee 
A project given positive indication by either the Programme Committee or the Head of 
Development Policy and Global Cooperation (UGS) will be submitted to the External 
Grant Committee for approval (Danida 2013b, 2013d: 8 & Annex 3). 
The External Grant Committee is chaired by the State Secretary for Development 
Policy or the Under-Secretary for Global Development and Cooperation (in case of 
absence of the former). In addition, two staff members at the level of Under-Secretary 
are represented in the committee. While in the Internal Grant Committee only Danida 
staff is represented, the External Grant Committee also includes four external and 
independent members - mainly from academia - who are appointed by the Minister for 
Development Cooperation for a period of three years (Danish MfA/Danida 2013c: 8).  
Minutes available from Grant Committee meetings suggest that mixed credit projects 
are usually presented by the Head/Deputy Head of Danida Business Finance to the 
members of the responsible Committee for approval (Danida 2013b, 2013c).  
11.4.1.2.2. Working Procedures  
In preparation of a Grant Committee meeting, relevant documents are circulated to 
the Committees’ members 10 working days prior to the meeting. Furthermore, the 
grant proposals are uploaded to and published on Danida’s transparency webpage 
(Danish MfA/Danida 2013c: 10). According to the information available, the Commit-
tee bases its decision-making on a qualitative assessment of the results presented in 
the appraisal report and takes into account eventual comments received in the consul-
tation. It appears that the Committee does not use any additional formal quantitative 
assessment tools with the help of which projects are analyzed. Hence the discussions 
within the Grant Committee which are based on the presented appraisal report and 
the project document, lead the Chairman to conclude whether a presented grant 
proposal is either: 
a) “Recommended for approval by the Minister for Development Cooperation 
b) Rejected in order to be submitted later, or 
c) Rejected” (Guidelines for Presentations to the: Programme Committee, Danida 
Grant Committees, Council for Development Policy 2013: 10 et seqq.). 
In general, decision-making on selection and approval of projects seems to be a con-
sensus-seeking procedure (Interview B1, B10). If a project raises concerns with re-
gard to certain aspects, then it is suggested to adapt the project document accord-
ingly and to submit it again at a later stage. In this manner, for instance, it was recom-
mended in the Grant Committee that for a rural electrification project in Ghana the 
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poverty reduction impact as well as the green growth scope of the project should be 
documented before it were re-presented to the External Grant Committee at a later 
stage (Danida 2013c: Agenda Item no. 2). Resulting from the fact that the Committee 
is a dialogue-based forum aiming at consensual decision-making, a formal vote does 
usually not take place (Interview B8, B9, B11).  
11.4.2. Tender Process 
Once a project has been approved by either the Internal or the External Grant Com-
mittee, Danida Business Finance signals to the relevant Ministry in the borrowing 
country to launch the tender process, which will be organized as national competitive 
bidding and will hence only be open for Danish companies. Although the tender pro-
cess is under the responsibility of the authorities in the recipient country, Danida pro-
vides assistance in the tender procedure by assigning an external consultant for tech-
nical assistance in the preparation of tender documents and the tender evaluation 
(Interview B1; Danish MfA/Danida 2007a: 4).  
Moreover, it has to be documented that competitive procurement has taken place and 
demonstrated that the offer which has won the bid is competitive regarding technolo-
gy, price and quality. This information is verified by Danida. In special cases, competi-
tive bidding can be replaced by price verification and direct contract award (Interview 
B1; Danish MfA/Danida 2007a). These cases, however, require approval by Danida 
(Interview B1).  
Danida’s procurement guidelines for mixed credits set out that pre-qualification is to 
be used in selecting and inviting prospective tenderers among those eligible and 
qualified. This process of pre-qualification is expected to result in a sufficient number 
of eligible and qualified tender applications in order to ensure that at least two tenders 
can be obtained. If this is not fulfilled, re-tendering will take place unless otherwise 
approved by Danida (Danish MfA/Danida 2007a: 2). This description suggests that 
international competitive bidding and Danish untied mixed credits only come into play 
if equally this second round does not succeed in attracting sufficient competition.  
During project preparation as well as in the tender procedure Danida tries to be in-
volved at an “arm’s length” distance in order to respect the ownership and responsibil-
ity of the recipient country. Yet, it is important for Danida to ensure that the tender 
procedure is administered fairly and transparently (Interview B1). In this respect, 
Danida has to give no-objections to the tender documents, to the evaluation of the 
tender and, of course, has to approve the resulting final contract (Interview B1; Danish 
MfA/Danida 2007a: 4). The no-objection requirement includes pre-qualification, ten-
der documents and evaluation of the tender (Danida 2013e: 6). 
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Pre-qualification is to be announced publicly “[…] in Denmark and in the Employ-
er’s262 country in sufficient time for potential applicants to obtain the pre-qualification 
documents and submit their application (usually minimum four weeks)”. The buyer is 
expected to send a draft of the announcement to Danida “[…] with a request to ad-
vertise the announcement on Danida’s homepage and in Danish newspaper(s) as 
appropriate”. The same announcement is also to be published by the buyer according 
to the rules in his country (Danish MfA/Danida 2007a: 6). In line with these guidelines, 
tender announcements can be publicly accessed on the homepage of Danida Busi-
ness Finance263 as well on the homepages of Danish embassies in partner countries 
(Interview B1). 
11.5. Monitoring and Evaluation 
11.5.1. Monitoring and Evaluation at Project Level 
As has been described above, the expected developmental relevance and impact of a 
Danida Business Finance project is assessed ex-ante as part of the regular appraisal 
process. Just as any other Danida activity, Danida Business Finance projects are, 
moreover, monitored throughout implementation. In order to ensure satisfactory pro-
ject progress Danida covers the costs for an external consultant who monitors the 
project from the tender process onwards to commissioning and who should also 
ensure that the tender is administered fairly and transparently. Furthermore, at com-
missioning, his/her tasks include to verify whether the installation which is being 
handed over is of good quality and done in accordance with the contract (Interview 
B1, B2, B7). After expiration of the guarantee period the monitoring consultant visits 
the project site once again in order to examine if there have been any unresolved 
issues at commissioning and if so, if they have been solved at this point (Interview 
B1).  
Additionally to project monitoring by an external consultant, the buyer is required to 
report to Danida on key output indicators on an annual basis for five consecutive years 
starting one year after final taking over of the project (Danish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs/Secretariat for Mixed Credits n.s.). The outcome indicators for this ex-post evalu-
ation are individually set in the project document and are as such presented for ap-
proval to Danida’s Grant Committees (Interview B1). Screening available project 
documents presented to the Grant Committees for approval does not allow drawing a 
conclusive assessment of the importance attached to development impact indicators. 
                                                            
262  The term “Employer“ is used by Danida to designate the buyer, i.e. “[t]he contracting authority in whose 
name the pre-qualification process, the tender process and the conclusion and execution of the contract 
are carried out and who will be taking over the Work on completion (Danida 2007a: Annex D-1). 
263  For current tender announcement, please see  
 http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/tender-announcements/ 
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In the project document for a wastewater and sanitation project in Vietnam, for in-
stance, the following project specific impact indicators are included (Danida 2013d): 
 “Reduction in deceases related to wastewater 
 Share of poor with access to sanitation 
 Improvement in the quality of the water in the rivers and the canals.”  
In another project document for rural electrification in Ghana no comparable indica-
tors have been included in the project document (Danida 2013e). The Grant Commit-
tee recommended the responsible desk officer to conduct further analysis and to 
document the poverty reduction impact as well as the green growth scope of the 
project and to re-present it to the External Grant Committee at a later stage (Danida 
2013c, Agenda Item no. 2). The fact that this project was “rejected in order to be 
submitted later” inter alia on grounds of lacking impact indicators strengthens the 
assumption that the latter are considered an integral part of both project planning and 
implementation.  
Additionally to this project specific set of indicators, adherence to the ILO conven-
tions on worker’s rights is required and monitoring thereof is usually part of the Terms 
of Reference of the Danida monitoring and verification consultant (Danida 2013e: 7).  
In addition to these standard monitoring and evaluation procedures, Danida produces 
reviews if a considerable volume of projects exists in a certain sector and or if there is 
a high concentration of projects in a specific country. In such reviews Danida/Danida 
Business Finance pools all projects which have been implemented in a certain sector 
and/or country – for instance all wind-farm projects or projects in water and sanitation 
– and evaluates their effectiveness from the perspective of development policy (Inter-
view B1). 
11.5.2. Evaluation at Program Level 
11.5.2.1. Evaluations of the Danish Mixed Credit Program 1998 and 2002 
The Danish mixed credit program was evaluated twice, in 1998 and in 2002. Only the 
later evaluation report, which was conducted as part of the regular annual evaluation 
program of Danida’s Evaluation Department, is electronically available.  
While the evaluation conducted in 2002 stressed that the mixed credit program ful-
filled the objectives of Danish development cooperation to a varying extent depending 
on the sector as well as the national and local contexts in which specific projects 
were embedded, all individual projects reviewed for the evaluation were found to 
address sector needs and recipient country priorities (Danish MfA/Danida 2002). 
In general the evaluation team identified a trend towards a greater emphasis put on 
aid quality over time, which was reflected in the increased sustainability of more re-
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cent projects. While they saw the strengths of the program it its contribution to tech-
nology and capacity development through trade and investments in situations where 
donor intervention was being phased out, the main weakness of the program was 
found to lie in the considerable amount of donor intervention required in order to en-
sure that projects were appropriately conceived, implemented and operated (Danish 
MfA/Danida 2002: 7, 8). In the evaluation report concern was expressed also with 
regard to the frequently poor quality of background documentation which in turn had 
repercussions on the quality of the decisive appraisal reports. The evaluators argued 
that “[t]here [was] not sufficient local pressure to consistently demand improvement 
in the quality of the studies, which is detrimental to the success of the preparation of 
DMC projects” (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 53). 
Regarding the impact of specific projects, the evaluation team concluded that elabo-
ration on the expected development impact as well as the specification of correspond-
ing indicators were not sufficiently anchored in the program’s guidelines for feasibility 
studies and appraisal reports. The evaluators, however, noted that in 2002 a process 
of developing output and outcome indicators was initiated (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 
58). The need for increased monitoring of project preparation and implementation was 
found to be of particular importance for achieving effectiveness, impact and sustaina-
bility of those projects that “… do not properly integrate capacity transfer” (Danish 
MfA/Danida 2002:55). The evaluation moreover critically noted that the lack of specif-
ic objectives of the program “… leaves room for interpretation on how to strike the 
balance between export promotion and aid quality – including the extent to which 
poverty reduction and the cross-cutting issues could be incorporated in the project 
design” (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 9).  
Overall the evaluators drew nonetheless a positive picture and concluded that “the 
Programme has during its existence experienced an increasing focus on aid quality 
during preparation and implementation”. The evaluators thus argued inter alia that the 
mixed credit program at the time of the evaluation “[…] has struck an appropriate 
balance between export promotion and aid quality” (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 8). 
11.5.2.2. Meta-Evaluation 2004: Private and Business Sector Development 
Interventions 
In addition to the above-mentioned evaluations of the mixed credit program, a Meta-
Evaluation of “Private and Business Sector Development Interventions” was conduct-
ed in 2004. This meta-evaluation report contains a chapter on the mixed credit 
scheme, drawing largely on the afore-mentioned evaluation from 2002.  
With regard to the beneficiaries of the program, the meta-evaluation clearly stated that 
Danish banks and companies are to benefit the most from the granted support (Dan-
ish MfA/Danida 2004: 38, 40). The meta-evaluation reiterated the criticism brought 
forward in the 2002 Evaluation concerning the lack of clearly stated objectives, out-
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puts and indicators for the mixed credit program (Danish MfA/Danida 2004: 37). 
Furthermore, it was highlighted in the report that “[t]he new MCP guidelines from 
2001 do not adequately pursue a comprehensive development perspective. The 
types of impacts to be expected and the indicators needed to ascertain achievement 
of impacts are not clearly specified in the guidelines and, thus, not in the appraisal 
reports” (Danish MfA/Danida 2004: 38).  
11.6. Accountability and Transparency 
The 2012 annual report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that “foreign policy 
is essentially about people, and therefore the MFA must focus on servicing all 
those with an interest in Denmark. In 2013, the cooperation with the business 
community and civil society is to be further developed” (Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2013: 11; original emphasis). To a certain extent this quote reflects also the 
attempt of the recently resigned Minister for Development Co-operation to reinvigor-
ate the Danish “corporatist culture” (Interview B3, B4) and to enhance the transpar-
ency of Danida’s administration and its activities in the field of development coopera-
tion. In his strategy (The Right to a Better Life) transparency and accountability are 
presented as core values of a human rights based approach to development coopera-
tion (The Danish Government 2012: 8, 37).  
11.6.1. Involvement of the Parliament 
In a review of aid management practices in DAC member countries, the OECD/DAC 
found that the Parliament plays an important role “[…] in monitoring the management 
and implementation of foreign assistance programmes” (OECD/DAC 2009: 19). In 
this respect the DAC, emphasized that the Parliament can hold the government ac-
countable for its development commitments both in special hearings and through 
regular parliamentary questions (OECD/DAC 2009: 19).  
Due to the fact that Denmark’s foreign policy and with it development co-operation is 
under the responsibility of the Government “[…] foreign policy is usually not based 
on legislation in the Danish Parliament”264. The parliament (Folketinget), however, 
discusses the Strategy for Development Co-operation and approves the annual Fi-
nance Bill and hence Account 6.3. of the Finance Act which is earmarked for devel-
opment cooperation, and includes the budget for activities under Danida Business 
Finance. In this respect, the Finance Committee needs to be mentioned. This commit-
tee deals “… with issues in the following areas: Finance Bills, Supplementary 
Appropriation Bills, appropriation applications (legal documents and supporting 
documents), Government Loan Bills, the final report from the Public Accounts 
                                                            
264  Please see http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Committees_and_delegations/Committees/URU.aspx 
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Committee regarding the budget, and economic policies in general“ 265. With regard 
to the budget it is moreover worth highlighting that in the Danish system resources 
are usually allocated in two steps. First, Danida’s resources are allocated as part of 
the government’s overall financial budget allocation in connection with the Finance 
Act. In a second step, Danida’s resources are internally allocated “… through the 
overall goals – and targets system (MRS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs“ (Danish 
MfA/Danida 2011d: 7). 
Furthermore, a specialized parliamentary standing committee, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee deals inter alia with development cooperation – notably, however, without 
decision-making power in itself (Interview B2). Although the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee has a broad agenda and tackles all sorts of issues related to national security and 
foreign policy issues, development aid has traditionally played a prominent role in the 
committee’s work266. The 2012 Act on International Development Cooperation, for 
instance, was discussed by the Foreign Affairs Committee before being presented to 
Parliament for approval (Interview B2). 
Furthermore, the Parliament might take part in discussions on geographical priority 
setting of Danish development assistance and in principle has the right to pose ques-
tions (Interview B2, B3). In general, it does not get involved with program details or 
project specific questions (Interview B1, B2, B3, B4). In addition, the DAC report on 
aid management mentioned earlier highlights that in Denmark parliamentarians are 
engaged in development policy, for instance, by arranging field visits by parliamentary 
committees. This concerns especially visits by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Finance Committee to partner countries (OECD/DAC 2009: 19).  
Concerning accountability provisions for the Danish mixed credit scheme, Danida 
produces a yearly report – Danida’s Annual Report – which provides detailed infor-
mation on all activities in the field of Danish development policy in a given year. From 
2007 onwards the “Report from the Danish Committee for Mixed Credits” was incor-
porated in Danida’s annual report. This chapter exclusively dedicated to mixed credits 
also contained a list of projects approved in a given year as well as the annual budget 
frame earmarked for mixed credit activities (Danish MfA/Danida 2008: 108). The 
latest report available in English is the Annual Report from 2011, thus the transfor-
mation of the mixed credit program to Danida Business Finance has not yet been 
captured by any annual report. Furthermore, the structure and format of the annual 
reports have been changed with this 2011 report, which is “published” as an inter-
linked webpage and no longer contains chapters on individual programs. As this 
                                                            
265  The Danish Parliament/Finance Committee: 
http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Committees_and_delegations/Committees/FIU.aspx; emphasis added 
266 Ibid.  
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report was completed, the 2012 electronic version of the annual report was only 
available in Danish (Danida årsberetning 2012267).  
11.6.2. Transparency and Availability of Information 
Danida Business Finance has published detailed instructions for application for mixed 
credit financing and provides a description of procedures and the main steps on its 
homepage. Despite the recent changes in the administration of Danish mixed credits, 
most available documents – with the exception of the “Danida Business Finance 
Broschure” – have not (yet) been updated and thus do not (yet) reflect major changes 
such as the abolishment of the specialized Committee for Mixed Credits268. 
In the attempt to increase transparency in Danish developing cooperation, agendas 
and minutes from meetings of both Grant Committees as well as of the Council for 
Development Policy are publicly available on Danida’s transparency webpage. The 
agenda documents uploaded prior to the meeting contain project documents in the 
case of Danida Business Finance and program strategies respectively. The minutes 
comprise the list of participants and short notes to all items discussed and provide 
information on the approval status of the latter (Danida 2013c). 
As part of the aid transparency initiative, moreover, a program and project database 
was installed, which is, however, only available in Danish. The database allows to track 
all bilateral and multilateral activities – including Danida Business Finance projects – 
which have been approved, are ongoing or were completed in a given year. Therein, 
all Danida activities are divided by country and sector according to the definitions and 
sector codes of the OECD/DAC269. In addition, the database provides the description 
of the project and its administration, information on volume and risk elements, and 
should provide monitoring and impact indicators. Notably, in the case of Danida Busi-
ness Finance projects, these indicators are mostly missing. In a more compact format, 
the “Project Pipeline” for Danida Business Finance contains information on the volume 
and main objectives of a Danida Business Finance project270.  
11.6.3. Stakeholder Consultation  
Stakeholder consultation appears to be a firmly established practice in the Danish 
public administration in general and also in the field of development cooperation (In-
terview B2, B3, B4). Although, according to one observer, less nuanced than it used 
to be in the past decades, the Danish public system is frequently referred to as a 
“mixed public administration” in the sense that an open consultation culture is preva-
                                                            
267  For the report please see http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-vi/aarsberetning2012/overblik/ 
268  Danida Business Finance, Guidelines: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/business/finance/guidelines/ 
269  For the project-and program database please see http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-vi/program-og-
projektorientering-ppo/ 
270  For the project pipeline please see http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-vi/aarsberetning2012/overblik/ 
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lent and interest groups are invited to take part in policy-making by being represented 
in advisory bodies and on boards (Interview B3). In an article in the Danish Foreign 
Policy Yearbook, Lars Engberg-Pedersen states that a great variety of stakeholders – 
unions, employers’ associations, NGOs and other interest groups – have a legitimate 
right to pursue their interests in relation to development cooperation and argues that 
few development ministers have dared to neglect these. According to the author this 
allows the government to fight-off criticisms from interest groups and helps to attract 
public support for its policies. He concludes his argument by saying that “the corpo-
ratist tradition has accordingly created both a relative consensus among major stake-
holders concerning Danish development policies and a tradition for politicians to 
signal particular Danish values in relation to development cooperation“ (Engberg-
Pedersen 2009: 128).  
In general, the incorporation of external stakeholders takes place both in an institu-
tionalized form, i.e. by providing interest groups seats in advisory bodies (e.g. Council 
for Development Policy), and on a case-by-case basis through mandatory and “spon-
taneous” consultation meetings on specific programs/projects.  
At a programming and policy-setting level, the newly introduced Council for Develop-
ment Policy with its 15 members from trade unions, private sector professional asso-
ciations, from research and civil society organization figures as illustration of this insti-
tutionalized form of “corporatist practice”271 in designing policies and strategies272 
(Danish MfA/Danida 2013c: 11). Future changes in the Danish mixed credit policies, 
for instance, would be discussed by the Council. In principle, this would provide a 
wide range of stakeholders with the possibility to express their ideas on the program 
(Interview B2, B3). Furthermore, proposals for sub-strategies made by the Council to 
the Minister would influence the orientation of Danida Business Finance which cur-
rently is to be aligned with the strategic framework on growth and employment as well 
as the sub-strategy on natural resources, energy and climate. 
At the level of project selection and approval under Danida Business Finance, stake-
holder consultation has seemingly decreased since the new administrative structure 
has been put in place. With the abolition of the Committee for Mixed Credits and later 
of the Board on International Development Cooperation – two bodies involving a great 
variety of stakeholders – the Danish mixed credit scheme, in particular in its implemen-
tation, became somewhat inward-bound and less open to the outside influence of 
stakeholders (Interview B11). The new decision-making bodies – the Internal and 
External Grant Committees – consist either exclusively of Danida staff or include four 
external advisors from academia. While this incorporation of Danida Business Finance 
                                                            
271  This term is used by Engberg-Pedersen in his article in the Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009. 
272  For information on the Council for Development Policy please see http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-
danida/danida-transparency/danida-documents/council-for-development-policy/ 
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into the regular Danida procedures is presented as a step towards the de-
fragmentation of the aid system, the reduced involvement of external stakeholders that 
came along with this integration seems to be somehow contradictory to the erstwhile 
Minister’s attempt of strengthening the corporatist culture through transparency and 
new public consultation mechanisms. 
At the project level, one particular institutionalized consultation mechanism, however, 
remains in place for project grants above DKK 35 million. The mandatory public con-
sultation process for large projects allows external stakeholders to express their views 
and concerns by commenting on the concept notes which Danida uploads to its 
transparency website 16 working days prior to the Grant Committee meeting. The 
comments received during this approximately ten day consultation period are subse-
quently discussed by the Danida Programme Committee which is responsible for the 
preliminary screening of (large) projects. The summary and conclusions of the meet-
ing, which are also to be found on Danida’s transparency webpage, shall reflect antic-
ipated modifications in further project planning and design that were made on the 
basis of comments received in consultations273. 
Certainly, the institutionalized character of consultations is to be welcomed and can 
be interpreted as an expression of the system’s “culture of compromise”. However, 
the extent to which the views expressed by different interest groups with regard to 
specific mixed credit projects or the program per se are truly taken into account re-
mains open for further investigation. As of now, it seems that, for instance, the Danish 
Industry regularly approaches Danida or is being approached by Danida with regard 
to the mixed credit program (Interview B11), while no major NGOs seem to be partic-
ularly involved with this specific form of development cooperation/finance.  
11.7. Conclusion and Outlook 
Denmark is often considered as one of the leading donors in the OECD living up to 
most of the non-binding principles agreed upon by the members of the organization’s 
Development Assistance Committee. For decades, Denmark has striven to remain 
among the “front-runners” in terms of relative aid volumes, by maintaining its aid level 
above the 0.7 % international GNI target (Lancaster 2008: 32). This case study has 
taken a closer look at one of the instruments behind Denmark’s traditionally high ODA 
figures – the Danish mixed credit program called Danida Business Finance – and 
aimed at assessing the development orientation of this instrument which is located at 
the interface of export promotion and development policy.  
Since the inception of the Danish Mixed Credit Programme in 1993, this hybrid in-
strument has undergone several transformations. The corresponding organizational 
and procedural changes – the latest of which were made in 2012/2013 – entailed an 
                                                            
273  Danida’s Transparency webpage: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/danida-transparency/ 
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ever-growing emphasis put on the development orientation/development policy as-
pects in the design of the program. Today, Danida Business Finance is formally inte-
grated in the organizational structures and procedures of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs/Danida and is located institutionally within Danida’s Green Growth Department. 
Correspondingly, Danida Business Finance is guided by Denmark’s overall develop-
ment strategy (The Right to a Better Life) and is (to be) aligned with its sub-strategies, 
most notably the Strategic Framework for Priority Area Growth and Employment as 
well as the Strategic Framework for Priority Area Natural Resources, Energy, and 
Climate Change. Derived from these strategies Danida Business Finance pursues the 
overall objectives of Denmark’s development cooperation and in particular aims at 
providing financing for large infrastructure projects to thereby contribute to sustaina-
ble, green and inclusive growth and employment creation in the recipient country. 
Engaging the (Danish) private sector to steer development processes is seen as an 
important way of leveraging aid and of transferring technology and know-how. The 
accruing benefit and presumed competitive advantage for Danish companies are not 
explicitly highlighted in most official program descriptions.  
Both the alignment of Danida Business Finance with Danida’s partner countries and 
its focus on green growth are not yet reflected in available statistical data on the dis-
tribution of Danish mixed credit commitments. In the period 2000-2012 commitments 
for tied mixed credits for a total of 23 countries have been reported by Danida to the 
DAC’s Creditor Reporting System. Among these, Mozambique, Sri Lanka and China 
can be identified as the three main beneficiaries of tied Danish mixed credits. With the 
new geographical focus on Danida priority countries a consolidation of the focus on 
Low Income Countries is to be expected. Both China (which has been graduating in 
accordance with the Arrangement’s provisions) and Sri Lanka are not among the 
priority countries and are no longer eligible for mixed credit support. Thus, the compo-
sition of recipient countries can be expected to change over the next decade or so, 
entailing a growing share of LICs and LDCs, respectively, among the recipient coun-
tries. In the same period (2000-2012), mixed credit commitments in 16 different sec-
tors were reported by Danida. The three largest sectors in this period were transport 
and storage, water supply and sanitation and energy, followed by projects in commu-
nications as well as in industry. It remains to be seen if the recently introduced prioriti-
zation of climate friendly and clean technology will have substantial effects on the 
sectoral distribution of mixed credit commitments by Danida.  
This incorporation of Danish mixed credits into regular Danida procedures is reflected 
in the project selection and approval process. In order for mixed credit projects to 
comply with overall Danida activities and policy standards, the project appraisals 
include mandatory on-site visits by external consultants. The resulting reports which 
build the basis for project approval by the regular Danida Grant Committees are ex-
pected inter alia to demonstrate compliance with Danida’s overall strategies and 
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activities and to provide an ex-ante assessment of the developmental impact of the 
potential project. Furthermore, mixed credit projects, like other Danida activities, are 
monitored during the entire project cycle and must fulfill minimum standards for ex-
post evaluation. In recent years notable efforts have been made to increase the trans-
parency of the Danish mixed credit program. For instance, all projects can be found in 
Danida’s program and project database, and both agendas (ex-ante) and minutes (ex-
post) of Grant Committee meetings – the decision-making body at the project level – 
are available on Danida’s transparency webpage. In addition, external stakeholders are 
invited to participate in public consultations as part of the screening and approval 
process (in the case of project grants above DKK 35 million). Despite these efforts, 
the program as such, just as individual projects financed under it, remains largely 
outside the realm of public debate.  
The Danish Danida Business Finance is a hybrid instrument which claims to ‘kill two 
birds with one stone’. Yet, assessing the institutional embedding of the Danish mixed 
credit program, the distribution of political responsibilities and the parameters of the 
program’s implementation suggests that considerable attention is directed to the 
development policy components and goals of this hybrid instrument. Thus, consider-
ing the institutional set-up, the project approval procedures as well as the program’s 
monitoring and evaluation guidelines, Danida Business Finance projects can be ex-
pected to demonstrate a high level of development orientation. The recent geograph-
ical focus put on Danida priority countries will presumably further increase the weight 
attributed to the development policy components of the program. Export promotion 
interests are reflected in the instrument at least in so far as the great bulk of Danish 
mixed credits is conditional upon procurement of goods and services from Danish 
companies. A more conclusive assessment of the development orientation of Danida 
Business Finance and the individual projects financed under the program would re-
quire closer examination of the mechanisms at work in the project identification and 
initiation phase.  
In spite of the organizational and procedural incorporation of the mixed credit program 
into Danida’s overall structures, one overt contradiction to Denmark’s role as “the 
good student in the DAC” is still inherent to the instrument: its tied nature. Resulting 
from the fact that tied mixed credits are always the default option and the accordingly 
insignificant number of untied projects approved, the untied mixed credit scheme is 
rather negligible. As has been briefly addressed, with regard to mixed credits Denmark 
replied to the OECD-wide trend towards the untying of aid in two steps. First, in 2002 
an untied window of the facility was introduced. The scope of this untied program is, 
however, limited by the fact that international competitive bidding is required only in 
those cases, in which restricted national bidding has not been sufficiently competitive. 
In a second step, in 2005 Danida changed its domestic content requirements for 
mixed credit financing and thereby changed its perception of “tied” under the Danida 
Business Finance program (Interview B1). While previously 50 % Danish content was 
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required, any such threshold was removed – the criterion of relying on the procure-
ment of goods and services from a Danish company, however, was maintained (Dan-
ish MfA/Danida 2006: 51). Ever since these changes were made, it seems that con-
troversial discussions on the tying of mixed credits have faded, notably at both the 
governmental and the non-governmental level. To a certain extent this reflects the 
above mentioned generally low level of public involvement in or discussions about the 
mixed credit program. The overall consensus on the political level appears to be that 
the mixed credit program due to its small share of Danish overall ODA, neither reduc-
es the effectiveness of Denmark’s aid nor harms the country’s reputation as a leading 
donor (Interview B1). On the contrary, this is argued to allow Denmark to create 
greater leverage of invested aid resources and to ensure support for development 
expenditures from important national stakeholders. In this vein, the program is per-
ceived as the part of development assistance by means of which Danida can effective-
ly engage the Danish business community to participate in Danida’s development 
strategy (Interview B1). Ingrained in this argument is the idea that incentives are 
needed for the private sector to participate. Similarly, both of these arguments are 
taken up in the 2011 DAC Peer Review of Denmark which addressed relics of tied 
aid, notably the mixed credit scheme and Danida Business Partnerships (OECD/DAC 
2011c). The review notes that Denmark considers these programs which together 
account for approximately 3 % of Denmark’s total ODA as “[…] constructive contribu-
tions to creating growth and employment in recipient countries. Denmark is aware of 
this transgression against the rules and has responded partially to the 2007 peer 
review recommendation by allowing the contractor flexibility in the procurement of 
goods and services and placing greater focus on projects in the poorest countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. However, according to Denmark, the public support benefits 
that accrue from these instruments justify their continued existence” (OECD/DAC 
2011c: 66, 67).  
Following this line of reasoning, it comes as little surprise that the untying of the mixed 
credit program and a notable shift towards the program’s untied window is not antici-
pated in the near future. Quite on the contrary, it seems that the mixed credit program 
is perceived as a way of integrating trade, aid and other policy fields in a more holistic 
approach towards development policy. It appears, however, that without increases in 
budgetary allocations to the program, the level of projects annually supported cannot 
be sustained. Due to a combination of the currently very low interest rates as well as 
the increased focus on LDCs, higher grants are required in order to meet the Ar-
rangement’s concessionality provisions. These developments entail a reduction of the 
leverage effect of this hybrid instrument, threatening its presumed cost-effectiveness. 
An untying of the program – which would reduce its costs as the Arrangement’s 
concessionality requirements would no longer apply – does not, however, seem to be 
a policy option for the time being. This might not at last be due to the fact that the 
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project pipeline of concessional credit programs, for instance, in Norway and Finland, 
dried out rather quickly after they had been untied.  
Concerning the future of the Danish mixed credit program, the ramifications of the 
recent shift towards Danida priority countries paired with the newly set focus on pro-
jects within Danida’s green growth agenda remain to be seen. At present it appears 
that the recent policy changes (especially the new emphasis put on green growth) 
have created some degree of uncertainty in the business community. If not better 
communicated, this could lead to an underutilization of the Danida Business Finance 
instrument. Considering the fact that several interviewees described Danida Business 
Finance as an instrument of particular use for smoothening the phasing out of devel-
opment aid in stronger developing countries, its usefulness for its newly prioritized 
poorer partner countries remains to be seen.  
Without doubt the future of Danida Business Finance will significantly depend on the 
future of Danish development cooperation more generally. With regard to the strategic 
orientation of the latter, the recent cabinet-reshuffle of February 2014 and the con-
comitant substitution of the cabinet-level post of a Minister for Development Coopera-
tion by a Minister for Trade and Development Cooperation will have to be considered. 
Whether these changes at the Ministerial level will entail reforms favoring Danish 
commercial interests and will have repercussions also on the strategic orientation of 
Danida Business Finance remains to be seen.  
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12. Germany 
All over Europe development budgets have continuously been cut within the last years 
in reaction to the economic crisis in 2008/2009. Germany is one of the few countries, 
which recently has decided to increase the development budget by EUR 2 billion 
between 2014 and 2017. Despite this decision, it will be relatively difficult for Germa-
ny to live up with its commitment to meet the ODA/GNI-target of 0.7 % by 2015274. 
The new Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Gerd Müller 
(CSU), who has been in office since December 2013, now has the opportunity to 
show how these funds will be implemented in near future. The former minister Dirk 
Niebel (FDP), who was in office between 2009 and 2013, had his focus on fostering 
sustainable economic development as well as democracy and human rights within 
German Bilateral Development Cooperation (BMZ 2013a: 49-69). 
Under Niebel’s era, German development policy aimed at improving the relationship 
between foreign trade and development cooperation and specifically their contribution 
to poverty reduction via economic growth and private sector development. Moreover, 
an emphasis was put on innovative finance for development; here the KfW 
Bankengruppe has been playing a major role as one of the world’s largest bilateral 
finance institutions for development (BMZ 2011). 
This is reason enough to analyze the developmental orientation of the portfolio of the 
KfW Development Bank, which is implementing the German Financial Cooperation. 
Furthermore, Germany has recently been sharply criticized by civil society actors for 
leveraging their budget funds with funds raised at the capital markets (Terre des 
Hommes 2012: 14-17). In addition, Germany has triggered a debate about the defini-
tion of concessionality in the OECD with its ODA reporting practice; both will be part 
of this case study. 
There have always been close linkages between development cooperation and foreign 
trade in Germany, thus some country facts and figures as well as the institutional set-
up will be illustrated before analyzing the German Financial Cooperation more thor-
oughly. 
                                                            
274  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/20131223-1en 
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12.1. Country Facts and Figures  
12.1.1. Economy and Foreign Trade 
Being the third largest exporter and importer in the world, Germany is a trading nation, 
accounting for more than half of the European Union’s international trade. In Europe, 
Germany is the largest national economy, providing the fourth-largest economy by 
nominal GDP worldwide (USD 3167 trillion, 2012 et.)275.  
Much of Germany’s exports focus on manufactured goods and services. In particular 
German mechanical engineering products, vehicles, and chemicals are highly valued 
internationally; e.g. Germany is the leading producer of wind turbines and solar power 
technology in the world. Around one Euro in four is earned from exports and more 
than every fifth job depends directly or indirectly on foreign trade276. 
The most important market for Germany is the European Union; about 57 % of all 
goods and services were delivered to its member states in 2012; followed by Asia 
with a share of 16 % and North and South America, with a share of approximately 
12 %277. The top countries of destination of German exports were France, followed by 
USA, UK and the Netherlands in 2012; most imports to Germany came from the 
Netherlands, China, France and the USA (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 2). 
In 2012, all German exported goods accounted for USD 1416.2 billion, whereas 
imported goods made up USD 1173.3 billion; thus, the export surplus was about 
USD 243.2 billion. Exports of goods and services account for 51.8 % of GDP. Apart 
from the financial crisis in 2008/2009, exports as a percentage of GDP have steadily 
risen within the last years.278 
In comparison to these economic indicators, the German Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) was about USD 14.533 billion in 2011, equivalent to 0.39 % of GNI; 
preliminary data for 2012 show a slight decrease to 0.38 % of GNI. In real terms, this 
represents a 5.9 % increase over 2010; nevertheless Germany is among the seven 
members of the EU that have not met the 0.51 % ODA/GNI target for 2010 set by the 
EU (OECD/DAC 2012d: 3, 6 & 2013a: 200).  
                                                            
275  CIA, The World Fact Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html 
276 Information Portal Economywatch: http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/germany/export-
import.html 
277  Destatis, German Federal Statistical Office: 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPartners/ 
Current.html 
278  OECD: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-germany_20752288-table-deu 
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12.1.2. Development Cooperation 
Germany’s development cooperation policy is underpinned by the coalition agreement 
that covers each legislative period and the budget procedure; in particular the budget 
act passed by the Bundestag each year (OECD/DAC 2010).  
The coalition agreement from 2009 defines the following key sectors for German 
development cooperation: good governance, education and training, health, rural 
development, protection of the climate, the environment and natural resources, and 
economic cooperation279. The agreement expresses the willingness to work towards 
achieving the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target. 
Under the overall policy and decision-making authority of the Federal Chancellor, the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) guides German 
development policy and financing. Hence, the oversight of German development 
cooperation is vested in the BMZ, with implementation carried out by a range of dif-
ferent ministries, federal states (Länder), agencies and “implementing organizations“ 
(EuropeAid 2013: 2). 
The BMZ has its own budget line, which forms part of the federal budget and denotes 
expenditure items for the running year. To increase predictability, some budget items 
include minimum expenditure volumes (“commitment appropriations”), usually for the 
following two to five years. Breakdowns of bilateral cooperation by region and sector 
are confidentially provided to Parliament but not published280. 
Germany’s development priorities are outlined in its overarching policy document, 
“Minds for Change“ from 2011. This policy outlines five key areas: strengthening 
Africa, particularly through the promotion of the private sector; sustainable energy for 
poverty reduction; climate friendly development; helping fragile states; and the promo-
tion of innovative global leadership (BMZ 2011: 10-12; OECD/DAC 2012d: 1). 
Within the last years, the federal government carried out organizational and structural 
reforms of the German aid structure in order to streamline processes and further 
improve aid effectiveness. This particularly involved the German technical cooperation; 
here three organizations have been consolidated to form GIZ, the German Agency for 
International Cooperation in 2011. The foundation of DEval, the German Institute for 
Development Evaluation, in 2012 has been one of the latest institutional reforms. 
12.1.2.1. Financial and Technical Cooperation 
Apart from Technical Cooperation (TC), the Financial Cooperation (FC) is one of the 
most important instruments of German development policy. Its main task is to support 
                                                            
279  In the coalition agreement from 2013 rural development, health, education and training, protection of the 
climate, environment and natural resources, energy, civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-
conflict peace building are defined as thematic focuses. 
280  Information Portal SEEK Development: http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/germany/budget-process 
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partner countries in the financing of measures which are important for their develop-
ment. These might be investments in the education or health system of the country, in 
the water supply and wastewater system, in the energy sector, in climate protection or 
agriculture281. 
Within the framework of FC, the BMZ provides support in the form of financial pay-
ments, in particular subsidized loans, equity capital and grants, which are non-
refundable (BMZ 2007: 10). The KfW Entwicklungsbank (Development Bank), which 
works on behalf of the German federal government, is the executing agency of the 
BMZ and responsible for project appraisals and implementing projects under Finan-
cial Cooperation282. 
If investments of this sort are to lead to lasting improvements, they must be accompa-
nied by reforms. For this reason, FC is very often conducted in close coordination with 
other German development cooperation activities, e.g. technical assistance with the 
German Development Agency (GIZ), or broader international initiatives283. 
One way of providing funds for projects in developing countries is by combining capi-
tal market loans with grants. Germany uses this instrument in both bilateral and Euro-
pean financial cooperation. This case study will consider these bilateral “blending“ 
activities of Germany. 
12.1.2.2. Programming of Bilateral Cooperation 
Regional as well as country strategies are the management instruments within the 
German bilateral development cooperation; both are developed in close cooperation 
with the developing countries which receive assistance.  
The regional strategies link the BMZ’s development policy principles or aims, and the 
individual country strategies. Country strategies are the key for country-level imple-
mentation; up to three priority areas are defined and negotiated between Germany 
and the recipient country. The framework and guidelines for these negotiations are 
basically provided by the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) drawn up 
by the recipient countries, and by the agreed priority areas of bilateral cooperation.  
The negotiated strategies, objectives and priority areas of cooperation form the basis 
of the German bilateral cooperation. Programs or projects within Financial Coopera-
tion or Technical Cooperation build upon the between Germany and the recipient 
country agreed priority areas and are based on intergovernmental agreements284. 
“Thus we ensure that they [‚the projects’, author’s note] are always embedded in the 
partner's development policy goals and priorities and are not just isolated solutions. It 
                                                            
281  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/approaches/ 
financial_cooperation 
282  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/ministry/structure/index.html 
283  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/service/glossary/F/finanzielle_zusammenarbeit.html 
284  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/laenderkonzentration/index.html 
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is essential for us that our commitment functions well and is shared in cooperation 
with the efforts of other donors“, explains an interview partner with regards to the 
coordinated approach of the German bilateral cooperation, which often includes 
European and international development cooperation (Interview C1). 
The priority areas, which are closely aligned with the key sectors of German develop-
ment cooperation and the individual country strategies, differ from country to country 
(Interview C1). In Vietnam, for example, sustainable economic development (including 
vocational training), environmental protection and conservation of natural resources 
(including adaptation to climate change) and health care are the priority areas285.  
12.1.2.3. Country and Sector Concentration 
The official German development cooperation concentrates on 50 program partner 
countries. The assistance has officially been cut from 120 developing countries to the 
above mentioned number within the last five to ten years in order to enhance aid ef-
fectiveness according to the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness and recommenda-
tions made by the OECD/DAC in corresponding reviews286.  
The following table illustrates the bilateral development cooperation in the context of 
country programs287. 
Table 13: Bilateral Development Cooperation in the Context of Country Programs 
Region Partner Country 
Asia 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Viet Nam 
South Eastern Europe / 
Caucasus 
Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Ukraine 
Latin America and the 
Carribean 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru 
Middle East Egypt, Palestinian Territories, Yemen 
Africa 
Ethopia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Cameroon, 
Kenya, D.R. Kongo, Mali, Malawi, Morocco, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Zambia, South 
Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda 
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ288 
                                                            
285  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/asien/vietnam/zusammenarbeit.html 
286  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/laenderkonzentration/index.html 
287  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/laenderkonzentration/tabelle_neu.html 
288  Ibid. 
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As illustrated in the table above, Africa will remain the main focus of German devel-
opment cooperation in regional terms. Almost half of all partner countries (24) are in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
According to the latest OECD DAC mid-term review (2012), in 2010 German’s top 
ten ODA-recipients included nine Middle Income Countries. “This ODA-allocation 
pattern is unique among DAC members and is partly a reflection of Germany’s in-
creasing use of concessional loans as part of differentiated development partnerships, 
the increasing engagement of other ministries in emerging economies and an out-
come of Germany’s strategy for working with emerging economies for the purpose of 
global and regional development and its policy of focusing on global public goods, 
such as climate and food security“ (OECD/DAC 2012d: 3). 
Sector Concentration 
According to the Annual Report of the KfW Development Bank from 2012, the great-
est share of Financial Cooperation (FC) commitments by priority development sector 
is allocated to social infrastructure (40 %), followed by the financial sector (24 %) and 
economic infrastructure (22 %) (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2012a: 45).  
In comparison, in 2007 social infrastructure had a share of 24 %, the financial sector 
had about 32 %, and economic infrastructure accounted 28 % (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2007a: 77). In 2002, the social sector had about 40 %, followed 
by economic infrastructure (27 %) the financial sector (12 %), and the producing 
sector (7 %) (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2002: 58). 
Figure 12.1 illustrates the KfW commitments by priority development sector in 2012.  
Figure 12.1: KfW Commitments by Priority Development Sector 2012 
 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank Annual Report 2012: 45 
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In the area of social infrastructure the KfW Development Bank supported in 2012 
projects and programs in the German government’s priority areas, which encompass 
particularly to water supply, solid waste management and sanitation, health-care sys-
tems and education. The financial sector mostly includes commitments to the micro-
finance sector. KfW funded in 2012 environmental loans and supported microfinance 
institutions. Apart from transport and communications, renewable energy use and 
efficient, climate friendly use of energy were the focus of most projects in the area of 
economic infrastructure (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2012a: 45). 
The KfW Development Bank has been working in climate protection and adjustment 
to climate change for more than twenty years; e.g. committed a total of EUR 7 billion 
for cross-sectoral environmental and climate protection between 1997 and 2007 
(KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007a: 3-4).  
However, both areas expired by the end of the nineties in terms of approved projects 
(Interview C1). Due to global warming and climate change global responsibility for 
climate protection has again become an important topic and prompted Germany to re-
announce supporting proposals and projects in the area of climate protection and 
energy (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007a: 9-13).  
The strategic refocus on climate protection and energy had a remarkable impact on 
the funds being used within the Financial Cooperation; they have led to an increased 
use of interest-reduced loans (Interview C1).  
12.2. Profile of Financial Cooperation  
The Financial Cooperation (FC) is part of the official German Development Coopera-
tion. Hence, the objectives, strategies and priority areas of Germany’s Development 
Policy are the framework, in which the Financial Cooperation is being done. Unlike the 
Technical Assistance, the Financial Cooperation is completely untied. In other words, 
financial loans are in principle not tied to goods and services from German companies 
(Interview C2, C1). 
12.2.1. Legal Background/History 
As Germany‘s Development Policy is not defined by law, but underpinned by the 
coalition agreement that covers each legislative period and the budget procedure, 
there are administrative rules and different policy documents that guide the KfW De-
velopment Bank as executing agency.  
The main policy document “Guidelines for bilateral financial and technical cooperation 
with partner countries of German development cooperation“ includes procedures and 
competences that bind the government, executing agencies and other involved actors 
(BMZ 2008). Thus, BMZ and KfW Development Bank have to act upon these regula-
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tions in order to initiate, assess, finance, monitor and evaluate financial cooperation 
projects (Dann 2012: 144-145).  
The KfW Development Bank has executed the Financial Cooperation on the basis of 
the “General Contract“ since 1961. The Bank’s mandate is to develop project pro-
posals, and to finance, monitor and evaluate projects which have been approved by 
the BMZ.  
12.2.2. Institutional Environment  
Several actors are involved within the framework of the German bilateral financial 
cooperation (FC). In this set-up, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) is the key actor. 
BMZ 
Being in charge of the German development policy and financing, the BMZ not only 
provides FC support in the form of financial payments, but oversees the programming 
of bilateral financial development cooperation. This programming includes the devel-
opment of regional and country strategies in general, government negotiations regard-
ing priority sectors and concrete projects as well as the setting up of procedures, 
terms and conditions of Financial Cooperation instruments. 
The BMZ was established as Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation in 1962. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (BMWi) and the Federal For-
eign Office (AA) still were in charge of development assistance; the BMWi for finan-
cial assistance and the AA for technical assistance. In general, fostering foreign trade 
policy was the principal motive that triggered Germany to provide development assis-
tance back in the 1950ies (Dann 2012: 44-45).  
It was Minister Erhard Eppler (1969-1974) who succeeded in constituting develop-
ment policy as a relatively autonomous policy field by disburding development assis-
tance from its subordination of foreign trade policy. Main competences included inter 
alia the political responsibility for the financial assistance and final decision-making 
powers regarding project approvals. Nevertheless, the BMZ had to consult other 
institutions before giving approval but the Interministerial Committee (IMC) which had 
decided upon project approvals of financial assistance under the responsibility of the 
BMWi was abolished (Dann 2012: 61-63). 
In the 1980ies German development policy again became an instrument of Germany’s 
own interests and thus, of general German foreign policy. To this end, German devel-
opment policy was subordinated and exploited by economic and foreign policy. This 
means that development loans were tied to goods and services from German compa-
nies, which were also more actively involved in identifying and defining new projects 
(Dann 2012: 81-82). 
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In 1993, the BMZ was renamed to Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and thus considered “development” in its name for the very first time. 
Nevertheless, the 1990ies were characterized by an excessive politicization and con-
ditionalization of development cooperation. Although the BMZ’s competencies were 
formally stabilized, the ministry was continuously losing them to the German Develop-
ment Agency GTZ (nowadays GIZ), which had been founded in 1975 (Dann 2012: 
83).  
Though Minister Heidimarie Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) was in office in 1998-2009 and 
had the possibility to influence decisions of the government as a member of the cabi-
net, the degree of influence and weight of the BMZ in the government is a matter of 
debate because it was challenging to improve the relationship between development 
cooperation and foreign policy, in particular security and defense policy289. 
Moreover, the ministry underwent two reorganizational reforms (2003, 2010) in order 
to strengthen the efficiency of development cooperation as well as to ensure the 
implementation of the new main political focal points, economic development and 
education (OECD/DAC 2010: 64-65). Further, the BMZ has been strengthened with 
the addition of 196 new jobs in the last couple of years (this represents an unprece-
dented increase in the staffing level of 30 %). Herewith, BMZ in particular stretched 
its organizational capacity at field level by additional 46 cooperation officers in partner 
countries (OECD/DAC 2012d: 3-4). 
Today, the terms and conditions governing the awarding of Financial Cooperation 
funds are laid down by the BMZ in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Finance 
(BMF), the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economics and 
Technology (BMWi)290 every year. They take into account the specific economic situa-
tion and the debt sustainability of each individual developing country291. 
The following figure illustrates the institutional set-up of the German bilateral Financial 
Cooperation, including its main actors and processes: 
  
                                                            
289  Die ZEIT, German Newspaper: http://www.zeit.de/2003/30/Entwicklungspol_ 
290  In December 2013, the Ministry was recreated as Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (Coalition 
Agreement 2013). 
291  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/approaches/ 
financial_cooperation 
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Figure 12.2: Institutional Set-up of the German Bilateral Financial Cooperation 
Source: BMZ n.s.: Slide 12 
Figure 12.2 illustrates that intergovernmental agreements between the BMZ, which 
acts on behalf of the Federal Government and the governments of the corresponding 
partner countries are the basis for the official bilateral Financial Cooperation.  
KfW Development Bank 
The KfW Development Bank is another key actor. The bank is part of the KfW Bank-
ing Group (KfW Bankengruppe, formerly Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) and con-
ducts Germany’s financial cooperation with developing countries on behalf of BMZ. 
The KfW Development Bank audits and implements loans and grants allocated to 
them from the federal budget. Furthermore, the KfW Development Bank complements 
federal government funds by raising additional resources on the capital market and 
deploying these for German development and climate protection finance292. 
The KfW Banking Group is a body under public law, which was founded in 1948. This 
law was amended upon the implementation of the Financial Cooperation in 1961. 
Since 1966, the KfW has acted upon the general mandate signed between the Fed-
eral Government (BMZ) and the KfW Development Bank. The contract covers finance 
and management of resources, monitoring and reporting requirements and has been 
amended most recently in the year 2009 (Dann 2012: 142). 
The DEG (founded in 1962, “Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft”) is 
one of the KfW Banking Group’s subsidiaries. In contrast to the KfW Development 
                                                            
292  KfW Entwicklungsbank: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-
Entwicklungsbank/About-us/Unser-Unternehmen/ 
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Bank, the DEG’s main activities are private sector development which includes financ-
ing and structuring of investments of companies and other private sector projects in 
developing and transition countries293. 
Another subsidiary of the KfW Banking Group is the KfW IPEX-Bank. Being a tradi-
tional export bank, it provides medium to long-term international project and export 
finance solutions. Further, the bank “is responsible for providing finance to support the 
German and European Economy, a task derived from the legal mandate assigned to 
the KfW Bankengruppe”294. 
The executive bodies of the KfW Group are the Executive Board and the Board of 
Supervisory Directors. The Executive Board has six members, currently three of them 
are experienced bankers with a background in law and business administration; others 
have expertise in agriculture, consulting and privatization. At least two board members 
are part of political parties (CDU, SPD). 
“The Board of Supervisory Directors and its committees supervise the conduct of the 
bank's business and the administration of its assets. The main tasks for which it holds 
responsibility are the appointment and dismissal of members of the Executive Board, 
the approval of the financial statements as well as the planning and selection of the 
auditor to be proposed by the Supervisory Authority.”295 
The Board of Supervisory Directors has three committees. Whereas the Executive 
Committee deals with legal and administrative matters, the Credit Committee con-
cerns itself with credit matters. Members of the Board of Supervisory Directors in-
clude inter alia representatives of business associations (BDI, DIHK) and trade unions 
(e.g. DGB). 
Environmental and climate protection, financial system development as well as water 
supply and sewage disposal are the key priority areas of the KfW Development Bank; 
main objectives are the promotion of reform processes, investments, consultancy and 
support service in cooperation with governments and state institutions296.  
Partner Country 
Another important key actor is the partner country including its corresponding institu-
tions. The German bilateral Financial Cooperation primarily provides financing for 
projects and programs in the public sector (social sector, economic development and 
financial sector), thus the government and/or government-related enterprises are 
mainly involved in such projects. 
                                                            
293  DEG: https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Die-DEG/Unternehmen/ 
294  KfW IPEX Bank: https://www.kfw-ipex-bank.de/International-financing/KfW-IPEX-Bank/About-KfW-IPEX-
Bank/Self-image-and-mission/ 
295  KfW Entwicklungsbank: https://www.kfw.de/KfW-Group/About-KfW/Vorstand-und-Gremien/Vorstand/ 
296  KfW Entwicklungsbank: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-
Entwicklungsbank/About-us/Unser-Unternehmen/ 
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The Ministry of Finance or another relevant Ministry dealing with the coordination of 
development cooperation usually acts as the counterpart in the partner country. The 
Ministry of Planning is not infrequently responsible for these issues in (former) Soviet 
countries. Partner countries sometimes also have a Ministry for Development Cooper-
ation or planning authorities below ministerial level which are in charge of the corre-
sponding issues (Interview C1). 
Consultations and negotiations take in principal place in the partner country. Depend-
ing on sectors, which have been agreed upon in the country strategy, relevant minis-
tries of the corresponding partner country are present in negotiations or consultations 
as well, e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health or Ministry of Infrastructure.  
Others: AA, GIZ, ECA 
The KfW Development Bank and the German Agency for International Cooperation 
(GIZ) are closely involved in the set-up of the Financial Cooperation. Both form part of 
informal consultations, which take place prior to the negotiations, as well as in the 
following formal government negotiations. BMZ is negotiator in both cases; KfW 
Development Bank and GIZ provide technical support and advice (Interview C1).  
Both, the formal negotiations and the informal consultations take place in the partner 
country. Thus, the German ambassador of the corresponding partner country who as 
well represents the German Federal Foreign Office (AA) is involved. 
If the BMZ approves a proposal, which has been developed by the KfW Development 
Bank in cooperation with a corresponding partner country, the project is financed and 
monitored by the KfW Development Bank.  
The GIZ is sometimes not part of projects or programs financed within the German 
Financial Cooperation. The Agency usually provides smaller Technical Assistance (TA) 
components; an interview partner states that GIZ brings in know-how in training and 
capacity building. Further, this interviewed stakeholder remarks that there also collab-
orative projects, in which the GIZ provides TA and the KfW Development Bank infra-
structure financing (Interview C4). 
Moreover, the Federal Government, represented by the Ministry of Finance guarantees 
for untied financial loans in the form of federal guarantees and sureties covering the 
risk of non-payment for the KfW Development Bank297. 
12.2.3. Terms and Conditions  
The German Financial Cooperation (FC) provides financing to governments or gov-
ernment-related enterprises, e.g. energy or water supplier in developing countries 
(Interview C4). 
                                                            
297  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/approaches/ 
financial_cooperation 
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FC-Conditions are specified every beginning of the year by the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development in coordination with the Federal Ministry of 
Finance, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Foreign 
Office with reference to the conditions set up by the World Bank (Interview C2). 
The main criterion which establishes the type of funding being used by the KfW De-
velopment Bank is the per-capita income of a partner country. Countries classified as 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) receive non-repayable grants (to 100 %), all other 
countries receive loans. The use of exemptions is afforded by the Guidelines and 
applies to proposals that are e.g. explicitly related to climate and resource protection 
(Interview C2; BMZ 2008: 23). 
If standard conditions are not met, deviations have to be clearly justified and well-
argued in coordination with other ministries. An interview partner e.g. mentioned that 
for a long period South-Eastern Europe had been qualified for particularly favorable 
conditions although the countries in this region already had higher Per-Capita Income 
(Interview C2).  
Developing countries have to meet certain criteria in order to qualify for FC develop-
ment loans: They have to be partner countries of the German Development Coopera-
tion. A partner country`s performance including the negotiated priority areas has to be 
robust in order to provide corresponding guarantees. Another crucial point worth 
taking into consideration is the question whether a loan is the necessary and ade-
quate instrument (Interview C2). 
The FC instruments, which are eligible to finance projects in each priority country, are 
listed in the “List of Conditions“ (“FZ-Konditionenliste“). This policy document is strict-
ly confidential and not accessible to the public.  
12.2.4. Financial Instruments 
The German bilateral Financial Cooperation provides funds out of the federal budget 
which are complemented by funds that have been raised on the capital market by the 
KfW („KfW funds“). According to several interview partners at KfW, these additional 
funds enable the KfW Development Bank to substantially leverage the lending volume 
und thus, broaden the effectiveness of the German Development Cooperation (Inter-
view C1, C4, C3).  
12.2.4.1. Overview 
Programs and projects are either purely financed from federal budget funds (grants 
and/or loans at very advantageous standard conditions) or from a mixture of federal 
budget funds and loans from KfW funds. The KfW Development Bank additionally 
offers loans at near-market conditions from pure KfW funds, so-called promotional 
loans (Interview C4). 
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The following figure provides an overview of the different funds of the German bilateral 
Financial Cooperation. The figure illustrates that the performance of the partner coun-
try is a crucial determinant for the type of funding available:  
Figure 12.3: Financing Pyramid – Financial Cooperation Funds 
 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011 
The loan conditions vary substantially and depend on the sector, the nature and cost-
effectiveness of the project. Further, the economic situation of the given partner coun-
try, its level of indebtedness and its state of development form the main criteria for 
financing projects and programs. Thus, the KfW Development Bank provides specifi-
cally tailored financing for their partner countries298. Several interview partners con-
firmed that apart from providing different funds, individual financial proposals are 
developed for every single project, considering very diverse criteria (Interview C1, C2, 
C4).  
As illustrated in Figure 12.3, the commitment and performance, in short – ownership – 
of the partner country are key for every single project or program. According to an 
interview partner, no single FC-proposal is financed without an injection of own re-
sources by the partner country (Interview C3). Ownership of the partner country is 
                                                            
298  KfW Entwicklungsbank: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-
Entwicklungsbank/About-us/Unsere-F %C3 %B6rderinstrumente/ 
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one of the critical principles, German Development Cooperation demands in accord-
ance with international agreements (Interview C4). 
Projects and programs do not only have to meet the development needs of the part-
ner countries; in terms of financing they also have to be technically feasible for both, 
the creditor (federal budget funds, KfW funds) and the borrower (partner country); 
(Interview C2).  
The following figure illustrates the different funds of the German Financial Coopera-
tion divided into funds from the federal development budget, funds raised purely by 
the KfW and the ones they provide jointly:  
Figure 12.4: Different Instruments of Financial Cooperation 
 
 
Source: BMZ n.s.: Slide 12 
12.2.4.2. Federal Budget Funds 
Grants, and loans, offered at very low interest rates, are purely provided by the Feder-
al Budget Funds. Although provided by the federal budget, both are administrated by 
the KfW Development Bank.  
Since 1978, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have received grants that do not 
need to be repaid. There are also conditions upon which Non-LDCs may receive 
grants for special projects. This derogation from the rules is defined in the guidelines 
and applies for projects or programs targeting climate protection or poverty reduction 
304 
(BMZ 2008: 23). In this way, e.g. Brazil may also receive funding via grants (Interview 
C2). 
The loans provided by the Federal Budget Funds are offered at very low rates of inter-
est compared to the interest rates at capital markets. The terms and conditions of 
these soft loans are similar to IDA-conditions. Thus, countries with an annual per-
capita income of currently up to USD 1915 (status: 2012) are offered loans at a very 
low interest rate of 0.75 % p.a., a maturity of 40 years and a 10 years grace period 
(e.g. Ethiopia, Burkina Faso); (BMZ n.s.: Slide 5; Interview C2).  
In addition, the KfW Development Bank offers loans at standard conditions, eligible 
for countries with an annual per-capita income of more than USD 1915 (status: 
2012). FC standard conditions include loans with an interest rate of 3 % p.a., a ma-
turity of 30 years and a 10 years grace period (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Indonesia) (In-
terview C1).  
The following figure illustrates that at the end of the 1990ies the instruments of the 
German Financial Cooperation have been modernized; starting with Promotional 
Loans and Reduced-Interest Loans in 2001 and an adapted form of Composite Fi-
nancing in 2004 (Interview C2). 
Figure 12.5: Short History of Financial Cooperation 
 
Source: BMZ n.s.: Slide 7 
12.2.4.3. FC Development Loans 
Loans and grants from the German development budget (BMZ) are complemented by 
the KfW Development Bank with funds it raises under favorable conditions on the 
capital markets.  
BMZ and KfW Development Bank created this kind of loans in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Federal Budget Funds available for development cooperation and 
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to increase the volume of German Official Development Assistance (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2011: 1-2).  
Several interview partners agreed on the increased volume and scope of German 
Financial Cooperation by combining funds emanating from the federal budget and the 
capital market. They explained that due to development loans large-scale projects 
could be financed in the area of social and economic infrastructure (e.g. power house, 
underground train system) (Interview C4, C3).  
Although terms and conditions of development loans are not as favorable as those 
from pure budget funds, they are significantly below market conditions. Development 
loans are combined in such a way that the projects are able to cover the costs and fall 
under ODA criteria (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011: 1-2). 
FC development loans include reduced-interest loans as well as composite and mixed 
financing. They differ in (1) combining federal budget funds with KfW funds raised at 
capital markets, (2) maturity and grace period and (3) details of any guarantees pro-
vided.  
Mixed financing loans mark the beginning of the German Financial Cooperation back 
in 1963. To this end, loans with favorable conditions from the German development 
budget with long maturities and grace periods, and an interest rate of 5 %, which is 
geared to IDA conditions, are combined with KfW funds raised on the markets. The 
KfW funds have less favorable conditions, higher interest rates and shorter maturities. 
In this case, the partner country is offered one contract with two different tranches 
(Interview C4). 
Mixed financing loans are covered through export credit insurance via Euler-Hermes 
and thus, contain a minimal procurement tied share of German goods and services. 
According to an interview partner this financial product is hardly used today because 
it does not qualify anymore to meet the general efforts of Financial Cooperation pro-
jects being not procurement tied to goods and services from German companies 
(Interview C2, C4).  
Mixed financing has been primarily used for infrastructure projects which have one 
large supplier and a relatively long lifetime (Interview C4). In the year 2013, this form 
of financing has only been used twice (Interview C2).  
Composite financing loans are very similar compared to the mixed financing loan 
type; both have in common that loans with favorable conditions from the development 
budget (BMZ) are combined with KfW funds raised on the markets. The difference is 
that while KfW’s risks are covered by an ECA when using mixed financing loans, 
composite financing loans are covered by a credit guarantee of the German Govern-
ment (MoF). For the mixed financing loan type, KfW’s risks are covered up to 90 % by 
an ECA; when the KfW provides composite financing loans, up to 80 % of the credit 
are guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) (Interview C2). Since 1994, compo-
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site financing loans have been broadly used to finance developmentally important 
infrastructure projects in partner countries (BMZ n.s.: Slide 7). As the conditions from 
the federal budget include long loan maturities, this loan type is in general more suita-
ble for long-lasting infrastructure projects (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011: 1-2). 
In contrast to mixed financing loans, composite financing does not have to be done 
with one large supplier; due to the type of guarantee (from the MoF) infrastructure 
projects with many smaller suppliers are feasible (Interview C4, C2).  
Reduced-interest loans are development loans, for which funds are raised on the 
capital markets by the KfW Development Bank. These KfW funds are then combined 
with grants, which come from the development budget and subsidize the interest rate 
for the borrower (Interview C4).  
Reduced-interest loans have been used since 2001 for financing developmentally 
relevant infrastructure projects, as long as the maximum maturity of this loan type is 
adequate for the project (BMZ n.s.: Slide 7). According to the KfW Development 
Bank, many partner countries are in this way enabled to invest in innovative and envi-
ronment-friendly energy, environmental and climate technologies which otherwise 
would not have been affordable (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011: 1-2). 
An interview partner states that this loan type has advanced to the most important FC-
instrument (Interview C4). Another one confirms this development and mentions that 
meanwhile up to 60-70 % of all FC-projects or programs are financed with reduced-
interest loans (Interview C2).  
Since 2009 reduced-interest loans have been largely covered by a guarantee of the 
German Government (MoF) (BMZ n.s.: Slide 7). In this way, projects are now afforda-
ble for partner countries and comply with ODA criteria (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011: 
1-2).  
To qualify as ODA, a transaction must be concessional in character and convey a 
grant element of at least 25 % according to the DAC’s definition. This 25 % grant 
element is calculated at a rate of discount of 10 % and should reflect a donor’s budg-
etary effort in favor of a developing country (OECD/DAC 2013c: 2).  
As long-term interests rates in Germany and most other member countries are well 
below 10 %, fulfilling the grant element has become much easier (Fritz 2013: 25-26). 
Even more, sometimes the concessionality level is de facto negative and thus, does 
not imply any budget effort for the donor, a practice which has been sharply criticized 
by various interview partners (Schweiger 2013: 13-16). 
12.2.4.4. FC Promotional Loan 
The German Financial Cooperation is completed by so-called promotional loans. They 
have been designed to finance development projects in countries without apparent 
indebtedness problems. They are primarily offered to developing countries with signif-
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icantly higher levels of income (threshold countries), for which other available FC 
funds are not suitable anymore (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2010).  
The award of these funds is conditional on the indebtedness of a country; in addition, 
projects have to be commercially cost-effective and provide added-value in terms of 
development policy299.  
Since 2001, the FC promotional loan has been available under terms and conditions 
that are close, but still below market conditions. Although the funds for promotional 
loans are purely raised on the capital markets by the KfW Development Bank, the 
award of these funds needs the final approval of BMZ (Interview C2; BMZ n.s.: Slide 3).  
Promotional loans form part of FC funds and are included in the forecasts by the 
ministry’s desk officers. If possible, the use of this loan type is included in the minutes 
of the bilateral negotiations between BMZ and the corresponding partner country 
(Interview C1). In appropriate cases – depending on the conditions – promotional 
loans are covered by a guarantee from the federal budget (Interview C2). 
If such loans are covered by a state guarantee, they must be eligible for ODA accord-
ing to Germany’s interpretation of concessionality because they incorporate an effort 
(in the implicit form of a guarantee for the default of the loan) by the German govern-
ment (Interview C10)300. Critical voices repeatedly pointed out that such reporting 
practice erode the ODA-concept, in particular as they refer to large amounts of loans, 
which do not meet any reasonable definition of “concessional in character” (Fritz 
2013: 25-26).  
According to the KfW Development Bank this type of loan complements the available 
FC funds and is particularly appropriate for promoting private and public investments 
in infrastructure, refinancing of financial institutions and for credit and equity invest-
ment operations in the micro finance sector (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2010).  
For instance, China does not receive any more grants or soft loans from the German 
development budget. Here promotional loans are used for financing public transport 
projects in order to continue the cooperation with China as a former development 
cooperation partner country. An interview partner mentioned that apart from China, 
Thailand or Vietnam, some East-European countries qualify for promotional loans 
(Interview C1).  
The promotional loan has accounted for the smallest share of all FC funds until now. 
Another interviewed person confirms that this instrument is used very carefully and 
mentions that the indebtedness of a country is seriously assessed by the KfW Devel-
opment Bank upon the basis of the debt sustainability analysis of WB and IMF (Inter-
view C2).   
                                                            
299  KfW Entwicklungsbank: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-
Entwicklungsbank/About-us/Unsere-F %C3 %B6rderinstrumente/ 
300  OECD: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/concessionality-note.htm 
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12.3. Performance of Financial Cooperation 
The statistical data provided in the following aims at analyzing the quantitative evolu-
tion of the German Financial Cooperation including their sectoral and geographical 
distribution. The chapter mainly draws on information extracted from the KfW Trans-
parency Portal, but will also take into account information from the DAC’s Creditor 
Reporting System, national budget frames, KfW Development Bank’ Annual Reports 
and builds on data provided by interview partners.  
12.3.1. Development of Financial Cooperation  
The total volume of loan commitments has significantly increased in recent years by 
combining federal budget funds with funds raised at the capital markets. 
The following table illustrates the total volume of commitments between 2003 and 
2012, which rose from EUR almost 1.6 billion in 2003 to nearly EUR 5 billion by 
2012. The German Financial Cooperation almost doubled its funds compared to the 
year 2006 when around EUR 2.5 billion had been committed.  
Table 14: Total Volume of Commitments (2003-2012) 
Year Amount in EUR million 
2003 1.577 
2004 1.934 
2005 1.881 
2006 2.445 
2007 2.902 
2008 3.313 
2009 3.331 
2010 4.452 
2011 4.532 
2012 4.916 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007a: 73; KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal301 
The share of German budget funds in the commitments of KfW Development Bank 
rose from EUR 1 billion in 2001 to around EUR 1.6 billion in 2012. As a result of the 
blending of market funds the total volume of commitments rose during the same peri-
                                                            
301  Information can be accessed at http://transparenz.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/ 
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od from just under EUR 1.6 billion to nearly EUR 5 billion by the end of 2012. Of 
these, over EUR 3 billion were KfW funds raised at the capital markets (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2007a: 73).  
The following figure illustrates the share of Federal budget funds and KfW Funds 
between 2007 and 2012. 
Figure 12.6: Origin of FC Funds (2007-2012) 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal302 
Total commitments have more or less continuously increased since 2002 as illustrat-
ed in the following table. In comparison to other years, particularly the period between 
2007 and 2009 marks the beginning of an overall increase in terms of the total vol-
ume of grants, development loans and promotional loans which have been provided 
within the German Financial Cooperation. 
  
                                                            
302  Please see http://transparenz.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/en/mittelherkunft/ 
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Table 15: Total Commitments (2002-2012), in EUR million 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FC grants 680 740 703 751 864 803 882 1112 1036 1336 1347 
FC standard 
loans 
182 227 271 307 280 277 351 230 179 145 179 
FC develop-
ment loans 249 287 782 492 704 579 1033 878 2142 1713 1600 
*Total budget 
funds 
109 101 321 157 198 131 213 106 215 134 112 
*Total KfW 
funds 
140 186 461 336 507 448 821 772 1927 1579 1487 
FC promo-
tional loans 41 246 160 247 512 1263 1314 1151 913 996 1603 
 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank Annual reports 2004, 2007, 2012 
The volume of standard loans has decreased in favor of development loans and pro-
motional loans within the last years. Federal budget funds (FC grants) have sharply 
increased since 2009 whereas total budget funds, which go into development loans, 
have substantially varied at a rather low level in the last five years. In comparison, the 
high volume of total KfW funds raised at the capital markets has dramatically in-
creased the leverage of development loans. While the leverage ratio (total KfW funds 
to total budget funds) was 7:1 in 2009, the analysis suggests that the leverage nearly 
doubled to 13:1 in 2012. 
In general, development loans, in particular reduced-interest loans, have advanced to 
the most important FC-instrument. Table 15 indicates that on average about EUR 
1800 million has been committed in the form of development loans in the period 
2010-2012. In addition, the volume of promotional loans has sharply increased since 
2007. The guarantee which has been provided by the Ministry of Finance since 2012 
led to a high peak of commitments with about EUR 1600 million last year. 
More than 270 different projects have been financed each year since 2007. In the last 
years the number of projects has increased to 354 projects in 2012 and 341 projects 
in 2011. 
Most project proposals, which receive funding, have a project size between EUR 5 
and 15 million; a few are smaller and thus, up to EUR 5 million. The establishment of 
reduced-interest loans has provided the opportunity to finance infrastructure projects 
at large-scale; e.g. Metro-projects which have a total volume of several EUR 100 
million (Interview C1).  
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Figure 12.7: Number of FC Projects (2007-2012) 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal303 
12.3.2. Recipient Countries  
Apart from China, Turkey and the Russian Federation, all main recipients are part of 
Germany’s bilateral development cooperation in the context of country programs. The 
following figure illustrates that China, India and Afghanistan have been the key recipi-
ents between 2007 and 2012. 
An interviewed stakeholder points out that the graduation of countries has in turn led 
to an increased use of (Promotional) Loans. Thus, countries like China do not receive 
any more grants but loans; further eligibility for countries like Sri Lanka and Philippines 
which have received grants is expiring. According to this source, Vietnam and India 
are big and interesting cooperation countries (Interview C1). 
 
 
                                                            
303  Please see http://transparenz.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/en  
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Figure 12.8: Main Recipients of Financial Cooperation (2007-2012) 
 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal304 
12.3.3. Sectors 
The key sectors of KfW Development Bank’s activities are environmental and climate 
protection and the promotion of financial, social and economic infrastructure.  
Based on the data provided by the KfW Development Bank’s transparency portal, 
which is based upon the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose codes for sector 
classification of the OECD, the key sectors have been analyzed.  
The following figure illustrates that economic infrastructure as well as social infrastruc-
ture have had highest shares between 2007 and 2012.  
  
                                                            
304  Please see http://transparenz.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/en  
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Figure 12.9: Key Sectors of Financial Cooperation (2007-2012) 
Source: KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal305 
Here economic infrastructure includes banking and financial services, energy genera-
tion and supply, transport and storage as well as business and other services. Water 
and sanitation, education, health, government and civil society, population poli-
cies/programs and reproductive health are key subsectors of social infrastructure and 
services.  
12.3.4. Share of Financial Cooperation to Total ODA  
The German Financial Cooperation has accounted for more than 30 % of total ODA 
in 2010-2012. Although the share of FC to total ODA varies in 2003-2012, a general 
increase is identified, except from the slight decrease in 2011. The following figure 
illustrates its highest peak in 2012 (around 38.2 % of total ODA). In comparison, the 
share of federal budget funds to total ODA – data is available from 2007 onwards – 
has only varied slightly; from 13.3 % in 2007 to 16.3 % in 2012. 
                                                            
305  Please see http.//transparenz.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/en/sektoren 
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Figure 12.10: Share of FC/Federal Budget Funds to Total ODA (2003-2012) 
Source:  OECD/DAC Statistics 2014; KfW Entwicklungsbank Annual Reports; KfW Entwicklungsbank,  
 Transparency Portal306 
12.4. Planning and Implementation of FC Funds  
All projects that are supported by the German Financial Cooperation go through the 
same processing cycle. Every stage of this cycle is subject to various checks and 
balances, e.g. quality assurance reviews (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2012b: 3). The 
following figure illustrates the planning and implementation of Financial Cooperation 
as well as Technical Cooperation in the strict sense. 
  
                                                            
306  KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal: http://transparenz.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/ 
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Figure 12.11: Planning and Implementation of Financial and Technical Cooperation 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ307 
  
                                                            
307  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/approaches/index.html 
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12.4.1. Intergovernmental Agreement and Project Pre-Selection  
The official bilateral Financial Cooperation is based on intergovernmental agreements 
between the Federal Government of Germany, represented by the BMZ and the gov-
ernments of the corresponding partner countries. 
These intergovernmental agreements are in turn framed by the programming of the 
Official German Bilateral Cooperation: Its regional strategies, country strategies and 
key sectors form the framework for any intergovernmental negotiation about projects 
or programs to be financed with FC funds. 
Before starting intergovernmental negotiations, the BMZ decides in informal consulta-
tions with the partner country on bilateral assistance priorities based on its country 
strategies and on the partner country’s development strategy. 
These informal consultations take place every two or three years; the main stakehold-
ers are the BMZ as negotiator, the KfW Development Bank and the GIZ are repre-
sented (for technical questions) and the respective German ambassador (AA). Their 
counterparts are the Ministry in charge of development cooperation and relevant line 
ministries or public authorities of the partner country (Interview C1).  
Proposals for projects or programs are then briefly described by the KfW Develop-
ment Bank for the BMZ. This brief statement of opinion (2-3 pages) includes a short 
description about the preparation and feasibility of the project, its developmental 
soundness and alignment with the priority areas of the given country; in short this brief 
statement of opinion evaluates whether the planned project is promising and benefi-
cial. An interview partner concludes that this assessment is relatively basic and solely 
intended as a basis for the BMZ to decide whether this project will be put in the fed-
eral budget and further, be part of intergovernmental negotiations (Interview C1; KfW 
Entwickungsbank 2012b: 4). 
The KfW Development Bank’s main duty in this process is to ensure the sufficient 
supply of proposals to meet the demand of projects; to develop proposals in coopera-
tion with relevant line ministries from partner countries, which then are ready to be 
discussed in these informal consultations, and furthermore, negotiated in the formal 
intergovernmental negotiations (Interview C1).  
Quite contrary to this procedure, different interview partners highlighted that owner-
ship of the partner country is key. According to them, in principle the partner countries 
themselves propose projects and programs, which form part of the informal consulta-
tions as well as the official intergovernmental negotiations (Interview C3, C1, C2). 
The ownership of partner countries is here solely indicated by the fact that projects 
are as well but not exclusively proposed by the partner country. Further, their devel-
opment strategy is one of the key documents which are considered in the intergov-
ernmental negotiations. It is important to note that the involvement of the KfW Devel-
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opment Bank in general depends to a large extent on the capabilities and capacities 
of the given country (Interview C3). 
The BMZ also provides a studies and counselling fund with a volume of EUR 15-20 
million per year. This fund, which is administrated by the KfW Development Bank, 
finances studies needed for project definition, including preliminary and feasibility 
studies in order to prepare a project or program (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2013: 20; 
Interview C1).  
The studies and counselling fund is not necessarily used to prepare every single pro-
ject because projects or programs are also prepared by a given study of the partner 
country. In addition, new projects proposed are very often follow-up projects; hence 
there is usually no need for doing an overall preparation or feasibility study again (In-
terview C4).  
An interviewed stakeholder estimates that one third of all projects, in absolute num-
bers, between 30 up to 40 projects per year, are prepared with resources of the stud-
ies and counseling fund (Interview C1).  
According to the website of the KfW Development Bank, “The partners in the respec-
tive developing country itself are responsible for procuring consultancy, construction 
works, supplies and services for the programs and projects“ they finance308. Several 
German interview partners agreed upon the importance to put the partner country in 
the “driver’s seat“ (Interview C4, C3).  
Nevertheless, the KfW Development Bank supports and assists in preparing the pro-
ject and provides back-up services during implementation. The Terms of Reference 
(ToR) of the above mentioned preparation and feasibility studies are provided by the 
KfW Development Bank in cooperation with the corresponding ministry (Interview 
C1). The partner country then carries out an international call for tender. The invitation 
to participate in an international competitive bidding process is usually published in 
the developing country and in Germany, if appropriate also in international media (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 8). These ToR often ask for very specific consultancy and 
for companies, which have a proven record of similar projects and country experience. 
Thus, in general technical consultants win these tenders because of the technical 
rather than socioeconomic questions that have to be answered. An interviewed per-
son concludes that these engineering consultants are very often from industrial coun-
tries, not only from Germany, also from Great Britain, France or the USA (Interview 
C1).  
                                                            
308  KfW Entwicklungsbank: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-
Entwicklungsbank/About-us/Vergabe-von-Auftr %C3 %A4gen/ 
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12.4.2. Decision-Making and Project Selection Process 
The stakeholders of the formal intergovernmental negotiations are the same as in the 
informal consultations held earlier on: the BMZ, the KfW, the GIZ, the AA and their 
counterparts from the given partner country. They agree upon concrete projects on 
the basis of the existing proposals and studies.  
The negotiated projects and programs, their volume of funding and other results of 
these negotiations are protocolled. These minutes form the basis for the intergovern-
mental agreement between the German Federal Government and the government of 
the partner country. This agreement is binding under international law (Interview C1).  
The developmental orientation, the volume of funding pledged and other important 
details are then agreed and implemented by the KfW Development Bank in the name 
and on behalf of the German government on the basis of the intergovernmental 
agreement. 
In detail, the KfW Development Bank is commissioned by the BMZ to conduct an on-
site appraisal. The ministry gives its approval on the basis of the brief statement of 
opinion done by the KfW Development Bank which then serves as basis for the deci-
sion to release these funds in the federal development budget (Interview C1; KfW 
Entwickungsbank 2012b: 5). 
Then the KfW Development Bank conducts the on-site appraisal, guided by a confi-
dential handbook from the BMZ, which has been operationalized for KfW staff. An 
interview partner confirmed that the bank is obliged by their very formal guidelines to 
carry out a full and complete examination of all the relevant facts and circumstances.  
According to this interview partner, the questions and criteria are manifold and similar 
to those of the World Bank (Interview C1). This on-site appraisal of a project or pro-
gram includes (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 17): 
 the overall economic situation in the partner country as well as the proof of neces-
sity of the given project or program; e.g. in the form of a sectoral or regional analy-
sis 
 the conceptualization, if necessary the design and technical characteristics (plan-
ning, implementation, operation), including opportunities to cooperate with the pri-
vate sector 
 relevant legal basis; organization, management and economic conditions of the 
project executing partner (including the partner’s ability to implement the project 
on his/her own), potential support by trained professionals as well as the requisite 
education and training 
 total costs (foreign currency costs, total local costs) and the financing of these 
costs, human and material supplies as well as financial contributions of each sin-
gle stakeholder 
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 Macroeconomic, socio-economic and socio-cultural impacts (e.g. possibility of 
conflict between different (ethnical) groups), gender aspects and environmental 
and social compatibility; economic aspects, operational and commercial risks, the 
target group’s attitude towards the project (Interview C1). 
Another interview partner concludes that there are few criteria for assessing the de-
velopmental orientation of the given project or program. Within financial cooperation, 
measures are rather more assessed along the logframe matrix and corresponding 
indicators (Interview C2). 
These on-site appraisals usually include field missions. All criteria have to be assessed 
each time and reported to BMZ. The appraisal report includes a proposal for funding 
(Finanzierungsvorschlag) which is based on the “List of Conditions“ (“FZ-
Konditionenliste“) (Interview C1). 
This program proposal is similar to the appraisal reports (Bankprüfberichte) of the 
World Bank; according to a stakeholder the reports of the KfW are shorter but usually 
contain quite similar information (Interview C1).  
If the appraisal, done by the KfW Development Bank, is positive, BMZ country desks 
(Länderreferate) normally approve the developmental criteria of the project appraisal 
as well as the proposal for funding. At this stage adaptations or changes regarding 
the developmental soundness of the project or the funding proposal could be amend-
ed by the BMZ because the ministry gives final approval for funding (Interview C2).  
Thus, the KfW Development Bank has to take into account the ministry`s objections 
and has to come up with developmental improvements or other financial proposals. In 
general, these proposals are developed jointly; because it is in the interest of both that 
the BMZ gives the KfW Development Bank the negotiating mandate for the loan 
agreement (Interview C1).  
Once the KfW Development Bank has received the ministry’s approval, the bank 
concludes the loan agreement with the corresponding government. The framework for 
the delivery of services to support projects or programs and for the selection of con-
sultants are also agreed upon in the loan agreement or other agreements between the 
project executing agency and the KfW (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2013: 3).  
These loan agreements generally do not have to be negotiated in detail; according to 
an interview partner, most partner countries are familiar with this kind of contracts. The 
contract is made up of 8 to 10 pages, particular risks have to be dealt with in the 
annex (Interview C1).  
“The supplies and services to be financed, the disbursement procedure to be applied 
and the details of the documents to be submitted to the KfW Development Bank are 
specified in the ‘Separate Agreement’ to the ‘Loan/Financing Agreement’“ (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2006: 1).  
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After signing the loan agreements, the KfW Development Bank makes the funds avail-
able. The Bank also deposits the grants and loans from the federal development 
budget (Interview C2). The payments are usually transmitted to the project partner or 
the project-executing organization, e.g. government-related energy supplier (Interview 
C4). 
12.4.3. Implementation-Planning and International Competitive Bidding 
The KfW Development Bank supports the project executing organization in the part-
ner country in preparing the project. One of these back-up services provides an inde-
pendent qualified consultant to advice on particular technical questions of the plan-
ning and implementation of the project, including the tender (Interview C4). 
In detail, the local or international consultant, who is generally awarded by the project 
executing agency via tendering, provides support for the project-executing agency in 
the detailed design of the project.  
This often includes the consultant’s role as a tender agent, preparing the tender doc-
uments (including technical specifications and the draft contracts for supplies and 
services), holding the tender, assessing the bids and proposing an applicant to be 
awarded the contract, drafting the contract, drawing up the final design, including the 
architectural plans, supervising the execution of the project and monitoring its devel-
opment (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2013: 20).  
“The consultant’s services also include examining and approving invoices and sup-
porting the project executing agency in foresighted cost and financial management of 
the project, in dealing with contractual issues, in accepting the project and in drawing 
up reports on the development of the project“ (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2013: 20).  
In principle, contracts for goods, works and associated services are always awarded 
by the project executing agency in charge of the implementation of the project, which 
in most cases is also the agency that calls for an International Competitive Bidding 
(ICB). In exceptional cases other awarding procedures may be applied. For instance, 
in individual cases, the KfW Development Bank may carry out part or all of the selec-
tion procedure and commission the consultant on behalf and in the name of the pro-
ject executing agency (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2013: 4-6).  
Nevertheless, the general role of the KfW Development Bank is to make sure that 
calls to tender and contract awards proceed according to international rules. Even 
though the bank emphasizes the commitment and ownership of the partner country, it 
still plays an active part in the preparation and implementation of the projects fi-
nanced. 
The bank’s obligation to exercise due diligence consequently influences the project in 
a manner that is appropriate to the case in hand: This influence shall ensure that the 
funds provided are spent as efficiently as possible and that the contracts are awarded 
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on the basis of fair and transparent competition, which is designed to identify the most 
suitable bidder according to performance and price (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2013: 5 
& 2007b: 4). 
Further, the bank will examine the tender documents, assessment reports, proposals 
for the award of the contract and draft contracts for prior approval to ensure that they 
conform with the agreements made with the Project Executing Agency and with inter-
national practices (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 4). 
Once, the preparation for the International Competitive Bidding (ICB) is done, the 
Project Executing Agency will publish an international invitation to tender supplies and 
services for the corresponding project. Publication in the partner country will follow 
the rules and regulations applicable there, but in principle publication will take place in 
the daily newspapers of the partner country (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 7).  
In addition, the procurement notice must be published in Germany in the databases of 
Germany Trade & Inward Invest Agency (GTAI) beforehand (KfW Entwicklungsbank 
2007b: 6.). Due to the guidelines of the German bilateral financial and technical co-
operation, the German economy must be informed as early as possible about projects 
financed with FC funds. An interviewed person states that in addition to the GTAI, 
publication takes place in the EU Official Journal (Interview C1). 
The bidding documents include the following (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 8-9): 
 general information about the project and the supplies and services to be provided 
 information on the execution of the bidding process and evaluation procedures 
 sample form of tender 
 general and specific conditions of contract and, if appropriate, draft contract 
 general technical conditions of contract, neutral technical specifications with bill of 
quantities, specifications or performance criteria for performance-based contracts 
 clear and complete design documents 
 specification of standards and measuring system applied  
 specimen declaration of undertaking  
 standard forms of bid bond, advance payment bond and performance bond 
 preliminary cost estimates, unless there are serious reservations against their 
disclosure 
The bidder has to ensure a fair and transparent competition and comply with, at least 
those ILO core labor standards that have been ratified by the partner country (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 7).  
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According to an interviewed person, the documents the bidder has to hand in vary 
from case to case; in general they heavily depend on the procurement system and 
legal issues in the partner country (Interview C1).  
The bids are usually evaluated by the contracting agency in cooperation with the 
tender agent or by the tender agent. If specified in the bidding documents, apart from 
the price, several factors are evaluated (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 10-11):  
 delivery of construction period 
 personnel 
 equipment lists 
 environmental and social acceptability 
 costs of operation and total useful life 
 supply of spare parts 
 qualification for training local personnel  
The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the most advantageous offer by as-
sessing all individual bids and by subsequently comparing all the bids submitted. The 
contracting agency has to send the detailed evaluation report to the KfW Develop-
ment Bank, which generally reserves the right to review all the bids and corresponding 
documents (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 20). 
In principle, the procurement procedure is confidential. The decision to whom the 
contract is awarded is made by the partner-contracting agency. The KfW Develop-
ment Bank may withhold funding if the award of the contract has not been carried out 
adequately (e.g. unduly favorable treatment of a bidder, offer does not comply with the 
public invitation to tender, serious deviation from the project design, corruption) (KfW 
Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 20). 
Once a supplier is awarded the contract, the consultant further provides “support for 
the Project Executing Agency in developing operation and maintenance concepts, in 
advising and training skilled personnel to operate and maintain the facilities construct-
ed under the project, and in carrying out flanking measures (e.g. hygiene advisory 
campaign in connection with drinking water supply projects).” (KfW Entwicklungsbank 
2013: 20).  
12.4.4. Payment Terms, Guarantees and Insurance 
One of the KfW Development Bank’s duties is to deal with payment terms, in particu-
lar to administrate disbursements and repayments of projects or programs to be fi-
nanced with FC funds. 
The bank disburses loans and non-repayable financial contributions (grants) according 
to the progress of the corresponding project or program to be financed or upon re-
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quest of the project executing agency. Further, the KfW Development Bank supervis-
es the contractually agreed utilization of the funds (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2006: 1). 
According to the KfW Development Bank its disbursement procedures are in line with 
the Paris Declaration (PD) in which donors have committed themselves to align their 
procedures more strongly with those of the partner countries. The bank generally 
applies this principle by providing all necessary information in order that partner coun-
tries are able to allocate the funds in their public budgets (KfW Entwicklungsbank 
2006: 1). 
The KfW Development Bank provides direct disbursements as well as reimburse-
ments. Upon request of the project executing agency, payments are directly disbursed 
to the enterprises (“suppliers”) whose supplies and services are to be financed by FC 
funds (Interview C3).  
An interview partner states that the KfW Development Bank usually applies reim-
bursements. Here the project executing agency or the authorized party first performs 
the full payment of amounts which are then requested by the partner and subsequent-
ly reimbursed by the KfW. If necessary, specific audits are done by independent audi-
tors in order to examine whether the funds were used for the contractually agreed 
purpose (Interview C3).  
In some cases the KfW Development Bank provides a so-called disposition fund. This 
fund is endowed with an adequate amount, if the authorized party, in most cases the 
project executing agency, is not able to pre-finance the supplies and services. The 
funds are then disbursed to cover the needs of the project over a period of up to four 
months. In contrast to reimbursements, disposition funds have to be audited on a 
regular basis by independent auditors (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2006: 2; Interview C3) 
Guarantees  
In general, the project executing agency is the borrower who receives funding from 
German Financial Cooperation. Since the partner country is not the borrower, it usual-
ly provides a state guarantee in order to guarantee for any payment defaults (Interview 
C4).  
In addition, FC funds are conditional upon guarantees covering the risk of non-
payment for the KfW Development Bank which are either covered by Euler-Hermes 
(ECA) or the German Ministry of Finance (Interview C4).  
Further, the contractor has to provide different bonds (bid bonds, advance payment 
bonds and performance bonds) in order to guarantee that all obligations will be duly 
fulfilled (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 16, 21-23). 
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Insurance  
According to the procurement guidelines, all “goods and works are to be insured 
adequately and to the customary extent against all risks that may occur up to the 
orderly completion and acceptance of the project so that replacement or rehabilitation 
is possible in the event of damage.“ (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 16-17). 
An interviewed person concludes that the KfW Development Bank supports the pro-
ject executing company in guarantee or insurance issues but the bank’s main function 
herein lies in auditing if these issues are considered adequately in each project (Inter-
view C1). 
12.5. Monitoring and Evaluation  
The KfW Development Bank monitors the progress of the measures financed with FC 
funds until the project or program will become operational. Once the project has been 
completed, the bank reviews whether the development objectives have been achieved 
and will have a lasting impact309. 
12.5.1. Reviewing Project-Related Progress  
The monitoring results are submitted by the KfW Development Bank to the ministry on 
a regular basis. They include reviewing the progress of outstanding action and con-
sider (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 18-19): 
 the latest development in the given sector 
 the impacts of the implemented actions 
 compliance with planning and financing (int. al. schedule and budget) 
 potential difficulties which have occurred during the implementation 
 potential modification of framework conditions 
 recommendations 
The reports that review the progress of a project or program in principle may be re-
ports of the project executing agency or local staff as well as results of an interim 
evaluation or other knowledge acquired by the KfW Development Bank and their 
corresponding stakeholders (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 19).  
If framework conditions change substantially during the implementation phase, the 
KfW Development Bank must immediately report to the ministry. In such cases the 
ministry reserves the right to request reports (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 19). 
                                                            
309  BMZ: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/approaches/bilateral_development_cooperation/approaches/ 
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In addition, the KfW Development Bank conducts field visits once or twice per year in 
order to monitor the operation of the respective project. If problems occur, the bank 
will conduct as many field visits as necessary. These progress reviews are then sub-
mitted to comply with BMZ in order to the reporting obligations. At the end of these 
reviews final inspection reports are drawn up. Here, KfW staff also includes engineers 
who determine which deliverables have to be mended (Interview C1).  
12.5.2. Independent Ex-Post Evaluation  
Two up to five years after a project or program has been implemented or has become 
operational, the KfW Development Bank generally conducts evaluations of these 
measures and activities.  
This so-called ex-post evaluation is carried out in order to analyze whether the ex-
pected developmental impacts of a given project have actually been achieved and 
whether they have initiated a sustainable development process. Aspects being evalu-
ated consider the whole project cycle, the environment, the partner and involved 
agencies as well as the target group310. 
The evaluations are done by the Evaluation Department of the KfW Development 
Bank (FC Evaluation) or by assigned external consultants.  
The Evaluation Department is officially an independent unit, which reports directly to 
the Board of Managing Directors. This board also appoints a highly qualified expert in 
the field from the outside as head of KfW's Evaluation Department in order to ensure 
that this unit is able to work independently (from regional divisions which are respon-
sible for the planning and implementation of FC funds)311.  
An interviewed stakeholder claims that despite the independence of the evaluation 
unit, external consultants are in practice still more independent, simply because of the 
fact that these evaluations are external and not in-house. This may call the independ-
ence of the evaluation unit, e.g. from regional divisions, into question. In addition, this 
interview partner argues that external consultants are often interested in follow-up 
orders and thus, external consultants are not always more critical in their evaluation 
reports (Interview C1).  
12.5.2.1. Approach and Methodology 
The Evaluation Department moved away from assessing every single project in 2007; 
since then a representative sample of individual projects has to be submitted for ex-
post evaluation. According to an interview partner, approximately half of all implement-
ed projects are evaluated in this sample per year; in total about 60 projects. Further, 
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the interviewed person mentions that this random sampling allows more profound and 
thorough analysis; e.g. providing own surveys, conducting thematic research or apply-
ing a more sophisticated methodology (Interview C1). 
On the bank’s website, the Evaluation Department states that this representative 
sampling provides a solid basis for the bank in order to determine the success rate of 
Financial Cooperation activities (Interview C1).  
It seems questionable whether it is sufficient to evaluate every second project. Evalua-
tions are not solely done in order to measure the success rate or to organize learning 
effects; they are essentially conducted to demonstrate whether funds have been 
employed efficiently and whether the target group is affected positively by the impacts 
of a given project or program. Thus, every single project should be evaluated thor-
oughly.  
About two thirds of all evaluations are done by the Evaluation Department of the KfW 
Development Bank, one third of all projects evaluated is conducted by external and 
independent consultants. As a general rule, the Evaluation Department never assigns 
individuals who have worked on the project under evaluation (Interview C1). 
12.5.2.2. Logframe and Field Missions 
Ex-post evaluations are generally based on the Logical Framework Matrix 
(“Logframe“). In principle, this matrix is produced every time when the KfW Develop-
ment Bank is commissioned by the ministry to conduct an on-site appraisal of a given 
project in order to provide a basis for the decision whether to finance the measures 
with FC funds. Thus, the logframe matrix is of major relevance throughout the whole 
process.  
On the basis of the logframe matrix the therein-formulated indicators and other related 
documents and interim reports of a given project, the evaluators assess the imple-
mented measures of a corresponding project or program (Interview C1).  
Field missions are usually part of an ex-post evaluation: Evaluators conduct interviews 
with representatives of the executing agency and the target group; analyze corre-
sponding data and statistics; assess statements and information of other stakehold-
ers, e.g. other external donors working in the sector the project corresponds to. The 
evaluation reports also consider documents and reports that are related to a given 
project or program and have been produced over the whole project cycle312.  
Criteria which are applied to measure a project’s development success are the follow-
ing: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, overarching developmental impact and sus-
tainability. “The bank considers a project sustainable if the project-executing agency 
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and/or the target groups are willing and able to carry on with the project once the 
external support comes to an end.“313 
The ex-post evaluations of the Evaluation Department in principle address the follow-
ing key questions:  
 “How have the partner country, the sector and the environment of the pro-
ject/program changed since preparation? Did the project/program specifically ad-
dress a major constraint in the partner country and has it contributed to solving a 
core problem? 
 Was the project/program carried out as originally planned (planned versus actual 
comparison of measures, costs and finance)? If applicable, were deviations war-
ranted? 
 Which elements of the design have proved more or less effective? To what extent 
have important anticipated effects actually occurred and how sustainable will they 
be? 
 What other positive and negative effects (also non-intended impacts) have oc-
curred? What could and should be done differently/better in new pro-
jects/programs from today's point of view?“314. 
In addition, at the end of each evaluation, a final performance assessment of the given 
project or program is done. Measures are considered to be successful (rating 1-3) or 
not successful (rating 4-6).  
The ex-post evaluation reports are submitted to the BMZ; abridged versions covering 
individual projects are published online and are available to the public. Additionally, 
every couple of years the Evaluation Department publishes analysis reports, which 
focus on different topic areas, with more detailed information about different sectors 
or regions, and provide detailed performance statistics315. 
12.6. Transparency and Accountability  
Although Germany’s development policy is not defined by law, there are guidelines 
and procedures that guide the BMZ being in charge of German development policy 
formulation and financing and the KfW Development Bank as the executing agency for 
FC funds.  
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Further, the BMZ has reporting duties to the parliament. In addition, the Federal Court 
of Auditors regularly audits the financial management of the Federal government, its 
ministries and executing agencies. Therefore, the BMZ and the KfW Development 
Bank are quite regularly monitored. The Bank is also continuously supervised by the 
private auditing company PricewaterHouseCoopers.  
The role of the German civil society is more strongly focused on the export credit 
transactions. Here, the KfW IPEX-Bank, one of the KfW Banking Group’s subsidiaries 
is regularly criticized.  
12.6.1. Involvement of the Parliament 
Forming part of the overall development cooperation, the financial cooperation is as 
well underpinned by the coalition agreement that covers each legislative period and 
the budget procedure (“Einzelplan23”). Since the 14th legislative period (1998-2002) 
policy statements on development have been an integral part of the debates of the 
Bundestag (EuropeAid 2013: 1).  
The Parliamentary Budget Committee (PBC) decides upon the development coopera-
tion budget every year, which has been drafted by the BMZ based on the ceiling of 
the overall federal budget allocated by the BMF. Before the PBC agrees upon a final 
version, the draft is debated in the corresponding committees. Thus, every year FC 
funding is agreed upon during the budget procedure316.  
The BMZ has reporting duties to the parliament regarding the approval of FC funds. 
The BMZ as well regularly reports to the Parliamentary Committee for Economic Co-
operation and Development (AWZ) about the developmental impact of evaluated 
projects317.  
Furthermore, members of the parliament are entitled to ask questions which have to 
be answered by the government or the corresponding ministry. German NGOs regu-
larly make use of this option and ask parliamentarians to request information about 
projects or programs being financed by the KfW.  
Several interview stakeholders of the German civil society conclude that parties in 
opposition to the government are more eager to help with such requests (Interview 
C9, C7). 
12.6.2. Auditing of Financial Management  
The financial management of the federal government, its various property funds and 
state-owned companies are regularly examined by the Federal Court of Auditors. 
Thus, the BMZ and also the KfW Development Bank as one of the ministry`s execut-
ing agency are audited by the Federal Court of Auditors.  
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As an independent and not subordinated organization of the federal government, the 
Federal Court of Auditors is able to freely choose the subject matters it intends to 
audit. The court usually does not only deliver recommendations, but also provides 
advice and counseling for the audited bodies in order to point out the potential for 
savings or increases in revenue.  
An interview partner explains that the court in principle does not audit the business 
activities of the KfW Development Bank, but rather examines specific issues, given 
projects or programs, e.g. fiduciary participations or appropriations for preparatory 
and complementary investment measures (Interview C3).  
Once the Federal Court of Auditors has audited the KfW Development Bank, the bank 
receives the audit findings in a ‚management letter’ for comment. The final report is 
sent to parliament where representatives of the corresponding ministries answer to 
questions of the members of parliament in the Parliamentary Budget Committee 
(PBC). According to an interviewed stakeholder, the individual reports are confiden-
tial; only the annual reports have to be made public (Interview C3).  
German Banking Act  
The KfW Development Bank is supervised by the Ministry of Finance, in consultation 
with the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) (Interview C3; KfW 
1969: 12).  
Being a public body (AöR), founded by law (Law concerning Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau) and acting upon a political mandate, the KfW is not regulated by the 
German Banking Act (KWG, “Banking Act“) (Interview C3). 
According to the law concerning the KfW, there is as well no supervision by the Fed-
eral Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). However, the federal government has the 
legal option to declare certain provisions of the KWG applicable, including supervi-
sion by the Financial Supervisory Authority (KfW 1969: 13).  
An interview partner highlights that the bank generally has to comply with stronger 
regulation procedures for the funds raised on the capital markets than for federal 
budget funds; according to him, especially handing out grants is significantly easier 
than other FC funds (Interview C3). 
Certified accountants  
The KfW Development Bank is not only audited by the Federal Court of Auditors for 
executing the federal budget funds from the BMZ but also by an external private ac-
countant consultancy (Pricewaterhouse Coopers – PWC) (Interview C1, C3).  
PWC is officially commissioned by the BMZ simply because of the ministry’s obliga-
tion to audit the sound management of public finances. Nevertheless the KfW Devel-
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opment Bank, being contracted as executing agency, concludes the contract with the 
auditing company (Interview C3).  
In contrast to the Federal Court of Audit, PWC conducts audits of all business activi-
ties. A stakeholder mentions that an audit team is constantly busy throughout the 
whole year in order to audit the KfW’s business activities (Interview C1). 
12.6.3. German Institute for Development Evaluation  
The main purpose of the German Institute for Development Evaluation (Deutsches 
Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit – DEval), which was founded in 
the year 2013, is to provide independent evaluation of the performance of German 
development cooperation measures in order to support the work of the BMZ and the 
ministry’s implementation organizations, such as the KfW Development Bank318.  
DEval intends to conduct an overarching evaluation of all FC Funds in 2015 (which 
has been planned for 2013 but then postponed to 2015). In this first evaluation, in-
struments of financial cooperation, which are leveraged by capital market funds, are 
evaluated (DEval 2013: 1; Interview C2).  
In general, DEval also helps the German Parliament (Bundestag) to perform its parlia-
mentary role of overseeing the work of the executive and provides the evidence it 
needs to formulate German policy initiatives in the field of international cooperation319. 
12.6.4. Civil Society and Availability of Information 
Projects to be promoted with FC funds are devised jointly by the German government 
and the government of the partner country. Before these negotiations start or final 
approvals are given, the BMZ regularly invites civil society actors to stakeholder con-
sultations in which individual partner countries are the subject for debate (Interview 
C1). 
All press information about the projects to be financed with funds from German Fi-
nancial Cooperation is published online by the BMZ after the involved governments 
have signed the intergovernmental agreement. An interview partner mentions that no 
information is available before the approval because a prejudgment and/or influence 
of the intergovernmental negotiations are not desired. Once the loan agreement has 
been signed project information is available to the public (Interview C1).  
The GTAI (Germany Trade & Inward Invest Agency) being the economic development 
agency of Germany provides information about tenders of German Financial Coopera-
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tion (so-called “KfW tenders”). The GTAI is a public enterprise; thus, interested par-
ties are charged for the information provided320.  
Though international export and project financing is covered by the KfW IPEX Bank, 
the promotion of KfW-tenders enables German business to benefit from informational 
and institutional advantage in order to acquire business opportunities abroad. Further, 
German business is institutionally organized in various associations, e.g. the Federa-
tion of Industries (BDI), the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) 
and/or the German Association of Consulting Engineers (VBI). 
These associations have in common that they lobby for an increased cooperation 
between German business and German development policy. Their representatives 
specifically promote private sector development in developing countries, German 
know-how and technology transfer, e.g. in the infrastructure sector, and innovative 
development finance instruments (DIHK 2010; BDI 2007; AGE 2005). 
Interestingly, the Working Group on Development Policy of German business (AGE) 
stated in a 2005 published position paper that partner countries should be more 
thoroughly supported by donor countries when defining projects and preparing the 
tender (AGE 2005: 11)321.  
Ever since AGE representatives recommended to the government and corresponding 
ministries that the cooperation between German business and partner countries of 
German development cooperation should commence when identifying new develop-
ment cooperation projects and could include the involvement of German business in 
the formulation of country strategy papers, the overall aim of German business be-
came apparent (BDI 2007: 5).  
In fact, several position papers illustrate that German business take an interest in 
generating foreign business opportunities within development cooperation. Repre-
sentatives of DIHK e.g. demanded that German business should be involved when 
BMZ jointly with other ministries decides upon partner countries and priority sectors 
(DIHK 2010: 7).  
In other words, German business have highlighted that they want to be involved in  
(in-)formal negotiations of potential development cooperation projects early on. Alt-
hough an interviewee denied that German business forms part of concrete project 
negotiations, their lobbying activities indicate that there are closer relationships than 
officials state in public (Interview C1). 
This is also confirmed by the fact that German business representatives (BDI, VBI) are 
regularly consulted by the BMZ in order to discuss options regarding the greater 
involvement of German business in bilateral and sectoral development cooperation. 
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This working group headed by BDI was established in 2006 and aims at enhancing 
business relationships between political and business stakeholders322. 
German Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) regularly criticize the strong(er) 
promotion of foreign trade in order to prevent fostering the involvement of Germany’s 
business sector within the official German development cooperation. 
Erlassjahr, a German NGO has recently also commenced to monitor the mixed financ-
ing activities within the German financial cooperation (Erlassjahr 2013). Nevertheless, 
the role of the German civil society is more strongly focused on the exports and pro-
jects which are financed by the KfW IPEX-Bank. The bank, one of the KfW Banking 
Group’s subsidiaries, is regularly criticized by different NGOs, for instance by 
Urgewald, a German environmental NGO, for financing projects which violate envi-
ronmental and social standards (Interview C7).  
An interview partner states that due to the harsh critique by the German civil society, 
the BMZ and the KfW have started to consider the compliance with environmental 
and social standards more strongly. Further, the interviewed person conceives that 
within FC the main actors could even do more to contribute that goods and services 
are awarded to companies which provide high quality and respect minimum standards 
(Interview C2). 
The KfW Development Bank created a transparency portal on development finance in 
order to support the international efforts for greater effectiveness and transparency in 
development cooperation. The portal is complete since January 2014 and provides 
information about the bank’s engagement in partner countries, relevant sectors, indi-
cating the sources of funds from 2007 onwards. Brief outlines of evaluation reports 
provide results of implemented projects. In addition, the portal is supplemented with a 
project database containing more detailed information on all projects agreed by con-
tracts signed since January 2013323. 
By establishing the transparency portal, the bank responds to critics of the German 
civil society and supports the BMZ in aligning with the ministry’s transparency and 
accountability activities324. In fact, the transparency portal is an important, but long 
overdue step. However, no detailed development-related information, e.g. country and 
project eligibility criteria or the assessment of the expected developmental impact of 
given projects is available. Moreover, no insights about concrete financing conditions, 
e.g. the level of concessionality and/or the source of market funds are provided for the 
public. 
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12.7. Conclusion and Outlook 
Germany is one of the few European countries, which has recently decided to in-
crease the development budget by EUR 2 billion between 2014 and 2017. Despite 
this decision, it will be relatively difficult for Germany to live up to its commitment to 
meet the ODA/GNI-target of 0.7 % by 2015.  
Nevertheless, Germany’s development cooperation currently provides one of the 
strongest bilateral finance institutions for development as well as one of the biggest 
development agencies worldwide. On the other side, Germany has enjoyed an inter-
national reputation as the World Champion in Exports (“Exportweltmeister”) for dec-
ades, exporting various goods and services, from the smallest precision equipment to 
the largest industrial plants.  
Apart from the Financial Cooperation, whose developmental orientation has been 
analyzed in this report, the Technical Cooperation is one of the main pillars of the 
official German Development Cooperation. In general, the Technical Cooperation is 
formally and institutionally separated from export and project financing. Whereas the 
KfW Development Bank is implementing the FC funds being the executing agency of 
the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the KfW IPEX-Bank 
provides export financing.  
In addition, private sector development in developing and transition countries is mostly 
covered by the DEG, another subsidy of the KfW Banking Group. Though these three 
institutions are formally separated, all of them belong to the KfW Banking Group. 
Apart from the KfW Development Bank, the BMZ is the key player. 
Although the German Financial Cooperation is officially not tied to goods and services 
procured from German companies, the last Minister for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2009-2013), Dirk Niebel, in particular aimed at improving the relation-
ship between German business and development cooperation and specifically their 
contribution to poverty reduction via economic growth and private sector develop-
ment.  
The strong(er) promotion of foreign trade in order to foster the involvement of Germa-
ny’s business sector within the official German development cooperation indicates 
that there are closer linkages between export promotion, foreign trade and develop-
ment cooperation than officially stated by the German government and/or its key 
actors. 
In fact, several business associations (BDI, VBI and DIHK) have lobbied for an in-
creased cooperation between German business and German development policy 
within the last years. In their position papers, they clearly address that German busi-
ness takes an interest in generating foreign business opportunities within develop-
ment cooperation.  
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To sum up, at various points in time, business representatives have recommended to 
the government and corresponding ministries that German business should be in-
volved – early on – in the selection of partner countries and priority sectors; further in 
the formulation of country strategy papers as well as in identifying new development 
cooperation projects. This suggests that that there are closer relationships between 
German business and development cooperation than interview stakeholders and other 
officials state in public. 
The German Financial Cooperation provides various financial instruments for govern-
ment or government-related enterprises in developing countries or emerging markets: 
Programs and projects are either purely financed from federal budget funds (non-
repayable grants and/or loans at very advantageous standard conditions) or from a 
mixture of federal budget funds and loans raised at the capital market. These Devel-
opment Loans include Composite Financing, Reduced-Interest Loans and Mixed 
Financing. In addition, loans at near-market conditions from capital market funds, so-
called Promotional Loans, are offered.  
12.7.1. Developmental Orientation 
The main task of the German Financial Cooperation is to support partner countries in 
the financing of projects or programs which have relevance for their development. The 
key sectors of KfW Development Bank’s activities are environmental and climate 
protection and the promotion of financial, social and economic infrastructure.  
In general, projects and programs financed with FC funds are embedded in country 
strategy papers, sector programs and other relevant documents of the partner coun-
tries and corresponding policies of German development cooperation.  
The developmental soundness of projects or programs is first and foremost analyzed 
along the logframe matrix and corresponding indicators: Macroeconomic, socio-
economic and socio-cultural impacts (e.g. possibility of conflict between different 
(ethnical) groups), gender aspects and environmental and social compatibility; eco-
nomic aspects, operational and commercial risks, the target group’s attitude towards 
the project.  
Ex-ante evaluations, monitoring activities (including field visits) and final inspection 
reports are done regularly by the KfW Development Bank or by assigned external 
consultants. Since 2007 only a representative sample of individual projects has been 
submitted for ex-post evaluation. 
The BMZ and the KfW Development Bank both stress the importance of ownership 
by the partner country. De facto no single FC-proposal is financed without an injection 
of own resources by the partner country. Additionally, recipients are responsible for 
the tendering and the contract management. The involvement of the KfW Develop-
ment Bank depends to a large extent on the capabilities of the given country. Never-
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theless, the bank is involved very closely in the implementation of projects and pro-
grams financed with FC funds and has important final decision-making powers.  
The bank is continuously trying to make efforts to improve its transparency. Neverthe-
less, so far only very basic information on development criteria used to analyze the 
development relevance of a corresponding project has been provided to the public. 
Different stakeholders repeatedly refer to the confidentiality of internal guidelines and 
manuals. Although the KfW Development Bank has launched a transparency portal, 
which fully became operational at the beginning of 2014, no detailed information 
about financing conditions, e.g. the level of concessionality or the source of market 
funds is available325. 
Technical assistance components from the German Development Agency (GIZ) are 
often part of the projects or programs financed with FC funds. In this context the 
German civil society strongly criticizes that GIZ and the KfW Development Bank have 
not been merged as proposed in the OECD/DAC peer review in 2005 and 2010 
(Reuke/Grohse 2013: 5-6). 
Being strongly focused on export financing, German NGOs are not that much of a 
watchdog of development finance activities of the officially untied German Financial 
Cooperation. Thus, the BMZ, including the KfW Development Bank as implementing 
agency, do not have a strong non-governmental opposition; their reporting duties are 
mainly those to the parliament and to the federal court of auditors. 
12.7.2. Rationale of ODA Reporting  
Financial cooperation instruments such as reduced-interest loans and/or promotional 
loans are mainly provided for emerging markets. Critical stakeholders indicate that by 
this export promotion is given the overarching priority and not poverty reduction. Fur-
thermore, LDCs will be marginalized in terms of fewer funds which are provided by the 
German Financial Cooperation (Reuke/Grohse 2013: 2). 
Further, the German civil society indicates that the use of different forms of mixed 
financing loans has been steadily increasing. Reduced-interest loans are very popular; 
here federal budget funds are used to reduce the interest rate of a loan provided by 
the KfW Development Bank with funds raised at the capital market. These loans are 
eligible to be counted as ODA which has been comprehensively criticized on quite a 
few occasions (Terre des Hommes 2012: 6). 
Critical voices (e.g. Richard Manning, former DAC chairman) have repeatedly pointed 
out over the last years that current reporting practices of Germany and other major 
DAC donor countries eroded the ODA-concept. This criticism particularly refers to 
large volumes of loans being counted as ODA although they did not meet any reason-
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able definition of being “concessional in character”, which is the basis of the OECD’s 
definition of aid (Fritz 2013: 25-26).  
On the other hand, it is being questioned inhowfar the definition of ODA is adequate 
because under low-interest conditions it largely depends on which meaning is as-
signed to “concessionality in character” in order to decide whether a loan qualifies as 
ODA. In other words, a precise definition is absent which means that members are 
relatively free to report loans as ODA as long as they meet the grant element criterion 
(OECD/DAC 2013c: 2-5). 
Germany has argued until now that Development (and Promotional) Loans are con-
cessional in character because these loans (1) incorporate an effort by the German 
government either by means of an explicit subsidy element (grant) or an implicit form 
of a guarantee; (2) are attested development relevance and provide benefits to the 
recipients because these loans have softer terms; (3) do not earn any profits for Ger-
many as the beneficial owner of KfW Development Bank as any benefits are passed 
on to the recipient country (Interview C10)326.  
The issue of how to establish “concessionality in character” has been discussed 
several times in the DAC, but has recently gained even more importance because of 
its different interpretation among DAC members. Thus, Germany has also been asked 
by the DAC “late in 2012 to identify which loans included in their ODA reporting 
represented marked-raised funds being on-lent on harder terms, i.e. without a subsidy” 
(OECD/DAC 2013c: 4). 
A stakeholder explains that final data on 2012 flows had been released in December 
2013 but no report has been published about the performance of DAC members until 
now. In addition, this person mentions that a report for the DAC Working Party on 
Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT) will be reviewed and discussed by DAC 
members in June 2014327. 
12.7.3. (Un)tied German Financial Cooperation? 
Germany has undertaken efforts to untie its FC Funds during the last years. Apart 
from Technical Cooperation, which is still partly tied to goods and services from Ger-
many, the BMZ being in charge of the German development policy officially communi-
cates that the German Financial Cooperation is completely untied (Interview C2; 
OECD 2012: 4). 
Several stakeholders confirm that the German financial cooperation is principally not 
tied to goods and services from Germany. In addition, an interview partner states that 
compared to the 1960ies and 1970ies tied aid has simply no significant relevance 
anymore. This person adds that nowadays construction work in big infrastructure 
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projects is awarded to local companies, companies from neighbor countries or con-
sortia, e.g. led by Chinese companies (Interview C2, C1). 
In addition, the same stakeholder underpins that all German exports amount more or 
less to EUR 1100 billion per year. In comparison to this number, the FC federal budg-
et funds are about EUR 1.5 billion and, approximately, an additional EUR 3 billion 
which are raised on the capital markets by the KfW per year328. Due to this, the person 
being interviewed draws the conclusion that the FC funds are about 1.4 permille of 
Germany’s foreign trade, which demonstrates the irrelevance of FC funds for German 
exports (Interview C1). 
In fact, these figures demonstrate that, compared to Germany’s foreign trade, the 
country’s financial cooperation is negligible in terms of the financial volume. Neverthe-
less, there are several points which have to be questioned when considering the 
relevance of (un-)tying within Germany’s financial cooperation: 
On average, about 60 % of all project deliverables, which have to be tendered interna-
tionally, are awarded to German companies within the German Financial Cooperation 
(Seebens 2012). Here several stakeholders point to the international competitiveness 
as the main reason for this high volume and add that a lot of project components, 
especially consultancy and advisory activities, need comprehensive know-how and 
sufficient experience (Interview C1, C4).  
However, Germany has created a range of services to encourage companies to make 
use of the opportunities for development policy engagement. 
Due to the guidelines of the German bilateral financial and technical cooperation, the 
German business sector must be informed as early as possible about projects fi-
nanced with FC funds (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2007b: 19-20). Thus, the information 
about so-called “KfW-tenders” is published by the GTAI, the German economic de-
velopment agency, which corresponds to the Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWi) and provides foreign trade information to German-based businesses seeking 
to expand in international markets, as early as possible (Interview C1)329.  
In addition, the former minister Niebel (2009-2013) e.g. established a new Service 
Point for the Private Sector within the BMZ in order to provide advice for German 
companies interested in investing in developing and emerging countries. Further, the 
BMZ started sending so-called EZ-scouts to industry associations and chambers of 
industry and commerce in order to advise their member companies about the services 
available to support development-related investment by the German private sector 
(BMZ 2013a: 17).  
                                                            
328  KfW Entwicklungsbank, Transparency Portal: http://transparenz.kfw entwicklungs-
bank.de/mittelherkunft/index.html 
329  GTAI: http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Meta/about-us.html 
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In the German Financial Cooperation partner countries intensively make use of the 
support and advisory services of consultants primarily in order to prepare, execute and 
operate specific projects. Although these consulting services are internationally ten-
dered by the partner country or the corresponding project executing agencies, these 
services are often delivered by engineering consultants from Germany, other industrial 
countries or consortia from Great Britain, France or the USA (Interview C1). 
As a result, the German Financial Cooperation may officially be untied to goods and 
services from Germany. Nevertheless, there are several mechanisms in place which 
facilitate the supply of goods and services from Germany or other industrial countries, 
because of informational and institutional advantages which have nothing to do with 
the competitive advantage of the German or European Economy in general.  
In conclusion, the analysis of the developmental orientation of the German Financial 
Cooperation indicates that concessional financing and promotional loans have in-
creasingly been used within the last years. This is partly a reflection of Germany’s 
strategy to work with emerging economies (here key countries are China, India and 
Vietnam) and its development policy focusing on global public goods such as climate.  
Though the German Financial Cooperation is institutionally separated from export 
financing, and development-related aspects are considered throughout the whole life 
cycle of a given project, more transparency is urgently needed in order to prevent that 
projects will be even more framed by economic views, export promotion and foreign 
trade interests. 
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13. The Netherlands 
For a long time, the Netherlands has always been one of the front-runners in terms of 
development cooperation in relation to other OECD/DAC members.  
The country’s outstanding credibility and well-deserved reputation was generally 
grounded in responding positively and creatively to major challenges and setting 
trends for new approaches. Further, the Netherlands has the reputation of being an 
early campaigner for international aid agreements and a country that advocates the 
need for coherent development policies and donor coordination (Spitz/Muskens/van 
Ewijk 2013: 6). 
13.1. Country Facts and Figures  
The very successful history of development cooperation is well documented by statis-
tics: Since 1975, the Netherlands is among the few DAC members to have surpassed 
the UN target of allocating 0.7 % of GNI for ODA (Official Development Assistance). 
According to preliminary OECD figures, the country was the 4th largest government 
donor in 2012, spending USD 5.5 billion on ODA (OECD/DAC 2011d: 11-15).  
Even though ODA has continuously decreased since 2008, it was still above the UN 
target of 0.7 % of GNI in 2012 (0.71 percent). In 2013, ODA shares were estimated 
to drop to 0.59 % of GNI, which would leave Dutch ODA far below the 0.7 % target 
for the first time since 1975. In addition, indicative budgets for the coming years show 
further reductions (Dutch MfA 2013a)330. 
“The decision to cut the aid budget and abandon the 0.7 percent target might seem 
to outsiders to be a surprising move“ (Spitz/Muskens/van Ewijk 2013: 6). As a con-
sequence of these budget cuts, the Dutch development policy has been undergoing 
far-reaching reforms since 2010 at the latest.  
13.1.1. Key Objectives of Dutch Development Policy  
Already in the year 2010, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policies 
(WRR), an independent think tank of the Dutch government, advocated a major 
change in Dutch development policy: thematic focus on fewer countries; a stronger 
alignment of development focus with Dutch expertise and interests; a shift from social 
to economic development (Spitz/Muskens/van Ewijk 2013: 13). 
                                                            
330  Information Portal SEEK Development: http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/netherlands 
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These recommendations were partly implemented by the State-Secretary of Develop-
ment Cooperation, Ben Knapen from the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), who 
was part of the Dutch government (2010-2012), headed by Prime Minister Mark Rutte 
from the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)331.  
In 2011, Knapen decreased the number of partner countries from 33 to 15 countries, 
ten of them in Sub-Saharan Africa332. Further, bilateral projects and embassies have 
been dismantled in former partner countries (Spitz/Muskens/van Ewijk 2013: 33). In 
general, Dutch self-interest and economic-diplomacy returned as a centrepiece of 
development policy during Knapen’s period: focus-countries and themes have been 
synchronized more strongly with Dutch commercial interests and expertise (ibid.: 13).  
Another part of the reformed bilateral development policy is the narrowed thematic 
focus, which has been framed to four spearhead areas. The priority areas of the Dutch 
development cooperation are women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health and 
rights (SRHR), water, food security as well as security and the rule of law333. 
All these major changes were agreed upon in the coalition agreement of October 
2010, but have remained unchanged in the second Rutte cabinet, formed by the VVD 
and the PvdA, which was installed in autumn 2012:334  
“Based on the policy program of the first Rutte Government, the government sees its 
mission as being to promote the security and well-being of the Netherlands and the 
Dutch people, and to that end it will focus on international stability and security, ener-
gy and raw material security, the international legal order (including human rights) and 
the commercial and economic interests of the Netherlands and Dutch businesses.“335  
It should be added that Dutch industry and business sectors have continuously been 
involved in development cooperation in the past. However, their extent has always 
been dependent on government constellations, the influence of representative stake-
holders as well as the international discourse (Hoebink/Schulpen 1998: 39-40). 
Although the Dutch industry and business are not really considered in the Private 
Sector Development concepts (PSD), which have gained more and more influence 
since the mid 1990ies, mainly their lobbying contributed to the establishment of PSD 
as a main pillar of Dutch development cooperation (Gütermann 2011: 71-72). 
                                                            
331  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/forming-a-new-
government/news/2010/10/14/rosenthal-and-knapen-new-government-members-at-foreign-affairs.html 
332  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/development-cooperation/partners-in-
development 
333  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/development-cooperation/the-
development-policy-of-the-netherlands 
334  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/government/coalition-agreement 
335  Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.government.nl/ministries/bz/about-the-ministry 
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13.1.2. A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment 
Considering the current development policy in the Netherlands, which is guided by 
the strategic policy document “A world to gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and 
Investment.“, a greater emphasis will clearly be placed on an economic view of devel-
opment and the advantages of bilateral aid in terms of trading opportunities for Dutch 
businesses in the coming years (Dutch MfA 2013b). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strongly targeted by these comprehensive reforms. 
The Dutch government established a new cabinet-level post of a Minister for Foreign 
Trade and Development Cooperation, currently held by Lilianne Ploumen from the 
Labor Party (PvdA). Thereby, the Dutch government has aligned development policy 
strongly with foreign trade336.  
The realignment between those two policy areas is further reflected by the Dutch 
Good Growth Fund (DGGF), a revolving fund of EUR 700 million financed from the 
development cooperation budget in the years 2014-2016. This fund was established 
in close collaboration with the business community, in particular with investment com-
panies, and will support investments in developing countries, especially by small and 
medium-sized enterprises.337 
Several other bilateral instruments that aim at advancing local development also pro-
vide opportunities for Dutch business to deploy activities in developing countries 
(Spitz/Muskens/van Ewijk 2013: 33-34). One of them is ORIO, a grant facility for 
public infrastructure projects, which will be under close scrutiny in the following.  
13.2. Profile of Programs 
It is important to note that the Dutch bilateral development cooperation currently does 
not provide any kind of “soft loans”. However, there are government funds, which 
provide mechanisms to combine public development finance with private finance. 
One of them is ORIO meaning “Development Relevant Infrastructure Incentive”, the 
Facility for Infrastructure Development, which provides long-term financing for public 
infrastructure projects338.  
ORIO is officially an untied facility and was established in 2009 as a part of a wider 
reform of the Netherlands’ ‘Development Relevant Export Transactions program’ (in 
Dutch: ORET), which had been tied to goods and services from Dutch companies339.  
                                                            
336  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/government/members-of-cabinet/lilianne-
ploumen/cv 
337  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/development-cooperation 
338  Agency NL: http://english.agentschapnl.nl/subsidies-programmes/facility-infrastructure-development-orio 
339  Agency NL: http://www.oret.nl/ 
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Another offshoot of the ORET-program is the Infrastructure Development Fund (IDF) 
formally known as the LDC Infrastructure Fund until October 2009. IDF provides 
grants, loans and equity for private sector infrastructure projects, e.g. in the form of 
associated financing340. 
Further, the so-called Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) will start providing conces-
sional loans and guarantees for Dutch companies in July 2014 in order to facilitate 
market entry in developing and emerging markets (Dutch MfA 2013c: 11-13). 
13.2.1. Historical Overview 
In the history of Dutch development cooperation, the Netherlands always had several 
motives for providing development aid. Using parts of its aid-budget to support Dutch 
business has until now always been a continuum.  
The Development Relevant Export Transactions program has been the most important 
program in which Dutch business has been supported during the last three decades. 
Apart from serving development interests, one of the main objectives of this program 
has explicitly been the promotion of Dutch exports (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 
12-17). 
The ORET-program was launched in 1983 as a combination of programs adminis-
tered jointly by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
providing finance for public infrastructure projects in developing countries in the form 
of soft loans and aiming to support development-related export transactions by Dutch 
companies (IOB/NCSTE 2006: 46).  
The first predecessor of the ORET-program already dates back to the year 1979, 
when the Mixed Credit Program was launched by the Minister for Development Co-
operation, De Koning in cooperation with the Ministry of Economic Affairs for export 
transactions that were related to the development in the recipient country. Mixed 
credits for export transactions combined concessional loans or grants and commercial 
loans (IOB 1999: 11).  
In 1987, the Mixed Credit Program was replaced by a program for Less Concessional 
Loans (LCLs), “[...] which not only provided concessional loans for exports of capital 
goods but also included service contracts that were linked to civil engineering pro-
jects or institution building in developing countries” and was operative between 1987 
and 1991 (IOB 1999: 12). 
The ORET-program was an LCL program until this loan-based financing was replaced 
by the award of grants to cover parts of the transaction costs by the year 1991 and 
renamed into ‘Development Relevant Export Transactions’. ODA grants were often 
                                                            
340  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/infrastructurefund 
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combined with officially guaranteed export credits in the form of Associated Financing 
(OECD 2008c: 14).  
An interview partner states that projects within the ORET-program, which have often 
been combined with commercial loans, have not only included a grant for the recipient 
country but also a subsidy for Dutch companies (Interview D5).  
The 1990ies evaluation of the Mixed Credit Program, which was done by the Policy 
and Operations Evaluation Department (IOV, now IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, inter alia “concluded that export relevance had overshadowed the develop-
ment relevance of the program: too few safeguards were built into the program to 
allow for international competitive bidding and ex ante assessment of development 
effects. As such, fair prices would not always be guaranteed and export relevance 
could easily prevail over development relevance” (IOB 1999: 13). 
The findings of the IOV/IOB evaluation and the “Helsinki Package” triggered some 
changes with regard to mixed credits. Although the ORET-program broadly retained 
the same design, ORET excluded commercially viable projects and did not provide 
any more concessional loans but full grants (Elbers 2002: 1).  
It is not a coincidence that the shift from loans to grants was proposed in the period 
of Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation between 1989 and 1998. Pronk 
wanted to stop giving loans financed out of public funds and to restrict the Dutch 
development assistance to grants only. According to him, public debt of developing 
countries had grown out of proportions in the 1980ies so that debt refinancing took 
place out of development budgets which led to decreasing funds to be spent on 
social issues and direct poverty reduction (Interview D1). 
Because of its dual character the ORET-program and its predecessors have always 
been controversial programs and subject to much criticism from various members of 
Parliament, Ministers for Development Cooperation, academics and pressure groups 
in the Netherlands (Elbers 2002: 1). 
As a consequence, the ORET-program has been adapted and reformed several times 
in order to be relevant and timely, and also to be in accordance with international 
agreements. In comparison to the LCL program, ORET e.g. started to apply detailed 
appraisal procedures to ensure a larger developmental relevance of the export trans-
actions (Elbers 2002: 19). 
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Table 16: History of Selected Dutch Government Funds 
 History of Government Funds The Netherlands 
1979 Mixed Credits Program 1979-1987 
1983 ORET-program 
Soft Loans (LCL) for development-related 
export transactions 
1987 Low Concessional Loans (LCL) Program 
Successor of Mixed Credit Scheme 
(1987-1991) 
1991 ORET-program 
Tied grant facility, combination of grants 
with commercial loans for development 
relevant public infrastructure projects 
1993 MILIEV-Program Additional to ORET; focusing on envi-
ronmental projects  
1998 ORET/MILIEV grant program 
Merger of ORET & MILIEV; procurement 
tied 
2002 LDC Infrastructure Fund 
Untied Fund providing loans, equity, 
grants and credit guarantees for in order 
to stimulate private infrastructure invest-
ments 
2005 ORET/MILIEV program renewed Tied pillar, untied pillar for LDCs  
2005 ORET Water Facility Tied pillar, untied pillar for LDCs 
2006 LDC Infrastructure Fund 
New public endowment; focus on social 
sectors (health, education, water, sanita-
tion, electricity, energy) 
2009 Infrastructure Development Facility ORIO 
Grant facility for public infrastructure 
projects; de iure untied, de facto tied aid 
facility 
2009 Infrastructure Development Fund IDF 
Revolving Fund providing grants, loans, 
equity in order to catalyze private and 
commercially viable infrastructure invest-
ments 
2012 ORIO Reform (objectives, procedures) 
2014 Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) 
Revolving Fund providing loans, grants, 
guarantees; strong focus on SMEs, 
procurement tied pillar 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
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In 1993, the MILIEV-program (Program for Environment and Economic Self-
sufficiency) was introduced in addition to ORET in order to partially provide financing 
for projects aiming at environmental improvement in developing countries. The 
MILIEV-program was comparable to ORET providing ODA grants combined with 
officially guaranteed export credits. The ORET- and MILIEV-program were merged in 
1998 because it had been decided that the separation had little surplus (IOB 1999: 
20).  
Although the influence of Dutch business deteriorated in the 1990ies – quite contrary 
to the success VNO-NCW being the Dutch employers’ organization had during the 
1970ies and 1980ies –, the discussion regarding the involvement of Dutch business 
in development of cooperation continued because their interest could hardly be side-
stepped (Elbers 2002: 17-21). 
At the end of the 1990ies, an evaluation report of the ORET/MILIEV program (1994-
1999) was provided by IOV/IOB. Though the report was fairly positive, critical re-
marks considered e.g. sustainable job creation as an unsuitable criterion for assessing 
the developmental relevance of a project; further IOB considered monitoring and 
evaluation procedures as completely inadequate (IOB 1999: XXVI-XXVIII). 
In addition, IOB stated that the economic benefits from tying the program to goods 
and services from Dutch companies should not be overstated (IOB 1999: XXIII). This 
conclusion was remarkable because since the 1970ies onwards the Dutch develop-
ment cooperation has been strongly tied to goods and services from the Netherlands 
(Elbers 2002: 17).  
Although the evaluation report of the IOV/IOB highlighted some critical points and 
some minor changes were implemented soon in the way ORET/MILIEV-projects were 
monitored and evaluated, opponents were disappointed, in particular compared to the 
very critical evaluation of the ORET-predecessor, the Mixed Credit Program (Elbers 
2002: 24). 
In 2000, Dutch policy on private sector development took shape in the memorandum 
“In Business against poverty”. This document emphasized the importance of private 
sector development with regard to pro-poor growth in developing countries. The 
memorandum stressed the importance of good infrastructure for the development of 
the private sector and the need to address problems related to attracting (foreign) 
capital for investments (IOB 2009: 29). 
In 2001, the ORET/MILIEV program was transferred from the Private Sector Depart-
ment of the Ministry for Development Cooperation to the Netherlands Development 
Finance Company (FMO) as a result of trying to improve the coherence and flexibility 
of the trade promotion instruments of the Dutch government (Elbers 2002: 20).  
In concrete terms, the Netherlands Investment Bank for Developing Countries (NIO 
Bank), a subsidiary of the FMO was authorized to administer the program in consulta-
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tion with the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In general, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
together with the Ministry of Economic Affairs was responsible to control the 
ORET/MILIEV program (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 6). 
At the same time, the debate about untying aid gained momentum at national and 
international level. As a result of the OECD agreement about untying in spring 2001, 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were excluded from ORET/MILIEV. The Dutch 
government decided to establish a new fund in order to stimulate infrastructure in-
vestment in the LDCs (IOB 2009: 30).  
The set-up of the LDC Infrastructure Fund, which was established in 2002, implied an 
important policy change impacting Dutch enterprises: instead of subsidizing exports, 
the fund would finance or facilitate investments by providing loans, equity, grants and 
credit guarantees: “It was to have a larger ‘risk appetite’ and provide financing to 
infrastructure projects that were considered too risky for other funds.” (IOB 2009: 7, 
33). 
Because the Fund developed considerably slower than anticipated and the subsidy 
period expired by the end of 2005, a revision as well as a new subsidy decision was 
necessary. Thus, in 2006, the government decided to extend the subsidy period until 
2013 with a focus on social sectors (including water, health and education) and facili-
tated the financing of non-commercial elements of sponsored projects (IOB 2009: 
34). 
In 2005, the ORET/MILIEV-program was renewed. The application of specific regula-
tions to MILIEV was discontinued, and the name was simplified to ORET (Berenschot/ 
Seor/Ecolas 2006: 12). Additionally, the ORET-program was augmented with an 
untied variant in order to serve the LDCs. Furthermore, a water facility was established 
and made available for all ORET countries (OECD/DAC 2005: 2). 
The reformulation of the ORET/MILIEV-program included a shift in the objectives from 
promoting employment in the recipient country to promoting sustainable economic 
development and the business climate (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 12-13).  
A crucial element was that the Dutch government did not decide on the allocation of 
the budget per country, nor did it decide on the contract partners anymore but was 
responsible to assess, monitor and safeguard the quality and sustainability of a project 
while providing a grant to the recipient country. In addition, the recipient government 
was officially responsible for the acquisition of projects, the procurement and the 
contracting process (OECD/DAC 2005: 3). 
The ORET/MILIEV-program (1999-2004) was evaluated by an external consortium on 
behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005/06. The evaluation highlighted that 
although objectives and regulations of the program were adopted several times, the 
thrust of the program – contributing to physical and social infrastructure in developing 
  19  347 
countries and supporting exports from Dutch origin – remained basically unchanged 
(Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 20, 63). 
Moreover, the evaluation concluded that a more strategic use of the program includ-
ing the refinement of appraisal procedures would be necessary because little atten-
tion had been paid to a proposal’s (potential) contribution to the program objectives. 
Further, to recipient countries, ORET was not the most practical financing modality 
since the grant covered only part of the costs, and therefore a second financing 
source was always required (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 64).  
With regard to Dutch exporters, ORET satisfied only those who already had been 
optimally established in the corresponding foreign market. Thus, the argument that 
ORET supports Dutch companies in order to facilitate the entry into new markets did 
not hold in the end. Furthermore, the evaluation report criticized the lack of a sound 
monitoring and evaluation system on effectiveness and impact (during the envisaged 
lifetime) of projects (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 66-68). 
The evaluation did not consider the renewal of the ORET/MILIEV program in 2005. 
The number of ORET applications submitted and the number of approved applica-
tions rose sharply between 2005 and 2006. Consequently, Bert Koenders, the Minis-
ter for Development Cooperation (2007-2010), decided not to make any new funds 
for financing new ORET applications available (ORET.nl 2007: 3). 
Moreover, since 2007 a consortium of PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ecorys (the 
former Netherlands Economic Institute – NEI), called Oret.nl, has been authorized to 
administer the ORET-program including its phasing-out in consultation with the Minis-
try of Economic Affairs (ORET.nl 2006: 1).  
The findings of the evaluation of 2005/06 were partly taken up in the establishment of 
the Facility for Infrastructure Development named ORIO in 2009; a grant scheme 
providing funds for the development of public infrastructure in developing countries. In 
general, the basis for ORIO was laid in the cabinet of Balkenende IV, which had de-
cided to replace ORET with a more demand-driven, more development-relevant pro-
gram as the ORET-program performed less well on development effects, including 
poverty reduction (Dutch MfA 2009: 23). 
In 2009, the LDC Infrastructure Fund was evaluated by IOB. The evaluation report 
concluded that the fund fills a gap in the financing of private and commercial infra-
structure projects in LDCs. Nevertheless, the report pointed out that it would appear 
difficult to find suitable projects that strengthen infrastructure being essentially a pub-
lic good through private projects. Furthermore, the report indicated the importance of 
considering start-up problems and the time needed for the realization of projects (IOB 
2009: 7-11).  
These findings served as a basis for the design and establishment of the Infrastructure 
Development Fund (IDF) providing grants, loans and equity for private and commercial 
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infrastructure projects in 2009. In particular, the design of the Facility for Infrastructure 
Development (ORIO) considered the time needed for the development of project 
proposals by providing a Development Phase (NL Agency/MfA 2013a: 8-9). 
ORIO officially being an untied infrastructure facility never had much support by the 
Dutch business although the government involving Dutch business developed the 
grant facility. Ever since the report about the strategic use of export financing instru-
ments was published in 2012, it became clear that the Dutch industry did not really 
want to give up the tied ORET-program. In this strategic paper it was argued that it 
was a serious loss for the Dutch business sector that there was no tied aid financing 
for exports in the Netherlands, in particular in a time in which concessional financing 
from countries like China, especially in Africa, had increased enormously (Werkgroep 
Exportfinanciering 2012: 7). 
Important ideas from this report were taken up by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Innovation in the first Rutte government, which had officially stepped 
down. In the development orientation that is touted by the current Minister for Devel-
opment Cooperation and Foreign Trade, Lilianne Ploumen (being part of the second 
Rutte cabinet) aid and trade go together very harmoniously341. In spring 2013, a new 
revolving fund for aid, trade and investment (DGGF) was announced. Hence, inter alia 
Dutch companies will be able to apply for export financing for development relevant 
projects (Dutch MfA 2013b: 7-8). 
The DGGF was mainly developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in consultation 
with the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance, the private sector (here in particu-
lar investment companies were consulted) and civil society organizations. According 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the to-be-created DGGF is the adequate form of 
funding in order to implement the “new cohesive approach to trade and development 
cooperation” (Dutch MfA 2013b: 44-45).  
Details about the new Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) were debated in hearings in 
parliament in spring and autumn 2013. The DGGF is faced with a lot of criticism from 
Dutch civil society as the fund is broadly designed to combine aid and trade; and to a 
great part will issue export and financing activities to Dutch and local businesses for 
activities in developing countries and thus raises questions about its developmental 
relevance as well as tied aid (Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 2-3). 
13.2.2. Legal Background 
The Dutch development cooperation is not defined by law, but underpinned by the 
coalition agreement that covers each legislature period (VVD-PvdA 2012)342.  
                                                            
341  Dutch Magazine for Development: http://www.viceversaonline.nl/2013/05/31916/ 
342  Government of The Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/government/coalition-agreement/the-
netherlands-in-the-world 
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The development budget gives guidance and strategy for the Dutch development 
cooperation in terms of money. This budget was part of the overall budget of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 2013. In 2014, for the first time, the Ministry has two 
budgets: besides the foreign affairs budget, there is a program budget for foreign 
trade and development cooperation. This budget ensures that aid and trade will be 
more closely linked in future343.  
A memorandum that provides more detailed information for the current budget year 
and indicative budgets for the following years of the legislature period in general com-
plements the budget. A third document summarizes all ODA provided by the different 
ministries (HGIS)344. Further, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides information to 
parliament by answering questions on the annual budget (Mess 2012: 128).  
In addition, there are administrative rules, manuals and various policy documents, e.g. 
the current development policy document “A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, 
Trade and Investment“ that guide the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their executing 
agencies, e.g. FMO or NL Agency. 
13.2.3. Institutional Environment  
Several actors are involved in the Dutch bilateral development finance cooperation. In 
this set-up, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics, which has 
been established as a super-Ministry for Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation 
between 2010 and 2012, are institutional key players345.  
FMO, the Dutch development bank, and NL Agency are implementing agencies of the 
Dutch government; they carry out policy and subsidy programs. In this framework, 
Atradius Dutch State Business offers insurance and export guarantee products. 
In the recipient country, the central government is a key actor. Apart from the central 
authority which usually is the Ministry of Finance the competent authority, a line minis-
try or regional or local authority, is mainly part of the institutional set-up (Interview D5). 
Depending on the fund or facility, infrastructure companies and other financiers 
(commercial bank, regional development bank, etc.) are involved once the implementa-
tion of a given project starts. In general, various consultants form part throughout the 
whole lifecycle of a given project (Interview D5). 
  
                                                            
343  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/news/2013/09/17/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-
faces-far-reaching-budget-cuts.html 
344  Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.government.nl/ministries/bz/policy-and-
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345  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/forming-a-new-
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Dutch development cooperation is an integral part of the foreign policy imple-
mented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfA). The Ministry is headed by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, currently held by Frans Timmermans (PvdA)346.  
The Netherlands continuously provided a Minister (1965-2010) or a State Secretary 
for Development Cooperation (2010-2012) which was part of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In order to reinforce the relationship between foreign trade and development 
cooperation the Dutch government established a new cabinet-level post of a Minister 
for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. Thus, the Minister Lilianne Ploumen 
(PvdA) who oversees the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS) 
has assisted Timmermans since November 2012347.  
Previously, the Netherlands also had two government members at Foreign Affairs: one 
Minister being in charge of overall foreign policy and the other Minister responsible for 
development cooperation and European affairs.348 Back then, foreign trade and export 
promotion were mainly part of the Ministry of Economics (Interview D2). 
The MfA is officially in charge of the implementation of the Dutch development coop-
eration. More specifically, the Ministry is responsible for the decision-making concern-
ing aid activities and the disbursement of aid funds.  
The Ministry does not carry out projects or programs, but finances activities of partner 
organizations and recipient governments. It is not itself involved in the implementation; 
bilateral government funds are implemented by executing agencies, e.g. FMO or NL 
Agency; the Ministry solely maintains links with implementing ministries on an adminis-
trative level.  
Dutch embassies and consulates-general are closely involved in the implementation of 
bilateral development cooperation funds. They select and implement development 
projects and also help to formulate a general approach.349 Further, these so-called 
‘Diplomatic Missions’ also have specific knowledge about foreign markets, which let 
Uri Rosenthal, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2010-2012), to engage embassies 
more strongly in export promotion and foreign trade related activities (Interview D2). 
An interviewee mentioned that the former minister did not see embassies in classical 
diplomacy terms, but rather as an additional instrument in order to promote Dutch 
exports. According to this person, the present Minister Timmermans slightly withdrew 
                                                            
346  Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.government.nl/ministries/bz/about-the-ministry 
347  Information Portal SEEK Development,: http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/netherlands/actors-
decision-making 
348  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/news/2010/10/14/rosenthal-and-knapen-
new-government-members-at-foreign-affairs.html 
349  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/embassies-consulates-and-other-
representations/missions-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-abroad 
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from this vision, nevertheless Dutch embassies were always aiding Dutch exports and 
Dutch enterprises when problems occurred or information was needed (Interview D2).  
The following figure illustrates the institutional set-up of the Dutch Development Fi-
nance Scheme including its main actors and their linkages with each other. 
Figure 13.1: Institutional Set-up 
Source: Own Elaboration 
FMO – Entrepreneurial Development Bank 
Being part of the Netherlands Development Cooperation, FMO is the Dutch bilateral 
development bank. The bank finances companies, projects and financial institutions 
from developing and emerging markets and thus, supports “sustainable” private sec-
tor growth in these countries350.  
FMO was founded in 1970 and is a public-private partnership; 51 % of its shares are 
held by the Dutch State, the other 49 % are held by commercial banks, trade unions 
and other private representatives. FMO has a solid capital base (AAA rating from 
Standard & Poor’s) which allows it to invest in higher risk markets; both with funds 
raised on the capital markets or on behalf of the Dutch government351.  
In FMO’s focus are sectors in which Dutch development cooperation is able to pro-
vide knowledge and to contribute to sustainable and long-lasting projects: financial 
institutions, energy and agribusiness, food and water352. 
                                                            
350  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: homepage, http://www.fmo.nl/about-us 
351  Ibid. 
352  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/about-us/profile 
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Carrying out Private Sector Development concepts from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the development bank provides different services and products (e.g. equity, 
loans and guarantees; capital market transactions; mezzanine capital) for developing 
countries which often do not have any access to adequate financial services353. 
FMO also implements FOM, a fund to stimulate Dutch companies to invest in emerg-
ing markets, and several government funds354. One of these facilities is the Infrastruc-
ture Development Fund (IDF) providing long-term financing for public infrastructure 
projects in low-income countries355. 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality were merged into the new Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Inno-
vation between 2010 and 2012.356  
Since autumn 2012, the ministry has again been renamed Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs. Nevertheless, agriculture, livestock, energy, sustainable growth and innovation 
and business are important dossiers of the ministry357.  
Foreign Economic Relations are an important part of the ministry’s activities. One of 
the main pillars of the ministry’s strategy is to support Dutch business abroad through 
economic diplomacy and, for example, assistance via embassies and consulates358. 
In terms of development policy, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has gained more 
influence during the last years than it had e.g. in the 1990ies when Jan Pronk was 
head of the Ministry for Development Cooperation (Interview D2, D1). When the first 
Rutte government installed the Ministry of Economics as a super-ministry, the influ-
ence got clearly visible.  
NL Agency359 
The NL Agency acts upon a mandate of the Dutch government and is mainly respon-
sible for promoting the international presence of Dutch companies in foreign markets 
and for supporting private sector development in emerging markets360.  
The organization, which is working closely with the Dutch Diplomatic Missions and 
Netherlands Business Support Offices, provides information and advice regarding 
                                                            
353  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/about-us/profile 
354  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/fom 
355  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/idf 
356  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/forming-a-new-
government/news/2010/10/14/rutte-government-sworn-in.html 
357  Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs: http://www.government.nl/ministries/ez 
358  Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs: http://www.government.nl/ministries/ez/strategy 
359  Important Note: In January 2014, NL Agency and the National Service for the Implementation of Regulati-
ons were merged into the Netherlands Enterprise Agency 
360  Information Portal of Agency NL: http://www.hollandtrade.com/organization/about.asp 
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financing, networking and regulatory matters for businesses, knowledge institutions 
and government bodies361.  
In particular, it provides Dutch companies with information and services in order to 
face opportunities in various foreign markets. Additionally, financial support is provid-
ed for Dutch activities contributing to sustainable private sector development in 
emerging markets362. Further, NL Agency provides detailed information regarding the 
Dutch economy363. 
The NL Agency was established and became operational on 1st January 2010. It is a 
merger of three former agencies all under the Ministry of Economic Affairs – the Neth-
erlands Agency for Sustainability and Innovation (SenterNovem), the Agency for Inter-
national Business and Cooperation (EVD), and the Netherlands Patent Office 
(OctrooiCentrum Nederland)364. 
Being an agency of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, NL Agency carries out 
policy and subsidy programs which focus on sustainability, innovation, international 
business and cooperation365. The Agency inter alia implements ORIO, the Facility for 
Infrastructure Development.  
Atradius Dutch State Business 
Dutch exporters of capital goods or international projects are offered a wide range of 
insurance and guarantee products by Atradius Dutch State Business (Atradius DSB) 
when doing business abroad366.  
Atradius DSB is a subsidy of Atradius, which is a private and international company 
working at an international level. Atradius DSB is mandated to provide export credit 
services on behalf of and for account of the Dutch state; thus, Atradius DSB is one of 
the implementing agencies of the Dutch government (Interview D9).  
“Credit insurance on behalf of and for account of the state usually involves export 
transactions with credit periods or a completion time in excess of twelve months. They 
always involve the supply of capital goods such as machinery, ships or greenhous-
es.”367 
An interview partner states that ‘Atradius DSB’ once was part of the Ministry of  
Economic Affairs and a semi-public organization until the “Nederlandsche 
Credietverzekering Maatschappij)“ was privatized in the 1980ies (Interview D9).  
                                                            
361  Consortium of Dutch Companies in the Food Sector: 
http://www.foodtechholland.nl/index.php/participants/public-stakeholders/nl-agency-nl-evd-internationaal 
362  Agency NL: http://english.agentschapnl.nl/subsidies-programmes/psi 
363  Official Portal of the Government of the Netherlands: http://www.hollandtradeandinvest.com 
364  Voluntary Network of European Energy Agencies: http://www.enr-network.org/NL_Agency.html 
365  Agency NL: http://english.agentschapnl.nl/home/about-nl-agency 
366  Point of Single Contact for the Netherlands: http://www.answersforbusiness.nl/subsidy/export-credit-
insurance 
367  Atradius DSB: http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl/dsben//index.html 
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Nowadays, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in terms of general policy guidelines com-
missions Atradius DSB. Therefore, the ministry has key responsibility and a special 
unit being in charge of export credit policies; they supervise the main Atradius DSB 
activities (Interview D9). 
Corresponding Corporate Social Responsibility Issues were dealt with at the BEB 
Department (DG BEB – “Foreign Economic Relations”) within the Ministry of Econom-
ic Affairs until autumn 2012. Under the current government, the DG BEB was moved 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; thus since November 2012 Minister Ploumen, being 
responsible for Foreign Trade, has been in charge thereof (Interview D9). 
13.2.4. Government Funds 
Apart from being concessional or a mechanism to blend grants, ORIO, IDF and 
DGGF have in common that they are government funds and form part of the develop-
ment cooperation budget. They are intertwined with Dutch foreign trade, private sec-
tor development and the debate about (un-) tying, which will be analyzed more thor-
oughly in the following.  
13.2.4.1. Facility for Infrastructure Development (ORIO) 
ORIO is a Dutch government facility supporting governments in developing countries 
in their efforts to create major infrastructure in partnership with the international busi-
ness community. In this way, ORIO mainly aims at stimulating human development as 
well as private sector development in developing countries368.  
Additionally, ORIO aims at stimulating the involvement of international business in 
order to benefit from the private sector’s expertise369. An interviewed stakeholder 
explains that companies are important drivers in such public infrastructure projects 
(Interview D7). 
Until 2012 ORIO had slightly different objectives and focused on financing public 
infrastructure projects with a sustainable impact on economic growth and private 
sector development, thereby paying particular attention to promoting SMEs and the 
poor (pro-poor growth) (NL Agency/MfA 2011: 12-13). 
ORIO has started in 2009 as successor of the ORET-program and was developed as 
a joint concept by the ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs involving VNO-
NCW, the Dutch employers’ organization, and Verkapex (Capital Exporters’ Associa-
tion) (ViceVersa n.d.: 2).  
                                                            
368  Agency NL: http://english.agentschapnl.nl/subsidies-programmes/facility-infrastructure-development-orio 
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ORIO is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by NL Agency. 
Central governments of about fifty developing countries can apply for an ORIO grant 
for their infrastructure development projects370. 
The grants are classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA), as defined in the 
DAC Guiding Principles of the OECD. In accordance with the OECD-DAC agreement 
on untying aid grants are awarded as untied aid. These grants are not subsidies as 
defined in General Administrative Law Act (NL Agency/MfA 2013a: 3). 
ORIO does only grant a certain percentage of the project costs; the facility does not 
provide funding for the complete project costs. In order to stimulate ‘ownership’ of the 
recipients, it is their responsibility to arrange the financing of the non-ORIO part of the 
project costs. This part may be financed by the government budget, commercial loans 
or other donors (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 13).  
According to an interview partner, recipients often lack the capacity to arrange part of 
the funding of a project. Thus, NL Agency supports recipient countries to find a form 
of financing which does fit their needs. Further, this person states that grants supplied 
by ORIO are very often blended with commercial loans which are provided by Dutch 
commercial banks (Interview D7). 
The grant which is provided by ORIO may differ for the development phase of a public 
infrastructure project from the ORIO contribution for the implementation and mainte-
nance phase. The list of eligible countries including the grant percentage is decided 
and reviewed semi-annually by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is based on the 
partner countries of the Dutch development cooperation in combination with some 
selected LDCs as well as emerging markets371.  
In order to prevent individual countries from receiving disproportionate amounts, the 
total maximum ORIO funding for a single country is limited to 25 % of the ORIO 
budget available for the corresponding year372. 
Typical public infrastructure projects eligible for ORIO funding are within the sectors 
water, environment, energy, transport and logistics, ICT, education and health care 
and civil works (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 3).  
One of the formal requirements of any ORIO project is that it must be commercially 
non-viable. The commercial viability of projects is assessed using the OECD ‚Ex Ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid’. As energy projects tend to be commercially viable, these kinds 
of projects are not allowed to be commercially viable within 12 years, even if sustaina-
ble energy projects are handed in for an ORIO grant. 
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If ORIO grants are combined with commercial loans to arrange funding for a public 
infrastructure project, then most of these transactions will be supplemented by export 
credit insurance373. An interview partner states that recipient countries have to comply 
with the country policies of Atradius DSB in order to obtain such insurance (Interview 
D9). 
In addition, the recipient government has to provide an unconditional guarantee for 
repayment of the commercial loan in order to cover the export credit insurance374.  
13.2.4.2. Infrastructure Development Fund (IDF) 
The IDF fund provides long-term financing for private and commercially viable infra-
structure investments that are relevant for the socio-economic development in devel-
oping countries. Being a revolving fund which provides risk capital, IDF is able to 
finance riskier projects than e.g. ORIO. In this sense, IDF is complementary to existing 
funds and/or facilities (Interview D5).  
FMO is commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to administer the Infrastruc-
ture Development Fund. The bank does not only draw upon IDF funds, but also gar-
ners interest from other financiers, e.g. acts as a gateway for additional private funds. 
Managing IDF on behalf of the Dutch government allows FMO to engage in projects 
that would otherwise be too risky to be prudently taken on by FMO’s own capital 
(FMO Evaluation Unit 2013: 18). Types of funding include e.g. loans, equity, mezza-
nine and/or associated financing (Interview D5). 
IDF provides financing for long-term projects (tenors of up to 20 years) for large infra-
structure projects in areas such as power, agribusiness, water, transport, and envi-
ronment. Loans are being provided of up to EUR 15.5 million; minority shares in equity 
investment of up to EUR 7.75 million as well as investments in international or multi-
lateral funds in order to facilitate defined infrastructure projects. IDF also provides 
grants, e.g. to take on funding that governments are unable to provide, or to cover 
one-off investments integral to project realization but not to profitability375.  
Funds are eligible for projects that positively impact the socio-economic development 
and/or lead to improvements in the corresponding areas. Furthermore, projects must 
meet FMO’s standard criteria. Apart from financial-economic performance, projects 
are scrutinized in areas such as corporate governance, environmental impact and 
social policies and practices in order to ensure the sustainability of the investment .376  
Projects typically have to be in line with the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs); further projects must comply with local law and international guide-
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374  Ibid. 
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lines, among others the World Bank Group’s EHS Guidelines and IFC Performance 
Standards (FMO 2012: 1-2). 
FMO also reviews investment plans, market analyses, due diligence studies, expected 
returns and the commitment level of management and co-financiers because IDF 
investments are based upon commercial terms and conditions (FMO 2012: 1-2). 
The Infrastructure Development Fund was known as the LDC Infrastructure Fund until 
2009 and is an offshoot of the ORET-program; currently it is invested in diversified 
assets with over EUR 230 million.377 The IDF fund is one of four governmental funds 
managed by FMO that reflect the Dutch government’s priorities in private sector de-
velopment378. 
13.2.4.3. Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) 
Initiated by the Dutch government, the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) will com-
mence in July 2014. The DGGF is an important cornerstone in the development policy 
of the current Dutch government, which aims at building a bridge between efforts to 
support private-sector development and efforts to promote trade and investment 
(Dutch MfA 2013c: 1-2). 
The main goal of the fund is to step up development-related investments in and trade 
with low- and middle-income countries, through intermediaries and to Dutch SMEs as 
well as to larger enterprises. The DGGF will provide financial support in the form of 
loans, guarantees and equity investments. Besides investment capital, there will also 
be funding for technical assistance (Dutch MfA 2013c: 1-2). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be politically responsible for the DGGF, whereas 
different parties will be responsible for the implementation. Three pillars through which 
the objectives of the fund are implemented structure the DGGF. In terms of conces-
sional financing and tied aid, the third pillar is of great relevance. 
Pillar 1: The first of the fund’s tasks is focused on promoting development-related 
direct investment of Dutch companies in low and middle-income countries. Therefore 
the fund will provide guarantees on loans and direct finance for loans or participations 
for Dutch SMEs which otherwise cannot be financed due to their high risk profiles. 
Being managed by NL Agency, EUR 175 million investment capital will be provided 
between 2014 and 2017 plus an extra EUR 18 million for technical support (Dutch 
MfA 2013c: 8-9; Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 6). 
Pillar 2: The second task aims at promoting the financing of SMEs in low- and middle-
income countries. These will not be direct investments but will use new or existing 
investment funds, e.g. private investors and financial intermediaries. The fund’s contri-
bution in this track will not provide more than a minority share which could come along 
                                                            
377  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/infrastructurefund 
378  FMO, Netherlands Development Bank: http://www.fmo.nl/idf 
358 
in equity investments, first loss protection, guarantees and/or loans. Apart from the 
investment capital of EUR 175 million about EUR 26 million will be available for tech-
nical assistance between 2014 and 2017. The implementing partner for this pillar has 
not been decided upon yet (Dutch MfA 2013c: 9-11; Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 
2013: 6). 
Pillar 3: The fund’s third task is focused on stimulating finance for Dutch SMEs wish-
ing to export in low and middle-income countries. This will involve exports of capital 
goods and services that ensure that better products can be made abroad, better 
services provided or production methods made more efficient. Therefore this part will 
focus on export transactions of up to EUR 15 million that are currently not covered by 
the market or regular governmental export credit insurance because of their high risks. 
Thus, additional ECI will be provided as well as guarantees for trade transactions. 
Atradius DSB will manage this part of the DGGF jointly with the Ministry of Finance 
(Dutch MfA 2013c: 12-13; Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 6).  
The DGGF will be a revolving fund, providing a budget at an amount of EUR 700 
million. The projected annual expenditure will be as follows:  
Table 17: DGGF Annual Expenditure (2014-2017) 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Investment capital 50 100 250 300 700 
 
Source: Dutch MfA 2013c: 4 
An amount of EUR 175 million will be provided to each of the three parts. The remain-
ing EUR 225 million will be kept separately in order to divide it on the basis of an 
interim evaluation at the end of 2015 (Dutch MfA 2013c: 4; Interview D6). Apart from 
the investment capital, additional EUR 75 million will be available for technical assis-
tance which will not be financed from the fund, but from the regular private sector 
development budget (Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 5-6). 
All projects financed with DGGF funds must contribute to the development of low and 
middle-income countries. Thus, proposals will be assessed in order to determine 
whether and to what extent they contribute to (1) employment in low and middle-
income countries; (2) the production capacity of local industry and (3) sustainable 
transfer of knowledge, skills and technology. Further, there will be a focus on busi-
nesses in fragile states, young entrepreneurs and female entrepreneurs (Dutch MfA 
2013c: 5-6).  
Activities have to (1) comply with the legislation of the country in question; (2) refrain 
from contriving arrangements designed to lower their profits or reduce tax in recipient 
countries and (3) comply with international rules concerning strategic goods, human 
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rights, etc. Furthermore, a single set of standards will be used to assess applications 
(IFC Performance Standards) (Dutch MfA 2013c: 6-7).  
13.3. Scheme Performance 
The Development Relevant Export Transactions program (ORET) was the predeces-
sor of ORIO, the Facility for Infrastructure Development and one of the most important 
programs in which Dutch business has been supported in the last three decades. 
Thus, in the following not only data about ORIO shall be provided but also some 
figures about the ORET-program. 
13.3.1. ORET Budget and Expenditures 
According to the authors of the ORET/MILIEV evaluation 1999-2004, the ORET-
program actually started in 1992. Prior to 1992 the program was in fact still a Low 
Concessional Loans (LCLs) program providing EUR 99.5 million for loans in 1991. In 
1992 the budget of ORET was about EUR 38.7 million, which rose to EUR 142.9 
million in 1998 due to the merger of ORET and MILIEV (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 
2006: 19).  
In 2002 the budget was reduced due to the exclusion of the LDCs from the program, 
for which the new LDC Infrastructure Fund was established. Since 2002 the budget 
of ORET has been about EUR 104 million per year (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 
19).  
The following table illustrates the total ORET/MILIEV program budgets and expendi-
tures worldwide, between 1992 and 2005. 
Table 18: Total ORET/MILIEV Program Budgets and Expenditures Worldwide (1992-2005) 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Budget (EUR million) 38.7 63.2 68.2 72.9 74.9 84 142.9 
Expenditures  
(EUR million) 
8.6 22.1 27 37.2 75.6 99.7 96.7 
                
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Budget (EUR million) 149.8 149.8 136 104 104 104 104 
Expenditures  
(EUR million) 95.9 95.1 79 63 74.7 82.7* 87.9* 
 
Source: Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 19 
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The expenditures from the ORET/MILIEV-program have fluctuated over the years. Until 
1996 the program did not spend its entire annual budget. The same phenomena have 
already occurred within the Mixed Credit Program available at the end of the 1970ies. 
Annual expenditures exceeded the annual budget in 1997, thus the program was 
closed for a certain time (Hoebink 1998: 189; Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 19). 
In 2005, the budget available was about EUR 100 million offered within the tied 
ORET-program, the untied facility for LDCs (a maximum of 30 of the whole amount 
was reserved for the untied program) and the water facility (OECD/DAC 2005: 2). 
In 2007 the budget was set to EUR 119 million. In August 2007, the period within 
which applications could be made for ORET grants was closed because applications 
made approximated three times the budget available (ORET.nl 2007: 1). 
13.3.2. ORET Grant Scheme 
The ORET-program offered within the first years a (minimum) grant percentage of 
40 %. In addition, the costs of financing of the commercial loan were often subsidized 
up to a maximum of 5 % of the transaction costs, making the total grant percentage 
45 % (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 19). 
Table 19: ORET/MILIEV Official Grant Percentages (1992-2005) 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Grant as % of 
total transaction 
40 or 
55+5
40 or 
55+5
40 or 
55+5 
40 or 
55+5
45 or 
60+10
45 or 
60+10 35 or 50 
                
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Grant as % of 
total transaction 
35 or 50 35 or 50 35 or 50 35 35 35 35 or 50 
 
Source: Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 19 
In 1993, as the MILIEV-program was launched, the grant percentage was 40 % of the 
transaction amount plus the costs of the credit (with a maximum of additional 5 %) 
and thus, quite similar to ORET. Certain projects got a higher percentage, e.g. if the 
environment component was only part of the transaction, it was decided to subsidize 
this part with 100. Overall, the grant percentages have been changed over time. Nev-
ertheless, the ORET/MILIEV grant has equalled 35 % of the total value of the transac-
tion, and 50 % for LDCs since 1998 (Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 19).  
13.3.3. LDC Infrastructure Fund 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expected that the disbursements within the LDC 
Infrastructure Fund would grow in four equal parts of approximately EUR 45 million 
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per annum. This was not realistic because the Fund started slowly within the first 
years; a more flexible approach increased the approved, contracted and disbursed 
amounts by the year 2005. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had disbursed about EUR 
139.7 million of its total commitment of EUR 181.5 million by the end of 2007 (IOB 
2009: 37-38).  
Table 20: LDC Infrastructure Fund, Investments (in Number and Value), 2002-2008 
Investments 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of approved investment* 3 3 3 11 5 5 6 
Contracted 0 6 2 9 10 7 5 
Amount approved (EUR million) 33.2 31.1 20.4 117.8 70.8 61.9 69.8 
Amount contracted (EUR million) 0 22.0 19.1 51.9 97.5 49.3 55.1 
Amount disbursed (EUR million) 0 22.0 28.3 40.9 73.3 41.4 43.0 
Disbursements by the Ministry 
(EUR million) 22.4 27.3 6.2 10.9 54.9 18.0 23.2 
 
Source: IOB 2009: 38 
Note:  * New projects/first disbursements, not including grants (for approval) 
The LDC Infrastructure Fund mainly provided long-term financing for infrastructure 
projects (tenors of up to 20 years) through (1) loans up 10 % (or EUR 20 million) of 
the total fund size; (2) equity investments up to lesser of 10 % of the total fund size 
(or EUR 20 million) or 20 % of the total transaction size or (3) grants for e.g. non-
commercial elements of projects that are financed by FMO or the develop-
ment/feasibility stage of identified projects (IOB 2009: 38).  
According to the authors of the evaluation of the LDC Infrastructure Fund, eleven 
projects had been financed with equity capital by the end of 2007; investments that 
had an average size of EUR 6.5 million including a number of smaller participations 
and two investments of approximately EUR 20 million. The Fund provided finance in 
the form of loans (16 loans with an average size of EUR 11.1 million. Furthermore, the 
Fund provided 27 grants with an average size of EUR 260,000 excluding two grants 
of more than EUR 1 million between 2003 and 2007 (IOB 2009: 38). 
In general, the Fund has been open to several sectors in order to provide finance for 
social and economic infrastructure but in practice financial support has been concen-
trated in three sectors: energy production & distribution, immobile infrastructure and 
telecommunications. Major recipients were Tanzania, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Benin 
and Togo (IOB 2009: 40). 
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13.3.4. Share of ORET/MILIEV of Total ODA 
The share of ORET/MILIEV including the disbursements of the LDC Infrastructure 
Fund (2002-2005) of total ODA varied between 0.4 and 3.8 % in the period 1992-
2005. The following figure illustrates its highest peak in the years 1996-1999.  
Figure 13.2: Share of ORET/MILIEV/LDC Infrastructure Fund of Total ODA (1992-2005) 
Source: Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas 2006: 19; IOB 2009: 38; OECD/DAC statistics 
13.3.5. ORIO Grant Scheme 
ORIO started out as a program providing grants in the total amount of EUR 140 mil-
lion in 2009. According to an interviewed person, this amount was later increased to 
EUR 180 million by ministerial decision in order to meet the great demand for projects 
(Interview D5).  
Thus, the total annual budget for ORIO was around EUR 180 million in the year 2012. 
Nevertheless, applications that had been accepted for appraisal exceeded the availa-
ble budget which led to a waiting-list, opened by ORIO. In 2013, the available budget 
for projects financed with ORIO grants was again approximately EUR 180 million379 . 
One up to two Calls for Proposals had been published each year between 2009 and 
2012. Altogether about 179 projects proposals were assessed against the eligibility 
criteria, of which 66 projects were selected for a grant. Two projects were withdrawn 
after selection, thus ORIO had 62 ongoing projects in spring 2013. Around 40 pro-
jects entered the Development Phase; the Grant Arrangement for another 16 projects 
will be signed by ORIO. In the year 2013, about six projects entered the Implementa-
tion Phase and the Operation & Maintenance Phase (NL Agency/MfA 2013c).  
                                                            
379  Agency NL: http://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes/facility-infrastructure-development-orio 
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The total project budget of granted projects including the non-grant part of each 
project was around EUR 2.1 billion by the end of 2013; total grants sum up to EUR 
740 million if all ongoing projects were implemented. The maximum grant percentage 
is 35 %, 50 % for LDCs and 80 % for fragile states. The list of countries eligible for a 
grant, indicating the status and the maximum grant percentages is set out in the an-
nex. The most popular sectors are the water sector, social services and transport (NL 
Agency/MfA 2013c).  
Figure 13.3: ORIO Projects per Sector (2009-2012) 
 
Source: NL Agency/MfA 2013c 
According to a review regarding ORIO, published in autumn 2013, 28 of the selected 
projects are from LDCs, another 38 projects from MDCs. Moreover, 43 out of the 66 
projects are located in Africa, followed by Asia (10 of 66 projects). Most projects are 
from Ghana, Vietnam, South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania. The review highlights 
that a total of five projects have been stopped or withdrawn (Carnegie Consult 2013: 
5). 
13.4. Implementation of Programs 
Being the key successor of the ORET-program, the following part of the Dutch coun-
try report is strongly focused on the Grant Facility for Infrastructure Development 
ORIO. Although the Infrastructure Development Fund IDF is also an offshoot of the 
ORET-program but focusing more strongly on private and commercial infrastructure 
activities in LDCs, this fund is not considered in the following.  
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For further information how FMO selects, monitors and evaluates projects, please 
view the ÖFSE-study about the comparative analysis of selected bilateral develop-
ment finance institutions in Europe from Gössinger/Raza (2011:23-38). 
The Dutch Good Growth Fund will be launched in July 2014, thus information about 
main procedures, criteria and decision-making is not yet available. 
13.4.1. Project Eligibility and Application 
The governments of around 50 recipient countries may submit applications for ORIO 
projects. Applications can be submitted when the Call for Proposals is open. A stand-
ard ORIO project has three phases: (1) Development phase, (2) Implementation 
phase and (3) Operations & Maintenance phase (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 3). 
Before submitting an application form, NL Agency (NL EFD International) provides an 
intake form for interested parties who want to assess whether their project idea quali-
fies for an ORIO grant. This form is not considered as an official application but shall 
provide constructive feedback on project ideas.380 
The intake form already asks for concrete project information, e.g. the project’s effects 
on human development and private sector development and/or how the non-ORIO 
portion of the budget will be financed (NL Agency/MfA 2013d: 2-3). 
The official project application includes a so-called project description, in which the 
applicant is asked to describe all elements of the project proposal in order to assess 
the project for ORIO financing. Apart from contact information, first questions have to 
be answered about the project budget and the project history. Information about the 
project history includes e.g. whether support programs or donor funding have been 
used to develop the project; whether the application concerns a former ORET appli-
cation or an ORET project follow-up or whether the project has any other linkages to 
NL Agency or FMO programs (NL Agency/MfA 2013d: 2-3). 
Furthermore, formal substantive information is required about the commercial non-
viability of the corresponding project according to the OECD’s Ex Ante Guidance for 
Tied Aid and the procurement modalities that will be used by the recipient must com-
ply with international and the recipient country’s legislation. The description of the 
project has to include information about the stakeholders, as well as information about 
the end users that are affected and/or involved. In addition, information about the 
economic, legal and institutional structure has to be provided; e.g. how the project fits 
into national, local and/or sector plans and strategies (NL Agency/MfA 2013d: 4-6). 
As a consequence of the evaluation findings of the LDC Infrastructure Fund in 2009, 
ORIO does not only provide grants for the Implementation Phase and the Operation & 
Maintenance Phase, but also for the Development Phase, in which proposals are 
                                                            
380  Agency NL: http://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes/do-i-qualify-orio 
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developed. In contrast, applicants for the predecessor of ORIO, the ORET-program 
had to submit sound business and project plans at the time of applying for a grant 
(Interview D5). 
The applicant has to clearly state for which phases of the project funding is asked for. 
If ORIO does not provide 100 % financing of the project it has to be specified how 
the other parts will be financed. The Development Phase generally includes feasibility 
studies, social and environmental impact assessment, preliminary project design, 
financial planning, project plan, project management, and monitoring & evaluation (NL 
Agency/MfA 2013d: 7-8). 
Concrete project descriptions have to include information about the input & output, 
the effectiveness of the project (outcome), the project impact on human development 
and on private sector development, and have to be submitted for the Implementation 
Phase and Operation & Maintenance Phase. In order to assess the sustainability of a 
project, the applicant also has to provide information about the financial sustainability, 
suitability of the technology being used, social & environmental risks, involvement of 
end users and the project organization and structure (NL Agency/MfA 2013d: 9-16). 
Ownership of the recipient country is key when it comes to developing and imple-
menting new projects funded with government funds like ORIO. Nevertheless, an 
interviewed stakeholder points out that Dutch companies are important ‘drivers’ for 
the development of new projects as well as consultancies who assist the grant recipi-
ent throughout the whole project cycle (Interview D7).  
13.4.1.1. Project Appraisal Process and Decision-Making 
All project applications are dealt with on a ‘first-come, first-served’ basis and are as-
sessed against the formal, administrative requirements by NL Agency. The most rele-
vant are the following:  
(1) Applications must be submitted by the central government authority of a country 
on the ORIO country list applicable to the relevant application period; (2) Applications 
must be received by NL Agency during the application period; (3) Eligible project 
costs must be at least EUR 2 million and no more than EUR 60 million; (4) Project 
applications must deal with the entire life cycle and must comply with the OECD 
definition of a project (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 10, 14). 
Applications that do not fulfil the most relevant formal, administrative requirements are 
not considered further; in other cases, the applicant has the option of revising the 
application or providing additional information.  
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Figure 13.4: Application Assessment Timeline 
Source: NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 12 
The following formal, substantive requirements are assessed: in order to receive an 
ORIO grant the corresponding project should not be commercially viable according 
the OECD Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid. Furthermore, goods, works and services for 
the project must be purchased in a transparent and efficient manner and must comply 
with international procurement practices provided by the OECD and/or ILO as well as 
with the recipient country’s legislation (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 12-13). 
Applications that have already fulfilled the necessary formal, administrative require-
ments are then assessed against the formal, substantive requirements. Furthermore, a 
meeting is held in which a questionnaire is discussed between the applicant and the 
ORIO-Team (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 12-13). 
All information from both the application and the questionnaire is used to assess the 
application on the basis of five OECD/DAC criteria: (1) relevance, (2) effectiveness, 
(3) impact, (4) efficiency, and (5) sustainability. Each criterion is then either scored 
‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’. In order to be eligible for an ORIO grant, the score 
must be satisfactory for each individual criterion (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 15; 17-27). 
During this assessment procedure NL Agency takes advice from the ORIO Advisory 
Committee (AC) named ACORIO, whose membership and procedures are decided 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This advisory board includes five stakeholders; 
among them are experts in the field of banking, science, contract law and engineering 
consultancy services (Interview D7). 
The AC assesses twice, once before entering the Development Phase; here applica-
tions are assessed against formal requirements and the OECD/DAC principles. Be-
fore a given project enters the Implementation and Operations & Maintenance Phase, 
the AC once more re-assesses more thoroughly the respective project. Further, an 
interviewee explains that ACORIO advises on the basis of consensus (Interview D5). 
If an application is accepted for assessment and found to meet all the formal require-
ments including the OECD/DAC criteria, then the project will be selected for a grant 
for the Development Phase as long as enough budget is available. Depending on the 
  19  367 
country, ORIO finances between 50 and 100 % of these costs. (NL Agency/MfA 
2013b: 3,13).  
Figure 13.5: Project Result Chain Linked to Criteria 
Source: NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 16 
The Grant Arrangement must be signed by the applicant and then returned to NL 
Agency. The arrangement comes into effect the day after it has been signed. NL 
Agency also could ask the Dutch Ambassador in the recipient country to sign the 
documents. Thereafter the corresponding embassy will organize the signing and ini-
tialing with the applicant. The first advance payment may be made (maximum of 15 % 
of the total grant of the Development Phase). In addition, the NL Agency may ask the 
applicant to come up with a guarantee of the contractor in order to provide financial 
security (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 29). 
The Development Phase includes conducting all necessary studies for implementing 
the project. Here NL Agency, the applicant, the competent authority and any private 
parties involved jointly work out the details including a round table in order to discuss 
specific matters that have emerged during the assessment, providing further infor-
mation about the process, content and the project plan being the end result (NL 
Agency/MfA 2013b: 28).  
The round table discussion will in particular address issues like the possible impact 
and risks that must be investigated, the project’s social and environmental effects and 
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institutional matters. Here ORIO will make use of the IFC Performance Standards, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and ILO conventions in order to con-
sider matters like working conditions, community engagement, land issues, manage-
ment of natural resources, pollution, waste management and supply chain manage-
ment (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 28). 
The contracting out of work will also be discussed at this stage, in particular what 
tendering process will be followed, what type of contract is to be used and who will 
do that. In addition, a monitoring and evaluation plan has to be drawn up for each 
project (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 29). 
The applicant and the competent authority are responsible for the project during the 
whole process. Several interview partners pointed out that both their commitment and 
ownership are essentially important for the success of the project (Interview D7, D5). 
Apart from a feasibility study, technical studies, a procurement plan, economic and 
financial studies result in a project plan, which must contain all necessary information 
for the decision on implementing the corresponding project. This project plan is then 
evaluated and includes that NL Agency will assess the need for and usefulness of the 
activities which have been set out in the input & output plan and whether they are in 
line with market prices (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 3). 
The Grant Arrangement may include go and/or no-go moments for those parts that 
are crucial to the feasibility of a project that NL Agency wants to have clarity before 
proceeding to make further advance payments.  
NL Agency may ask the applicant to provide further information at any time during the 
assessment. For this reason, the applicant has to make direct contacts with relevant 
parties involved, e.g. consultants, financiers, credit insurers and suppliers (NL Agen-
cy/MfA 2013b: 31). 
Further, NL Agency may also ask for advice from external experts, other relevant par-
ties who are active in the corresponding sector, e.g. development banks, other bilat-
eral donors and/or the Dutch embassy in the recipient country, which has an im-
portant advisory role (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 31). 
The Development Phase finally results in a detailed Project Plan, including all studies, 
letters and other matters agreed in the round table and described in the Input & Out-
put Plan. The complete Project Plan is then reassessed against formal requirements 
as set out earlier:  
In concrete, the Project Plan is assessed to determine whether the project is still 
relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable and has a significant impact on human 
development and private sector development. In addition, more emphasis is put on the 
formal requirements regarding the commercial non-viability and the procurement pro-
cedure (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 31-33). 
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If the project meets the formal requirements, ‘scores satisfactory’ on the criteria and 
does not depart substantially from the key indicators agreed upon at the start of the 
Development Phase, it will be eligible for a grant for subsequent phases and the Grant 
Arrangement for the implementation and Operation & Maintenance Phase will be 
signed (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 3). 
An interviewee states that from 179 project proposals which have been assessed on 
the eligibility criteria about 66 projects have been selected for a grant in the Develop-
ment Phase. Further, this person points out that too much time is needed to develop 
projects because 3-5 years pass by in order to bring ideas from development to im-
plementation. Because of these difficulties only a handful of projects were in the Im-
plementation Phase in fall 2013 providing e.g. medical equipment or generators (In-
terview D7).  
13.4.1.2. Project Implementation, Tendering and Contract Management  
If financing agreements have been made and submitted by the Central Government 
authority or the corresponding authority in order to arrange the financing that is need-
ed on top of the intended ORIO grant to implement the project, then the grant is 
disbursed by NL Agency (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 36). 
ORIO finances between 35 and 80 % of the costs for the Implementation and Opera-
tion & Maintenance Phases (for up to a maximum of ten years), depending on the 
country (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 3).  
Once a project has been selected for the Implementation Phase, the detailed design 
is done in consultation with NL Agency, also in order to set up the basis for the ten-
der. The procurement procedures may differ; they depend on the type of contract (NL 
Agency/MfA 2013b: 38). 
Although the recipient country’s government or the corresponding authority is respon-
sible for the tendering and the contract management, NL Agency reviews the process 
for the procurement in order to ensure that the procurement of goods, works and 
services comply with international and the recipient’s procurement legislation and 
practices (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 38). 
Contrary to the fostering of the recipient country’s ownership, the applicant e.g. has to 
submit the complete draft set of prequalification or tender documents to NL Agency 
for review prior to an invitation to prequalify or tender. Further, a detailed prequalifica-
tion or tender evaluation report must be submitted to NL Agency for review prior to 
finalizing a prequalification list or awarding a contract. Moreover, the applicant has to 
submit the draft of the final contract including any amendments to NL Agency for 
review (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 38). 
The figure below illustrates the key steps of the procurement process: 
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Figure 13.6: Procurement Process 
Source: NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 38 
The figure illustrates that e.g. feasibility studies, social and environmental impact as-
sessments or preliminary project designs are awarded in direct negotiations. Here 
various consultancies (e.g. engineering, project design & management) are typically 
considered. Depending on the procurement legislation in the recipient country, the 
contract for the detailed design may be awarded via direct negotiations to the same 
contractor that was responsible for the preliminary design (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 
38).  
The tender procedure for the construction may be International Competitive Bidding 
(ICB), Limited International Bidding or National Competitive Bidding. According to an 
interview partner, ORIO has a strong preference for ICB tenders (Interview D11). If a 
component is negotiated directly, the local procurement clauses, the OECD Good 
Procurement Practices for Official Development Assistance as well as the ORIO 
procurement rules have to be considered (NL Agency/MfA 2013e: 8-9).  
An interview partner points out the difficulties which are associated with International 
Competitive Bidding. According to him, a lot of companies do not participate in such 
bidding procedures because they do not have the necessary resources and/or do not 
see any chance to be awarded with the delivery of goods and/or services. In addition, 
this person highlights that procurement costs are very difficult to estimate because of 
the recipient country’s procurement legislation which has to be considered within 
ORIO (Interview D7).  
As only a handful of projects are in the tendering phase for the construction, the 
award of contracts within ORIO has been particularly attractive to project developers, 
engineering firms and consultants, which have been involved in the development of 
identified projects. Because of informational and institutional advantages, Dutch con-
sultancies have great advantages to be awarded a contract. Thus, although being 
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officially an untied grant facility, ORIO is de facto procurement tied to goods and 
services from Dutch companies. 
Once the contract has been awarded, the approved implementation plan can be 
carried out. This plan considers reporting duties by the applicant to NL Agency and 
includes how and by whom the implementation will be supervised. In many cases, 
monitoring and evaluation is outsourced to an independent engineer or employer’s 
representative, who will report to the competent authority and NL Agency (and any 
other financiers) (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 36). 
The appointment of this consultant has to be submitted to NL Agency for a statement 
of no objection like all other contracts being awarded by the applicant. 
13.4.1.3. Payment Terms, Guarantee and Operations and Maintenance 
Phase 
The payment schedule as described in the Grant Arrangement will be adjusted after 
the allocation of the tender in order to align ORIO grant payments pro rata with pay-
ments of other project financiers. The grant payments do not go to the applicant, they 
will be made directly to the suppliers of works, goods or services after the awarding of 
the contracts has been done (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 37).  
After the final instalment of the corresponding infrastructure project, the Operation & 
Maintenance Phase commences. In general, ORIO pays its grants for a period of no 
more than the first ten years of the Operation and Maintenance Phase (NL Agency/ 
MfA 2013b: 37). 
Although both phases are described in one Grant Arrangement, they may be tendered 
or outsourced separately; this depends on the project circumstances and the prefer-
ence and capacity of the involved experts (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 37). 
In order to make successive grant payments a management and maintenance plan 
has to be drawn up including periodic checks, at least on an annual basis. An inde-
pendent engineer or employer’s representative usually assesses the management 
performance (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 37). 
As stated above, the non-grant part of an ORIO funded project must be financed with 
other funds. ORIO grants are in many cases associated with commercial loans, for 
which export credit insurance (ECI) is available quite regularly. These ECIs are provid-
ed by Atradius Dutch State Business on the basis of their country policies. The recipi-
ent government usually has to cover the export credit insurance with an unconditional 
guarantee for the repayment of the commercial loan.381  
                                                            
381  Atradius DSB: 
http://www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl/dsben/overheidsregelingen/ontwikkelingsrelevante_infrastructu
ur_ontwikkeling/index.html 
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According to Atradius DSB, the maximum transaction amount is limited to EUR 15 
million; grant is excluded here. The limit per country is EUR 50 million including a 
maximum repayment period of 10 years. ORIO funds public infrastructure projects, 
thus they must meet the concessional requirements as agreed by OECD countries to 
promote sustainable lending practices. 
13.5. Monitoring and Evaluation  
In order to facilitate the smooth implementation of projects NL Agency periodically 
undertakes field visits to speak to all stakeholders involved and to ensure the progress 
of projects. If available, the Embassy of the Netherlands may also assist in monitoring 
activities (Interview D5). 
In general, the project implementation plan considers reporting duties by the Applicant 
to NL Agency and includes how and by whom the implementation will be supervised. 
In many cases, monitoring and evaluation is outsourced to an independent engineer or 
consultant, who will report to the competent authority and NL Agency (and any other 
financiers) (NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 36). 
13.5.1. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 
The list of indicators to be monitored during the project is usually drafted by the appli-
cant with support of the ORIO project consultant. The monitoring and evaluation plan 
considers indicators according to the project result chain including data about output 
(realized infrastructure), outcome (access and use of the infrastructure), impact (op-
tional) and sustainability (financial, social and environmental and maintenance) (NL 
Agency/MfA 2013d). 
This monitoring information has to be provided by the applicant at least once a year 
during the Implementation and the Operations & Maintenance Phase in addition to 
progress reports which have to be submitted at least every six months.  
The following figure illustrates the logical steps leading from project inputs to the 
short- and long-term effects that projects intend to achieve: 
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Figure 13.7: Project Result Chain Focusing on Short- and Long-Term Effects of Projects 
 
Source: NL Agency/MfA 2013b: 23 
In the Development Phase, these progress reports have to include the current status 
of all deliverables and all financial conditions as described in the input & output plan 
as well as organizational or institutional issues. These matters consider major national 
or regional changes in the project context or changes concerning e.g. the applicant, 
and/or the involved consultants (NL Agency/MfA 2013g). 
13.5.2. Impact Evaluations 
About 10 to 15 % of all ORIO projects are subject to an independent impact evalua-
tion. These projects should cover most sectors and countries, which form part of the 
ORIO program (NL Agency/MfA 2013f).  
Ex ante evaluations are done by NL Agency in order to attribute the results of a given 
project. In this case, the selected projects will start with a baseline study before the 
beginning of the implementation phase. Further, other intended and/or unintended 
effects of the project are taken into account by providing a control group. In general, 
the impact evaluations use a mix of qualitative and quantitative (statistical and econo-
metric) methods.  
Apart from impact evaluations, an independent evaluation party verifies all other pro-
jects on the outcome level. In general, the applicant should cooperate in project eval-
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uations, e.g. must regularly report data on output and outcome during the Operation & 
Maintenance Phase (NL Agency/MfA 2013f).  
According to an interview partner, the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department 
(IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MfA) has drawn up the monitoring & evaluation 
system for ORIO. Thus, all monitoring and evaluation data on project level will be used 
by IOB for periodic evaluations at program level (Interview D5).  
Program evaluations are generally provided by IOB, whereas project evaluations are 
awarded externally by NL Agency. FMO, the Dutch development bank has its own 
evaluation unit, which provides evaluations at project as well as at program-level (In-
terview D4). 
ORIO was reviewed in fall 2013 and will be reformed upon these recommendations 
provided by this review. An interview partner mentioned that this reform could mean 
that ORIO will provide in the future a combination of loans and grants and/or could be 
streamlined with other funds (PSI, DGGF) (Interview D7).  
The ORET-program, whose phasing-out was in 2013, will be externally evaluated 
according to the latest policy rules from 2006/07 (Interview D5). In the case of exter-
nal evaluations, very often consultancies (e.g. Carnegie) or consortia of consultants 
and research institutions have been awarded in the past. 
13.6. Transparency and Accountability  
The Dutch Development Finance system generally includes FMO, the Dutch develop-
ment bank and NL Agency being a department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs as 
main implementing agencies of Dutch funds and facilities.  
An interview partner points out that NL Agency reports to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on program level about ORIO. At the project level there is day-to-day contact 
between the ministry, NL Agency as well as other involved actors, e.g. Dutch embas-
sies or other financiers (Interview D5). 
Most funds are disbursed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has reporting duties 
to the parliament through the regular budgetary cycle. FMO and NL Agency, both in 
turn have to report to the MfA on a regular basis (Gütermann 2011: 192-195).  
13.6.1. Role of the Parliament 
In parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal), the Parliamentary Committee for 
Foreign Affairs deals with development cooperation issues. The Committee mainly 
scrutinizes the government’s development policy and budget allocation through oral 
and written consultations. Further, it has the right to introduce motions and can amend 
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government bills. In addition, the Committee has the lead in the discussion of the 
budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs382.  
Interestingly, the newly established Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) was contro-
versially discussed in parliament twice in 2013. Different stakeholders, inter alia de-
velopment experts from universities and non-governmental organizations were involved 
in these debates. In the second debate in November, the opposition was acquiesced 
EUR 50 million by earmarking to poverty reduction, which reduced the Fund’s total 
budget from EUR 750 to 700 million.383 
The Senate’s (Erste Kamer der Staten-Generaal) main duty is to pass or reject bills; 
thus it does not play an important role in development policy as it has no right to 
amend bills.384  
Moreover, financial accountability is provided by independent consultancies, e.g. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers has been awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
administer the phasing out of the ORET-program (2007/2013) (Interview D5). 
13.6.2. Civil Society 
Dutch civil society organizations are actively engaged in development cooperation and 
direct various advocacy activities towards the main actors. These activities do not only 
include the government and its relevant ministries – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and/or the Ministry of Economic Affairs – in their role as the protagonists in policy 
formulation but also consider other stakeholders like the Dutch development bank 
FMO or Atradius DSB as implementing agencies of development relevant projects.  
In October 2013, the Dutch government made it clear that the co-financing system in 
its present form will not be continued after 2014 (Spitz/Muskens/van Ewijk 2013: 33). 
Annual funding for civil society organizations will sharply decrease to EUR 219 million 
in 2015 compared to EUR 453 million in 2013. Most of this money will be streamlined 
to fewer Dutch development organizations. Further, more funds will be channelled via 
an accountability fund to finance CSOs in developing countries385. 
Dutch civil society organizations heavily criticized these budget cuts as well as the 
general budget cuts in development cooperation. In addition, they lobbied against the 
Dutch Good Growth Fund mainly because of its strong focus on private sector devel-
opment and the fund’s procurement tied component (Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 
2013: 2-3).  
                                                            
382  Information Portal SEEK Development: http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/netherlands/actors-decision-
making 
383  Dutch Magazine for Development: http://www.viceversaonline.nl/2013/11/ploumen-krijgt-oppositie-nog-
niet-warm-voor-dggf/ 
384  Government of the Netherlands: http://www.government.nl/issues/parliament/senate-and-house-of-
representatives 
385  Information Portal SEEK Development: http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/netherlands/actors-decision-
making 
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Both Ends, a Dutch NGO also published a very critical report about the Dutch export 
credit insurance agency Atradius DSB, in which the screening procedure of projects 
was assessed as insufficient and not transparent (Both Ends 2013). An interview 
partner points out that regular monitoring is urgently needed but would be difficult to 
undertake in practice due to limited resources (Interview D9). As the procurement tied 
pillar of the Dutch Good Growth Fund will be implemented by Atradius DSB, trans-
parency and accountability are even more topical now (Dutch MfA 2013c).  
The influence of the Dutch business sector is demonstrated by the fact that its repre-
sentatives have been advocating for the introduction of concessional financing in 
order to be competitive with other European companies, which have access to mixed 
credits (Werkgroep Exportfinanciering 2012: 38-45). As a result of these lobbying 
activities, the Dutch Good Growth Fund, which was mainly developed jointly with 
investment companies in 2013, has considered the Dutch business’ interests by 
providing concessional loans for Dutch SMEs wishing to export in low and middle-
income countries (Dutch MfA 2013c: 12-13). 
In addition, this pillar of the DGGF is procurement tied to Dutch goods and services, 
which is sharply criticized by Dutch NGOs. Interestingly, the Dutch business repre-
sentatives have never denied that they did not really want to give up the tied ORET-
program, which was officially untied with its successor ORIO in 2009 (Werkgroep 
Exportfinanciering 2012: 7). Although VNO-NCW (the largest Dutch employer’s or-
ganization) and Verkapex (Capital Exporters’ Association) were involved in the design 
of ORIO, the government finally wanted to comply with the international discourse in 
untying aid (Interview D6). 
Nevertheless, the Dutch business sector, namely VNO-NCW has strong ties to the 
government (e.g. Ministry of Economic Affairs), and in particular in the field of trade 
and aid. Unsurprisingly, the Dutch business sector already played a catalyzing and 
leveraging role in the past (1960ies-1980ies) and demanded for instruments (e.g. 
mixed credits, ORET-program) which should generally help to promote the Dutch 
economy via the promotion of exports. 
13.6.3. Transparency 
In order to increase insight into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign poli-
cy, the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOV/IOB) of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MfA) was established in 1977. IOB’s mandate was extended from 
project and more comprehensive evaluations to cover the entire foreign policy of the 
Dutch government in 1996386. 
IOB is an independent body, which also advises on the planning and implementation 
of evaluations that are within the responsibility of the ministry. IOB’s evaluations pro-
                                                            
386  IOB, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the MFA: http://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/node/667 
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vide targeted feedback and thereby enable the ministry to derive lessons for future 
policies. Furthermore, the ministry justifies to parliament its policies and the allocation 
of resources on the basis of these evaluations.387  
An interviewed person confirms that IOB in general does a good job and thus, other 
stakeholders, e.g. universities, trade unions or other civil society actors have not done 
that much research and/or monitoring about mixed financing or tied aid in the past 
(Interview D2). In addition, it is important to note that the evaluations done by IOB are 
publicly available. 
As IOB has its focus on impact evaluations, project evaluations are done by external 
agencies. NL Agency e.g. has contracts with several evaluation companies that moni-
tor all ORIO-projects. Nevertheless, no civil society actors are involved at project-level 
(Interview D5). 
The Dutch key implementing agencies FMO and NL Agency are rather reluctant to 
provide information at the level of concrete projects. Although e.g. FMO is not obliged 
to involve civil society stakeholder groups, the bank takes the view that it is important 
to make efforts to consider corresponding requests (Gütermann 2011: 192-193). 
Civil society organizations still demand more transparency. Although various stake-
holders have been consulted in the policy formulation phase of the Dutch Good 
Growth Fund, CSOs call for more stakeholder involvement in the realization of the 
fund. They point out that transparency and accountability are necessary, both on the 
project level and the decision-making level (Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 3).  
Furthermore, they would like to take the implementation of the DGGF as a starting 
point for a critical discussion about the goals, activities and impacts of bilateral devel-
opment cooperation, in particular about the role of the private sector. 
13.7. Conclusion and Outlook 
The Netherlands are a strongly export orientated country in which both foreign trade 
and development policy have always been important and intertwined policy fields. 
Their approach has also been described as a combination of ‘the Merchant and the 
Clergyman’, indicating that the Netherlands has a long colonial heritage, in-between 
trade and missionary zeal. 
In the history of Dutch development cooperation, the Netherlands always had several 
motives for providing development aid. Using parts of its aid-budget to support Dutch 
business has until now always been a continuum. Therefore, the Netherlands have 
been providing mixed credits and/or low concessional loans for export transactions 
that were related to the development in the recipient country. 
                                                            
387  Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.government.nl/ministries/bz/policy-and-budget/evaluation-of-
foreign-policy-spending 
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The establishment of the ORET-program mainly stopped these activities and provided 
grants instead of concessional financing from 1991 to 2007. This procurement tied 
program offered financing through a combination of ODA grants and officially guaran-
teed export credits. Although the Netherlands started reporting new commitments for 
ODA only for grants and not for loans in 1991, the resulting financing arrangement is 
similar to mixed credits or associated financing (Interview D5; OECD 2008c: 14).  
It is not a coincidence that the shift from loans to grants was proposed in the period 
of Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation between 1989 and 1998, who 
wanted to stop giving loans financed out of public funds and to restrict the Dutch 
development assistance to grants only. According to him, public debt of developing 
countries had grown out of proportions in the 1980ies so that debt refinancing took 
place out of development budgets which led to decreasing funds to be spent on 
social issues and direct poverty reduction (Interview D1). 
Today, the Dutch Development Finance system is broadly drawn up by (revolving) 
funds and grant facilities. Most of these funds are commissioned by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and implemented by FMO, the Dutch development bank. The officially 
not procurement tied grant facility ORIO, the successor of the ORET-program is 
implemented by NL Agency, a department of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and has 
been focused on financing public infrastructure projects by providing grants mostly in 
combination with commercial loans since 2009. 
The latest Dutch Development Policy document “A world to gain: A New Agenda for 
Aid, Trade and Investment” clearly points out that a greater emphasis will be placed 
on the economic view of development and the advantages of bilateral aid in terms of 
trading opportunities for Dutch businesses. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strongly 
targeted by these reforms because the Netherlands, which have traditionally provided 
a Minister for Development Cooperation, established a new cabinet-level post of a 
Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation in order to reinforce these 
two policy fields. 
The establishment of the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF), which will commence 
operations in July 2014, inter alia aims at stimulating finance for Dutch SMEs wishing 
to export to low and middle-income countries by providing loans, official export insur-
ance as well as guarantees. The design of this procurement tied pillar indicates that 
the Dutch development policy is about to abandon the OECD-DAC agreement on 
untying aid (Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 2-3). 
The Dutch development cooperation has always had an outstanding credibility which 
was generally grounded in its responding positively to major challenges and in setting 
new trends. Thus, the Netherlands has also strongly committed itself to untie its de-
velopment assistance within the last decade; in particular within the ORET-program 
they also have been providing an untied facility for LDCs from 2001/2 onwards. 
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Although the grant facility ORIO has officially been an untied program since 2009, 
Dutch companies have great informational and institutional advantages to be awarded 
a contract. As only a handful of projects are in the tendering phase for the construc-
tion, the award of contracts within ORIO has been particularly attractive to Dutch 
project developers, engineering firms and consultants, which have been involved in 
the development of identified projects (Carnegie Consult 2013: 7).  
The fact that Dutch engineering consultancies often develop projects may finally lead 
to Dutch companies which will be awarded a contract after winning the International 
Competitive Bidding because the project including the tender documents could have 
been specified to the supply of Dutch companies’ goods and services. In addition, 
final approval is given by ORIO asking for a statement of no objection before a com-
pany is being awarded by the project applicant. 
ORIO generally emphasizes the ownership of the recipient country. Nevertheless, the 
idea of demand-driven projects is detracted by numerous checks and balances ORIO 
asks for during the whole life cycle of a given project. The grant payments e.g. do not 
go to the applicant of the given project, but are made directly to the suppliers of 
works, goods or services after the contract awarding (Interview D7). In addition, iden-
tified projects are very often developed by (mostly Dutch) companies and consultants. 
Obviously, frequently not recipient countries but private corporate actors are in the 
‘driver’s seat’ (Carnegie Consult 2013: 4). 
The untied design of ORIO is not very appealing to an important part of Dutch busi-
ness, in particular to suppliers of infrastructure. There are simply not enough compa-
nies participating in international tenders because of the resources needed for partici-
pation and the uncertainty of being awarded a contract (Interview D7).  
A reform of ORIO was recommended in a review of the given program in fall 2013. 
One of the key recommendations is to streamline ORIO with other instruments, e.g. 
the Dutch Good Growth Fund and to align the interests with regard to development 
relevance with Dutch business and export financing. Further recommendations to 
reform ORIO e.g. include soft loans or direct loans as options (Carnegie Consult 
2013: 8).  
The recommendations of this review commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and conducted by a consultancy suggest that the influence of the Dutch industry has 
not been reduced. Their lobbying had already been present within the ORET-program 
(1991-2007) and its predecessors (1979-1991). The establishment of the Dutch 
Good Growth Fund was also heavily accompanied by lobbying from the Dutch corpo-
rate sector:  
In 2012, Dutch business representatives published a report about innovative export 
finance instruments. In this report, they state that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
busy working on new instruments involving business development in the last years. 
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They highlight that the ministry considered their commercial interests in the installment 
of new funds like the Infrastructure Development Fund and the Access to Energy 
Fund (Werkgroep Exportfinanciering 2012: 42).  
Nevertheless, they clearly advocate the introduction of an effective and innovative 
instrument of concessional financing so that Dutch business will be able to compete 
with companies from other European countries, in which mixed credits are available. 
They argue that concessional loans particularly facilitate the financing of commercially 
non-viable infrastructure projects in civil engineering, which for the Dutch would be of 
particular relevance in the water sector (Werkgroep Exportfinanciering 2012: 38-45). 
The Dutch civil society does not only heavily voice criticism about the recent general 
budget cuts in development cooperation but also argues that the demand for the new 
Dutch Good Growth Fund and its focus on private sector development have not been 
analyzed thoroughly enough. Furthermore, the low transparency in the export credit 
insurance scheme (ECI) is criticized. As grants are often combined with commercial 
loans, for which the Dutch government provides ECI, civil society actors emphasize 
the urgent need for more transparency and accountability of sponsored projects (In-
terview D9).  
Apart from human development, Dutch funds and facilities ultimately focus on contrib-
uting to private sector development and on stimulating the international business 
climate via infrastructure projects. Several NGOs have pointed out that development 
relevance should include more than enhancing employment, production capacity and 
foreign trade. Among them, strong doubts prevail whether businesses in developing 
countries and/or Dutch businesses should mainly be targeted as beneficiaries of 
bilateral aid (Action Aid/Both Ends/Somo 2013: 2-3).  
Thus, Minister Ploumen’s new portfolio which combines foreign trade and develop-
ment cooperation makes transparency about the beneficiaries and the development 
relevance of the projects even more crucial in future. In sum, Dutch policy has 
changed dramatically and seems again to be oriented towards export finance. 
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14.  Comparative Assessment of 
Case Study Countries 
In Part III of this study soft loan programs (and one grant facility respectively) of four 
selected OECD donors have been analyzed with regard to their development orienta-
tion. While tied soft loan programs had been in place in all of the four case study 
countries up to the late 1980ies/early 1990ies, the programs and their successors 
respectively moved into different directions in the past 23 years since the adoption of 
the tied aid disciplines under the Helsinki Package of the Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits. 
Two of the programs examined, the Austrian soft loan program and Denmark’s Danida 
Business Finance essentially build on the provisions laid down in the Helsinki Package 
of the Arrangement. They are both largely tied to procurement from national compa-
nies and soften the terms of a commercial loan, mainly by providing interest rate sub-
sidies. In contrast, Germany’s Financial Cooperation is de jure untied and is thus not 
subject to Arrangement terms. Similarly, the Dutch ORIO program, per definition a 
grant facility, which is predominantly blended by commercial loan financing, is officially 
not tied to procurement from the Netherlands and is not bound to act upon the provi-
sions laid down in the Arrangement. Due to their de jure untied nature and their grant 
form, respectively, these two programs are covered by neither the rules on project and 
country eligibility nor the notification obligations.  
The assessment of the institutional embedding of Austrian soft loans, Danida Busi-
ness Finance, the German Financial Cooperation and the Dutch ORIO program, the 
distribution of political responsibilities and the parameters of the programs’ implemen-
tation suggest a marked heterogeneity and reveal considerable differences in the 
development orientation of the analyzed instruments. A comparative analysis of the 
four programs along the dimensions listed below shall serve to scrutinize the devel-
opment orientation of soft loan financing in Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Neth-
erlands. 
14.1.  Comparative Analysis of the Case Study Results:  
a Tabular Presentation 
The following table summarizes the main findings of the case study analyses and 
serves to compare the respective programs along 14 key dimensions. Subsequently, 
this will allow to draw comparative conclusions on the development orientation of soft 
loan financing in Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. 
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388  Comparability with the other soft loan programs is limited by the fact that ORIO is officially a grant facility  
Dimension – Program Characteristics 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands388  
 
The Austrian soft loan 
program provides loans for 
public recipients which are 
procurement tied to Austrian 
goods and services. Local 
costs and third country 
procurement is limited to 
50 % of the contract value.  
ODA eligible grants to an 
export credit (AF grants) 
comprise of interest rate 
support and reduction of the 
premium. Additional grants are 
currently not being issued. The 
concessionality level of 
individual transactions is 
generally just above the 
requirements of the Arrange-
ment on Officially Supported 
Export Credits.  
 
Denmark’s mixed credit 
program is labeled Danida 
Business Finance. Danida 
Business Finance provides both 
tied and untied mixed credits, 
the latter, however, only come 
into play if the restricted 
national bidding applied in the 
tied variant is not sufficiently 
competitive. In its default 
option the program is thus tied 
to procurement of goods and 
services from Danish compa-
nies (content requirements are 
no longer applied). 
Essentially a Danish mixed 
credit is similar to a regular 
export credit – the major 
difference being that Danida 
ensures concessionality of the 
commercial loan. Danida’s 
support comprises a projected 
amount for technical assis-
tance and a subsidy which 
consists of three main compo-
nents, namely interest rate 
support, export credit premium 
and a bank margin. Should the 
total sum of these components 
not suffice to achieve the 
concessionality requirements of 
the Arrangement of 35 and 
50 % respectively, Danida 
furthermore allocates a cash 
grant in order to reduce the 
principal loan amount. 
 
The Financial Cooperation 
(FC) is part of Germany’s 
official Development Coopera-
tion. FC’s main task is to 
support partner countries in 
the financing of projects or 
programs which have relevance 
for their development. 
The German Financial Coopera-
tion provides various financial 
instruments for government or 
government-related enterprises 
in developing countries or 
emerging markets:  
Programs and projects are 
either purely financed from 
federal budget funds (non-
repayable grants and/or loans 
at very advantageous standard 
conditions) or from a mixture 
of federal budget funds and 
loans raised at the capital 
market. These Development 
loans include Composite 
Financing, Low-Interest loans 
and Mixed Financing. In 
addition, loans at near-market 
conditions from pure capital 
market funds, so-called 
promotional loans, are offered. 
Contrary to the Technical 
Assistance, the Financial 
Cooperation is officially 
completely untied. 
 
The Dutch Development 
Cooperation provides various 
government funds and 
facilities aiming to foster 
human development, private 
sector development and the 
involvement of international 
business.  
The Facility for Infrastructure 
Development (ORIO) is an 
untied grant facility that is 
“blended” by commercial 
loans, recipient’s government 
funds or other donors’ funds. 
The Infrastructure Development 
Fund (IDF) provides long-term 
financing for private and 
commercially viable infrastruc-
ture investments, e.g. in the 
form of associated financing. 
The Dutch Good Growth Fund 
(DGGF) which will start in July 
2014, is a revolving fund 
providing loans, guarantees and 
equity investments. 
One of the three tracks of the 
DGGF is focused on stimulating 
finance for Dutch business 
wishing to export in low and 
middle-income countries by 
providing exports of capital 
goods and services. 
ORIO and IDF are officially 
untied programs since 2009 
and are off-shots of the former 
ORET program. However, ORIO 
grants are de facto procure-
ment tied to Dutch goods and 
services. 
 
Dimension – Pro  haracteristics 
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Dimension – Importance of the Program in the Development Policy Field 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
The volume of AF grants varies 
and amounted between 2.2 % 
and 6.8 % of total bilateral 
ODA over the past years 
(2009-2011). The Austrian soft 
loan program is not part of 
official Austrian development 
cooperation but in the 
responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance. 
 
With an annual budget of 
roughly EUR 40 million, Danida 
Business Finance is a com-
paratively small program (1-
2 % of annual total bilateral 
ODA). Yet, mixed credits have 
for decades been an integral 
part of Danida’s development 
cooperation instruments. 
Together with Danida’s 
Partnership program they 
constitute the core activities of 
Danida’s engagement with the 
private sector which is 
increasingly considered an 
indispensable partner in 
development endeavors.  
 
The Financial Cooperation is a 
highly important part of the 
German Development Coopera-
tion. Apart from Technical 
Assistance (GIZ), FC instru-
ments are the main pillar of 
bilateral cooperation. 
In 2012, in total EUR 4.9 billion 
funds were provided, which 
accounts for about 38 % of 
total bilateral ODA. From this 
total sum, about EUR 1.6 billion 
are federal budget funds, 
delivered as grants or low-
interest loans. The other EUR 
3.3 billion are KfW funds which 
were raised at the capital 
markets. The share of Federal 
Budget Funds in total ODA – 
data is available from 2007 
onwards – has only varied 
slightly; from 13.3 % in 2007 
to 16.3 % in 2012. 
 
The government funds of the 
official Dutch development 
cooperation are an important 
instrument in order to finance 
development related projects/ 
programs/investments. 
In terms of money, ORIO 
provided EUR 90 million. in the 
year 2013. 
IDF is a diversified revolving 
fund with over EUR 230 million 
assets in various infrastructure 
projects. 
The DGGF has a total invest-
ment capital of EUR 700 
million, investing EUR 100 
million in 2014 and 2015. 
In quantitative terms, these 
government funds are a 
comparatively small part of 
annual total bilateral ODA  
(2-4 %). 
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Dimension – Institutional Environment 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
The Ministry of Finance is 
politically responsible for the 
soft loan program and policy 
design.  
The implementing entity is the 
Austrian ECA, OeKB, which is 
owned by Austrian commercial 
banks. The legal basis of the 
program is the Export 
Promotion Act (AusfFG) and 
the Export Finance Promotion 
Act (AFFG). Additionally the 
Development Cooperation Act 
(EZA-G) presents a legal basis. 
In practice, policy coherence 
stipulated by the EZA-G is 
weakly implemented. 
Furthermore, bilateral 
agreements for soft loan 
financing are signed by some 
recipient countries. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/Danida is both political-
ly responsible for the Danish 
mixed credit program and in 
charge of program administra-
tion/implementation. The 
Danish export credit agency, 
Eksport Kredit Fonden, issues 
the guarantee in a mixed credit 
arrangement, but is not directly 
involved in project selection 
and approval.  
The background, purpose and 
procedures of Denmark’s 
mixed credit program are laid 
down in Act No. 64 of 7 
February 2013 (Folketinget).  
 
 
The Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) drives 
German development policy 
and financing. The KfW 
Entwicklungsbank (Develop-
ment Bank), which works on 
behalf of the German federal 
government, is the executing 
agency of the BMZ and 
responsible for project 
appraisals and implementing 
projects under Financial  
Cooperation. 
Germany‘s Development Policy 
is not defined by law, but 
underpinned by the coalition 
agreement that covers each 
legislative period and the 
budget procedure. In addition, 
there are administrative rules 
and different policy documents 
that guide the BMZ, and the 
KfW Development Bank as 
executing agency. 
Intergovernmental agreements 
are signed by recipient 
countries and Germany and are 
the basis for further coopera-
tion. 
Moreover, the federal govern-
ment, represented by the 
Ministry of Finance guarantees 
for untied financial loans in the 
form of federal guarantees and 
sureties covering the risk of 
non-payment. 
 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is politically responsible for the 
government funds ORIO, IDF 
and DGGF.  
The implementing agencies are 
FMO (Dutch Development 
Bank) and/or NL Agency. The 
latter is a division of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
which is another institutional 
key player.  
The Dutch ECA, Atradius Dutch 
State Business, provides export 
credit insurance.  
The Dutch development 
cooperation is not defined by 
law, but underpinned by the 
coalition agreement that covers 
each legislature period.  
The government facilities/funds 
are designed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in cooperation 
with various stakeholders (e.g. 
ORIO was designed together 
with the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Dutch employ-
er’s organization VNO-NCW). 
FMO and NL Agency are 
commissioned by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs; Atradius 
DSB is commissioned by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
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Dimension – Objectives of the Program 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
According to the Austrian soft 
loan policy, the program aims 
at facilitating market entry of 
Austrian products and services 
as well as to assist Austrian 
exporters competing in 
international markets. 
Exporting firms are expected 
to positively impact the 
Austrian economy e.g. through 
technological spill overs. 
Additionally soft loan-financed 
projects should foster 
sustainable development in 
recipient countries.  
 
In accordance with Denmark’s 
overall development strategy 
(The Right to a Better Life) 
and in alignment with the 
Strategic Framework for 
Priority Area Growth and 
Employment as well as the 
Strategic Framework for 
Priority Area Natural Re-
sources, Energy, and Climate 
Change, Danida Business 
Finance pursues the aim of 
providing financing for mainly 
large-scale infrastructure 
projects, thereby contributing 
to sustainable, green and 
inclusive growth and employ-
ment creation in the recipient 
country. 
By facilitating access to 
financing and engaging 
commercial partners, the 
program is, furthermore, 
expected to act as promoter of 
investments in infrastructure, 
in turn contributing to the 
creation of a better framework 
for economic growth and 
employment. 
 
 
The German Financial Coopera-
tion aims at supporting partner 
countries in the financing of 
large public infrastructure 
projects and programs that are 
relevant for their development 
and thus, based on country 
development and sector 
strategies and aligned with 
Germany’s development policy 
including international agree-
ments.  
In carrying out Financial 
Cooperation, Germany is 
engaged to strengthen the 
partner country’s sense of 
ownership. In accordance with 
Germany’s overarching 
development policy, the 
involvement of business actors 
and the focus on innovation, 
entrepreneurship and private 
sector development is clearly 
addressed. 
 
 
The government funds ORIO 
and IDF aim at fostering 
human development and 
private sector development as 
well as stimulating the 
involvement of international 
business in order to benefit 
from the private sector’s 
expertise. 
The DGGF puts its efforts in 
support of private-sector 
development and efforts to 
promote trade and investment 
The funds provide finance for 
projects/programs for public 
infrastructure (ORIO), for 
private/commercial infrastruc-
ture (IDF) and development-
related investments in and 
trade with low- and middle-
income countries (DGGF). 
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Dimension – Country Eligibility Criteria 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
In principle soft loans can be 
provided for any tied aid 
eligibility country receiving an 
export guarantee from the 
Republic of Austria approved 
by the export guarantee 
committee (AusfFG Beirat). 
The Ministry of Finance 
publishes a list of target 
countries characterized by 
economic growth and 
potential markets for Austrian 
businesses. 
 
Since 2012/2013 only 
Danida’s priority countries are 
eligible for Danida Business 
Finance projects. Prior to this 
harmonization all developing 
countries fulfilling the Helsinki 
criteria could apply for and 
receive Danish mixed credit 
financing. 
 
FC-Conditions are specified 
every beginning of the year by 
the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) in 
coordination/consensus with 
the Federal Ministry of 
Finance (BMF), the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and 
Technology (BMWi) and the 
Federal Foreign Office (AA) 
with reference to the condi-
tions set up by the World 
Bank. 
 
 
The list of eligible countries 
including the ORIO-grant 
percentage is decided and 
reviewed semi-annually by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
is based on the partner 
countries of the Dutch 
development cooperation in 
combination with some 
selected LDCs as well as 
emerging markets. 
Dimension – Sector and Project Eligibility Criteria 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
In addition to the Helsinki 
criteria, project eligibility is 
determined by three criteria: 
(1) market entry, (2) 
project’s relevance in terms 
of economic policy in the 
donor country (including 
technological spill over 
effects), and (3) project’s 
sustainability. 
 
While explicit sector re-
strictions have not (yet) been 
defined, as of 2012/2013 
projects applying for a Danish 
mixed credit are in addition to 
the project eligibility provi-
sions of the Arrangement on 
Officially Supported Export 
Credits expected to be in line 
with Danida’s Green Growth 
agenda. Clear-cut criteria for 
deciding whether a project 
falls within this agenda are 
missing.  
 
 
German Financial Cooperation 
is based on the programming 
of the Official German 
Bilateral Cooperation; in 
particular on the country 
strategies of the BMZ and 
therein formulated priority 
sectors (no more than three) 
and on the partner country‘s 
development strategies.  
Once a project or a program is 
proposed, the KfW Develop-
ment Bank issues a brief 
statement of opinion (feasibil-
ity; economic viability; social, 
cultural and ecological 
aspects; developmental 
orientation of a potential 
project, possible risks).  
These brief statements of 
opinion are the basis for the 
intergovernmental agree-
ments, in which the under-
standing on the maximum 
amount that may be available 
by the Federal Government 
and on what terms and 
conditions is signed by both 
parties. 
 
According to the formal 
requirements for an ORIO-
grant projects must be 
commercially non-viable; 
which is assessed using the 
OECD ‘Ex ante Guidance for 
Tied Aid’. The project costs 
must amount to at least 
between EUR 2 million and 
must not exceed EUR 60 
million per application.  
Further, e.g. the procurement 
of goods and services for the 
project must comply with the 
recipient country’s legislation 
and international procurement 
practices. 
The project has to (1) be 
relevant; (2) effective; (3) 
have an impact on human 
development and/or private 
sector development; (4) be 
efficient; (5) sustainable; (6) 
economically viable 
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Dimension – Assessment of Expected Developmental Impact 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
The core tool to assess the 
developmental impact is a 
questionnaire directed to the 
exporter. The instrument 
functions as a check-list and 
addresses the project’s 
sustainability, social and 
environmental impact, as well 
as financial, technical and 
economic aspects. Answers 
consist of information 
provided by the exporter. 
The OeKB’s procedure 
provides for a reduced 
questionnaire for de minimis 
projects. 
OeKB’s 'Project and Environ-
mental Analyses' department 
is in charge of project 
appraisal including the 
evaluation of the question-
naire. The department 
assesses the comprehensive-
ness of the information given 
but does not apply standard-
ized instruments of evaluation 
or weigh the answers given. 
 
Danida’s procedures include 
an appraisal of the potential 
project which is to be 
conducted by external 
consultants. Based on their 
field trips/on-site visits, an 
appraisal report is produced 
which constitutes the basis for 
project approval by Danida’s 
Grant Committees. The 
appraisal reports follow 
Danida’s standard forms and 
are expected to provide an 
assessment of the project’s 
compliance with Danida’s 
overall objectives and 
strategies and shall demon-
strate the expected develop-
mental impact, including 
project monitoring and impact 
indicators.  
Furthermore, the appraisals 
should contain inter alia an 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment, an assessment of 
Working Environment and 
Rights at Work, an economic 
analysis and a chapter 
outlining risks and assump-
tions.  
Systematic quantitative 
project assessment tools are 
not mentioned. 
 
On the basis of inter-
governmental agreements and 
brief statements of opinions, 
the KfW Development Bank 
conducts on-site appraisals 
along internal and confidential 
guidelines which are similar to 
the audits done by the World 
Bank. The appraisal includes 
field trips and is generally 
done along the log frame 
matrix and corresponding 
indicators: 
(a) the proof of necessity of 
the given project or pro-
gram; e.g. in the form of 
a sectoral or regional 
analysis 
(b) the conceptualization, 
the design and technical 
characteristics including 
opportunities to cooper-
ate with the private  
sector 
(c) relevant legal basis; 
organization, manage-
ment and economic 
conditions of the project 
executing partner  
(d) total costs and the 
financing of these costs, 
human and material 
supplies as well as fi-
nancial contributions of 
each single stakeholder 
(e) Macroeconomic, socio-
economic and socio-
cultural impacts, gender 
aspects and environ-
mental and social com-
patibility; economic as-
pects, operational and 
commercial risks, the 
target group’s attitude 
towards the project  
 
ORIO’s application procedure 
includes an intake form, in 
which detailed information 
about the effects on human 
development and private 
sector development has to be 
provided along the project 
results chain. 
In order to obtain an ORIO 
grant for the development 
phase, projects are assessed 
on the basis of five OECD/DAC 
criteria: relevance, effective-
ness, impact, efficiency and 
sustainability. 
E.g. Sustainability considers 
(1) No, or mitigated, negative 
social or environmental 
consequences; (2) Financial 
sustainability; (3) Involved 
parties are capable and have 
the capacity to carry out the 
project; (4) Suitable technolo-
gy; (5) Consistency with 
national/regional development 
policy; (6) Institutional, 
financial and legal factors 
have been taken into account 
and (7) End users are 
involved. 
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Dimension – Project Approval  
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
Soft loan financing has to be 
approved by the export 
financing committee (EFK). 
Its voting members, the 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, the 
Austrian Chamber of Com-
merce, and the Chamber of 
Labor traditionally decide by 
consensus. This committee 
deciding on project eligibility 
for soft loan-financing is 
composed of representatives 
of selective organized political 
interests. EFK members are 
not selected on grounds of 
professional expertise. They 
are internally nominated by 
the respective organizations.  
 
 
In a first step, project 
proposals are screened by the 
Head of Development Policy 
and Global Cooperation 
(project grants < DKK 35 
million) or Danida’s Pro-
gramme Committee (project 
grants > DKK 35 million).  
In the attempt to streamline 
Danish mixed credit proce-
dures, since 2013 Danida’s 
Internal Grant Committee 
(project grants < DKK 35 
million) and External Grant 
Committee (project grants > 
DKK 35 million) respectively 
are in charge of the subse-
quent approval of projects. 
Formally final approval is 
given by the Minister for 
Development Co-operation.  
Up to 2011 a specialized 
committee – the Committee 
for Mixed Credits – and in an 
interim-period (2012) the 
Board on International 
Development Cooperation 
were in charge of project 
approval. 
While in these former 
approval committees a great 
variety of stakeholders were 
represented, the now respon-
sible Danida Grant Commit-
tees can rather be described 
as inward-bound, expert-
driven committees, in which 
the wide spectrum of 
traditional political stakehold-
ers is no longer involved.  
 
 
Once the appraisal report is 
done and positively assessed 
by the KfW Development 
Bank, the country desks 
(Länderreferate) of the 
Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) normally approve the 
developmental criteria of the 
project appraisal as well as 
the proposal for funding. Here 
adaptations or changes 
regarding the developmental 
orientation of the project or 
the funding proposal could be 
called by the BMZ because 
the ministry gives the final 
approval for funding. The 
country desks’ staff is public 
civil servants from the 
Ministry and thus, includes 
state-internal experts. No 
other (political) stakeholders 
are officially involved. 
 
 
During this assessment 
procedure NL Agency takes 
advice from the ORIO Advisory 
Committee (AC) named 
ACORIO. This advisory board 
includes five stakeholders; 
among them are experts in 
the field of banking, science, 
contractors and engineering 
consultancy services. ACORIO 
in principle decides unani-
mously. Formally final 
approval is given by the 
Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation. 
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Dimension – Stakeholder Involvement 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
The soft loan program does 
not provide for stakeholder 
consultations with the public 
or civil society. ADA’s regional 
offices and WKO Foreign 
Trade Offices are not 
mandated to be involved in 
the assessment process of 
projects but inform and 
consult on request.  
Whether local NGOs are 
consulted is entirely at the 
discretion of the recipient. 
 
 
In line with its standard 
procedures, Danida’s project 
screening and approval 
process of mixed credit 
projects includes mandatory 
public consultations for 
project proposals > DKK 35 
million (10 day consultation 
period). 
 
Projects to be promoted with 
FC funds are devised jointly by 
the German government and 
the government of the partner 
country. Before these 
negotiations start or final 
approvals are given, the BMZ 
regularly invites civil society 
actors to stakeholder consul-
tations in which individual 
partner countries are the 
subject for debate.  
 
 
Dutch government funds do 
not provide for stakeholder 
consultations with the public 
or civil society on the level of 
concrete projects. Dutch 
embassies are strongly 
involved in consulting and 
informing the implementing 
agencies NL Agency or FMO. 
When new funds are about to 
be established, like the DGGF, 
then hearings take place in 
parliament.  
392 
Dimension – Role of the Partner Country in the System 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
The Austrian soft loan policy 
does not interfere with 
national procurement 
regulations of recipient 
countries.  
In order to frame bilateral 
financial relations and 
facilitate soft loan financing 
for projects by accelerating 
procedures in the recipient 
country the Austrian Ministry 
of Finance has concluded 
bilateral agreements with 
some recipient countries’ 
governments.  
The Austrian soft loan policy 
includes a foreign content 
rule limiting local costs and 
third country procurement to 
50 % of the contract value. 
  
Official program descriptions 
highlight that Danida Business 
Instruments are expected to 
follow the principles of owner-
ship, alignment, harmonization, 
results and mutual accountabil-
ity. In short, the principles of the 
Paris Declaration shall be 
applied. In terms of recipient 
ownership it is expected that 
the project idea originates from 
the recipient country and is 
developed by the borrower/ 
buyer without major involvement 
from the side of Danida. 
Likewise, the tender process is 
under the responsibility of the 
authorities in the recipient 
country. Danida, however, 
provides assistance in the 
tender procedure by assigning 
an external consultant for 
technical assistance in the 
preparation of tender documents 
and the tender evaluation. 
Due to the fact that the main 
recipient countries today 
correspond to Danida partner 
countries, usually no specific 
intergovernmental agreements 
for mixed credit financing are 
signed with the partner country. 
However, sometimes framework 
agreements are concluded upon 
demand of the recipient country 
or in cases where there is a 
huge portfolio of projects and 
where pre-agreed conditions 
make it easier (and accelerate 
procedures). In sum, intergov-
ernmental agreements on mixed 
credits are not a requirement to 
receive funding, but are 
occasionally concluded. 
Alternatively, mixed credit 
financing forms part of the 
Danida’s country strategy which 
has to be endorsed by the 
responsible ministries in the 
partner country.  
Ownership and Commitment 
of the partner country are 
pointed out as main principles 
in order to carry out German 
Financial Cooperation. Thus, in 
principle the recipients 
themselves propose projects 
and programs within the 
framework of bilateral 
negotiations and agreements. 
De facto no single FC-proposal 
is financed without an 
injection of own resources by 
the partner country. In 
addition, recipients are 
responsible for the tendering 
and the contract manage-
ment. The involvement of the 
KfW Development Bank 
depends to a large extent on 
the capabilities of the given 
country. Nevertheless, key 
procedures are supervised by 
a consultant and drafts of 
tender documents or con-
tracts have to be sent to the 
KfW for review and for a 
statement of no objection.  
Ownership of the partner 
country is key when imple-
menting projects funded with 
government funds like ORIO. 
The recipient country’s 
government or competent 
authority is project owner and 
obliged to finance the non-
grant part. Recipients 
regularly need assistance in 
financing this part of a 
project. In general, (Dutch) 
companies are important 
drivers in proposing new 
projects. Although the 
recipient country is responsi-
ble for the tendering including 
the contract management, NL 
Agency supervises main 
procedures via their embas-
sies or hired consultant 
engineers and has to be 
consulted regularly for a 
statement of no objection in 
key decisions that have to be 
taken.  
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Dimension – Project Monitoring 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
Exporters are obliged to 
propose a monitoring concept 
and monitor progress, in 
order to measure the 
project’s sustainability. In 
case of de minimis projects a 
final report after project 
implementation or product 
delivery is required. Monitor-
ing reports are not publicly 
available.  
Danida assigns a monitoring 
consultant who is responsible 
for reviewing project-related 
progress from the tender 
process until commissioning 
and end of project. The main 
monitoring indicators guiding 
the consultant’s reporting are 
set out in the appraisal report 
and the project document.  
The KfW Development Bank 
monitors the progress of the 
measures financed with FC 
funds until the given project 
or program will be brought 
into service. The monitoring 
includes reviewing the 
progress of outstanding action 
and considers the latest 
development in the given 
sector; the impacts of the 
implemented actions; 
compliance with planning and 
financing; potential difficulties 
which have occurred during 
the implementation; potential 
modification of framework 
conditions and/or recommen-
dations. 
 
The Policy and Operations 
Evaluation Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(IOB/IOV) has designed a 
monitoring & evaluation 
system for ORIO which has 
not been executed yet. 
Nevertheless, internal 
accountability is provided via 
reviews, semi annually and 
yearly reports about the 
progress of a corresponding 
project.  
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Dimension – Project-Level Evaluation (ex-post) 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
The Soft loan procedure does 
not provide for systematic ex-
post evaluation of the 
developmental impact of 
projects.  
Within the scope of a greater 
study aiming at evaluating 
the ecologic, social, and 
economic impact of Austria’s 
export promotion in recipient 
countries ETA Umwelt-
management and ARBOS 
(2010) evaluated 5 individual 
soft loan-financed projects. 
In addition to the reporting on 
project progress and impact 
indicators by the monitoring 
consultant, the buyer is 
required to report to Danida 
on key output indicators on an 
annual basis for five consecu-
tive years starting one year 
after final taking over of the 
project. The outcome indica-
tors for this ex-post evaluation 
are individually set in the 
project document and are as 
such presented for approval to 
Danida’s Grant Committees. 
Two up to five years after a 
project or program has been 
implemented or has become 
operational, the KfW Devel-
opment Bank generally 
conducts evaluations of these 
measures and activities. 
This so-called ex-post 
evaluation is carried out in 
order to analyze whether the 
expected developmental 
impacts of a given project 
have actually been achieved 
and whether they have 
initiated a sustainable 
development process. Aspects 
being evaluated consider the 
whole project cycle, the 
environment, the partner and 
involved agencies as well as 
the target group. 
The evaluations are done by 
the Evaluation Department of 
the KfW Development Bank or 
by assigned external consult-
ants.  
The Evaluation Department 
moved away from assessing 
every single project in 2007; 
since then a representative 
sample of individual projects 
is submitted for ex-post 
evaluation 
About two thirds of all 
evaluations are done by the 
KfW Development Bank; one 
third of the sample is 
conducted by external 
consultants. 
Evaluations are carried out or 
outsourced by NL Agency in 
cooperation with the recipient 
country.  
  19  395 
 
  
Dimension – Program-Level Evaluation 
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
 
Apart from ETA Umwelt-
management, ARBOS (2010), 
the Soft loan program has 
been evaluated by T. Url et al. 
(2003) and K. Bayer, J. 
Stankovsky and T. Url (1992).  
None of the listed studies has 
explicitly evaluated the 
developmental impact of soft 
loan-financed projects. 
 
 
In 1998 and 2002 evaluations 
of the program were conduct-
ed by Danida’s Evaluation 
Department. In 2004 a Meta-
Evaluation of private and 
business sector development 
interventions touched upon 
the mixed credit program. 
 
 
DEval intends to conduct an 
overarching evaluation of all 
FC Funds in 2015 (which has 
been planned for 2013 but 
then postponed to 2015).  
In this first evaluation about 
FC, instruments of financial 
cooperation leveraging capital 
market funds by German state 
funding will be evaluated.  
 
A program review of ORIO was 
done in autumn 2013 by 
Carnegie Consulting commis-
sioned by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. ORIO will be 
reformed upon these policy 
recommendations. Further, 
ORIO is being evaluated by 
IOB in the year 2015. 
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Dimension – Transparency and Accountability  
Austria Denmark Germany  The Netherlands  
The OeKB website publishes 
relevant information for 
exporters on soft loan terms 
and conditions, presenting 
the current soft loan policy. 
The bank does not publish 
information on individual soft 
loan-financed projects. 
The EFK, the committee 
approving projects, neither 
publishes statements on 
project decisions, nor minutes 
of meetings.  
The AusfFG Beirat provides 
yearly reports to the Austrian 
parliament but soft loans are 
not addressed explicitly.  
The Austrian parliament has 
the option to ask questions. It 
makes use of its right but 
focuses its interest on 
commercial export credits. 
A public debate about the 
program per se or individual 
projects in the donor country 
is absent.  
In recent years notable efforts 
have been made to increase the 
transparency of the Danish 
mixed credit program, for 
instance all projects can be 
found in the program and 
project database. Furthermore, 
both agendas (ex-ante) and 
minutes (ex-post) of Grant 
Committee meetings – the 
decision-making body on the 
project level – can be accessed 
on Danida’s transparency 
webpage. 
A considerable amount of 
information on the implementa-
tion of the program is publicly 
available. The quality of the 
available guidelines is slightly 
weakened by the fact that the 
updating of all documents in 
accordance with recent 
reorganizations and procedural 
changes is still outstanding. 
In order to comply with its 
reporting duties towards the 
Parliament, Danida produces a 
yearly report – Danida’s Annual 
Report – which provides detailed 
information on all activities in 
the field of Danish development 
policy in a given year. From 
2007 onwards the “Report from 
the Danish Committee for Mixed 
Credits” was incorporated in 
Danida’s annual report. The 
structure and format of the 
annual reports have been 
changed with the 2011 report, 
which is “published” as 
interlinked webpage and no 
longer contains chapters on 
individual programs. 
Despite the comparatively high 
level of transparency and 
accessibility of information, the 
program as such just as 
individual projects financed 
under it remain largely outside 
the realms of public debate. 
In order to be transparent, 
overall press information 
about FC projects is published 
online by the BMZ after the 
intergovernmental agreements 
are signed. Further, infor-
mation is publicly available 
once the loan agreement of a 
concrete project has been 
signed. 
The KfW Development Bank 
recently made efforts to 
improve its transparency with 
the launch of an online 
transparency portal. The 
portal is complete since 
January 2014 and provides 
information about partner 
countries, sectors, sources of 
funding and evaluation results 
from 2007 onwards including 
a project database with details 
on projects signed since 2013. 
The portal is an important, but 
long overdue step. However, 
detailed development-related 
information, e.g. concrete 
financing conditions, is not 
publicly available. The BMZ 
has reporting duties to the 
parliament. In addition, the 
Federal Court of Auditors 
regularly audits the financial 
management of the Federal 
government, its ministries and 
executing agencies. Thus, the 
BMZ and the KfW Develop-
ment Bank are quite regularly 
monitored. The Bank is also 
continuously supervised by the 
private auditing company 
PWC.  
The role of the German civil 
society is more strongly 
focused on the export credit 
transactions. Here, the KfW 
IPEX-Bank, one of the KfW 
Banking Group’s subsidiaries 
is regularly criticized.  
NL Agency is obligated to 
report the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs about the progress of 
corresponding ORIO projects. 
The Ministry has reporting 
duties to the parliament. 
Within the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Committee for 
Foreign Affairs deals with 
development cooperation and 
thus, scrutinizes the govern-
ment’s development policy in 
general, budget allocations as 
well as the concrete design of 
funds/facilities. Further, the 
parliament can amend 
governmental policies and has 
the right to introduce motions.  
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14.2.  Comparative Conclusions of the Case Studies 
14.2.1.  Program Characteristics 
Conclusion 1: The analyzed instruments, which are used to provide concessional 
financing, are heterogeneous. In particular, they differ in their official tying status. 
Two programs are officially tied to procurement of goods and services in the donor 
country, the remaining two are de jure untied.  
The official tying status is probably the most obvious difference between the four 
analyzed programs. The Austrian soft loan program and the Danish Danida Business 
Finance are largely tied pre-mixed and mixed credits, German Financial Cooperation 
and the Dutch ORIO fund, on the contrary, claim to be untied. So whereas the Austri-
an and the Danish programs are officially tied to procurement and have an explicit 
export promotion angle, the German Financial Cooperation and the Dutch ORIO 
portray themselves from the very on-set in a different light. From the perspective of 
international regulation – in particular the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits – this difference has repercussions on concessionality requirements, country 
and project eligibility criteria, and transparency obligations (notification mechanisms). 
However, also within the categories of tied and untied programs, respectively, signifi-
cant variations can be detected. While the Austrian soft loan program is de jure tied to 
procurement from Austrian companies and sets a domestic content rule of 50 %, the 
Danish mixed credit program is in its default option conditional upon procurement 
from Danish companies, but does not provide for any such threshold. Furthermore, 
presumably as a reaction to the untying debate which gained momentum in the early 
2000s with the adoption of a DAC Recommendation on Untying of Official Develop-
ment Assistance to the LDCs, an untied window for mixed credits to Danida’s pro-
gram countries and South Africa was introduced in 2002 (see Folketinget 2013). 
Notably, this option only materializes if national competitive bidding under the tied 
regime is not sufficiently competitive.  
In contrast to the Austrian and the Danish programs, the Dutch and the German coun-
terparts are de jure not tied to the procurement of goods and services from domestic 
companies. Yet, with regard to both programs suspicion has repeatedly been voiced 
that de facto tying practices are applied. Current OECD/DAC definitions of tying 
leave open certain possibilities of using subtle forms of tying and/or of providing do-
mestic companies with competitive and informational advantages in the bidding pro-
cess. In the Netherlands, there is reason to assume that although the grant facility 
ORIO has officially been an untied program since 2009, grants are de facto procure-
ment tied to Dutch goods and services. However, it has to be noted that as of now 
only tenders for the Development Phase, not the Implementation Phase, had been 
held. The fact that in the new Dutch Good Growth Fund a tied pillar will be included 
further illustrates this ambiguity towards the untying debate. In Germany the untied 
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nature of German Financial Cooperation (unlike its Technical Cooperation) is an im-
portant characteristic in the official discourse. Yet, roughly 60 % of all project deliver-
ables, which have to be tendered internationally, are awarded to German companies 
within the German Financial Cooperation. Whether this high ratio can be attributed 
solely to the international competitiveness of German exporting companies has re-
peatedly been questioned. Informal practices providing German companies with in-
formational advantages or tailor-made calls for tenders might distort competition. In 
this respect, project development activities (often conducted by German technical 
advisors) are likely to assume a decisive role.  
Comparing the four programs it becomes, thus, apparent that also the mechanisms 
used for contract award vary across the case study countries. Although recommend-
ed by the DAC Good Procurement Practices for Official Development Assistance 
(1986), not all programs necessarily apply international or at least national competitive 
bidding to identify the most competitive bid. While the German Financial Cooperation 
is de jure untied and is based on International Competitive Bidding, direct contract 
award is conceivable in the Austrian programme. The Danish program largely relies on 
National Competitive Bidding (with the exception of a few untied projects) and in the 
Netherlands mostly ICB is applied.  
Conclusion 2: In all case study countries but the Netherlands, associated/mixed 
financing is provided. Two among the three countries which offer associated/mixed 
financing are bound by the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits 
(Helsinki Package).  
The Arrangement’s terms on minimum concessionality levels, country and project 
eligibility constitute the framework of reference of the Austrian soft loan program. 
Accordingly, for lower middle-income countries a concessionality level of 35 % of the 
contract amount has to be provided. Soft loan financing for Least Developed Coun-
tries (LDCs) requires a higher budgetary effort in order to meet the minimum 
concessionality level of 50 %. The program currently offers financing in the form of 
pre-mixed credits. These credits are considered budget-friendly loans that are 
achieved by combining low interest rates as well as long repayment and grace peri-
ods. The terms and conditions of soft loans do not vary by sector or project character-
istics. Currently the program offers loans with a zero interest rate and a 21-year credit 
period including a five year grace period. Soft loan financed projects comprise prod-
ucts such as medical devices, firefighting vehicles, bridges etc. It is questionable 
whether all products financed have a life cycle of 21 years. 
Similarly to the Austrian program, Denmark’s mixed credits build on the Helsinki 
architecture in the design of terms and requirements for program support. Within this 
framework, Danida Business Finance offers interest-free or low-interest loans, typically 
with a maturity of ten years and issued exclusively in either USD or EUR. The borrow-
er/buyer is obliged to repay the loan principal (less any cash grants) in equal, semi-
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annual installments, normally starting six months after the start of operation and certifi-
cation of the project, i.e. when the project has been installed, tested and handed over 
to the buyer (Danida 2013d). Furthermore, the commitment and management fees to 
the Danish lending bank are to be covered by the borrower (Danish MfA/Danida 
2011a). The financial support granted by Danida consists of three main components, 
namely interest rate support, export credit premium and a bank margin. Unlike in Aus-
tria, one additional mechanism is in place in the Danish system: Should the total sum 
of these components not suffice to achieve the concessionality requirements of the 
Arrangement, Danida allocates an outright grant in order to reduce the principal loan 
amount. With the current very low interest rates, this cash grant is usually needed, 
even for countries in which a 35 % concessionality level is required (Danida 2013d; 
Interview B1). As a result of the combination of the prevailing low interest rates and 
the predominance of lower income countries as program beneficiaries (requiring the 
higher concessionality level of 50 %), the leverage of the instrument deteriorates 
(Interview B1). As in the Austrian system, sector specific variations in the 
concessionality level are not provided for. 
In Germany, the Financial Cooperation provides various financial instruments for 
government or government-related enterprises in developing countries or emerging 
markets. With the exception of the so-called “mixed financing loans”, these instru-
ments are de jure untied and thus not subject to the Arrangement. Programs and 
projects are either purely financed from federal budget funds (non-repayable grants 
and/or loans at very advantageous standard conditions) or from a mixture of federal 
budget funds and loans raised on the capital market. These “development loans” 
include composite financing, low-interest loans and mixed financing. In addition, loans 
at near-market terms, so-called promotional loans, are offered. The precise financing 
terms and conditions of the German Financial Cooperation are determined every 
beginning of the year by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ) in coordination with the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) 
with reference to the conditions set up by the World Bank. The Financial Cooperation 
appears hence more flexible in its financing terms than the Austrian and Danish equiv-
alents. Notably, in the German Financial Cooperation the loan conditions vary in ac-
cordance with the sector, the type of project and its commercial viability.  
The Dutch bilateral development cooperation constitutes a peculiar case in that it 
currently does not offer soft loan financing. While up to the early 1990ies a tied mixed 
credit program had been in place, today several government funds provide for mecha-
nisms to combine public development finance with private resources. One of these is 
the so-called Development Relevant Infrastructure Incentive (ORIO), which provides 
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long-term financing for public infrastructure projects389. ORIO was established in 2009 
as a de jure untied grant facility and succeeded the “Development Relevant Export 
Transactions program” (in Dutch: ORET). The latter had been tied to goods and ser-
vices from Dutch companies390. This move from a tied to an untied program represent-
ed a paradigm shift and was not without controversy. In particular, the Dutch industry 
voiced concern with regard to negative repercussions and potential losses of compet-
itiveness of Dutch companies on international markets. With ORIO grants different 
project phases can be financed. A distinction is made between an ORIO contribution 
in the so-called Development Phase and an ORIO contribution in the subsequent 
Implementation and Maintenance Phase. Notably, an ORIO grant does not provide 
financing for the full project/contract amount. The non-grant part of an ORIO financed 
project must be financed with other funds. In many cases, ORIO grants are associat-
ed with commercial loans, for which export credit insurance (ECI) is regularly provided 
by Atradius Dutch State Business on the basis of its country policies. Strikingly, the 
resulting financing form appears to be similar to the soft loan instruments in place in 
the three other case study countries. Furthermore, Dutch development finance is 
under reconstruction again and a new fund is currently set up. As from July 2014 the 
so-called Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) will provide tied soft loans for Dutch 
companies in order to assist them in their efforts to expand into the markets of devel-
oping and emerging markets.  
Conclusion 3: All programs postulate the additionality of invested resources as well 
as the leverage effect of combining public and commercial funds. 
One of the main aspects subtly inscribed in all of the programs, which is also used for 
legitimizing the injection of grant money into a loan, is the leverage component of the 
resulting financing packages as well as the additionality of the invested resources. 
Thereby, similarly to the case of “blending mechanisms” the strengths of instruments 
of mixed and associated financing are interpreted in the context of constrained re-
sources for financing development. However, under prevailing capital market condi-
tions with very low interest rates, the tied soft loan programs (Austria and Denmark) 
encounter genuine difficulties in meeting the concessionality thresholds that are re-
quired by the Arrangement. As a result, the instrument looses one of its most appeal-
ing characteristics: its leverage effect. Moreover, taking up the Busan call for partner-
ship with the private sector, across the case study countries, the business community 
is described as an indispensable partner in development, although partly as a result of 
the global financial crisis, private funding for development has been stagnating during 
the last years. 
                                                            
389 http://english.agentschapnl.nl/subsidies-programmes/facility-infrastructure-development-orio 
390  http://www.oret.nl/ 
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14.2.2.   Importance of the Program in the Field of Development  
 Cooperation 
Conclusion 4: The importance and share in volume of the respective concessional 
finance programs with respect to the overall ODA of a given country varies consider-
ably, with classical tied aid programs lying between 1-6 % of total ODA. By exten-
sively using blending mechanisms, untied concessional finance has however in-
creased substantially in the case of Germany.  
The volume of associated financing grants varies and amounted between 2.2 and 
6.8 % of Austria’s total bilateral ODA over the past years (2009-2011). The yearly 
volume of associated financing grants reported to the DAC in the period 2001-2011 
fluctuated. Nevertheless a slight upward trend can be observed as from 2005 on-
wards. For the upcoming years high volumes are expected because an exceptionally 
high number of projects (67 projects applications) with an overall project volume of 
EUR 455 million was approved by the EFK in 2012 as a consequence of the closing 
opportunity to fund projects in graduating countries, in particular in China.  
With an annual budget of roughly EUR 40 million, Danida Business Finance is in 
comparison a relatively small program (1-2 % of annual total bilateral ODA). Yet, 
mixed credits have for decades been an integral part of Danida’s development coop-
eration instruments. Together with Danida’s Partnership Program, they constitute the 
core activities of Danida’s engagement with the private sector which is increasingly 
considered an indispensable partner in development endeavors. While in terms of 
commitments reported, volumes peaked in 2004 with a tied amount of USD 160 
million391, in terms of the number of project approvals the years 2002 and 2007 fig-
ured as record years (DBF Database, provided on 10/10/2013). As from 2009 on-
wards a downward trend in the number of annual project approvals can be noticed, 
which reached its all-time low with zero projects approved in 2012. Whether this 
development is indicative of future trends remains to be seen. The slight budget cuts 
predicted by the budgetary outlook for 2013-2017, in any case, give rise to the as-
sumption that either the number of projects or the volume of projects will have to drop 
in the years to come – the first scenario of which seems more likely.  
In the Netherlands, the share of ORET/MILIEV – i.e. of the program preceding the 
ORIO program – including the disbursements of the LDC Infrastructure Fund (2002-
2005) of Total ODA varies between 0.4 and 3.8 % in the period 1992-2005. ORIO 
started out as a program providing grants in the total amount of EUR 140 million in 
2009. According to an interviewed person, this amount was later increased to EUR 
180 million by ministerial decision in order to meet the great demand for projects 
(Interview D5). Thus, the total annual budget for ORIO was around EUR 180 million in 
                                                            
391  Calculated on the basis of commitments reported to the DAC Creditor Reporting System 
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the year 2012. Nevertheless, applications that had been accepted for appraisal ex-
ceeded the available budget which led to a waiting-list, opened by ORIO. In 2013, the 
available budget for projects financed with ORIO grants was again approximately EUR 
180 million. 
With a share of more than 30 % of total ODA in 2010-2012, the by far biggest share 
of concessional financing instruments on overall ODA is observable in Germany. 
Although the share of the Financial Cooperation on total ODA shows fluctuations in 
the period 2003-2012, a general increase (with a preliminary peak in 2012) in com-
mitted resources can be identified. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that these 
numbers also include the funds raised by KfW on the capital markets. The share of 
Federal Budget Funds to total ODA – data is available from 2007 onwards – has only 
varied slightly; from 13.3 % in 2007 to 16.3 % in 2012. The volume of standard loans 
has decreased in favor of development loans and promotional loans within the last 
years. Federal budget funds have sharply increased since 2009 whereas total budget 
funds, which go into development loans, have substantially varied at a rather low level. 
In comparison, the high volume of total KfW funds raised at the capital markets has 
dramatically increased the leverage of development loans. While the leverage ratio 
(total KfW funds to total budget funds) was 7:1 in 2009, the analysis suggests that 
the leverage nearly doubled to 13:1 in 2012. 
14.2.3.  Institutional Setting 
Conclusion 5: The institutional settings in which the programs operate vary consid-
erably among the case study countries. Both the political responsibilities as well as 
the responsibilities for program administration are distributed differently among the 
relevant actors, which are mainly the ministry in charge of development cooperation, 
the aid agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Export Credit Agency.  
While these actors all appear to have a stake in the respective soft loan programs 
(and the analyzed grant facility), the distribution of power among them varies across 
the researched countries. Remarkably, in all case study countries with the exception of 
Austria the political responsibility for the strategic orientation of the programs falls 
within the competence of the ministry in charge of development cooperation. Although 
influenced by the institutional history of each country, the extent to which the conces-
sional financing programs are embedded into the prescriptive framework of develop-
ment policy will in the following paragraphs be considered as an indicator of the de-
velopment orientation of the programs.  
In Austria the Ministry of Finance is politically responsible for the soft loan policy, 
defines its strategic pillars and sets the parameters of program implementation. The 
ministry in charge of Austria’s development cooperation – the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs – has no formal competences in the design of the soft loan policy. The imple-
menting entity is the Austrian export credit agency, Österreichische Kontrollbank AG 
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(OeKB), which is acting on an export promotion mandate and on behalf of the Repub-
lic (Ministry of Finance). The imperative for export promotion is further underpinned by 
the legal basis of the soft loan program, the Export Promotion Act and the Export 
Finance Promotion Act. The Federal Development Cooperation Act, on the contrary, is 
not explicitly considered as a legal basis of the program. In light of the principle of 
policy coherence for development, the embedding of the Austrian soft loan policy into 
overall development policy and cooperation appears to be insufficient.  
Contrary to the Austrian case, in Denmark the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida is 
both politically responsible for the mixed credit program and in charge of program 
administration and implementation. The Danish export credit agency, Eksport Kredit 
Fonden (EKF), issues the guarantee in a mixed credit arrangement, but is – unlike in 
the Austrian system – not directly involved in project selection and approval. The 
current administrative structure of the Danish mixed credit scheme has been in place 
since 2012/2013, when the re-organization and integration of the former Secretariat 
for Mixed Credits into the Green Growth Department as well as the alignment of 
procedures with overall Danida guidelines and practices became effective.  
Likewise, in Germany the ministry in charge of development cooperation – the Feder-
al Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) – is responsible for the 
programmatic and strategic aspects of all activities under the Financial Cooperation. 
The KfW Entwicklungsbank (Development Bank), which as a state-owned bank acts 
on behalf of the federal government, is the executing agency of the BMZ and is 
charged with auditing proposals and implementing projects under Financial Coopera-
tion. 
Also, in the Netherlands the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is politically responsible for 
the government funds ORIO, IDF and DGGF. Responsibilities for administration and 
implementation of ORIO have, however, been transferred to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, more precisely the NL Agency. Moreover, in the committee in charge of project 
approval the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only has observer status. The Dutch ECA, 
Atradius, is involved to the extent that the non-grant part – mostly a commercial loan – 
is likely to receive export credit insurance (ECI).  
14.2.4.  Objectives of the Programs 
Conclusion 6: The researched programs all pursue multiple goals located some-
where on the spectrum between development of the recipient country and export 
promotion/business support for the donor county. As a result, the programs can be 
characterized as hybrid instruments influenced by both export promotion and devel-
opment cooperation. Yet, due to the heterogeneity of the elementary characteristics 
of the instruments (i.e. tied/untied) and the different institutional structures in place, 
the weight given to the respective goals varies between countries. 
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While in the Austrian program export promotion goals are evident, the German Finan-
cial Cooperation and the Dutch ORIO fund are de jure untied and put emphasis on 
economic development objectives rather than export promotion. Denmark’s Danida 
Business Finance, which is pooled with other business instruments under the umbrel-
la “Business Cooperation”, can be located somewhere in-between.  
The Austrian soft loan program is probably the closest to the export promotion pole 
of the above described spectrum. This is ingrained in the goal-setting (and the institu-
tional setting) of the program which aims at facilitating market entry of Austrian prod-
ucts and services, thereby strengthening the competitive position of Austrian export-
ers. In addition, soft loan financed projects should foster sustainable development in 
recipient countries. From the perspective of development policy, this hybridity of the 
instrument and its multiple objectives raises questions with regard to the ODA eligibil-
ity of the resulting flows, the injected grant to be precise. This concerns in particular 
the “motivational test” which requires ODA resources to have the “promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective” 
(OECD/DAC 2008).  
Just as the Austrian program, Danida Business Finance pursues the aim of providing 
financing for infrastructure projects. In its beginnings the goals of export promotion 
seemed to dominate the projects funded with a Danish mixed credit. Steadily, howev-
er, the integration of the scheme into Danida’s structures and overall strategies rein-
forced the development orientation and allowed development aspects to gain ground 
throughout the entire project cycle (Danish MfA/Danida 2002: 8; Interview B1). In 
accordance with Denmark’s overall development strategy, Danida Business Finance 
today pursues the aim of providing financing for mainly large-scale infrastructure pro-
jects and thereby contributes to sustainable, green and inclusive growth and employ-
ment creation in the recipient country. Although (mostly) a tied aid program as well, in 
the Danish mixed credit program export promotion goals are less pronounced and are, 
unlike in the Austrian counterpart, not stated among the main objectives. The most 
explicit (and one of the few) references to Danish companies and export interest can 
be traced in the strategic framework for natural resources, energy and climate change, 
in which it is stated that “… DANIDA Business Instruments have proven useful in 
supporting the agenda of meeting increasing demand from developing countries for 
trade and investments and, at the same time, supporting Danish companies’ interest 
in gaining access to new markets” (Danida 2013a: 29). Concomitantly, it is highlight-
ed that Danida Business Finance – just as any other aid instrument – is expected to 
follow the principles of the Paris Declaration.  
In a similar vein, the German Financial Cooperation aims at supporting partner coun-
tries in the financing of large public infrastructure projects. These are based on the 
country development and sector strategies of the recipient country. Thus, the officially 
stated goals suggest that in the German Financial Cooperation development policy 
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objectives are comparatively more pronounced. Furthermore, alignment with Germa-
ny’s development policy including international agreements is sought. In accordance 
with Germany’s overall development policy, the involvement of business actors and 
the focus on innovation, entrepreneurship and private sector development is clearly 
addressed in the German Development Policy. 
The Dutch program ORIO aims at fostering human development and private sector 
development as well as at stimulating the involvement of international businesses in 
order to benefit from private sector expertise. In this endeavor it joins general efforts of 
the Dutch development cooperation and its focus on private sector activities as stipu-
lated in the latest policy document “A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade 
and Investment”. Furthermore, with the establishment of the Dutch Good Growth 
Fund export promotion goals will again become more prominent among the objectives 
of Dutch instruments.  
14.2.5.  Country Eligibility Criteria 
Conclusion 7: Depending on the program objectives and institutional set-up, the four 
analyzed donor countries pursue different geographical/country strategies with their 
concessional financing programs. With the exception of the Austrian soft loan pro-
gram, potential beneficiaries of the programs correspond with the respective partner/ 
program countries of the official development cooperation. 
While in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands eligible recipients are aligned with 
partner countries of the overall development cooperation, very limited overlaps with 
ADA program countries can be observed in the Austrian case. Depending on the tying 
status of the programs, furthermore, country restrictions according to the Arrange-
ment’s GNI thresholds are applied. Those programs which are not subject to the 
Arrangement (ORIO in the Netherlands and Germany’s Financial Cooperation) adapt 
the financing terms in accordance with GNI thresholds or indebtedness of recipient 
countries. The ORIO contribution for the implementation phase, for instance, ranges 
from 35 to 80 % of the project volume (in the Implementation and Maintenance 
Phase).  
While the Helsinki architecture provides the framework for the Austrian soft loan 
program, a narrow focus on a specific group of countries – richer lower middle in-
come countries with presumably promising markets for Austrian companies – can be 
detected. Looking at the actual flows of subsidies to recipient countries reveals that 
the soft loan program has focused on few countries in the last decade, most notably 
China. Notably, hardly any overlaps with activities of the Austrian aid agency in pro-
gram countries of development cooperation have occurred. This tendency is rein-
forced by the fact that due to the increased budgetary efforts required to meet the 
50 % concessionality threshold, currently Austrian soft loans are not available for 
Least Developed Countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanza-
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nia, Uganda and Zambia). Nevertheless, the project preparation program is still availa-
ble for those countries, which might be interpreted as a commitment towards continu-
ing the soft loan program in these countries in the foreseeable future. 
Similarly to the Austrian soft loan program, Denmark’s Danida Business Finance 
builds on the provisions for country eligibility defined in the Helsinki Package. Unlike in 
the Austrian case, however, Danish mixed credits have increasingly been incorporated 
into regular Danida activities. Since 2012/2013 only Danida’s priority countries are 
eligible for Danida Business Finance projects. Prior to this harmonization, all develop-
ing countries fulfilling the Helsinki criteria could apply for and receive Danish (tied) 
mixed credit financing. The untied window of Danish mixed credits was open to 
Danida program countries as well as South Africa. Concerning the empirical distribu-
tion among recipient countries, in the period 2000-2012, commitments for tied mixed 
credits for more than 20 countries have been reported by Danida to the DAC’s Credi-
tor Reporting System. Among these, Mozambique, Sri Lanka China and Tanzania can 
be identified as the four main beneficiaries of tied Danish mixed credits.  
While the relevant programs in both Germany and the Netherlands are just as 
Danida Business Finance concentrated on partner and program countries of the offi-
cial development cooperation, both the German Financial Cooperation and the Dutch 
ORIO facility are not subject to the GNI thresholds for country eligibility that are de-
fined in the Arrangement. In Germany potential projects for financial cooperation are 
discussed as part of the regular negotiations with partner countries on intergovern-
mental agreements. They are, thus, from the very beginning integrated in Germany’s 
overall approach towards and interventions in a partner country. In addition, the eco-
nomic situation of the respective partner country and its debt burden are main criteria 
for financing projects and programs. Thus, the KfW Development Bank aims at tailor-
ing its financing to the specific circumstances in partner countries392.  Equally in the 
Dutch case, the list of eligible countries including the ORIO-grant percentage, which 
is set and reviewed twice a year by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is based on the list 
of partner countries of the Dutch development cooperation. Currently, the govern-
ments of about 50 countries can apply for ORIO grants.  
14.2.6.  Sector and Project Eligibility Criteria  
Conclusion 8: In the majority of the programs examined (Austria, Denmark, the 
Netherlands) the commercial non-viability of projects is considered as a key criterion 
for eligibility. Exclusively the German Financial Cooperation does not explicitly list 
this criterion as a requirement, which is derived from the tied aid disciplines of the 
Helsinki Package. All of the programs assessed consider investments in large-scale 
                                                            
392 see https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/About-
us/Unsere-F%C3%B6rderinstrumente/ 
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infrastructure projects as an indispensable contribution to development. It is their 
public good character that forms the basis for the presumed development contribu-
tion of soft loan financed projects.  
As in the case of country eligibility, the Austrian soft loan program is guided by the 
Helsinki criteria for project eligibility (most importantly the financial and commercial 
non-viability). In addition, project eligibility is determined by the criteria market entry, 
relevance of the project for economic policy in the donor country (including technolog-
ical spill-over effects), and the contribution of the project to sustainable development 
in the recipient country. 
Due to their tied nature, Danish mixed credits are just as their Austrian equivalents 
bound by the commercial non-viability criterion. In Denmark, de minimis projects, 
however, are exempted from these disciplines and are allowed to generate positive 
cash-flows. Whether this interpretation of the de minimis rules is truly in the spirit of 
the Arrangement remains open for debate. Analysis in Chapter 5 of the discussion 
within the Participants Group on de minimis projects that form part of an associated 
financing package came to the conclusion that small projects should adhere to the 
same rules in terms of country and project eligibility and were merely exempted from 
the attached administrative burden. 
Despite its grant form, the Dutch ORIO program also follows the commercial non-
viability criterion of the Arrangement and basis the assessment thereof on the Ex-ante 
Guidance for Tied Aid. This can most likely be interpreted as a relic of ORIO’s roots in 
the Dutch mixed credit program of the 1980ies. In order to be eligible for an ORIO 
grant, the project costs must be at least EUR 2 million and must not exceed EUR 60 
million. In addition, in order for projects to be eligible, delivering companies have to 
declare acceptance of and compliance with both the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises and the ILO conventions. 
Although the commercial non-viability of a project is not an eligibility criterion of Ger-
man Financial Cooperation funds, the provided resources are, just as in the three 
other programs, mainly used to finance physical and social infrastructure projects, 
which tend to be characterized by market failures.  
Conclusion 9: The aspired alignment with sectoral strategies in the recipient country 
as well as with country strategies is formally stated in (the approval guidelines for) all 
programs. The latter is of particular relevance in the German Financial Cooperation. 
Apart from that, at the program level sectoral preferences are only spelled out in the 
Danish and the German programs.  
In the Austrian case no systematic mechanisms are in place, which ensure the align-
ment of soft loan projects with the country strategies of Austrian development coop-
eration or the coordination with sectoral efforts of other donors. Consequently, some 
projects may fall within the strategic sectors while others are entirely detached from 
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sectoral efforts of development cooperation. Even if overlaps exist, synergies appear 
to be used to an insufficient extent. An analysis of statistical data in the period be-
tween 2001 and 2011 illustrates that most soft loan financed projects were allocated 
in the sectors health, followed by transport and storage, education, water supply and 
sanitation, and government and civil society. Based on the assumption that the num-
ber of qualified Austrian companies in these individual sectors is small, the observed 
concentration suggests that a limited number of companies that are able to provide 
infrastructure for the health sector has benefited most from the soft loan program, with 
the health sector not being a priority sector of Austrian development cooperation. 
In order to be eligible for support under Danida Business Finance, as of 2012/2013 
prospective projects are in addition to the project eligibility provisions of the Arrange-
ment expected to be in accordance with Danida’s green growth agenda. Clear-cut 
criteria for deciding whether or not a project falls within this agenda are however 
missing. According to an analysis of DAC data (Creditor Reporting System) for the 
period 2000-2012, the three largest sectors receiving mixed credit commitments 
were transport and storage, water supply and sanitation and energy, followed by 
projects in communications as well as in industry. It remains to be seen if the recent 
focus put on climate friendly and clean technology will have substantial effects on the 
sectoral distribution of mixed credit commitments by Danida.  
Just as in Austria, the Dutch ORIO program does not apriori define sector re-
strictions. However, the importance of alignment with sectoral strategies of the part-
ner countries as well as with other activities of Dutch development cooperation is 
stressed. According to information on project approvals in the period 2009-2012, the 
three main sectors were water, social services (mainly health care) and transport.  
The German Financial Cooperation follows the overall sectoral focus of German 
development cooperation which is stated in the Coalition Agreement defining the 
overall German development policy. Accordingly, prospective projects have to fall into 
the sectors of good governance, education and training, health, rural development, 
protection of the climate, the environment and natural resources or economic cooper-
ation. Furthermore, prospective projects are expected to be in line with the three 
priority sectors that are defined individually for and in discussions with each partner 
country in Germany’s country strategies. Empirically, the analysis of data provided by 
KfW showed that economic infrastructure (banking and financial services; energy 
generation and supply; transport and storage) as well as social infrastructure (e.g. 
water and sanitation; education; health) were the two main areas of intervention be-
tween 2007 and 2012.  
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14.2.7.  Ex-ante Assessment of Expected Development Impact 
Conclusion 10: Implementing agencies across the case study countries do not fol-
low a standardized methodology for project appraisal and ex-ante assessment of the 
developmental impact of potential projects. Depending on the institutional embed-
ding of the programs, the selection criteria used and the weight attributed to devel-
opment components and expected impacts differ widely. Furthermore, unlike in DFIs 
such as the Dutch FMO or the German DEG, systematic quantitative assessment 
tools are not common practice in the field of soft loan financing.  
In the majority of the programs examined (except for the German Financial Coopera-
tion), the ex-ante assessment builds on the criteria and components recommended in 
the Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid of the Arrangement. Elements such as economic, 
technical and financial aspects are covered and basic social and environmental anal-
yses are included. However, the rigor with which these assessments are conducted 
varies substantially. In the Austrian case, for instance, the core tool for ex-ante as-
sessing the developmental impact is a questionnaire which is to be answered by the 
exporter. Thus, the appraisal of the expected (developmental) impacts relies solely on 
the assessment provided by the exporting company. While the respective chapter of 
the questionnaire dedicated to the expected development impact was designed by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and contains questions concerning the character of the 
project, the exporting company and tries to capture whether the project is part of a 
development strategy, the information gained by means of this questionnaire remains 
limited. Remarkably, neither an appraisal by external consultants nor the systematic 
consultation of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Austrian Development 
Agency in the recipient country are formally part of the approval procedure. The pro-
ject and environmental analysis department of OeKB is in charge of assessing pro-
jects on the basis of the information provided in the questionnaire. The department 
decides whether the answers are comprehensive. Subsequently, a SWOT-analysis is 
performed by OeKB. Standardized instruments for the evaluation of applications, such 
as weighted rating instruments, however, are not applied.  
Unlike in the Austrian program, Danida does not rely on information provided by the 
exporter when ex-ante assessing the development impact of a prospective project. 
The incorporation of Danida Business Finance into regular Danida procedures also 
affected the project selection and approval process. In order for mixed credit projects 
to live up to overall Danida activities and policy standards, the project appraisals in-
clude mandatory on-site visits by external consultants. These project appraisals, which 
can be considered the core quality check of the project proposal, include an assess-
ment of the expected development impact. Taken together, development and aid 
quality related aspects are to be addressed explicitly in several chapters of the ap-
praisal report (Working Rights, Economic Analysis, Justification for Danida Support, 
Monitoring Indicators) and are implicit to the chapters on environmental assessment 
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and risks/assumptions. Thus, development criteria are visibly incorporated in the ap-
praisals. The appraisal templates tend to be repetitive with regard to certain aspects – 
employment generation and working rights are, for instance, mentioned in multiple 
sections of the reports and therefore inflate the weight attributed to development 
impact assessment. Similarly to Austrian procedures, the Grant Committee bases its 
decision-making on a qualitative assessment of the results presented in the appraisal 
report and takes into account (eventual) comments received in the public consultation. 
It appears that the Committee does not use any additional quantitative assessment 
tools for its appraisal. 
Within the German Financial Cooperation, on the basis of inter-governmental 
agreements and brief statements of opinions, KfW audits each prospective project. 
Usually, these audits are based on field missions. In the resulting reports, which are 
similar to appraisal practices by the World Bank, proposed projects are discussed 
along the log frame matrix and focus on indicators such as macroeconomic, socio-
economic and socio-cultural impacts (e.g. possibility of conflict between different 
(ethnical) groups), gender aspects and environmental and social compatibility; eco-
nomic aspects, operational and commercial risks and the target group’s attitude to-
wards the project. Unfortunately, the comprehensive handbook for the appraisal of 
projects is held confidential. According to an interviewed expert the criteria for as-
sessing the developmental orientation of projects were limited.  
In the case of the Dutch grant facility ORIO, the application procedure is organized 
in several stages. In a first step, an intake form has to be submitted, in which the antic-
ipated effects of the project on human development and private sector development 
need to be portrayed. In order to obtain an ORIO grant for the project development 
phase, projects are, moreover, assessed on the basis of five OECD/DAC criteria: 
relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency and sustainability. If an application is found 
to meet all the formal requirements including the OECD/DAC criteria, the project is 
awarded a grant for the development phase of the project as long as enough budget 
is available (‘first come, first serve’). During this “Development Phase” necessary 
studies for implementing the project shall be conducted. Jointly NL Agency, the appli-
cant, the competent authority and any private parties involved work out the details 
including a round table meeting in order to discuss specific matters that have 
emerged from the assessment, providing further information about the process and 
content, with the project plan being the end result of this process. As part of these 
round table meetings the potential developmental impact, social and environmental 
effects are discussed and possible risks are investigated. In doing so, ORIO draws on 
a set of established guidelines for project assessment, most notably the IFC Perfor-
mance Standards. Apart from a feasibility study, technical studies, a procurement 
plan, economic and financial studies result in a project plan, which must contain all 
necessary information for the decision on implementing the corresponding project.  
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14.2.8.  Project Approval 
Conclusion 11: Just as the application process, project approval procedures show 
substantial heterogeneity. Responsibilities for and procedures of project approval 
depend on the overall institutional setting in place in the respective case study coun-
try. Yet, one common feature can be observed: In all of the researched programs (de 
facto) approval is given by a committee. The composition of the latter, however, is 
country-specific.  
While in some countries (Austria and the Netherlands), specialized bodies are in 
charge of project screening and approval, regular procedures, which are applied to 
overall development cooperation projects/programs, are followed in others (Denmark, 
Germany). Accordingly, the composition of decision-making bodies (de facto project 
approval bodies) varies and can be categorized along the dimensions “expert-driven” 
vs. “political representation”. Strikingly, overall transparency and public availability of 
(project) information appear to be inversely proportional to the degree of stakeholder 
involvement in the actual project approval process. It seems that in Denmark and 
Germany, where funding decisions are largely made internally, increased transparency 
of the programs is strived for by making extensive information available to the wider 
public. On the contrary, in Austria various political stakeholders are involved in the 
project approval process. It appears, however, that the responsible committee and its 
members enjoy a high degree of autonomy and follow limited transparency provisions. 
This assumption can be illustrated by comparing the Austrian and the Dutch systems 
to the Danish and German approaches and will be further inquired in the dimension 
“transparency and accountability”.  
In Austria, soft loan financing is approved by a specialized body, the so-called Export 
Financing Committee (EFK). Its voting members, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Chamber of Labor traditionally decide by consensus. The Austrian Development 
Agency has observer status. This shall ensure the transfer of information to those in 
charge of the operational development cooperation. The inclusion of political interest 
groups reflects the selective representation of organized interests. Representatives of 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or academia, who could provide relevant 
expertise, are not integrated in the EFK. Furthermore, EFK members are appointed by 
their respective institutions and are not necessarily selected on grounds of their spe-
cific expertise. Currently, the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the 
only explicit development expert in the committee. This means that the opportunity for 
systematically exploiting the development cooperation expertise both on a project and 
program level is largely foregone. Yet, this committee not only decides on the (often 
very technical) criteria of eligibility of a project but also assesses its developmental 
orientation. Considering the composition of the committee there is reason to assume 
that the distribution of interests in the EFK does not favor developmental objectives. 
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This unbalanced distribution of interests among EFK members helps to explain why 
developmental aspects are not of a higher priority to the committee. The selective 
representation of interests and absence of professional development expertise in the 
EFK (with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as well as the centralized 
competence in the Ministry of Finance supports the conclusion that the development 
orientation of the program is limited and that policy coherence for development as 
stipulated by the Federal Development Cooperation Act is weakly implemented in 
practice.  
Similarly to the Austrian case, in the Netherlands a specialized committee, the so-
called advisory Committee ACORIO, is de facto in charge of project approval. The 
composition of the committee as well as its working methods and procedures are set 
by the Minister in charge of trade and development cooperation. This advisory board 
includes five external experts; among them are specialists in the field of banking, de-
velopment research, contract law and engineering consultancy services. In this com-
mittee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is politically responsible for the ORIO 
program, only has observer status. This peculiar composition of the committee is likely 
to be due to specific political circumstances at the time of its formation.  
In contrast, in Denmark procedures for mixed credit financing have steadily been 
aligned with Danida’s general procedures. Since 2013, depending on the volume of 
the project grant Danida’s Internal and External Grant Committee respectively is en-
trusted with the approval of projects. Formally final approval is given by the Minister 
for Development Co-operation. Up to 2011 a specialized committee comparable to 
the Austrian EFK – the Committee for Mixed Credits – and in an interim-period (2012) 
the Board on International Development Cooperation were in charge of project ap-
proval. Unlike these former approval committees, the now responsible Danida Grant 
Committees can be described as inward-bound, expert-driven committees, in which 
the wide spectrum of traditional political stakeholders is no longer represented. The 
External Grant Committee is chaired by the State Secretary for Development Policy or 
the Under-Secretary for Global Development and Cooperation (in case of absence of 
the former). In addition, two staff members at the level of Under-Secretary are part of 
the committee. While in the Internal Grant Committee only Danida staff is represent-
ed, the External Grant Committee also includes four external and independent mem-
bers – mainly from academia – who are appointed by the Minister for Development 
Cooperation (as of February 2014 the Minister for Trade and Development Coopera-
tion) for a period of three years (Danish MfA/Danida 2013c: 8).  
In Germany, the country desks (Länderreferate) of the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) assess if developmental components are suffi-
ciently build into the project proposals and comprehensively covered by the appraisal. 
Eventually, the competent country desk gives final approval over the granted funding. 
Decision-making on project approval is, thus, essentially at the discretion of public 
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officials in the ministry. Unlike in Austria and the Netherlands, the inclusion of external 
stakeholders (i.e. important political interest groups) in the decision-making process is 
not provided for in the German system.  
14.2.9.  Stakeholder Involvement 
Conclusion 12: Forms of stakeholder involvement in the donor countries differ. In 
some countries a variety of stakeholders is represented in the project approval com-
mittees or advisory bodies, in others public consultations for specific projects are 
standard practice or even mandatory. On the project level institutionalized forms of 
stakeholder consultation are not included in all of the examined programs. Consulta-
tions with stakeholders in the narrow sense of the term, i.e. those directly affected by 
an anticipated intervention, are not formalized in the programs analyzed. 
While the involvement of political stakeholders is provided for in the decision-making 
process of EFK, the Austrian soft loan program does not include stakeholder con-
sultations with the wider public or civil society organizations. Whether civil society in 
the recipient country and/or those directly affected are consulted is entirely at the 
discretion of the recipient country. Similarly, the Dutch ORIO program does not 
provide for stakeholder consultations with the public or civil society at the level of 
individual projects. ACORIO, the project approval committee, constitutes – unlike its 
Austrian equivalent – rather a body of experts than a forum for selective representation 
of stakeholders.  
In Denmark the forms of involvement of stakeholders from the wider public have 
changed over the past years. On the level of project selection and approval, the incor-
poration of stakeholders has decreased since the new administrative structure has 
been put in place. While the integration of Danida Business Finance into the regular 
Danida procedures is presented as a step towards the de-fragmentation of the aid 
system, the reduced involvement of external stakeholders that came along with this 
integration appears to contradict the former393 Minister’s attempt to strengthen the 
corporatist culture through transparency and new public consultation mechanisms. 
On a project level, one particular institutionalized consultation mechanism, however, 
remains in place for project grants above DKK 35 million. The mandatory public con-
sultation process for large projects allows external stakeholders to express their views 
and concerns by commenting on the concept notes which Danida uploads to its 
transparency webpage 16 working days prior to the Grant Committee meeting. The 
comments received are subsequently discussed by the Danida Programme Commit-
                                                            
393  In November 2013, Minister Friis Bach (Social Liberal Party) resigned from his post and was replaced by 
Rasmus Helveg Petersen (Social Liberal Party). In early February 2014 a cabinet reshuffle brought about 
changes on the Ministerial-level. Notably, a new cabinet-level post of a Minister for Trade and Develop-
ment Cooperation was established and substituted the post of the Minister for Development Cooperation. 
Simultaneously, Mogens Jensen entered into office.  
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tee which is responsible for the preliminary screening of (large) projects. The summary 
and conclusions of the meeting, which are also to be found on Danida’s transparency 
webpage, shall reflect anticipated modifications in further project planning and design 
that were made on the basis of comments received in consultations. 
In Germany, projects under Financial Cooperation are devised jointly by the German 
government and the government of the partner country. Before these negotiations 
start or final approvals are given, the BMZ regularly invites civil society actors to 
stakeholder consultations, in which programs in individual partner countries are the 
subject of debate.  
14.2.10.  Role of Recipient Countries 
Conclusion 13: Ownership and commitment from the partner country are officially 
considered a crucial prerequisite for successful projects. Examining the intergovern-
mental frameworks for soft loan financing as well as the application and tender pro-
cedures gives reason to assume that the role attributed to recipient countries varies, 
but is in general of limited scope.  
At the High Level Meeting in Paris in 2005, DAC members declared that partner 
countries should “… exercise effective leadership over their development policies, 
and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD 2005-2008: 3). Ac-
cordingly, with the exemption of the Austrian program, which is more detached from 
the development policy discourse, the buzzword “ownership” ranges high on the 
rhetoric agenda of the respective programs in Denmark, Germany and the Nether-
lands. 
With reference to the Paris Declaration, official program descriptions of Danida high-
light, for instance, that Danida business instruments – including Danida Business 
Finance – are expected to follow the principles of the Paris Declaration, i.e. inter alia 
of ownership. In accordance with the principle of ownership, project ideas are ex-
pected to originate in the recipient country. Consequently, the latter is also in charge 
of submitting the application for a Danish mixed credit. Notably, at the time of applica-
tion a feasibility study should have already been conducted by the project stakehold-
ers in the partner country. The idea that these provisions contribute to stronger com-
mitment from the recipient country and strengthen the ownership of the latter is in 
Germany, furthermore, reflected in the required injection of domestic resources (from 
the partner country). This mechanism is also apparent in the case of the Dutch ORIO 
fund. The recipient country’s government or competent authority is the project owner 
and obliged to finance the non-grant part. Recipients regularly need assistance in 
financing this part of a project. Contrasting the ownership narrative presented by the 
donor, in general, (Dutch) companies are observed to be important drivers in the 
identification of new projects. Despite the self-proclaimed focus on projects, which 
originate in the recipient county and are ought to be demand-driven, exporting com-
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panies assume a decisive role also in the Austrian and Danish program equivalents. In 
both cases the exporting companies (as well as consultants) are described as im-
portant actors in identifying and initiating projects. The Austrian system, in which the 
exporting company – not the recipient country – submits the application for soft loan 
financing appears in particular conducive to supplier-driven dynamics.  
The role of recipient countries can also be traced in the process of contract award. In 
all of the programs examined, the organization of the tender procedures (if applied) 
falls within the competences of the recipient country. This split and transfer of compe-
tences is described as an indicator and evidence of lived ownership of the recipient 
countries. Nonetheless, the competent authorities of Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Germany are involved in several ways. This “control function” is ensured inter alia by 
providing consultancy from the preparation of the tender documents onwards to the 
monitoring and supervision of the tender procedure. In particular, the responsible 
authorities in these three donor countries have to give no-objection to the tender 
procedures. The Austrian soft loan policy emphasizes that the procurement for soft 
loan financed goods and services has to be in line with the regulation of the recipient 
country. This, in principle, creates space for ownership. Whether the recipient gets 
value for money depends, however, largely on his/her bargaining power and access to 
expertise to review the offer. Similarly, in the German Financial Cooperation program 
administrators argue that the involvement of the KfW Development Bank depends to a 
large extent on the capabilities of the recipient country. Irrespective thereof, the bank 
is very closely involved in the implementation of projects and programs financed with 
FC funds and more importantly, the bank has final decision-making powers.  
The role of recipient countries in defining the terms of soft loan policies can be ana-
lyzed in the different forms of agreements that are in place between donor/exporting 
country and recipient government. Bilateral agreements specifically dedicated to soft 
loan financing are only concluded in some of the examined programs. Presumably due 
to the low level of integration into overall development policy, in Austria the conclusion 
of bilateral agreements for soft loan financing between the Austrian Ministry of Fi-
nance and the recipient country are standard practice, albeit not obligatory. Such 
specific agreements are not concluded in the German case. In the latter soft loan 
projects form part of the overall bilateral agreements concluded with partner countries 
of German bilateral cooperation. Also in the Netherlands the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements for ORIO grants is not standard practice. In Denmark specific agree-
ments are only signed if explicitly requested by the recipient government.  
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14.2.11.  Monitoring and Evaluation 
Conclusion 14: While some basic forms of project monitoring and (ex-post) evalua-
tion mechanisms are standard practice in all of the programs analyzed, the degree of 
sophistication of these varies. Likewise, the underlying monitoring and impact indica-
tors (to the extent publicly accessible) show different levels of detail.  
The Austrian soft loan program obliges the exporting company to meet basic moni-
toring standards. As part of the application, exporters are obliged to propose a moni-
toring concept with the help of which the sustainability of a project shall be measured 
throughout implementation. The specific definition of the sustainability of a project 
depends on the sector and project characteristics. Monitoring relies on data which is 
collected during the implementation of the projects, such as delivery of components, 
trainings held, as well as by the operation of the facility, e.g. degree of utilization. The 
reports are written by the exporter and submitted to OeKB, but are not made publicly 
available by the latter. In addition, the Austrian soft loan program does not provide for 
systematic ex-post evaluation of the developmental impact of projects. On a case by 
case basis projects are visited jointly with the exporter, mainly within the scope of 
business missions.  
Also in Denmark, Danida Business Finance projects are, just as any other Danida 
activities, monitored throughout implementation. Unlike in the Austrian soft loan pro-
gram, however, reporting is not the duty of the delivering company. In order to ensure 
reliability of the reported progress, Danida entrusts an external consultant with moni-
toring tasks, which last from the tender process onwards to the start of operation of 
the implemented project. Furthermore, when the project is handed over, he/she is 
assigned to verify whether the installation meets agreed quality standards (Interview 
B1, B2, B7). After expiration of the guarantee period the monitoring consultant visits 
the project site once again in order to examine if there have been any unresolved 
issues and if so, if they have been solved at this point (Interview B1). Also, in the case 
of Danida Business Finance evaluation guidelines are more comprehensive than in the 
Austrian counterpart. Additionally to project monitoring by an external consultant, the 
buyer is required to report to Danida on key output indicators on an annual basis for 
five consecutive years starting one year after final taking over of the project (Danish 
MfA/Secretariat for Mixed Credits n.s.). The outcome indicators for this ex-post evalu-
ation are individually set in the project document and are as such presented for ap-
proval to Danida’s Grant Committees (Interview B1).  
The KfW Development Bank monitors the progress of the measures financed under 
the Financial Cooperation until the installment starts to operate. The monitoring in-
cludes reviewing the progress of outstanding action and considers: the latest devel-
opment in the given sector; the impacts of the implemented actions, compliance with 
planning and financing, potential difficulties which have occurred during the imple-
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mentation phase, potential modifications of framework conditions and/or recommen-
dations. Furthermore, two to five years after the completion of implementation/ 
commissioning, the KfW Development Bank conducts evaluations of these measures 
and activities. These ex-post evaluations consider the whole project cycle, the envi-
ronment, the partner and involved agencies as well as the group of beneficiaries. It 
needs to be noted, however, that in 2007 the Evaluation Department moved away 
from assessing each and every project. Today, only a representative sample of individ-
ual projects is submitted for ex-post evaluation.  
Also the Dutch ORIO program spells out monitoring requirements and duties of the 
applicant to NL Agency. The corresponding list of indicators is submitted by the ap-
plicant and drafted with the support of an ORIO project consultant. Usually, the moni-
toring and evaluation plan considers indicators according to the project result chain 
including data about output (realized infrastructure), outcome (access and use of the 
infrastructure), impact (optional) and sustainability (financial, social and environmental 
and maintenance) (NL Agency/MfA 2013d). This monitoring information has to be 
provided by the applicant at least once a year during the Implementation and the 
Operations & Maintenance Phase. The latter are thought to complement progress 
reports which have to be submitted at least every six months. Frequently, monitoring 
and evaluation is outsourced to an independent engineer or consultant who is as-
signed to report to the competent authority in the recipient country and NL Agency. 
As is the case with the evaluation practices under German Financial Cooperation, ex-
post evaluation on the project-level is only conducted for a selective sample of ORIO-
funded projects. 
14.2.12.  Transparency and Accountability  
Conclusion 15: Accountability of the four programs towards both the parliament and 
the wider public is ensured to different degrees in the case study countries. Although 
accountability provisions towards the parliament exist in all case study countries, 
generally parliamentary involvement with soft loan programs, let alone individual 
projects, appears rather low across the case study countries.  
The Austrian export guarantee committee (AusfFG Beirat) is obliged to submit an 
annual report to the Austrian parliament. As soft loans are conditional upon an export 
guarantee, the former are in principle also part of the activities of the committee. Soft 
loans as a specific topic are, however, hardly ever covered by the committee’s report-
ing to the parliament. In addition, the parliament has the possibility to ask questions 
and to request information. It makes use of its right, but is in general more concerned 
with commercial export credits and less so with soft loan financed projects. An inquiry 
into the Austrian parliament’s archive394 shows that the soft loan program has not been 
                                                            
394 Austrian parliament: http://www.parlament.gv.at 
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discussed by the parliament and that only little information on the program was re-
quested by the parliament.  
In Denmark, development policy as a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is under 
the responsibility of the government. The parliament, however, has several control 
functions and a specialized standing committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, dis-
cusses development policy related topics and might also frame soft loan policies. In 
order to comply with its reporting duties to the parliament, Danida produces a yearly 
report – Danida’s Annual Report – which inter alia provides information on activities 
under the mixed credit program. The structure and format of the annual reports have 
been changed with the 2011 report. Today, this report is published as an interlinked 
Danida webpage and no longer contains chapters on individual programs. 
Likewise, the German BMZ has reporting duties to the parliament. In addition, the 
Federal Court of Auditors regularly audits the financial management of the Federal 
government, its ministries and executing agencies. Thus, the BMZ and the KfW De-
velopment Bank are regularly monitored. The Bank is also continuously supervised by 
the private auditing company PricewaterHouseCoopers (PWC).  
In the Netherlands, the implementing agency – NL Agency – is obliged to report to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the progress of ongoing ORIO projects. The 
Ministry, in turn, has reporting duties towards the Dutch parliament. Within the House 
of Representatives, the Committee for Foreign Affairs deals with development coop-
eration and thus, scrutinizes the government’s development policy in general, budget 
allocations and inquires into the specific design of funds/facilities – ORIO included. 
Conclusion 16: The availability of project-specific information to the general public 
varies substantially across the programs analyzed. Transparency appears insufficient 
in most cases.  
A comparison of the Austrian and the Danish soft loan systems reveals the strongest 
deviations in the degree of transparency and public availability of information. For 
instance, whereas in Austria information on individual projects is not publicly available, 
Danida’s transparency webpage provides key information on any project financed 
under Danida Business Finance. 
Examining the work of EFK with regard to accountability shows that the Austrian soft 
loan program lacks transparency. The responsible authorities neither ex-ante nor ex-
post publish information on the project approval process and the Austrian parliament 
does in general not request additional information. This suggests that the EFK and its 
members enjoy a high degree of autonomy and can hardly be held accountable for 
their decision-making by the national parliament or by the wider public. The social 
partners are included in the project approval process, but are obliged to respect 
confidentiality of project-specific content, which considerably limits their agency to 
use information. In short, the OeKB only publishes relevant information on the current 
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terms and conditions for soft loan financing and primarily focuses on their customers. 
Systematic information on individual projects is not publicly available. This severely 
limits possibilities to comment on individual projects or to challenge funding decisions 
made by the EFK. 
Likewise, the Dutch key implementing agency – NL Agency – is rather reluctant when 
it comes to publishing information on specific projects. As in Austria, information on 
decision-making is not accessible to the public, neither in ex-ante nor ex-post formats. 
As a reaction, the Dutch civil society voiced criticism with regard to the insufficient 
level of transparency and criticized in particular the lack of transparency of the export 
credit insurance scheme (ECI). This is perceived to be even more problematic con-
sidering that ORIO grants are often combined with commercial credits, for which 
official export credit insurance is available.  
In Denmark, on the contrary, notable efforts have been made to increase the trans-
parency of the mixed credit program. For instance, all projects can be found in 
Danida’s online program and project database. The database allows to track all bilat-
eral and multilateral activities – including Danida Business Finance projects – which 
have been approved, are ongoing or were completed in a given year. Therein, all 
Danida activities are divided by country and sector. Moreoever, the database provides 
the description of the project and its administration, information on volume and risk 
elements, and should also list monitoring and impact indicators. Notably, in the case 
of Danida Business Finance projects, these indicators are mostly missing. In a more 
compact format, the “Project Pipeline” for Danida Business Finance contains infor-
mation on the volume and main objectives of a Danida Business Finance project. 
Furthermore, both agendas (ex-ante) and minutes (ex-post) of Grant Committee meet-
ings – the decision-making body on the project level – are available on Danida’s 
transparency webpage. The agenda documents uploaded prior to the meeting contain 
project documents in the case of Danida Business Finance and program strategies 
respectively. The minutes comprise the list of participants and short notes to all items 
discussed and provide information on the approval status of the latter (Danida 
2013c). In addition, external stakeholders are invited to participate in public consulta-
tions (for large projects) as part of the screening and approval process.  
As a reaction to repeated criticism voiced by German civil society actors, the KfW 
Development Bank is currently working on its transparency and accountability activi-
ties and attempts to align the latter with the standards set by the BMZ. For that pur-
pose the bank launched a web portal in 2013 in order to present its engagements in 
partner countries, indicating the sources of funds it used, and how it used them. Ac-
cording to the website, the publication of evaluation reports is anticipated. Similarly to 
Danida’s program and project database, KfW also intends to disclose facts and fig-
ures starting from 2007, broken down by country and sector until the end of 2013. 
Furthermore, the portal will be supplemented with a project database containing de-
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tailed information on all projects agreed by contracts signed since January 2013. The 
webportal started to operate in January 2014. Detailed information on financing condi-
tions, such as the level of concessionality or the source of market funds, is however 
not made publicly available. 
Conclusion 17: The NGO community in the four case study countries appears wide-
ly passive and not particularly involved in soft loan financing as well as related moni-
toring and advocacy work. Seemingly, their efforts are rather focused on the “tradi-
tional” export credit and business promotion activities.  
For example, in Germany the role of the civil society is more strongly focused on the 
export credit transactions. In this regard, the KfW IPEX-Bank, one of the KfW Banking 
Group’s subsidiaries is regularly criticized for its activities. In Denmark, despite the 
comparatively high level of transparency and accessibility of information, also the 
mixed credit program as such just as individual projects financed under it remain 
largely outside the realm of public debate. A similar silence about the program per se 
or individual projects can also be observed in the Austrian case.  
On the contrary, the anticipated changes in the Dutch system of development finance 
and in particular the reintroduction of tying in the new Dutch Good Growth Fund, 
have provoked multiple reactions from NGOs in the development policy field.  
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15. General Conclusions and Outlook 
15.1.  Conclusions – Between Institutional Heterogeneity,  
Hybridity and Development 
The comparison of the Austrian soft loan program, Denmark’s Danida Business Fi-
nance, the German Financial Cooperation and the Dutch ORIO facility with regard to 
the respective institutional set-up, strategic orientation and implementation patterns 
revealed a marked heterogeneity in the soft loan landscape. Albeit reunited in the 
quest for financing large infrastructure projects, the programs show considerable 
differences in almost all of the dimensions analyzed. Subsequently, the extent to which 
development safeguards are built into the policies and programs varies. This suggests 
that development policy aspects are anchored in the programs (and the resulting 
projects) to different degrees.  
From the comparative analysis conducted above three general conclusions on the 
characteristics of the field of soft loan financing can be derived:  
(1)  the pronounced institutional heterogeneity surrounding the various instruments,  
(2)  the hybrid nature of the programs, and  
(3)  the rather conventional understanding of development in which they are ground-
ed.  
(1) Institutional Heterogeneity of National Implementations  
The intended impact of soft loan financed projects is homogeneous and consists of 
the provision of public infrastructure. Despite this shared feature, the field of soft loan 
financing is characterized by marked institutional heterogeneity. The heterogeneity of 
both the institutional structures as well as the specific design of the instruments ap-
pears to be one of the central traits of the sphere of soft loan financing. Accordingly, it 
has to be concluded that the harmonization of donor policies (and requirements and 
procedures) as stipulated in the Paris Declaration has remained limited, both in the 
design and in the implementation of soft loan policies. 
Heterogeneity can firstly be traced in the financing modalities. These differ and en-
compass both tied and untied premixed credits, mixed credits, as well as grants in de 
facto association with loans. The most peculiar case in this comparison appears to be 
the Dutch program, which de jure only provides untied grants. These, however, are de 
facto associated with commercial loan financing (for which typically a guarantee by 
422 
the Dutch ECA is available). Described as a “programmatic shift” from loan-based 
forms of development finance to grant financing, this specific arrangement is likely to 
be the expression of political dynamics in the Netherlands in the late 1980ies/early 
1990ies, which have apparently been motivated by the deep debt crises, many Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) had experienced during that period.  
Supposedly, the specific design of the national instruments is linked to the second 
salient feature: the heterogeneity in the distribution of responsibilities within the do-
nor/exporting country. The analysis above has demonstrated that in the programs 
examined, a variety of actors from both the development policy field and the trade and 
export promotion domain assume a role in soft loan policies. Yet, the distribution of 
responsibilities and competences among them varies substantially. Remarkably, in all 
case study countries but Austria the political responsibility for the strategic orientation 
of the programs falls within the competence of the ministry in charge of development 
cooperation. Whereas in Denmark not only the political responsibilities, but also the 
responsibility for program administration and implementation is concentrated in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida (Green Growth Department), the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) delegates program im-
plementation to the KfW development bank. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
entrusts NL Agency with the implementation of the ORIO fund, the former being a 
division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It appears likely that this heterogeneity on 
the level of institutions is due to specific power balances among relevant actors as 
well as a function of the “individual” program objectives. 
Furthermore, any inquiry into the causes of this heterogeneity must turn to the interna-
tional regulatory framework for answers. First of all, one might be expecting differ-
ences in the institutional set-up depending on whether or not a program falls within 
the scope of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits – the latter of 
which is limited to procurement-tied programs. Although the Arrangement defines 
minimum standards for project and country eligibility, concessionality requirements 
and transparency provision, it becomes apparent that also among Helsinki-type tied 
aid programs marked institutional differences are in place. When it comes to the insti-
tutional split of competences, harmonization among countries remains therefore low. 
This can be explained by the reluctance of the Arrangement to give guidance with 
regard to implementation structures. The Arrangement – as such the product of nego-
tiations between sovereign states on a sensitive issue – leaves considerable room for 
maneuver to national actors and does not spell out any preference for which kind of 
national agency should be in charge of (tied) soft loan programs. This means that the 
implementing agency might or might not have a “development mandate” to fulfill. The 
variances in the implementation practices of the countries analyzed illustrate that this 
room for maneuver has been extensively used by the states subscribing to the Ar-
rangement. 
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This study has shown that OECD member states provide several financing forms 
similar to traditional soft loans that do for different reasons, however, not fall into the 
scope of the Arrangement. Most notably this concerns the above described specific 
path chosen by the Netherlands via untied grant financing which is de facto associat-
ed with a commercial loan, but also the untied variants offered by Germany. 
(2) Hybridity of the Instruments 
Secondly, the hybridity of the instruments examined can be identified as a distinguish-
ing feature shared by all of the analyzed soft loan programs as well as the grant facili-
ty. The term “hybridity” thereby refers to their position at the interface of official export 
promotion and development policy and evokes a certain ambiguity in their program-
matic orientation. In particular, this characteristic is reflected in the multiplicity of goals 
stated in program descriptions and the resulting attempt to “kill two birds with one 
stone”. With tied soft loan programs, donors claim to support domestic enterprises in 
their export endeavors while simultaneously contributing to the development of recipi-
ent countries. Thus, the goals of export promotion and of development co-operation 
are assumed to be not only complementary, but also achievable with a single instru-
ment. Yet, the specific hierarchy of the respective sets of goals, the project approval 
procedures as well as the financing terms might bring programs closer to either the 
trade/export promotion pole or to the development policy/cooperation pole. In particu-
lar in the case of untied programs, the export promotion goals might be less overt. De 
jure untying, however, does neither per se lead to a proportional increase in the devel-
opment orientation the programs, nor is it necessarily motivated by aid effectiveness 
concerns. For instance, loans which are de jure untied and not subject to the Ar-
rangement might be provided on significantly harder terms because they do not have 
to comply with the 35 and 50 % concessionality requirements, respectively, of the 
Arrangement. Moreover, conceptual ambiguities in the determination of the tying 
status of aid flows might lead via informal practices to a situation in which untied 
programs have similar effects in terms of the delivery of goods and services from the 
donor country as in formally tied ones.  
Taking the historical evolution of today’s soft loan financing into account, it appears 
reasonable to assume that a partial explanation for this hybridity can be traced to the 
historical roots of these instruments (or their predecessors). Their genealogy reaches 
back to the mercantilist foreign trade policies of the 1970ies and 1980ies. The analy-
sis in Chapter 5 showed that in its beginnings, this hybrid instrument has been inextri-
cably linked with export credits and its political orientation has, thus, been largely 
dominated by commercial objectives. As explored in Chapter 5 tightening of rules on 
traditional export credits paired with a severe debt crisis in the developing world, had 
placed tied aid credits at the heart of national export policies of many industrialized 
countries and made them become a “protectionist device” (DCD/DAC/FA(93)3). In 
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these circumstances, the original motivation behind giving tied soft loans was one of 
gaining competitive advantages for the donors’ domestic enterprises. Development 
goals were thereby at best pursued as an add-on that should conceal the trade dis-
torting effects of the practice. Since then, policies have evolved and the instruments 
have been adapted. Yet, the original purpose has not entirely vanished and is still 
perceptible – albeit to different extents – in the soft loan instruments of today. This 
status between export promotion and development policy makes tied soft loans sub-
ject to tensions stemming from the diverging interests of the actors involved. To vary-
ing degrees these tensions can still prevail in the soft loan field, i.e. in the discussions 
that have come up in several countries on the potential untying of their programs.  
As has been examined with regard to institutional variations, the specific distribution of 
competences (and power) among relevant actors as well as the country-specific pro-
gram objectives led to a substantial heterogeneity in the field of soft loan financing 
and to a varying importance attached to development goals. Nonetheless, by adopting 
a long-term perspective on the evolution of soft loan financing, a trend towards 
strengthening the development orientation of soft loan instruments over the last dec-
ades has to be noted. 
As stated above, in its beginnings (tied) soft loan financing was unequivocally export-
oriented and commercially motivated. Throughout the 1990ies and 2000s, develop-
ment components increasingly – though to different extents – manifested themselves 
at least partially in the untying of the programs, in project appraisal and approval pro-
cedures, and in financing modalities. In Austria, for instance, soft loans were originally 
conceived as a tool for export promotion. Only through slowly negotiated steps devel-
opment components were introduced into the procedure of soft loan financing, mainly 
via the introduction of the questionnaire which aims at assessing the developmental 
relevance of a prospective project. These changes were accompanied by the injection 
of a development objective into the goal-set and can be interpreted as a modest in-
crease in the development orientation of the program. 
In the OECD/DAC driven development discourse, the untying of development assis-
tance has been generally propagated as a major step towards greater effectiveness of 
invested resources. In this vein, both the German Financial Cooperation as well as the 
Dutch ORET program were untied (the latter was transformed into ORIO) and Danida 
complemented its tied program with an untied window. De jure untying, however, 
does not per se necessarily boost the development orientation of the programs and 
constitutes, thus, rather a means towards an end (e.g. strengthening of local econo-
mies via local procurement) rather than an end in and of itself. In particular in the late 
1990ies, early 2000s, voices were raised at the OECD level addressing the circum-
vention of Helsinki provisions on concessionality and transparency (notification) re-
quirements via the de jure untying of soft loan financing. Current DAC debates on the 
calculation of the grant element/concessionality level illustrate the political sensibility 
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of the different discount rates which are used by the DAC on the one hand and by the 
Arrangement on the other. In the case of Germany, the fact that also low-concessional 
loans, presumably without any budgetary effort, are reported as ODA, might exemplify 
such concerns. These reporting practices, which substantially vary across DAC mem-
ber states, have triggered discussions about the – as of now not benchmarked – 
ODA criterion “concessional in character”.  
Today, the question arises of whether a de jure or de facto tied soft loan instrument is 
still fit for its purpose(s). These discussions are triggered by shifts in the geographies 
of development. From the 1980ies onwards, these hybrid instruments have predomi-
nantly been used in the emerging economies of East Asia and the Pacific which were 
due to their dynamic growth considered as promising export markets. Slowly but 
surely this group of emerging countries is, however, graduating and is no longer eligi-
ble for traditional (tied) soft loan financing. The prospects that a great number of other 
LDCs will follow the example of the highly dynamic emerging countries remain unclear 
as of now. Thus, the current situation suggests a shift of focus towards less devel-
oped markets, which might be less attractive from an export promotion point of view.  
The adaptation strategies adopted by the case study countries to overcome the legit-
imization problems and imminent crisis of soft loan policies differ. With the introduc-
tion of the “promotional loans” Germany, for instance, tailored its instruments to spe-
cific circumstances in the emerging economies, mainly of Eastern Asia. Any such 
financing, of course, is only conceivable outside the scope of the Arrangement. In the 
Netherlands currently a renewed impetus for the export orientation is observable with 
the set-up of the Dutch Good Growth Fund (and in particular its third pillar which 
provides tied aid financing). This move will be accompanied by the abandoning of the 
international (OECD) recommendations on untying. The extent to which these devel-
opments in the Netherlands are indicative of future scenarios in the field of bilateral 
soft loan financing remains to be seen. Future developments in the field of soft loan 
financing will most likely also be influenced by the anticipated changes in the interna-
tional development architecture post-2015, and in particular by the discussions on the 
future of development financing. The latter is likely to be increasingly affected by non-
OECD countries which themselves have become donors, but are not (yet) playing and 
abiding by the same rules as the DAC members. 
(3) Notion of Development  
Preliminary conclusions on the notion of development inherent to soft loan programs 
can be derived from the assessment of programmatic goals of the instruments exam-
ined as well as from the empirical analysis of supported sectors/projects.  
Firstly, the analyzed programs draw on a conventional notion of development concep-
tualized as economic development. Taking up the additionality argument, which is 
ingrained in soft loan financing, it becomes clear that in view of resource constraints 
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and “financial gaps”, financial flows are thought to impact positively on development 
processes. In this reading financial flows contribute to economic growth and concomi-
tantly to development, mainly via employment creation and income generation. Broadly 
speaking, investments are equaled with economic growth that will eventually trickle 
down and create wider benefits – i.e. feed into development processes. These pre-
sumed linkages between financial flows and development suggest that a conventional 
economic notion of development is implicit to soft loan programs.  
Secondly, the examination of officially stated development goals and objectives of the 
respective programs demonstrate that above all it is a sectoral approach that is the 
basis of the notion of development implicit to the programs examined: the fact that 
soft loans primarily flow into sectors such as health, water, transport or education is 
used as a legitimation of their development impact. The provision of public goods, 
which in the absence of soft loan financing would not have been produced or not in 
the required amount by the market, is key to development. The explanations provided 
in the Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid that are followed at least in the Austrian, the 
Danish and the Dutch programs, supports this assumption. The focus on the provision 
of not only physical but also social infrastructure has been observable since the intro-
duction of the commercial non-viability requirement for procurement-tied projects in 
the early 1990ies and can be interpreted as conceptual re-orientation towards the 
notion of “human development”, which became the lead discourse on development in 
the 1990ies. In the 2000s, concerns over the sustainability of development in its 
economic, social and environmental dimensions gained momentum and have also 
entered the field of soft loan financing. Concomitantly, several programs (i.e. the Ger-
man and the Danish) strengthened their emphasis on social infrastructure and includ-
ed the environmental sector as a priority sector for soft loan financing.  
Lastly, in recent years a priority and rhetorical shift towards private sector develop-
ment can be observed also in the field of soft loan financing. Increasingly, soft loans 
are put in the context of the promotion of entrepreneurship and of business-friendly 
climate. There is reason to assume that this trend, which among the case study coun-
tries is the most pronounced in the Netherlands, will entail changes in the develop-
ment notion that has so far underpinned soft loan financing. Strikingly, already today 
soft loan programs are frequently counted among private sector development instru-
ments – although they explicitly focus on public projects and public recipients and, 
thus, are not the most adequate means towards the end of private sector develop-
ment. Furthermore, the role of an “engine for development”, which is attributed to the 
private sector, must go hand in hand with new responsibilities of private sector actors 
and raises the question of how to strengthen the development dimension in the pri-
vate sector in both donor and recipient countries. The key question to address in this 
context is which development policy commitments should and could be imposed on 
donor domestic companies participating in soft loan programs. 
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15.2.  Outlook – What Future for Soft Loans? 
Though national programs have been quite distinct, our analysis has shown that soft 
loans have been an integral part of external and development finance policies, respec-
tively, in almost all DAC donor countries during the last four decades. Nevertheless, it 
appears as if the importance of soft loans has been declining in recent years. Tied soft 
loan financing volumes have decreased and some countries have evidently initialized 
steps to reform their development finance mechanisms. While the rapid economic 
development of emerging economies, and in particular China and Indonesia, has for 
many years provided a geo-economic environment favourable to using soft loan fi-
nancing mechanisms, the graduation of many of these countries into upper middle 
income country status has effectively curtailed this avenue for the foreseeable future. 
A proper assessment of the future of soft loans as an instrument of development 
finance will, however, have to consider a number of recent developments, which will 
without doubt exert a significant influence upon the future of development cooperation 
and development finance. Amongst the former, three major drivers of change need to 
be highlighted: 
(1) the global financial and economic crisis and its repercussions on development 
policy;  
(2) the discussions on a post-2015 development agenda at UN level and the asso-
ciated discussion on the future of ODA in the OECD 
(3) the emergence of new donors, in particular amongst the BRICS countries, and 
their influence upon development cooperation. 
Ad (1): The most obvious consequence of the global economic and financial crisis on 
most OECD donors has been its effects upon public finances. Growing public debt 
has led to austerity programs in many OECD donor countries and, with only a few 
exceptions, translated into cuts in development assistance budgets. Though currently 
it appears as if the economic situation in the OECD world has somewhat stabilized, 
consolidation policies will be continued in the medium term, particularly in the EU. 
Budgetary resources for development assistance will thus remain circumscribed for 
years to come. Donors have reacted to this situation differently, but some trends are 
becoming visible. Some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) have effectively abandoned 
their commitment to the 0.7 % ODA target, while others, which officially sticking to 
the 0.7 % target, are intensifying their efforts to increase their ODA by unorthodox 
measures. Amongst the latter, two related avenues are becoming increasingly popu-
lar: firstly, leveraging public aid money (grants) with ever increasing amounts of private 
money; and secondly, pressing towards a wider definition of what counts as ODA. In 
these circumstances, a real danger exists that the 0.7 % target, which was meant to 
serve as an incentive to donors, creates the perverse effect of watering down the 
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prevailing ODA concept by including a variety of other financial flows and instruments 
(e.g. state guarantees). It is clear that grants as the central instruments of develop-
ment assistance in particular to LDCs become decidedly less attractive, while loans or 
mixed/blended instruments with low concessionality levels become the instruments of 
choice. 
Ad (2): The discussions on a future development agenda for the period after 2015 are 
still on-going at UN level. It remains to be seen if agreement on a new development 
agenda with binding commitments will be achieved. This indeterminacy notwithstand-
ing, the thrust of the discussion so far suggests that the Post 2015 development 
agenda will probably be substantially widened and include new issues, e.g. climate 
change, provision of global public goods, migration etc.395 This expansion bears two 
dangers: firstly, that the priority focus on poverty alleviation in development assistance 
will become diluted, and secondly, that the additional financing needs resulting from 
the new agenda will not be met by a proportionate increase in disposable financial 
resources. Thus, unless hopes for raising substantial amounts of private financing for 
the Post-2015 development agenda eventually materialize, competition for – as a 
consequence of the financial crisis – scarce public resources amongst the many 
development challenges will probably increase. In addition, pressure to include the 
new items on the development agenda into the ODA definition at the OECD/DAC 
level should be expected to mount.  
Ad (3): The emergence of New Donors, like for instance China and Brazil, has raised 
significant attention during recent years. By 2011, annual concessional flows from 
emerging economies to Low Income Countries (LICs) were estimated at USD 12-15 
billion. Technical assistance grants from China stood at USD 67 billion annually 
(World Bank 2013c: 19). Though unsurprisingly the new donors also serve their own 
interests with their aid policies, their emergence in the field of international develop-
ment was welcomed by most developing countries, be it for political reasons, e.g. the 
appeal to a new south-south cooperation agenda, or be it for the pragmatic reason of 
attracting new and alternative sources of development finance. Besides, it has been 
well received that the New Donors do not attach political conditionalities as well as 
social and environmental standards of the kind OECD/DAC donors usually require. As 
a consequence, it has become more difficult and/or costly to pursue foreign (econom-
ic) policy goals for DAC donors via their development assistance activities, including 
concessional financing. In addition, development programs and projects are imple-
mented not only with funding from New Donors, but also to some extent with pro-
curement tied goods and services from the former. This has led to two kinds of reac-
tions: (i) business interests in DAC countries lobby for relaxing demanding 
conditionalities and standards attached to aid and external finance (in particular fi-
                                                            
395  See e.g. Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
(United Nations: 2013) 
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nance under Arrangement terms), since the former are perceived as disadvantageous 
to their business interests. The export-led growth strategies promoted by many OECD 
countries as a response to the financial and economic crisis have given additional 
weight to these calls; (ii) DAC members have increased their efforts to integrate the 
New Donors into the OECD/DAC framework, the latest initiative being the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, initialized by the High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Progress on these initiatives has how-
ever remained limited so far. 
Against this general framework, four scenarios are possible for the future development 
of soft loans as an instrument of concessional finance. These can be categorized 
along the two fundamental dimensions – degree of concessionality (low/high) and 
their tying status (tied/untied). 
Figure 15.1: Four Scenarios for the Future of Soft Loans 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Scenario A “Cheap Exports” combines tying with low levels of concessionality, i.e. 
less than 35 %. It is a scenario that under current arrangement terms is not permissi-
ble with the exception of very small projects of less than SDR 1 million. It would con-
tradict both the spirit of the Arrangement and one of the core principles of the OECD 
development agenda. Thus, scenario A does not seem to be a feasible scenario for 
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the near future, since it would depend on a complete overhaul of the current institu-
tional architecture. 
Scenario B “Cheap Aid” combines untying with low levels of concessionality, i.e. less 
than 35 %. As described, some of our case study countries have recently moved into 
the direction of leveraging stagnant budgetary aid resources with private monies. 
Germany with its development loans and the Dutch ORIO program are cases in point. 
Assuming that budgetary resources will remain scarce in the near future, both due to 
the continuation of austerity policies in many donor countries and the broadening of 
the Post-2015 development agenda, we would posit that Scenario B will be attractive 
to many donors. This is particularly true for donors, who want to target graduating 
emerging economies, be it in the interest of their export sectors or be it for develop-
ment reasons. The recent parliamentary report of the UK House of Commons on Brit-
ish development assistance has explicitly called upon the Department for International 
Developmen (DfID) to search for financial instruments in order to be able to continue 
support for e.g. poverty alleviation programs in emerging economies (House of Com-
mons 2014). Evidently, aid contributions for higher middle-income countries will have 
to involve lower levels of concessionality, which under current Arrangement terms, is 
however allowed only in untied form. Overall, we therefore think that concessional 
financing under Scenario B will be of relevance in the future. 
Scenario C “Costly Aid” combines untied aid with high levels of concessionality, i.e. 
above 50 %. This presupposes large grant elements in concessional loans and would 
thus be particularly suitable for aid policies targeting low-income countries. In this 
sense, Scenario C would present the straightforward option for re-programming soft 
loans towards a strong development orientation. The realisation of this scenario de-
pends on two conditions. Firstly, the political will to allocate substantial amounts of 
public money to such a program, and secondly, acceptance by the respective export 
interests, since no formal tying is allowed. The latter would seem most likely in coun-
tries with highly-competitive export sectors, e.g. Germany, where national exporters 
win a high share of contracts also under international competitive bidding. However, 
the viability of this scenario depends on the confluence of two conditions, the proba-
bility of which must be judged rather small. 
Scenario D “Costly Exports” is a combination of tied aid with high levels of 
concessionality, i.e. above 50 %. It represents of course the straightforward continua-
tion of the Helsinki Package’s provisions for tied aid to Least Developed Countries 
and Low-Income Countries, respectively. In contrast to Scenario C, its viability de-
pends on only one condition, i.e. the political will to allocate sufficient budgetary re-
sources in order to finance the concessional element, while simultaneously satisfying 
prevailing export interests. The potential of this scenario therefore consists of combin-
ing a higher development orientation of such a program (e.g. by targeting focus coun-
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tries of national development assistance or priority sectors) with procurement from 
donors, thus making a, albeit limited, contribution to export promotion.  
Our comparative discussion has resulted in a juxtaposition of two pairs of scenarios. 
The first pair consists of Scenario A and C, implying a move from tied to untied, while 
concomitantly increasing concessionality. This would of course represent an ideal-
type movement away from export promotion towards development orientation goals. 
Unfortunately, from our perspective, this does not seem to be very realistic at the 
moment. Promoting growth, including via export policies, in order to exit the economic 
crisis remains the top priority in many OECD countries. Instead, we would posit that 
the second pair of scenarios consisting of B and D, respectively, presents the more 
viable avenue under current economic and political conditions. Evidently, this pair 
involves a trade-off between tying status and level of concessionality. Scenario B may 
become attractive for continuing soft loan programs with emerging economies, both 
for export promotion, particularly in the case of highly-competitive donor country ex-
porters, as well as for targeted aid programs in those countries. Scenario D is the 
logical choice, if soft loan programs want to focus on LICs, while to some extent safe-
guarding donors’ export interests. From a development perspective, however, even 
highly concessional tied aid would contravene the spirit of the OECD development 
agenda. Thus, it would be imperative that such soft loan programs are aligned with 
donors’ development assistance priorities and programmed in a way which adheres to 
basic development principles, in particular alignment, ownership and PCD. 
If, and to what extent, soft loans will play a role as an instrument of development  
finance in the future, thus, remains to be seen. 
  
432 
 
 
   19  433 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 
 
Bibliography 
Interview List 
Authors 
 
  
 434 
 
   19  435 

Bibliography 
Literature 
ActionAid/Both Ends/Somo (2013): The Dutch Good Growth Fund. Who Profits from Develop-
ment Cooperation? Joint Publication in November 2013. 
http://www.eurodad.org/Entries/view/1546061/2013/11/12/The-Dutch-Good-Growth-Fund-
who-profits-from-development-cooperation (17.02.2014). 
ActionAid/Milligan, Jean (2001): ActionAid: Untying Aid in the European Union. In: International 
Trade Forum 2001/4. 
AGE (2007): Entwicklungspolitik und Außenwirtschaft: Gemeinsame Interessen nutzen. 
Fachtagung am 28.November 2007 in Berlin. 
http://www.bdi.eu/download_content/GlobalisierungMaerkteUndHandel/AGE_Fachtagung_EZ_
_AW-_28_11_07.pdf (17.02.2014). 
AGE (2005): Entwicklung des Privatsektors. Schlüssel zur Armutsbekämpfung. Die Konzeption 
der deutschen Wirtschaft zur Erreichung der Milleniumsziele. AGE Positionspapier. 
http://www.bdi.eu/download_content/GlobalisierungMaerkteUndHandel/AGE_Privatsektor.pdf 
(17.02.2014). 
Agerskov, Ulla/Bisgaard, Clerk (2013): Statistical Yearbook 2013. Copenhagen: Statistics 
Denmark. Copenhagen. http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/upload/17957/sty2013.pdf 
(5.12.2013). 
Agerskov, Ulla/Bisgaard, Clerk (2012): Statistical Yearbook 2012. Copenhagen: Statistics 
Denmark. Copenhagen. http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/upload/16251/sty2012.pdf 
(5.12.2013). 
Arrowsmith, Sue/La Chimia, Annamaria (2009): Addressing Tied Aid: Towards a more Develop-
ment-Oriented WTO? In: Journal of International Economic Law, 12/3, 707-747. 
Atkinson, Anthony B. (2004): New Sources of Development Finance. A Study Prepared for the 
World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University.  
Helsinki et al. 
Austrian Parliament (1997): Parlamentarische Materialien. Wien, 3369/AB XX.GP. 
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XX/AB/AB_03369/fnameorig_131678.html 
(15.02.2014). 
Barder, Owen/Krylová, Petra (2013): Briefs. Commitment to Development Index, 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CDI-brief-2013.pdf (5.12.2013). 
Barder, Owen (2009): Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid. Center for Global 
Development, Working Paper 185. 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27465/1/WP 185 - Beyond planning - 
Markets and networks for better aid.pdf?1 (15.02.2014). 
Barnes, Amy/Brown, Garrett W. (2011): The Idea of Partnership within the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals: Context, Instrumentality and the Normative Demands of Partnership. In: Third World 
Quarterly, 32/1, 165-180. 
 436 
Bayer, Kurt/Stankovsky, Jan/Url, Thomas (1992): Soft Loans: Förderung österreichischer Exporte 
durch Kredite zu Entwicklungshilfekonditionen. Studie des Österreichischen Instituts für 
Wirtschaftsforschung. 
BDI (2007): Positionspapier. Kooperation zwischen deutscher Industrie und Entwicklungspolitik. 
http://www.bdi.eu/download_content/GlobalisierungMaerkteUndHandel/BDI_PosPa_Wirtschaft
skooperation.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Berenschot/Seor/Ecolas (2006): ORET/MILIEV Evaluation. 1990-2004. Final Report. November 
2006. http://www.berenschot.com/news-inspiration/showcases/showcases/evaluatie-oret/ 
(17.02.2014). 
BMeiA (2012): Dreijahresprogramm der österreichischen Entwicklungspolitik 2013-2015. Wien. 
BMeiA (2011): Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Republik Österreich vertreten durch den 
Bundesminister für Finanzen und dem Ministerrat der Republik Albanien vertreten durch das 
Ministerium für Finanzen über die finanzielle Kooperation. BGBLA_2011_III_93. 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2011_III_93/BGBLA_2011_III_93.pdf 
(27.02.2014). 
BMeiA (2010): Dreijahresprogramm der österreichischen Entwicklungspolitik 2010-2012: 
Fortschreibung. Wien.  
BMF (2013): Bericht der Bundesministerin für Finanzen an den Hauptausschuss des 
Nationalrates: Tätigkeitsbericht des Beirates gemäß § 6 Ausfuhrförderungsgesetz für das 
Geschäftsjahr 2012 . http://www.bmf.gv.at/wirtschaftspolitik/aussenwirtschaft-
export/Taetigkeitsbericht_2012_des_Beirates.pdf (20.12.2013). 
BMF (2010): Mit dem BMF zum Export, Bundeministerium für Finanzen, Abteilung V/7. Wien 
http://www.bmf.gv.at/Publikationen/Downloads/BroschrenundRatgeber/BMF_zum_Export_Zoll_
2012.pdf (15.02.2014). 
BMWA (2008): Wirtschaftsbericht Österreich 2008. Wien. 
http://www.bmwfj.gv.at/Wirtschaftspolitik/Wirtschaftspolitik/Documents/Wirtschaftsbericht%20
%C3%96sterreich%202008.pdf (20.10.2013). 
BMZ (2013a): 14. Entwicklungspolitischer Bericht der Bundesregierung. Weißbuch zur 
Entwicklungspolitik. 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/Infomaterial/BMZ/Weissbuch_lang_21986464.html 
(17.02.2014). 
BMZ (2013b): Leistungen der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit für die Wirtschaft. 
http://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/mitmachen/Leistungsspektrum_EZ-
Wirtschaft_121115.pdf (17.02.2014). 
BMZ (2011): Minds for Change – Chancen schaffen. Enhancing Opportunities – Zukunft 
entwickeln. 
http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/special_publications/Minds_for_ 
Change.pdf (17.02.2014). 
BMZ (2008): Leitlinien für die bilaterale Finanzielle und technische Zusammenarbeit mit 
Kooperationspartnern der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Konzepte 165. 
http://www.bmz.de/de/publikationen/reihen/strategiepapiere/konzept165.pdf (17.02.2014). 
BMZ (n.s.): FC Funds. Master Presentation. 
Bonucci, Nicola (2011): OECD Work on Export Credits: A Legal and Institutional Laboratory. In: 
OECD (ed.): Smart Rules for Fair Trade. 50 Years of Export Credits. Paris, 49-54. 
Both Ends (2013): Cover for What? Atradius Dutch State Business’ Support for Transactions 
via Tax Havens. http://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/document/Cover_for_what.pdf 
(17.02.2014).  
   19  437 
Breuss, Nonno T. (2005): Aktuelle Reformperspektiven der Österreichischen Kontrollbank AG: 
eine Analyse der Umsetzung der OECD Common Approaches on Environment and Officially 
Supported Export Credits vor dem Hintergrund der NGO Kritik am Exportfinanzierungsverfahren 
der Republik. Wien. 
Byatt, Ian C.R. (1984): Byatt Report on Subsidies to British Export Credits. In: The World Econ-
omy, 7/2, 164-178. 
Carnegie Consult (2013): Review ORIO. Eindrapportage. 14 October 2013. 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-262745.html (17.02.2014). 
Center for Global Development (n.s.): Commitment to Development Index. 
http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index (15.02.2014). 
Chang, Charles C./Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo/Servén, Luis (1999): Measuring Aid Flows: A New 
Approach. In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS2050. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/02/24/000094946_99
031911113670/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Chang, Hyun-sik/Fell, Arthur M./Laird, Michael (1999): Comparison of Management Systems for 
Development Co-operation in OECD/DAC Members, DCD 99/6. 
Chianca, Thomaz (2008): The OECD/DAC Criteria for International Development Evaluations: 
An Assessment and Ideas for Improvement. In: Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation, 5/9,  
42-51. 
Christiansen, Karin/Rogerson, Andrew (2006): Is the Current Aid Architecture ‘Fit for Purpose’? 
In: ÖFSE (ed.): Mehr Wirksamkeit in der EZA. Quantensprung oder Rhetorik. Österreichische 
Entwicklungspolitik: Analysen, Informationen. Wien, 11-17. 
CIA (2013): The World Factbook. Denmark. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/da.html (10.11.2014). 
Clark, Helen (2011): The Real Wealth of Nations: Lessons from the Human Development Re-
port. In: OECD (ed.): Development Co-operation Report 2011. 50th Anniversary Edition. Paris, 
47-56. 
Clay, Edward, J. et al. (2009): Untying Aid: Is It Working? Thematic Study on the Developmental 
Effectiveness of Untied Aid: Evaluation of the Implementation of the 2001 DAC Recommenda-
tion on Untying ODA to the LDCs. Synthesis Report, Copenhagen. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork (15.02.2014). 
Clay, Edward J. et al. (2008): The Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid (1) Evaluation of 
the Paris Declaration and of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the LDCs, 
Phase I Report. Copenhagen, 1-67. 
Cohen, Daniel/Jacquet, Pierre/Reisen, Helmut (2006): After Gleneagles: What Role For Loans In 
ODA? In: OECD Development Centre Policy Briefs, 31, 4-26. 
Commission on International Development (1970): Report of the Commission on International 
Development (“Pearson Report”). http://www.laetusinpraesens.org/docs/infwill/inf5.php 
(15.02.2014). 
Conte, Christober/Karr, Albert R. (2001): Outline of the U.S. Economy. Washington D.C. 
Cutts, Steve/West, Janet (1998): The Arrangement on Export Credits. The OECD Observer, 
2011/April-May, 12-14. 
Danida (2013a): NEC Strategy. Strategic Framework for Priority Areas. Natural Resources, 
Energy, and Climate Change. http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Danida/Det-
vil-vi/Udv-strategi/NEC%20Strategy%202013.pdf (1.2.2014). 
 438 
Danida (2013b): Minutes from External Grant Committee Meeting on 8 May 2013. 
http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/danida-transparency/danida-documents/danida-grant-
committee/previous-grant-committee-meetings/ (5.12.2013). 
Danida (2013c): Minutes from External Grant Committee Meeting on 12 June 2013. 
http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/danida-transparency/danida-documents/danida-grant-
committee/previous-grant-committee-meetings/ (5.12.2013). 
Danida (2013d): Internal Grant Committee Meeting 3 May 2013, Agenda Item No. 7. 
Danida (2013e): External Grant Committee Meeting 12 June 2013, Agenda Item No. 2. 
Danida (2007): Danish Mixed Credit Standard Form for Appraisal of Wind Energy Projects. 
Copenhagen. http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Activities/Business/ 
DB%20Finance/Rules%20and%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20for%20Appreisals/APPRAISALO
FWINDENERGYPROJECTS.jpg (5.12.2013). 
Danida/Secretariat for Mixed Credits (2010): General Conditions for Loan Agreements and for 
the Provision and Administration of Interest Subsidy under the Mixed Credit Programme for 
Developing Countries. October 2010. http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/Danida/Activities/Business/DB%20Finance/Rules%20and%20Guidelines/Con
ditionsfortheLoanAgreements_October10.jpg (20.01.2014). 
Danish MfA (2013): Annual Report 2012. Copenhagen. http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/About-us/Annual%20Report%202012.pdf (5.12.2013).  
Danish MfA (2012): Danish Act on International Development Cooperation Consolidated Act no. 
555 of 18.06.2012, English Translation. Copenhagen. 
http://amg.um.dk/en/~/media/amg/Documents/Overall%20Policies/New%20law%20for%20de
velopment%20cooperation/Lov%20ENGELSK.pdf (5.12.2013). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2013): Guidelines for Presentations to the: Programme Committee, Danida 
Grant Committees, Council for Development Policy. Copenhagen. 
http://amg.um.dk/en/~/media/amg/Documents/Technical%20Guidelines/Guidelinse%20for%20
Presentations%20of%20Appropriations%20and%20Strategy%20Documents/Guidelines_ 
for_Presentation_of_Appropriations_and_Strategy_Documentsfinal1.pdf (20.11.2013).  
Danish MfA /Danida (2012): Danida’s Annual Report 2011. http://um.dk/en/danida-
en/activities/annual-report-2011/the-story-of-the-years-danish-development-cooperation/ 
(10.11.2013). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2011a): DB Finance Broschure. Copenhagen. 
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Activities/Business/DB%20 
Finance/Danida%20Business%20Finance%20Folder%202012.pdf (5.12.2013). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2011b): Danida Strategic Framework for Priority Area Growth and Employ-
ment 2011-2015. http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Goals/ 
Strategies/Growth%20and%20Employment%20Strategy%202011-15.pdf (21.11.2013). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2011c): Danida’s Annual Report 2010. Denmark’s Participation in Interna-
tional Development Cooperation 2010. http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/11095/html/ 
entire_publication.htm (21.01.2014). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2011d): Danish Development Cooperation in a Results Perspective. 
Danida’s Framework for Managing for Developments Results 2011-2014. Copenhagen. 
http://amg.um.dk/~/media/amg/Documents/Front%20page/DanidasFrameworkforManagingforD
evelopmentResults20112014Final.pdf (5.12.2013). 
  
   19  439 
Danish MfA/Danida (2010): FREEDOM from POVERTY – FREEDOM to CHANGE. Strategy for 
Denmark’s Development Cooperation. 
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/Englishsite/Documents/Danida/Goals/Strategy/Freedom%20from
%20poverty.ashx (20.01.2014). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2008): Danida’s Annual Report 2007. 
http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/9115/pdf/danidas_annual_report_2007.pdf (21.01.2014). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2007a): General Rules and Guidelines for Procurement. Danish Tied Mixed 
Credits to Developing Countries. Copenhagen. http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/Danida/Activities/Business/DB%20Finance/Rules%20and%20Guidelines/Guid
elines%20for%20Procurement/Tied.jpg (5.12.2013). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2007b): Brief Guidelines. Mixed Credits for Programme Countries (May). 
http://amg.um.dk/en/~/media/amg/Documents/Technical%20Guidelines/Danida%20Business%
20Finance/BriefGuidelinesMixedCreditstoProgrammeCountriesMay2007.ashx (5.12.2013). 
Danish MfA/Danida (2006): Danida’s Annual Report 2005. 
http://www.netpublikationer.dk/UM/7410/pdf/danidas_annual_report_2005_b.pdf (21.01.2014).  
Danish MfA/Danida (2004): Meta-Evaluation. Private and Business Sector Development Inter-
ventions. 2004/6. Copenhagen. 
Danish MfA/Danida (2002): Evaluation. Mixed Credit Programme. 2002/4. Copenhagen. 
Danish MfA/Secretariat for Mixed Credits (n.s.): Buyer/End-Unser’s Declaration. 
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/Activities/Business/ 
DB%20Finance/Rules%20and%20Guidelines/OtherStandardDocuments/BuyerEndusersDeclar
ation.jpg (26.02.2014). 
Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry (2001): The Statutes of Eksport Kredit Fonden. Circular on 
the Statues of Eksport Kredit Fonden 19 of February 8, 2001. http://www.ekf.dk/en/about-
ekf/ekfs-legal-basis/Pages/Vedt%C3%A6gt.aspx (5.12.2013). 
Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry (1999): Act on Eksport Kredit Fonden, Legislative Order 
913 of December 9, 1999. Copenhagen. http://www.ekf.dk/en/about-ekf/ekfs-legal-
basis/Pages/Lov-om-Dansk-Eksportkreditfond.aspx (5.12.2013). 
Dann, Philipp (2012): Entwicklungsverwaltungsrecht. Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechts der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, untersucht am Beispiel der Weltbank, der EU und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Jus Publicum 212. Tübingen.  
De Milly, Hubert (2012): From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness: Paying Tribute to 
the WP-EFF. http://www.hiidunia.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/120614-
Celebrating-Busan.pdf (15.02.2014). 
DEval (2013): Multi-Annual Evaluation Programme (MEP) 2013-2015. 
www.deval.org/de/evaluierungsprogramm.html?file=files/content/Dateien/Evaluierung/Multi-
annual_Evaluation_Programme.pdf (17.02.2014). 
DIHK (2010): Mehr Wirtschaft wagen! Pläydoyer für eine wachstumsorientierte deutsche 
Entwicklungspolitik. Entwicklungspolitisches Positionspapier des deutschen Industrie und 
Handelkammertag. http://www.dihk.de/themenfelder/international/aussenwirtschaftspolitik-
recht/entwicklungspolitik/positionen (17.02.2014). 
Dutch MfA (2013a): Factsheet on the Homogeneous Budget for International Cooperation 
(HGIS) – 214. http://www.government.nl/government/documents-and-
publications/budgets/2013/09/17/factsheet-on-the-homogeneous-budget-for-international-
cooperation-hgis.html (17.02.2014). 
 440 
Dutch MfA (2013b): A World to Gain. A new Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment. April 2013. 
http://www.government.nl/ministries/bz/documents-and-publications/letters/2013/04/05/global-
dividends-a-new-agenda-for-aid-trade-and-investment.html (17.02.2014). 
Dutch MfA (2013c): Chapter 3 The Dutch Good Growth Fund: Finance for Development. 
AVT13/BZ110239. 
Dutch MfA (2009): Results in Development. Report 2007-2008. 
Easterly, William (2006): The White Man’s Burden. New York. 
Egger, Nadja (1997): Soft Loans in der internationalen Finanzierung. Eine Fallstudie aus 
Österreich, Wien. 
Elbers, William (2002): Poverty Reduction (Be)For(e) Profit? A Study about the Contribution of 
the ORET-Program to Poverty Reduction. Master Thesis. Catholic University Nijmegen. 
Engberg-Pedersen, Lars (2009): The Future of Danish Foreign Aid: the Best of the Second-
best? In: Hvid, Nanna/Moritzen, Hans (eds.): Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook. Copenhagen, 
107-136.  
Erlassjahr (2013): Gefahr einer neuen Überschuldung: Die Mischung von öffentlichen 
Zuschüssen und privatem Kapital. Fachinformation Nr. 44 von Walter Ulbrich. 18.12.2013. 
http://www.erlassjahr.de/cms/upload/2013/Fachinfo_44/Fachinfo_Mischfinanzierung_No.44_Ko
pie.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Escobar, Arturo (1995): Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. Princeton, NJ. 
ETA Umweltmanagement/ARBOS (2010a): Evaluierung der österreichischen Exportförderung. 
Ökologische, soziale und ökonomische Auswirkungen auf die Zielländer: Endbericht. Im Auftrag 
des Bundesministeriums für Finanzen.  
ETA Umweltmanagement/ARBOS (2010b): Evaluierung der österreichischen Exportförderung. 
Ökologische, soziale und ökonomische Auswirkungen auf die Zielländer: Zusammenfassung 
einer Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Finanzen von ETA Umweltmanagement und 
ARBOS management advisors. https://www.bmf.gv.at/wirtschaftspolitik/aussenwirtschaft-
export/ETA-Kurzzusammenfassung_2.pdf?3vtn20 (2.12.2013). 
EuropeAid (2013): Germany at a Glance. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-
policies/financing_for_development/documents/accountability-report-
2013/2013_germany_donor_profile_en.pdf (17.02.2014). 
European Commission (2012): Denmark. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-
policies/financing_for_development/documents/denmark-donor-profile.pdf (5.12.2013). 
European Commission (2011): EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, 
SEC(2011) 1627 final, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-
policies/documents/eu_2011_report_on_pcd_en.doc.pdf (15.02.2014). 
European Commission (2002): Responses to the Challenges of Globalization. A Study on the 
International Monetary and Financial System and on Financing for Development. European Econ-
omy, Special Report, 2002/1, Luxembourg. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication7652_en.pdf (15.02.2014). 
European Union (2006): Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, C 321 E/1. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF 
(15.02.2014). 
European Union (1992): Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 191. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html (15.02.2014). 
   19  441 
Evans, Peter C. (2003): International Rules Governing Export Credit Financing: Too Strong, Too 
Weak or Just Right? A Report Prepared for the International Financial Flows an Environment 
Project, World Research Institute. http://pdf.wri.org/evans_draft_7_30_03.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Eyben, Rosalind (2010): Harmonisation: How Is the Orchestra Conducted? In: Cornwall, An-
drea/Eade, Deborah (eds.): Deconstructing Development Discourse. Buzzwords and Fuzzwords. 
Bourton on Dunsmore, Rugby, 215-222.  
Fernald, Mark D. (1984): The Legal Effect of International and Domestic Efforts to Control their 
Use. In: Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 7/2, 433-468. 
Fielding, David/McGillivray, Mark/Torres, Sebastian (2007): A Wider Approach to Aid Effective-
ness: Correlated Impacts on Health, Wealth, Fertility and Education. In: Mavrotas, George/ 
Shorrocks, Anthony (eds.): Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics.  
Hampshire and New York, 183-197. 
Fleisig, Heywood/Hill, Catherine (1984): The Benefits and Costs of Official Export Credit Pro-
grams. In: Baldwin, Robert E./Krueger, Anne O. (eds.): The Structure and Evolution of Recent 
U.S. Trade Policy. Chicago, 321-258. 
Flick, Uwe (2009): Sozialforschung. Methoden und Anwendungen. Ein Überblick für die BA-
Studiengänge. Reinbeck bei Hamburg. 
FMO (2012): Infrastructure Development Fund – Quick Scan. 
www.fmo.nl/l/nl/library/download/urn:uuid:e66b6924-78e5-422f-bc56-b613361fa496/2012-
idf-quickscan-2.pdf?format=save_to_disk&ext=.pdf (17.02.2014). 
FMO Evaluation Unit (2013): FMO Evaluation Report 2012/2013. Mind the Gap: Expectations 
versus Realizations of Project Outcomes. Investment & Mission Review. March 2013. 
Folketinget (2013): Folketinget 2012-13, Aktstykke nr. 64, 7. februar.Folketingstidende E.  
Fraser, Alastair/Whitfield, Lindsay (2009): Understanding Contemporary Aid Relationships. In: 
Whitfield, Lindsay (ed.): The Politics Of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. Oxford, 
New York, 74-107. 
Fritz, Livia (2013): Tied Aid Credits – A Hybrid Instrument at the Interface of Export Promotion 
and Development Policy. Diplomarbeit. Universität Wien. 
Fry, Lucia (2011): Africa Let Down by Busan Aid Agreement. 
http://www.actionaid.org/2011/12/africa-let-down-busan-aid-agreement (15.02.2014). 
Führer, Helmut (1996): The Story of Official Development Assistance. A History of the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee and the Development Co-operation Directorate in Dates, Names 
and Figures, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/dac/1896816.pdf (15.02.2014). 
G8 (1975): Rambouillet Declaration. 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1975rambouillet/communique.html (15.02.2014). 
GAO (2002): Export-Import Bank and Treasury Differ in Their Approaches to Using Tied Aid, 
Washington D.C. http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/235016.pdf (15.02.2014). 
GATT/WTO (1994): Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Gatti, Stefano (2008): Project Finance in Theory and Practice: Designing, Structuring, and 
Financing Private and Public Projects. London. 
Geberth, Rolf (1998): The Genesis of the Consensus. In OECD (ed.): The Export Credit Ar-
rangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 27-32. 
Gibson, Clark C et al. (2005): The Samaritan’s Dilemma. The Political Economy of Development 
Aid. Oxford, New York. 
 442 
Gössinger, Agnes/Raza, Werner (2011): Bilateral Development Finance Institutions in Europe.  
A Comparative Analysis of DEG, CDC, FMO and NORFUND with Recommendations for Devel-
opment Policy. December 2011. ÖFSE Working Paper 29. 
http://www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/WP29_Finance_Institutions.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Government of the Netherlands (2012): Development Cooperation. Spending Cuts and Increas-
es. Leaflet. 19.09.2012. http://www.minbuza.nl/en/news/2012/09/review-of-development-
cooperation-well-under-way.html (17.02.2014). 
Grath, Anders (2012): The Handbook of International Trade and Finance: The Complete Guide 
to Risk Management, International Payments and Currency Management, Bonds and Guaran-
tees, Credit Insurance and Trade Finance. London. 
Gulrajani, Nilima (2011): Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate: Managerialism, Radicalism 
and the Search for Aid Effectiveness. In: Third World Quarterly, 32/2, 199-216. 
Gütermann, Aljoscha (2011): “Be Social, Make Profit”. Eine Untersuchung zur Arbeitsweise der 
niederländischen Entwicklungsbank, FMO. Diplomarbeit. Universität Wien. 
http://othes.univie.ac.at/12910/1/2011-01-04_0307120.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Hall, Steven (2011): Managing Tied Aid Competition: Domestic Politics, Credible Threats, and 
the Helsinki disciplines. In: Review of International Political Economy, 18/5, 646-672. 
Hancock, Graham (1989): Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the Interna-
tional Aid Business. New York.  
Handrich, Martin (1992): Förderung von Exporten im Rahmen von 
Entwicklungshilfefinanzierungen: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen. Vienna. 
Hanssen-Bauer, Jon/Owen, Anthony D./Grimsrund, Bjørne (2008): Evaluation of the Norwegian 
Mixed Credits Programme, Evaluation Reports 2000/8,l. Oslo. http://www.norad.no/en/tools-
and-publications/publications/publication?key=165405 (15.02.2014). 
Harmer, Adele/Ray, Deepayan B. (2009): Study on the Relevance and Applicability of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in Humanitarian Assistance. London. 
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6020.pdf 
(15.02.2014). 
Hoebink, Paul (2011): Die Niederlande als Vorbild? Herausforderungen und Perspektiven der 
niederländischen Entwicklungspolitik. Neue Wege in der EZ. Zentrum Jahrbuch.  
Hoebink, Paul (1998): The Humanitarianisation of the Foreign Aid Program in the Netherlands. 
In: The European Journal of Development Research,11/1, June 1999, 176-202. 
http://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/546128/1999_-_paul_hoebink_-
_the_humanitarization_of_the_foreig_aid_programme_of_the_netherlands_-_ejdr_11-1.pdf 
(17.02.2014). 
Hoebink, Paul/Schulpen, Lau (1998): Netherlands Aid Policies for Poverty Reduction. Working 
Paper 115. ODI. http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/2776.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Holland, Martin (2008): The EU and the Global Development Agenda. In: Journal of European 
Integration, 30/3, 343-362. 
House of Commons (2014): The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 1: Develop-
ment Finance. Eight Report of Session 2013-14, Volume 1: Report, together with formal 
minutes, oral and written evidence, HC 334, International Development Committee, 12 February 
2014. 
  
   19  443 
IOB (1999): ORET/MILIEV Review 1994-1999. Assisting Developing Countries to Buy Invest-
ment Goods and Services in the Netherlands. IOB Evaluations. N.283. November 1999. 
http://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/sites/iob-evaluatie.nl/files/283%20Oret-Miliev%201994-1999.pdf 
(17.02.2014). 
IOB (2009): Evaluation of the LDC Infrastructure Fund. Investing in Infrastructure. IOB Evalua-
tion. N.324. July 2009. http://www.oecd.org/derec/netherlands/44362357.pdf (17.02.2014). 
IOB/NCSTE (2006): Country-led Joint Evaluation of the Oret/Miliev Programme in China. The 
Development and Environment Related Export Transactions Programme. Ncste (China) and IOB 
(Netherlands). Aksand. Amsterdam. http://www.iob-
evaluatie.nl/joint_evaluation_ORET_MILIEV_programme (17.02.2014). 
Jackson, Penny (2012): Value for Money and International Development: Deconstructing Myths 
to Promote a More Constructive Discussion, OECD/DCD. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49652541.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Jennings, Michael (2006): Using Archives. In: Desai, Vandana/Potter, Robert B. (eds.): Doing 
Development Research. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 241-250. 
Jepma, Catrinus J. (1991): The Tying of Aid. Paris. 
Keijzer, Niels (2012): The Future of Development Cooperation: from Aid to Policy Coherence for 
Development? Ecdpm. 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/1376CE79C07BD125C1
2579F300756B90/$FILE/ECDPM_assisesBE_plenary_English.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Ketkar, Suhas/Ratha, Dilip (2009): Innovative Financing for Development. Washington D.C. 
KfW (1969): Law Concerning Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. Version of 18th July 2013. 
www.kfw.de/Download-Center/KfW-Gesetz-und-Satzung-sowie-
Gesch%C3%A4ftsordnungen/Law-concerning-KfW-and-KfW-By-laws/KfW_Gesetz_E.pdf 
(17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2013): Assignment of Consultants. Guidelines for the Assignment of 
Consultants in Financial Cooperation with Partner Countries.  
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Richtlinien/Consulting-E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2012a): Innovation Works. Technology for Development. Annual Report 
2012 on Cooperation with Developing Countries.  
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Jahresberichte/2012_Jahresbericht_E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2012b): From the Idea to Operation – the Project Cycle. A Closer Look 
at the Procedures of Financial Cooperation. https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-
Center/PDF-Dokumente-Flyer/Verfahrensflyer_2012_E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2011): FC Development Loans. Need-Based Financial Products. 
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Finanzprodukte/Fin.Prod.-Englisch.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2010): FC Promotional Loan. A Complementary Financing Instrument of 
Financial Cooperation (FC) with Developing Countries.  
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Finanzprodukte/Merkblatt_F%C3%B6rderkredit_en.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2007a): Working Together for Our Climate. Annual Report 2007 on 
Cooperation with Developing Countries. KfW Entwicklungsbank. DEG. KfW Bankengruppe. 
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Jahresberichte/2007_Jahresbericht_E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
 444 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2007b): Guidelines for Procurement of Goods, Works and Associated 
Services in Financial Cooperation with Partner Countries. Last updated in September 2013. 
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-Richtlinien/Vergabe-
E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2006): Promotion of Developing Countries. Disbursements of Funds. 
https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Richtlinien/Merkblatt_Auszahlungen_E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2004): Investing Bears Fruits. Annual report 2004 on Cooperation with 
Developing Countries. KfW Entwicklungsbank. DEG. KfW Bankengruppe. https://www.kfw-
entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Jahresberichte/2004_Jahresbericht_E.pdf (17.02.2014).  
KfW Entwicklungsbank (2002): New Energy. For Development with a future. Annual report on 
German Cooperation with Developing Countries. https://www.kfw-
entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-
Jahresberichte/2002_Jahresbericht_E.pdf (17.02.2014). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank (n.s.): Die Finanzielle Zusammenarbeit mit Entwicklungsländern – Ziele, 
Konzepte und Beispiele aus der Praxis. Master Presentation. 
Kindornay, Shannon (2011): From Aid to Development Effectiveness: A Working Paper, the 
North-South Institute. http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2011-From-aid-to-
development-effectiveness.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Kindornay, Shannon/Morton, Bill (2009): Development Effectiveness: Towards New Understand-
ings. Issue Brief, Development Cooperation Series, the North-South Institute. 
http://www.focusintl.com/GD126-%20Development%20effectiveness%20-
%20Towards%20new%20understandings.pdf (15.02.2014). 
King, Michael et al. (2012): Measuring Policy Coherence for Development, Final Report, Ecdpm. 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/6E502CEB0FA7D3E6C1
257A090060DA79/$FILE/Measuring%20PCD%20report%20Volume%201_comb.pdf 
(15.02.2014). 
Klein, Michael U./Hardford, Tim (2005): The Market for Aid. Washington D.C. 
Kuhn, Michael G./Horváth, Balázs/Jarvis, Christopher J. (1995): Officially Supported Export 
Credits. Recent Developments and Prospects. Washington, D.C. 
La Chimia, Annamaria (2004): International Steps to Untie Aid: The DAC / OECD Recommenda-
tion on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries. In: Public 
Procurement Law Review, 13/1, 1-29. 
Lammersen, Frans (2001): Development Choices: Opening Up Markets. In: International Trade 
Forum, 2001/4. 
Lammersen, Frans (1998): Mission Accomplished: Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid. In OECD 
(ed.): The Export Credit Arrangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 59-66. 
Lammersen, Frans/Owen, Anthony D. (2001): The Helsinki Arrangement: its Impact on the 
Provision of Tied Aid. In: International Journal of Finance; Economics, 6/1, 69-79. 
Lancaster, Carol (2008): Danish and US Foreign Aid Compared: A View from Washington. In: 
Hvid, Nanna/Moritzen, Hans (eds): Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook. Copenhagen, 31-54. 
Lancaster, Carol (2007): Foreign Aid. Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago and 
London. 
Lerrick, Adam/Meltzer, Allan H. (2002): Grants: A Better Way to Deliver Aid. Quarterly Interna-
tional Economics Report, Carnegie Mellon Gailliot Center for Public Policy. 
http://www2.gsu.edu/~poljsd/4421/4421readings/Lerrick-Meltzer.pdf (15.02.2014). 
   19  445 
Levit, Janet K. (2004): The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement 
on Officially Supported Export Credits. In: Harvard International Law Journal, 45/1, 65-183. 
Lomoy, Jon (2013): Yes, It Is Time to Revisit the Concept of Development Assistance, OECD 
Insights, May 4, 2013. http://oecdinsights.org/2013/05/04/yes-it-is-time-to-revisit-the-concept-
of-official-development-assistance/ (15.02.2014). 
Maca, Silvia et al. (2007): Soft Loans – Neuerungen, 21 November 2007. 
http://www.oekb.at/de/osn/DownloadCenter/exportservice/finanzieren/Praesentation-Soft-
Loans-Neuerungen.pdf (15.02.2014). 
Mahon, Rianne/McBride, Stephen (2008): The OECD and Transnational Governance. Vancou-
ver, Toronto. 
Manning, Richard (2013): OECD is Ignoring its Definition of Overseas Aid. In: Financial Times, 
April 9, 2013. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3d73884-a056-11e2-88b6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2U1AjIUfN (15.02.2014). 
Manning, Richard (2011): The Future of International Concessional Flows. In: OECD (ed.): 
Development Co-operation Report 2011. 50th Anniversary Edition. Paris, 109-120. 
Martenczuk, Bernd (2008): Export Aid and EC State Aid Control. In: Santaolalla Gadea, Francis-
co/Rodríguez Iglesias, Giles C. (eds.): EC State Aid Law. Alphen aan den Rijn, 169-190.  
Martens, Kerstin/Jakobi, Anja P. (2010a): Mechanisms of OECD Governance: International 
Incentives for National Policy-Making? Oxford, New York. 
Martens, Kerstin/Jakobi, Anja P. (2010b): Introduction: The OECD as an Actor in International 
Politics. In: Martens, Kerstin/Jakobi, Anja P. (eds.): Mechanisms of OECD Governance: Interna-
tional Incentives for National Policy-Making? Oxford, New York, 1-25. 
Martens, Kerstin/Jakobi, Anja P. (2010c): Conclusion: Findings, Implications and Outlook of 
OECD Governance. In: Martens, Kerstin/Jakobi, Anja P. (eds.): Mechanisms of OECD Govern-
ance: International Incentives for National Policy-Making? Oxford, New York, 260-280. 
Martens, Bertin et al. (2002): The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. Cambridge. 
Mayring, Philipp (2004): Qualitative Content Analysis. In: Flick, Uwe/Steinke, Ines/ Von Kardorff, 
Ernst (eds.): A Companion to Qualitative Research. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 266-
269. 
Mendelowitz, Allan I. (1994): Combating U.S. Competitors’ Tied Aid Practices. Washington D.C. 
Mendelowitz, Allan I. (1989): Export Credits: The Effectiveness of the 1987 Agreement to Con-
trol the Use of Tied Aid Credits Under the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported 
Export Credits. Testimony. Washington D.C. 
Mess, Markus (2012): Niederlande. In: Gieler, Wolfgang (ed.): Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im 
europäischen Vergleich. Eine grundlegende Einführung in die Politik ausgewählter Staaten. 
Internationale Politik. Berlin, 125-139. 
Meyer, Stefan/Schulz, Nils-Sjard (2008): From Paris to Accra: Building the Global Governance 
of Aid, Development in Context. In: FRIDE, 2008/16. Madrid. 
Michaelowa, Katharina A. (1998): Die neue politische Ökonomie liefergebundener 
Entwicklungshilfe. Baden-Baden. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland/WaterPro Partners and Associated Firms (2003): Evaluation 
of the Finnish Concessional Credit Scheme. 
Moravcsik, Andrew M. (1989): Disciplining Trade Finance: the OECD Export Credit Arrange-
ment. In: International Organization, 43/1, 173-205. 
 446 
Morrissey, Oliver (1999): Aid and Trade Policy (In)Cohernece. In: Forster, Jacques/Stokke, Olav 
S. (eds.): Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation. London et al., 373-388. 
Morrissey, Oliver (1998): ATP is Dead: Long Live Mixed Credits. In: Journal of International 
Development, 10/2, 247-255. 
Moyo, Dambisa (2009): Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for 
Africa. London. 
NL Agency/MfA (2013a): Policy Rules for the ORIO Grant Facility. 
http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/Policy%20Rules%202012%20-
%20English_0.pdf (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2013b): ORIO Manual 2013. 
http://english.agentschapnl.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/ORIO%20Manual%202013%20in%2
0English.pdf (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2013c): ORIO Fact Sheet 2013. 
http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/EN%20factsheet%202013.pdf (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2013d): Intake Form ORIO, Facility for Infrastructure Development.  
http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/ORIO%20Intake%20form_0.doc (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2013e): Procurement Process and Assessment ORIO. 
http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/ORIO%20Procurement%20guidelines%20versi
on%202.5.pdf (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2013f): Template Result Indicators. http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/ 
2013/12/Template%20Result%20Indicators.xls (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2013g): Template Progress Report. http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/ 
2013/12/ORIO%20Progress%20Report%20Template.doc (17.02.2014). 
NL Agency/MfA (2011): ORIO Policy Rules 2009-2011. http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/ 
files/2013/12/ORIO%20Policy%20Rules%20English.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Nygren, Birgitta (1998): Mission Impossible: Enhancing Discipline on Tied Aid Credits. In: OECD 
(ed.): The Export Credit Arrangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 55-58. 
Obrovsky, Michael (2006): Entwicklungspolitische Kohärenz. Zu den erweiterten politischen 
Rahmenbedingungen für mehr Wirksamkeit in der EZA. In: ÖFSE (ed.): Mehr Wirksamkeit in der 
EZA. Quantensprung oder Rhetorik. Österreichische Entwicklungspolitik: Analysen, 
Informationen. Wien, 69-81. 
Obrovsky, Michael/Schlögl, Lukas (2011): Politikkohärenz durch Kohärenzpolitik! Bedingungen 
für Policy Coherence for Development in Österreich, ÖFSE-Edition 17. Wien. 
ODI (2009): The Trade Implications of Aid Instruments and Tying Practices, Studien und 
Materialien. KfW-Development Research. Frankfurt am Main. 
OECD (2013a): OECD Country Classification 2013 – as of 20 July 2013. 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/2013-ctryclass-en-as-of-20-july-2013.pdf (5.12.2013). 
OECD (2012): OECD Strategy on Development. Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial 
Level. http://www.oecd.org/development/50452316.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD (2011a): Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration. 
Paris. 
OECD (2011b): Smart Rules for Fair Trade. 50 Years of Export Credits. Paris. http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/trade/smart-rules-for-fair-trade_9789264111745-en (15.02.2014). 
OECD (2008a): The Export Credits Arrangement 1978-2008. Achievements and Challenges - 
Contintued! Paris. http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/40594872.pdf (15.02.2014).
   19  447 
OECD (2008b): Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development. 4 June 2008 – 
C/MIN(2008)2/FINAL. 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=138&InstrumentPID=
134&Lang=en&Book=False (15.02.2014).  
OECD (2008c): Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries and Non-Member 
Economies: Netherlands. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/export-credit-financing-systems-in-
oecd-member-countries-and-non-member-economies-netherlands_9789264071735-en 
(17.02.2014) 
OECD (2005-2008): The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for 
Action. http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD (2005): The Development Dimension. Policy Coherence for Development. Promoting 
Institutional Good Practice. Paris. 
OECD (2003): Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development. Policy Brief. 
http://www.oecd.org/development/pcd/20202515.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD (2001): The DAC Guidelines Poverty Reduction. Paris. http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/poverty-reduction_9789264194779-en (15.02.2014). 
OECD (1998): The Export Credit Arrangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. 
Paris. 
OECD (1995): Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member and Non-Member Countries. 
Paris. 
OECD/DAC (2014): The Future of the DAC List of ODA Recipients. DCD/DAC(2014)4. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/externalfinancingfordevelopment/documentupload/ERG%20S2%20Ja
n%202014%20-%20The%20Future%20of%20the%20DAC%20List%20of%20ODA 
%20Recipients%20DCD-DAC-2014-4-ENG.pdf (28.02.2014).  
OECD/DAC (2013a): Development Co-operation Report 2013. Ending Poverty. Paris. 
OECD/DAC (2013b): Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire. Paris. DCD/DAC(2013)15/FINAL. 
OECD/DAC (2013c): Loan Concessionality in DAC Statistics. Feb 2013. DCD/DAC(2013)2. 
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC%28201
3%292&docLanguage=En (17.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2012a): The DAC List of ODA Recipients. Factsheet. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/58/49483614.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2012b): DAC High Level Meeting 2012: New Directions in DAC Measurement 
and Monitoring of External Development Finance. 
http://www.oecd.org/dachlm/DACHLMDevFinance.pdf (12.07.2013). 
OECD/DAC (2012c): Development Co-operation Report in 2012. Lessons in Linking Sustaina-
bility and Development. Paris. http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4313111e.pdf?expires=1387205714&id=id&accname=guest&
checksum=8F5A1D00AB576012646E60B5923BC785 (16.12.2013).  
OECD/DAC (2012d): Mid-Term Review of Germany, November 2012. DCD/JL(2012)63. 
http://www.bmz.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/Presse/47_414_1_Abschlussbericht_Brief_Lo
moy_2.pdf (17.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2011a): Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. 
http://effectivecooperation.org/files/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2011b): Table 22: Statistics Other Terms Parameters, for loan-giving DAC mem-
bers. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/tab22e.xls (15.05.2013). 
 448 
OECD/DAC (2011c): DAC Peer Review of Denmark. Paris. 
OECD/DAC (2011d): The Netherlands. Development Assistance Committee. Peer Re-
view.http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/49011988.pdf (17.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2010): Peer Review of Germany. http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-
reviews/46439355.pdf (17.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2009): Better Aid. Managing Aid. Practices of DAC Member Countries. Paris. 
OECD/DAC (2008): Is it ODA? Factsheet. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf 
(15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2005): Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees. Notifications of 
changes in the export credit System. Notes from the Netherlands. TD/ECG/N(2005)5. 
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=TD/ECG/N%282005%29
5&docLanguage=En (17.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2003): Rome Declaration on Harmonisation. 
http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/31451637.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2002): History of the 0.7% ODA Target. DAC Journal, 3/4, III-9-III-11. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/45539274.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (2001): Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries, 
DCD/DAC/2001)12/Final.  
OECD/DAC (1996): Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation. 
Paris. 
OECD/DAC (1992): Development Assistance Manual. DAC Principles for Effective Aid. Paris.  
OECD/DAC (1987): DAC Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially 
Untied Official Development Assistance. http://www.oecd.org/dac/31775636.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (1978): DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/31426776.pdf (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (n.s.) Aid Statistics. Official Development Assistance-Definition and Coverage. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
(15.02.2014). 
OECD/DAC (n.s.) DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacglossaryofkeytermsandconcepts.htm (15.02.2014). 
OECD/DCD (n.s.): Peer Reviews of DAC Members. http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/ 
(15.02.2014). 
OECD/ECG (2008): Principles and Guidelines to Promote Sustainable Lending Practices in the 
Provision of the Official Export Credits to Low Income Countries adopted by the OECD Working 
Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG). Paris, TAD/ECG(2008)15. 
OECD/PG (2013): Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. Paris, 
TAD/PG(2013)11. http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/ 
?doclanguage=en&cote=tad/pg%282013%2911 (05.12.2013). 
OECD/PG (2005): Ex Ante Guidance for Tied Aid. TD/PG(2005)20. 
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=td/pg%
282005%2920 (21.01.2014).  
OECD Stats (2013a): OECD.StatExtracts. 
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=TABLE3A 
(14.06.2013). 
   19  449 
OECD Stats (2013b): OECD.StatExtracts. 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE3A (03.06.2013). 
OeKB (2013): Environmental and Social Assessment under the Austrian Export Promotion 
System: Process Description. http://www.oekb.at/en/osn/DownloadCenter/export-
services/project-and-environmental-analyses/esa/OeKB-ESA-Process-Description.pdf 
(02.11.2013). 
OeKB (2012): Exportservice: Jahresbericht. 
http://www.oekb.at/de/osn/DownloadCenter/unternehmen/berichte/OeKB-Exportservice-
Jahresbericht-2012.pdf (02.11.2013). 
OeKB (2011): Mit weichen Darlehen harte Fakten schaffen. In: Relevant. Informationen der 
Oesterreichischen Kontrollbank Gruppe, 1, 6-9. 
OeKB (2010a): Export Financing with OeKB: The Optimal Way to Finance Exports and Foreign 
Investments. June 2010. Wien. 
OeKB (2010b): Soft Loan-Fragebogen für Unternehmen die einen gebundenen Hilfskredit 
(Rahmen II-Finanzierung) beantragen. 
http://www.oekb.at/de/osn/DownloadCenter/exportservice/finanzieren/Soft-Loan-Fragebogen-
Allgemein-Dezember-2010.docx (12.10.2013). 
OeKB (n.s.): Soft Loans. http://www.oekb.at/en/export-services/financing/soft-
loans/pages/default.aspx (15.02.2014). 
Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (n.s): 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effective-
ness (HLF 4). http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/4th-high-level-forum-on-aid,080?lang=en 
(15.02.2014). 
ORET.nl (2007): Frequently Asked Questions ORET October 2007. 
http://www.oret.nl/docs/ORET_FAQ_oktober_2007_ENG.pdf (17.02.2014). 
ORET.nl (2006): ORET Program. http://www.oret.nl/docs/ORET_brochure_eng.pdf 
(17.02.2014). 
Owen, Tony (1998): Mission Assessed: What Grounds for Commercial Viability? In: OECD 
(ed.): The Export Credit Arrangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 67-70. 
Petermann, Jan-Henrik (2013): Between Export Promotion and Poverty Reduction: The Foreign 
Economic Policy of Untying Official Development Assistance. Wiesbaden.  
Picciotto, Robert (2005): The Evaluation of Policy Coherence for Development. In: Evaluation, 
11/3, 311-330. 
Picciotto, Robert (2004): Policy Coherence and Development Evaluation Concepts, Issues and 
Possible Approaches, Institutional Approaches to Policy Coherence for Development OECD 
Policy Workshop 18-19 May 2004 Room Document 2. http://www.oecd.org/pcd/31659358.pdf 
(15.02.2014). 
Power, Michael (1997): The Audit Society. Oxford. 
Provost, Claire/Tran, Mark (2013): Value of Aid Overstated by Billions of Dollars as Donors Reap 
Interest on Loans. In: The Guardian, April 30, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/apr/30/aid-overstated-donors-interest-payments (15.02.2014). 
Raffer, Kunibert (1998): Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth. In: Zagbreb International Review of 
Economics&Business, 1/2, 1-21. 
Rao, Pinninti K. (2003): Development Finance. Heidelberg.  
Ray, John E. (1998): The Arrangement from the Inside. In OECD (ed.): The Export Credit Ar-
rangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 33-38. 
 450 
Ray, John E. (1995): Managing Official Export Credits: the Quest for a Global Regime. Washing-
ton D.C. 
Renard, Robrecht/Cassimon, Danny (2001): On the Pitfalls of Measuring Aid, Discussion Paper 
2001/69: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research. 
Reuke, Ludger/Grohse, Yasmin (2013): Aus ODAstan nichts Neues: Es gilt das gebrochene 
Wort. Die unzureichende deutsche „Öffentliche Entwicklungsunterstützung“ 2006-2011/2012. 
Germanwatch. Studie. http://germanwatch.org/en/download/7786.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Riddell, Roger C. (2007): Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford. 
Rosefsky, Katherine P. (1993): Tied Aid Credits and the New OECD Arrangement. In: Journal of 
International Law, 14/3, 437-467. 
Ruckert, Arne (2008): Making Neo-Gramscian Sense of the Development Assistance Commit-
tee. In: Mahon, Rianne/McBride, Stephen (eds.): The OECD and Transnational Governance. 
Vancouver, Toronto, 96-113. 
Sanchez, Michelle R. (2008): The WTO and the OECD Rules on Export Credits: a Virtuous 
Circle? The Example of the Embraer Case and the 2007 Civil Aircraft Understanding. Direito 
Artigos Working Paper (29). São Paulo. 
Schmidt, Wilson E. (1964): The Economics of Charity: Loans versus Grants. In: Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 72/4, 387-395. 
Schweiger, Eva (2013): Tied Aid Credits as an Instrument of Development Finance. An Econom-
ic Assessment. Diplomarbeit Universität Wien. 
Seebens, Holger (2012): Entwicklungspolitik Kompakt. Wie stark profitiert die deutsche 
Volkswirtschaft von der öffentlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit? KfW-Development Research. 
Entwicklungspolitik Kompakt. Nr.19, 14. Dezember 2012. https://www.kfw-
entwicklungsbank.de/Download-Center/PDF-Dokumente-Development-Research/2012-12-
14_EK_EZ-und-Exporte.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Severino, Jean-Michel (2011): The Resurrection of Aid. In: OECD (ed.): Development Co-
operation Report 2011. 50th Anniversary Edition. Paris, 121-134. 
Six, Clemens (2006): Harmonisierung und Anpassung als Strategien für wirksamere Hilfe? 
Bisherige Erfahrungen mit bi- und multilateralen Gebern. In: ÖFSE (ed.): Mehr Wirksamkeit in der 
EZA. Quantensprung oder Rhetorik. Österreichische Entwicklungspolitik: Analysen, 
Informationen. Wien, 17-31. 
Spitz, Gabi/Muskens, Roeland/van Ewijk, Edith (2013): The Dutch and Development Coopera-
tion. Ahead of the Crowd or Trailing Behind? NCDO. March 4th. Amsterdam. 
http://www.ncdo.nl/sites/default/files/Report%20Analysis%20The%20Dutch%20and%20Devel
opment%20Cooperation%20FINAL%202013%2003%2004.pdf (17.02.2014). 
Stafford, David (1998): Wallén, Helsinki, Schaerer et al: Some Major Achievements, Some 
Challenges to Meet. In: OECD (ed.): The Export Credit Arrangement. Achievements and Chal-
lenges 1978-1998. Paris, 45-50. 
Statistik Austria (2013): Außenhandel: Die wichtigsten Handelspartner Österreichs 2012. 
http://www.statistik.gv.at/web_de/services/wirtschaftsatlas_oesterreich/aussenhandel/index.html 
(23.11.2013). 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2013): Foreign Trade. Ranking of Germany’s Trading Partners in 
Foreign Trade 2012. Published on October 30, 2013. 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingP
artners/Tables/OrderRankGermanyTradingPartners.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (17.02.2014). 
  
   19  451 
Terre des Hommes (2012): Die Wirklichkeit der Entwicklungspolitik. Eine kritische 
Bestandsaufnahme der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Wohin steuert die 
Entwicklungspolitik? Zahlen und Fakten. 
http://www.tdh.de/fileadmin/user_upload/inhalte/10_Material/Wirklichkeit_der_Entwicklungshilfe
/2012-20-1_2/2012-20_2_Wirklichkeit_der_Entwicklungspolitik.pdf (17.02.2014). 
The Danish Government (2013): Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation. Overview of the 
Development Cooperation Budget 2014-2017. http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/Danida/Goals/Strategy/priorities%20for%20the%20Danish%20development%
20Cooperation%20for%202014.pdf (5.12.2013). 
The Danish Government (2012): The Right to a Better Life. Strategy for Denmark’s Development 
Cooperation, June 2012. Copenhagen, http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/Danish-
site/Documents/Danida/Det-vil-vi/right_to_a_better_life_pixi.pdf (5.12.2013). 
The Danish Government (2010): Freedom from Poverty. Freedom to Change. Copenhagen. 
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/Danida/Goals/Strategy/Freedom%20from%20poverty.ashx (5.12.2013). 
The Danish Parliament (n.s): The Committees. http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Committees_ 
and_delegations/Committees/URU.aspx, (18.01.2014). 
The Reality of Aid Management Committee (2012): South-South Development Cooperation: A 
challenge to the aid system? In: ReliefWeb (ed.): Briefing Kit for Reality of Aid Project + Humani-
tarian Financing. Quezon City. 
Timonen, Eero (1998): The Birth of the ‘Helsinki Package’. In: OECD (ed.): The Export Credit 
Arrangement. Achievements and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 51-54. 
Tinbergen, Jan (1986): On the Theory of Economic Policy.ISI Current Contents (22), 914, June 
2, 1986. http://www.garfield.library.upenn.edu/classics1986/A1986C401200001.pdf 
(15.02.2014). 
Tinbergen, Jan (1952): On the Theory of Economic Policy. Amsterdam. 
Tujan, Antonio Jr. (2011): Aid Effectiveness Debatte. Ownership braucht Demokratie. In: E+Z, 
2011/09, 340-341. 
Tvardek, Steve (2011): Smart Aid Rules for Development, Not Export Promotion. In OECD (ed.): 
Smart Rules for Fair Trade. 50 Years of Export Credits. Paris, 208-214. 
UNIDO (2008a): Independent Evaluation. SIERRA LEONE. UNIDO Integrated Programme. Post-
Conflict SME Support Programme for Industrial Development and Poverty Alleviation. Vienna. 
UNIDO (2008b): Public Goods for Economic Development. Vienna. 
United Nations (2013): A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies 
through Sustainable Development. The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda. New York. 
http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf (03.03.2014).  
United Nations (2003): Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, 
Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002. 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/aconf198-11.pdf (15.02.2014). 
United Nations (n.s.): Millennium Development Goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 
(15.02.2014). 
Url, Thomas (2003): Die Rolle von Soft Loans in der Außenhandelsförderung. Studie des WIFO 
im Auftrag der Oesterreichischen Kontrollbank AG (Not released study). Wien.  
 452 
Van der Hoeven, Rolph (2010): Policy Coherence: The Newest Fad in International Discourse? 
In: Hoebink, Paul (ed.): European Development Cooperation. In Between the Local and the 
Global. Amsterdam, 25-46. 
Vanheukelom, Jan et al. (2012): Reporting on Development: ODA and Financing for Develop-
ment. Maastricht, Brussels. 
ViceVersa (n.d.): Factsheet Ontwikkelingsrelevante Infrastructuurontwikkeling (ORIO). 
http://viceversaonline.nl/images/stories/vooroordeel4.doc (17.02.2014). 
Wang, Zhen-kun (1997): Managing Official Export Credits: The Quest for a Global Regime by 
John E. Ray. In: The Economic Journal, 107.1997/442, 823-825. 
Werkgroep Exportfinanciering (2012): Agenda voor een Strategische Inzet Van Het 
Instrumentarium Voor Exportfinanciering. Rapport High-Level Werkgroep Exportfinanciering – 
Den Haag, 4 Juli 2012. 
West, Janet (2011): Export Credits and the OECD. In OECD (ed.): Smart Rules for Fair Trade. 
50 Years of Export Credits. Paris, 20-34. 
West, Janet (1998): Introduction. In: OECD (ed.): The Export Credit Arrangement. Achievements 
and Challenges 1978-1998. Paris, 9-12. 
Whitfield, Lindsay (2009): The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. Oxford, 
New York. 
Wolff, Stephan (2004): Analysis of Documents and Records. In: Flick, Uwe/Steinke, Ines/ Von 
Kardorff, Ernst (eds.): A Companion to Qualitative Research. London, Thousand Oaks, New 
Delhi, 284-289. 
Wolfmayer-Schnitzer, Yvonne et al. (2003): Evaluierung von interessanten Absatzmärkten und 
Exportpotentialen für die österreichische Exportwirtschaft: Zusammenfassung und wirtschafts-
politische Schlussfolgerungen. Studie des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung im 
Auftrag der Oesterreischischen Kontrollbank AG im Namen und auf Rechnung des Bundes 
(Bundesministerium für Finanzen), (unpublished). 
Wood, Bernard et al. (2011): The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration. Final Report, Danish Insti-
tute for International Studies. Copenhagen. 
Wood, Bernard et al. (2008): Synthesis Report on the First Phase of the Evaluation of the Im-
plementation of the Paris Declaration. Copenhagen. 
Woodward, Richard (2009): The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). London. 
World Bank (2013a): World Bank GNI per Capita Operational Guideliens & Analytical Catego-
ries. siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls (5.12.2013). 
World Bank (2013b): Net ODA Received (% of GNI). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS (03.04.2013). 
World Bank (2013c): Financing for Development Post-2015, The World Bank Group, October 
2013. Washington D.C. http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/ 
document/Poverty%20documents/WB-PREM%20financing-for-development-pub-10-11-
13web.pdf (07.03.2014).  
Ziai, Aram (2007): Exploring Post-development. Theory and Practice, Problems and Perspec-
tives. London, New York. 
Ziai, Aram (2006): Zwischen Global Governance und Post-Development. Entwicklungspolitik aus 
diskursanalytischer Perspektive. Münster. 
  
   19  453 
OECD Archive Footage 
DAC Working Party on Financial Aspects of Development Assistance 
DAC/FA(81)1 
DAC/FA/M(81)1(Prov.) 
DAC/FA(82)2 
DAC/FA/M(82)1(Prov.) 
DAC/FA(85)2 
DAC/FA(86)8 
DAC/FA(86)11) 
DAC/FA(86)12 
DAC/FA(87)1 
DAC/FA(87)2 
DAC/FA(87)5 
DAC/FA(87)6 
DAC/FA/M(87)1(Prov.) 
DAC/FA(89)2 
DAC/FA/M(89)1(Prov.) 
DAC/FA/M(89)1(Prov.) 
DCD/DAC/FA(90)5 
DCD/DAC/FA(90)8 
DAC/FA/M(90)1(Prov.) 
DCD/DAC/FA(91)1 
DCD/DAC/FA(91)2 
DCD/DAC/FA/M(94)1/PROV 
DAC/FA(92)1 
DCD/DAC/FA(92)1 
DCD/DAC/FA/M(92)3 
DCD/DAC/FA(92)8/REV1 
DCD/DAC/FA(93)3 
DCD/DAC/FA(93)6 
DCD/DAC/FA/M/(93)2/PROV 
 
DCD/DAC/FA(93)10/REV1
DCD/DAC/FA(94)3 
DCD/DAC/FA(94)8 
DCD/DAC/FA(94)9 
DCD/DAC/FA/M(94)1/PROV 
DCD/DAC/FA/M(94)2/PROV 
DCD/DAC/FA(95)1 
DCD/DAC/FA(95)2/REV 1 
DCD/DAC/FA(95)14 
DCD/DAC/FA(95)3/REV1 
DCD/DAC/FA(96)1)  
DCD/DAC/FA(96)6 
DCD/DAC/FA(97)8 
DCD/DAC/FA(97)10 
D/DAC/FA(97)8 
DCD/DAC/FA/M(97)1 
DCD/DAC/FA(98)3 
DCD/DAC/FA(98)4 
DCD/DAC/FA(98)6 
DCD/DAC/FA(98)12 
DCD/DAC/FA(98)13 
DCD/DAC/FA(99)6 
DCD/DAC/FA(99)8 
DCD/DAC(2001)12/FINAL 
DCD/DAC/FA(2002)2 
DCD/DAC/FA(2002)9 
DCD/DAC(2010)34/FINAL 
DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1 
 
 
  
 454 
Participants Group  
TD/CONSENSUS/84.23
TD/CONSENSUS/85.88 
TD/CONSENSUS/86.11  
TD/CONSENSUS/86.52 
TD/CONSENSUS/86.53 
TD/CONSENSUS/86.66 
TD/CONSENSUS/88.14 
TD/CONSENSUS/88.25 
TD/CONSENSUS/89.24 
TD/CONSENSUS/89.4 
TD/CONSENSUS/89.4/Annex 
TD/CONSENSUS/90.26 
TD/CONSENSUS/90.52 
TD/CONSENSUS(90)43/Annex I 
TD/CONSENSUS(91)23 
TD/CONSENSUS(91)31 
TD/CONSENUS(91)32 
TD/CONSENSUS(92)12 
TD/CONSENSUS(92)42 
TD/CONSENSUS(93)6 
TD/CONSENSUS(93)23 
TD/CONSENSUS(93)46 
TD/CONSENSUS(93)55 
TD/CONSENSUS(94)32 
TD/CONSENSUS(94)50  
TD/CONSENSUS(95)11 
TD/CONSENSUS(95)12
TD/CONSENSUS(95)17 
TD/CONSENSUS(95)43 
TD/CONSENSUS(95)54 
TD/CONSENSUS(96)20 
TD/CONSENSUS(96)23 
TD/CONSENSUS(96)39  
TD/CONSENSUS(96)14 
TD/CONSENSUS(97)21 
TD/CONSENSUS(97)45 
TD/CONSENSUS(97)57 
TD/CONSENSUS(2001)6 
TD/PG(2003)7  
TD/PG(2003)8 
TD/PG(2004)8 
TD/PG(2004)17 
TD/PG(2004)26 
TD/PG(2005)7 
TD/PG(2005)8 
TD/PG/M(2005)13/FINAL 
TD/PG(2005)20 
TD/PG(2006)9 
TD/PG(2006)23 
TAD/PG(2012)9 
TAD/PG(2013)1 
 
Other 
C-M(90)11-Prov. 
DAC(83)7, 
DAC(83)17 
DAC(87)17 
DAC(88)11 
DCD(99)6 
DCD/DAC(2007)39/FINAL 
DCD/DAC(2010)40/REV1  
DCD/DAC, Final Communiqué 16/05/2002 
DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)18/REV1 
DCD/DAC/STAT(2012)20/DRAFT 
OECD/GD(94)67 
SG/PRESS(92)35 
TAD/ECG(2008)1 
TC/ECG/82.4 
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OECD Archive Footage: Document Codes 
Code 
 
Corresponding Body/Working Party 
 
C-MIN Ministerial Council Meeting 
DAC/FA, after 1991 DCD/DAC/FA  
Development Assistance Committee –  
Working Party on Financial Aspects of  
Development Assistance – Documents 
DAC/FA/A, after 1991 DCD/DAC/FA/A 
Development Assistance Committee –  
Working Party on Financial Aspects of  
Development Assistance – Agenda 
DAC/FA/M, after 1991 DCD/DAC/FA/M 
Development Assistance Committee –  
Working Party on Financial Aspects of  
Development Assistance – Minutes 
DAC/STAT 
Development Assistance Committee –  
Working Party on Statistical Problems – 
Documents 
OECD/GD OECD General Distribution 
TC/ECG, after 1989 TD/ECG,  
after 2007 TAD/ECG 
Trade (and Agriculture) Committee – Group 
on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees – 
Documents 
TD/CONSENSUS, after 2003 TD/PG, 
after 2007 TAD/PG 
Trade Directorate – the Participants Group – 
Documents 
TD/CONSENSUS/A, after 2003 
TD/PG/A, after 2007 TAD/PG/A 
Trade Directorate – the Participants Group – 
Agenda 
TD/CONSENSUS/M, after 2003 
TD/PG/M, after 2007 TAD/PG/M 
Trade Directorate – the Participants Group – 
Minutes 
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Interview List 
Interview Partner Institution / Position  Date 
OECD; STAT etc.  
Silvia Maca 
Austrian Ministry of Finance, Head of Department III/7 Export 
Financing, International Export Financing Policy and Risk 
Management Export Promotion 
22.06.2012 
Christoph Kreutler 
Austrian Ministry of Finance, Department III/7 Export Financ-
ing, International Export Financing Policy and Risk Manage-
ment Export Promotion 
22.06.2012 
Kamran 
Kazamzadeh 
Austrian Permanent Mission to the OECD, Counselor  29.06.2012 
Marielies Rehor 
Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, former 
Head of the Finance Division, Department for Development 
Co-operation 
01.08.2012 
Frans Lammersen 
OECD Development Directorate (DCD/DAC), former Chair-
man of the Participants' Consultation Group and Vice Chair-
man of the Participants Gruop 
03.07.2012 
Bill Nicol 
OECD Development Directorate (DCD/DAC), Senior Counse-
lor 05.07.2012 
Steve Tvardek Export Credits Division, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, 
Head of Division 
04.07.2012 
Francois De 
Ricoflis 
Export Credit Division, Head of the ECG and the Participants 
Group 
20.07.2012 
John Evans 
Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC), Gen-
eral Secretary 02.07.2012 
Consultation Meetings 
Michael Obrovsky 
Austrian Foundation for Development Research (ÖFSE), Head 
of Research Department; Development Policy & Development 
Cooperation  
June 2012 
Hedwig Riegler DAC Working Party on Statistical Aspects (WP-STAT), former 
Head of Statistics in the Austrian Development Agency 
April 2013  
Klaus Steiner 
Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 
(BMeiA), Head of Unit VII.2a “Quality Management and Evalu-
ation” in the General Directorate for Development Cooperation 
 Mai 2012 
Austria 
Carl de Colle Austrian Chamber of Commerce (WKO) 02.10.2013 
Barbara Koder-
Krajnik 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend 
(BMWFJ) 
18.10.2013 
Eva Kohl 
Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Head of Coordination 
Office Mozambique 29.08.2013 
Christoph Kreutler 
Ministry of Finance (BMF), Department III/7 Export Financing, 
International Export Financing Policy and Risk Management 
Export Promotion 
27.09.2013 
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Michael Laschan Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend 
(BMWFJ) 
18.10.2013 
Silvia Maca 
Ministry of Finance, Head of Department III/7 Export Financing, 
International Export Financing Policy and Risk Management 
Export Promotion 
27.09.2013 
Oliver Prausmüller Austrian Chamber of Labor (AK) 24.10.2013 
Werner Schmied 
Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB), Head of Depart-
ment Project and Environmental Analyses   27.09.2013 
Klaus Steiner 
Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 
(BMeiA), Head of Unit VII.2a “Quality Management and Evalu-
ation” in the General Directorate for Development Cooperation 
12.09.2013 
Verena Valduga Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB) 27.09.2013 
Astrid Wein 
Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Head of Coordination 
Office Albania 
14.10.2013, 
11.10.2013 
(Email) 
Hilde Wipfel Koordinierungsstelle der Österreichischen Bischofskonferenz 
für internationale Entwicklung und Mission (KOO) 
08.10.2013 
Denmark 
Tina Bidstrup 
Hansen 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida,  Danida Business Finance, 
Chief Advisor 
18.09.2013 
Lars Christian Oxe 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation Department, Senior 
Advisor / Chief Technical Advisor   19.09.2013 
Lars Koch IBIS, Director of Policy and Campaigns  20.09.2013 
Anne Skovlund Danish Church Aid 20.09.2013 
Lars Engberg-
Pedersen DIIS, Senior Researcher  23.09.2013 
Poul Buch-Hansen  former Director of Development Associates, former Professor 
at the University of Copenhagen 
24.09.2013 
Søren Juhl EKF, Large Corporate, Deputy Director 25.09.2013 
Christine Louise 
Steffensen 
EKF, International Relations, Advisor 25.09.2013 
Niels Egerup  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, Green Growth Department, 
Chief Advisor 25.09.2013 
Henrik Schaum-
burg-Müller 
former Professor at Copenhagen Business School, Consultant 
to Danida 
26.09.2013 
Marie Gad Danish Confederation of Industries, Chief Policy Advisor 26.09.2013 
Germany 
Sophie Kraume 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
Abteilung 2, Referat 221: Grundsätze, Verfahren der FZ, TZ-
Gremien und Instrumentarium von KfW, DEG 
23.09.2013 
Stefan Russek Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
Lieferaufbindungsfragen Technische Zusammenarbeit 
23.09.2013 
Helmut Reisen 
Head of OECD Development Centre until 2012, now CEO of 
Shifting Wealth, Professor of Economics University Basel 24.09.2013 
Regine Richter NGO Urgewald, Expert on Export Finance of KfW IPEX Bank 24.09.2013 
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Martin Dorschel KfW Development Bank, Head of Evaluation Unit 26.09.2013 
Klaus Peter-
Pischke 
KfW Development Bank, Leiter Grundsätze und Verfahren 26.09.2013 
Thomas Reker 
KfW Development Bank, Project Manager Bereich 
Förderpolitik, Promotional Instruments and Financial Products 25.09.2013 
Telephone Conference   
Jan-Henrik 
Petermann dpa-Journalist; Dissertation about (Un)tying Aid 01.08.2013 
Walter Ulbrich NGO Erlassjahr, Expert on Development Finance 01.09.2013 
Stefan Russek Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
Lieferaufbindungsfragen Technische Zusammenarbeit 
01.10.2013 
Almut Knop 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
Department on OECD/DAC, ODA Statistics 
01.11.2013 
Hedwig Riegler 
DAC Working Party on Statistical Aspects (WP-STAT), former 
Head of Statistics in the Austrian Development Agency 01.12.2013 
Email Correspondence 
Peter Wolff German Development Institute (DIE), Head of Department 
'World Economy and Development Financing' 
March-August 
2013 
The Netherlands  
Wiert Wiertsema NGO Both Ends, Expert on Export Credit Agencies and  
Capital Flows 
20.09.2013 
Mirco Goudriaan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senior Policy Officer, Sustainable 
Economic Development Department, Business Climate and 
Markets  
19.09.2013 
Sandra Luiszoon 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Officer, Social Development 
Department & Sustainable Economic Development Department 19.09.2013 
Andri van Mens  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senior Policy Officer, Private  
Sector, CSR and Infrastructure, Sustainable Economic  
Development Department 
19.09.2013 
Wim Bekker 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Advisor Infrastructure and 
Financial Sector Units, Sustainable Economic Development 
Department 
19.09.2013 
Theo Sande Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Expert on OECD/DAC Statistics  20.09.2013 
Janse Joris NL Agency, Unit Manager ORIO/ORET Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation 
19.09.2013 
Jan Pronk Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
Professor, former Minister for Development Cooperation 
16.09.2013 
Paul Hoebink 
Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen 
(CIDIN), Director of CIDIN and Professor at University of 
Nijmegen 
17.09.2013 
Paul Wolff 
Entrepreneurial Development Bank (FMO), Senior Investment 
Manager Emerging Markets Fund  18.09.2013 
Stan Stavenuiter 
Entrepreneurial Development Bank (FMO), Senior Policy 
Officer Evaluation Unit 18.09.2013 
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